UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. RUMENI DANIEL ROMERO, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 17-1702
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
July 18, 2018
Before Lynch, Kayatta, and Barron, Circuit Judges.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Elaine Pourinski on brief for appellant.
Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, and Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
LYNCH,
The relevant facts follow. On January 24, 2017, Department of Homeland Security agents apprehended Romero in the course of an investigation in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Romero, a native of Honduras, had been ordered removed from the United States and deported to Honduras on four occasions between 2006 and 2013. On February 23, he was charged with unlawful re-entry, in violation of
At Romero‘s sentencing hearing, held on July 11, 2017, the district court checked with the parties that it correctly understood that “there is no dispute with respect to the sentencing guideline range.” Romero‘s counsel confirmed that the court‘s understanding was “correct” and that the offense level of 19 and corresponding Guidelines range of 46-57 months set forth in the PSR rested on “correct calculations.” After hearing the parties’ sentencing recommendations and noting that it had considered Romero‘s Guidelines range as a “beginning point,” the court sentenced Romero to a below-guidelines term of 42 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Romero claims for the first time that the district court‘s application of the
We review unpreserved challenges to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence for plain error. United States v. Rondón-García, 886 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2018). Under that standard, the defendant must show “(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant‘s substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
The government concedes that Romero can establish plain error because application of the
The government‘s sole argument for an affirmance is that Romero waived his claim of error. See United States v. Corbett, 870 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Although a forfeited claim will be reviewed for plain error, ‘a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal.‘” (quoting United States v. Walker, 538 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2008))). The crux of the argument is that by not just failing to object but also affirmatively conceding to the district court that the PSR‘s 46-57 month Guidelines range calculation was “correct,” Romero knowingly relinquished his right to challenge
We are dubious about the government‘s waiver rationale. Sentencing judges routinely ask defendants whether they have any objections to the contents of their presentence report, including in particular the calculated Guidelines range. Where the Probation Office has committed an error in preparing a presentence report that was not then caught by either the prosecution or defense counsel, treating the defendant‘s general concession that he has no objections and that the calculated Guidelines range is “correct” as a waiver of his right to challenge a subsequently identified error on appeal would undermine our law‘s distinction between forfeiture and waiver. Cf. Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1907 (emphasizing that the Court “‘routinely remands’ cases involving inadvertent or unintentional errors, including sentencing errors,” for plain error review (quoting Hicks v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2000, 2000 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring))); id. at 1904 (deeming it “unsurprising . . . that ‘there will be instances when a district court‘s sentencing of a defendant within the framework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed’ by the parties as well, which may result in a defendant raising the error for the first time on appeal” (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1342-43 (2016))).
In any event, we need not decide whether Romero‘s representations to the court amounted to waiver, for even if they did, we would excuse the waiver in the interest of justice. See United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2011) (excusing waiver where it “would likely mean a much longer and arguably unjustified [prison] term” for the defendant and “there is no reason to think that the government would be unfairly prejudiced by reopening the issue“). In this case, all parties involved -- the Probation Office, the prosecution, and defense counsel -- simply missed the significance of Application Note 3 to
