YASIR QAHTAN SAUD v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:21-cr-41
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Newport News Division
March 13, 2024
Case 4:21-cr-00041-RAJ-RJK Document 56 Filed 03/13/24 Page 1 of 6 PageID# 382
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Yasir Qahtan Saud‘s (“Petitioner“) pro se Motion Pursuant to
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 30, 2021, a Grand Jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Petitioner on four Counts. ECF No. 3. Counts One and Two charged Petitioner with Receipt of Child Pornography, in violation of
According to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR“), around August 2020, the National
Around December 2020, the FBI began investigating Petitioner and learned that in addition to uploading, downloading, and distributing child pornography, Petitioner also created eight email accounts associated with various aliases. Id. On March 10, 2021, the FBI executed a lawful search warrant and spoke with Petitioner, who waived his Miranda rights and admitted to this illicit conduct. Id. Petitioner remembered only five email addresses he created with aliases and acknowledged two of his Facebook pages under aliases that he used to communicate in Facebook Messenger groups. Id. Petitioner explained that sometimes, he and others in the groups use images of child pornography to shut down a group or an account. Id. According to Petitioner, he used child pornography to induce the service provider to block or “burn” the account to ensure that the account was fully disabled, completely deleted any history or archived posts, and preserved the privacy of members. Id. Petitioner said the accounts were blocked because of revenge or to prevent an unwanted person access to the account. Id. Petitioner also used accounts on WeChat, WhatsApp, Viber, and Telegram. Id. Petitioner admitted to uploading child pornography to WeChat and viewing child pornography on Telegram in the past. Id. Petitioner is accountable for twenty-eight (28) videos containing child pornography, twelve (12) images containing child pornography, and one (1) video containing sexually explicit conduct with an infant. Id.
Petitioner was assessed a Criminal History Category of I and a Total Offense Level of 34. Id. ¶¶ 102-03. On April 7, 2022, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 60 months imprisonment followed by
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A pro se petitioner is entitled to have his petition and asserted issues construed liberally because pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than attorneys drafting such complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
“[W]hen the party is blameless, his attorney‘s negligence qualifies as a ‘mistake’ or as ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 60(b)(1). Moreover, both cases require a movant to act in a timely fashion, to avoid unfair prejudice to the non-movant, and to proffer a meritorious defense . . . to obtain relief.” Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988). Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from final judgment for “any other reason that
Although Petitioner has characterized his motion as one falling under Rule 60(b), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that district courts must nonetheless examine the substance of such a motion to determine whether it is the “functiona[l] equivalent to a successive [habeas] application,” which “depends on the nature of the claims presented.” United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 206-07 (4th Cir. 2003). If a petitioner files “a motion directly attacking [his] conviction or sentence,” such motion will usually amount to the equivalent of a habeas petition. Id. at 207. However, where the motion “seek[s] a remedy for some defect in the collateral review process,” then it is properly framed as a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider, and a district court may address it on its merits. Id. at 207. If a motion labeled as one falling under Rule 60(b) should instead be treated as a habeas petition, then it is subject to the rules governing § 2255 proceedings. Walker v. United States, No. 4:95CR373, 2014 WL 4388253, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2014).
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner presents a series of claims to prove his actual innocence. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, affirmative defenses, and governmental misconduct. See Pet‘r‘s Mot.; see also Pet‘r‘s Mem. This argument attacks Petitioner‘s conviction and does not seek reconsideration of the collateral review process. Accordingly, Petitioner‘s motion must be characterized as a § 2255 motion.
Construing Petitioner‘s Motion liberally, he fails to meet the standards outlined in Rule 60(b). In this case, Petitioner‘s actual innocence claim under Rule 60(b)(6) is improper. Rule 60(b)(1) is the proper avenue for relief for Petitioner‘s actual innocence claim. Earnest v. Davis, No. 7:18-CV-00595, 2023 WL 5673968, at *3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2023). To seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1), Petitioner must have filed his Motion within one year from the entry of judgment, which he failed to do. See
Additionally, Petitioner fails to meet the standards outlined in § 2255. Petitioner waited 20 months to raise these issues in the instant motion, which he should have raised under a § 2255 motion. However, Petitioner never filed a § 2255 motion, and he cannot now seek to challenge his conviction, which he should have done within § 2255 statute of limitations. See
attesting his guilt, and at sentencing, he did not raise any objections to the PSR. See ECF Nos. 31, 32,
IV. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Petitioner‘s Motion, the Court does not find any reason that would justify granting Petitioner relief. Accordingly, Petitioner‘s Motion is DENIED. ECF Nos. 51, 52.
This Court may issue a certificate of appealability only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
The Court ADVISES Petitioner that he may appeal this order by forwarding a written notice of appeal to the Clerk of the United States District Court, United States Courthouse, 600 Granby Street, Norfolk, VA 23510. The Clerk must receive this written notice within sixty (60) days from this Order‘s date.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia, World Trade Center, Suite 8000, 101 West Main Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23510.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Newport News, Virginia
March 13, 2024
Raymond A. Jackson
United States District Judge
