United States v. Robert CrossUnited States v. Robert Cross
thorized to codify, revise and collect in the form of a Code all ordinances of a general nature, and in so doing, the city council shall have full power and authority without special ordinance referring to each ordinance amended, altered, repealed or modified, to amend, alter, repeal or modify any ordinance of a general nature other than contract ordinances, franchise ordinances, ordinances relating to bond issues or other ordinances in or by which the city has assumed such contract obligations as are protected by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Tennessee.
Charter § 11.12. Dodd argues on appeal that the City could not repeal § 2-411(d)s three-readings requirement through the ordinance that purported to repeal it because the ordinance was a “general ordinance,” whereas § 11.12 requires a “special ordinance,” one specifically referring to the ordinances it modifies, to amend the pension plan.
However, Dodds argument ignores the opening clause of Charter § 11.12. The provisions limitations only apply, if at all, when the City modifies the pension plan through its codification power. Yet the City did not repeal the three-readings requirement through its codification power. The relevant ordinances preamble states that it was passed pursuant to Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee State Constitution, which is the home-rule provision that gives the City the power to amend its charter. See Ordinance 11590 pmbl. There is no indication in the ordinance—and Dodd has presented no argument to this court—that the City was legislating pursuant to its codification power, rather than this general power to amend the Charter. Thus, Charter § 11.12s limitations did not apply when the City repealed the three-readings requirement. Because Dodd presents no other argument that Ordinance 12674 was not validly enacted, his challenge is unsuccessful.
IV.
The judgment
ON BRIEF: David S. Hoskins, HOSKINS, HILL & HILL, PLLC, Corbin, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, Ellen Kathleen Coffey, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, London, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Before: KETHLEDGE and WHITE, Circuit Judges; COHN, District Judge.*
OPINION
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.
Robert Cross argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release a second time based on conduct occurring before the first revocation. We reject that argument and affirm.
Cross was convicted of a federal marijuana offense in 2006 and sentenced to 60 months in prison, to be followed by 48 months of supervised release. In August 2010 Crosss prison term ended and his supervised release began. During the next 32 months, Cross committed two state-law offenses: drug possession and theft, both of which violated the conditions of Crosss supervised release. The district court learned about the drug possession first; on that ground the court revoked Crosss supervised release in April 2013 and ordered him to serve eight months in prison, to be followed by another 24 months of supervised release. In December 2013, Cross finished his eight-month post-revocation incarceration and resumed his supervised release.
The district court did not learn about Crosss theft offense until April 2015, after Cross pled guilty to that offense in Kentucky state court. By then Cross had completed about 15 months of his remaining 24-month period of supervised release. In June 2015 the district court held a revocation hearing, at which Cross argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release based on the
We review de novo the district courts June 2015 determination that it had jurisdiction to revoke Crosss supervised release. See United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2008). The question, broadly stated, is whether a district courts supervisory authority over a defendant continues unbroken throughout the defendants supervised release, or whether, instead, when a court revokes the defendants supervised release, the court revokes its own supervisory authority along with it. Cross takes the latter view: as he sees it, his supervised release ended when the district court first revoked it in April 2013; a second, distinct term of supervised release then began in December 2013, when he finished his eight-month prison term; and the district court lacked authority to revoke that second term of supervised release based upon a crime (the theft offense) that Cross committed during the first.
Crosss argument misconstrues the nature of revocation as described in
Revocation therefore revokes only the release part of supervised release; the district courts supervisory authority continues until the defendants supervised release terminates or expires. See id. at 706;
Although in Johnson the Supreme Court construed the 1994 version of
Nor does the addition of
A more straightforward reading of the statute is that “term of imprisonment[,]” as used in
The district courts judgment is affirmed.