United States v. Robert Roach
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11755
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Robert Roach was owner/officer of All Metals Processing (AMP), an electroplating business in Burbank that stored hundreds of barrels of hazardous waste without a permit from 1990–2007.
- AMP was evicted after a stipulated judgment requiring AMP to remove toxic materials by March 16, 2007; many barrels (some leaking, some sealed) remained on the premises after AMP failed to remove them.
- EPA and county inspectors sampled materials in June 2007; sealed containers contained hazardous concentrations and some containers were leaking; EPA ultimately remediated the site.
- A grand jury indicted Roach (and a co-defendant) under RCRA § 6928(d)(2)(A) for knowingly storing hazardous waste without a permit during June 16–27, 2007; Roach was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to 1 year and a day.
- On appeal Roach conceded he stored hazardous waste but argued the wastes had been "disposed" (or abandoned) such that he could not be convicted of storage under RCRA definitions; the Ninth Circuit rejected that defense and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roach could be convicted of "storage" under RCRA when some containers leaked on the premises | Gov't: Roach knowingly stored hazardous waste in sealed containers; storage excludes only waste that has been disposed, and conviction valid as to contained barrels | Roach: RCRA defines storage to exclude acts that constitute "disposal," and leaking/leaching showed disposal rather than storage | Court: Affirmed conviction — sealed, intact containers constituted storage even if other containers leaked; not required to decide whether leaking containers could separately constitute disposal |
| Whether abandonment of the site converted storage into disposal for all containers | Gov't: Abandonment did not transfer liability; custody passed to landlord and Roach caused the storage; Roach remained liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) | Roach: By abandoning the barrels in an unsupervised/abandoned site, he effectively "placed" them so they might enter the environment, i.e., disposal | Court: Rejected — building was not an abandoned unsupervised site; abandonment did not change earlier storage into disposal and § 2(b) liability for causing storage applies |
| Whether Roach could be held liable as a principal for storage caused through intermediaries | Gov't: § 2(b) applies to one who causes the storage even if others exercise custody | Roach: (implicit) contends transfer of custody undermines liability | Court: Held Roach liable as a principal under § 2(b) because he caused the storage despite custody change |
| Proper interpretation of the statutory terms "storage" vs. "disposal" | Gov't: Storage = containment that does not constitute disposal; Congress did not intend to render storage meaningless by equating it with any risk of eventual environmental entry | Roach: The statutory phrase "may enter the environment" means leaving containers in place (after eviction) amounted to disposal | Court: Held that construing "may enter the environment" so broadly would erase the statutory distinction; storage remains viable where waste is contained |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Humphries, 728 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting "disposal" and "storage" are mutually exclusive and addressing intent-to-dispose vs. unlawful storage)
- United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing liability under causing statutes and principals via innocent intermediaries)
- United States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (§ 2(b) liability where defendant causes proscribed conduct through others)