UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert ROACH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14-50260.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed July 8, 2015.
Argued and Submitted June 3, 2015.
792 F.3d 1142
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs plausibly argue that Williams’ confined seating during his prolonged air travel was an “external” cause of his death. However, they point to no aspect of his flights or his seating position that departed from the usual conditions of such travel. Hence, regardless of whether Williams’ death may be characterized as an externally caused “аccident” when considering that word in isolation, his loss of life was not within the policy‘s coverage. His fatal injury did not directly result from an unintended and unanticipated happening “external to the body.”
We therefore affirm the district court‘s rulings granting summary judgment for National Union and denying summary judgment for Plaintiffs.
AFFIRMED.
Lawrence Jay Litman (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS, Chief Judge, CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARD R. KORMAN, District Judge.*
OPINION
KORMAN, District Judge:
After a bench trial, Robert Roach was convicted of one count of storing and causing the storage of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA“),
BACKGROUND
1. Roach‘s Business
All Metals Processing Company (“AMP“) was an electroplating business located in Burbank, California, for which Roach served as an owner, officer, and
On January 18, 2007, the executor of the Estate of Helen L. Powers (“Powers Estate“)—the successor in interest to AMP‘s landlord—filed an unlawful detainer action against AMP on the basis of the company‘s failure to рay rent. In February 2007, the parties lodged a stipulated judgment in favor of the Powers Estate in which AMP agreed to vacate, “remove toxic material from,” and clean up the premises by March 16, 2007. AMP was evicted on March 20, 2007. A large number of barrels containing hazardous waste, some of which were corroded and others of which were “sealed and did not appear to be leaking,” were left behind. Although the Powers Estate granted AMP permission to hire a hazardous waste transpоrt company to enter the property and remove the waste, AMP did not do so, purportedly because of cost.
2. Inspections and Sampling
In June 2007, nearly three months after the eviction, the former AMP facility was inspected by a Hazardous Materials Specialist with the Los Angeles County Fire Department, and, later, a contractor for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA“). The investigators testified that they found numerous receptacles containing waste, and also observed that some (but not аll) of the containers were leaking. Samples collected from substances within closed receptacles were found to contain hazardous concentrations of chemicals that had the substantial potential to be hаrmful to humans and to the environment. The EPA ultimately emptied and demolished the building.
3. Indictment, Conviction and Sentencing
On February 23, 2012, a grand jury returned a single-count indictment charging Roach and one co-defendant with storing and causing the storage of hazardous waste without a permit from the EPA оr the California Department of Toxic Substances, in violation of the RCRA,
On June 2, 2014, the district judge found Roach guilty. The record does not indicate that the judge made any specific findings of fact, either in open court or in a written opinion. Such findings are, however, only required where requested by the parties,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, including questions of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. United States v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir.2014) (citing United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 590 (9th Cir.2010)). “There is suffiсient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). This standard applies to both bench and jury trials. United States v. Spears, 631 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir.1980) (citation omitted).
1. Statutory Definitions
Roach was accused of violating
2. Roach‘s Argument on Appeal
The evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable dоubt that, as a factual matter, Roach knowingly stored hazardous waste in the former AMP facility without a permit to do so. Indeed, Roach conceded as much in a joint stipulation at trial, and again at oral argument on appeal. Nеvertheless, he argues that he cannot be found guilty of unlawfully storing hazardous waste, because the RCRA defines “storage” as “containment of hazardous waste ... in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste,” and the еvidence at trial established that there was extensive leaking and leeching of waste in the former AMP building.
Roach‘s argument rests primarily on United States v. Humphries, which held that a defendant‘s intent to eventually dispose of hazardous materials does not immunize him from conviction for unlawfully storing the waste in thе meanwhile. 728 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir.2013). In the course of its opinion, resolving an entirely different issue than that presented here, the panel noted that, “[u]nder the [RCRA], ‘disposal’ and ‘storage’ are mutually exclusive: a person cannot be convicted of storing waste once the person has disposed of it.” Id. at 1031. Roach acknowledges, however, that his conviction was based solely on the hazardous waste contained in five containers that were sealed and were not leaking. Humphries‘s common-sеnse observation that “a person cannot be convicted of storing waste once the person has disposed of it,” id., does not provide a basis for a defense where, as here, waste from certain barrels leaked onto the ground while waste in other barrels, on which the defendant‘s conviction rests, remained completely contained. Even accepting Roach‘s argument based on the technical definitions of “storage” and “disposal” contained in the RCRA, he was clearly engaged in storing hazardous waste in the sealed and intact containers left in the premises located at 264 West Spazier Avenue. Thus, it is not necessary for us to resolve the issue whether, if he had been so charged, Roach could not have been found guilty of both storage and disposal of the containers that were leaking.
Roach argues alternatively that he disposed of all of the containers left in the former AMP facility—even those that were sealed and intact—by “abandoning” them in the building in which they were stored. This argument is premised on the statutory language defining “disposal” as the “placing” of waste on the land such that it “may enter the environment.”
This argument is without merit. While Roach may have abandoned the premises in which the containers were stored, the containers were not abandoned. They continued to be stored in the same building in which they had always been housed, which was owned and oversеen by the Powers Estate. This was not “an abandoned and unsupervised hazardous waste site.” Indeed, Roach violated the express terms of the stipulated judgment requiring AMP to “remove toxic material from” the building by March 16, 2007. Roach‘s “abandonment,” in effect, merely transferred custody of the storage containers to his former landlord.
Roach is therefore liable as a principal under
There is another reason why Roach‘s abandonment theory fails. Roach conceded at oral argument that he was guilty of storage before he abandoned the premises—and before the start of the time period charged in the indictment—but argues that the act of abandonment transformed his behavior from storage to disposal. This theory is premised on the notion that waste left within an abandoned site is more likely to “enter the environment.” See
AFFIRMED.