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IV.
OPINION
Notes

United States v. Robert CrossUnited States v. Robert Cross

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jan 18, 2017
15-5641
Versions:846 F.3d 188
2017 FED App. 0012P
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 867
2017 WL 192961

thorized to codify, revise and collect in the form of a Code all ordinances of a general nature, and in so doing, the city council shall have full power and authority without special ordinance referring to each ordinance amended, altered, repealed or modified, to amend, alter, repeal or modify any ordinance of a general nature other than contract ordinances, franchise ordinances, ordinances relating to bond issues or other ordinances in or by which the city has assumed such contract obligations as are protected by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Tennessee.

Charter § 11.12. Dodd argues on appeal that the City could not repeal § 2-411(d)s three-readings requirement through the ordinance that purported to repeal it because the ordinance was a “general ordinance,” whereas § 11.12 requires a “special ordinance,” one specifically referring to the ordinances it modifies, to amend the pension plan.

However, Dodds argument ignores the opening clause of Charter § 11.12. The provisions limitations only apply, if at all, when the City modifies the pension plan through its codification power. Yet the City did not repeal the three-readings requirement through its codification power. The relevant ordinances preamble states that it was passed pursuant to Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee State Constitution, which is the home-rule provision that gives the City the power to amend its charter. See Ordinance 11590 pmbl. There is no indication in the ordinance—and Dodd has presented no argument to this court—that the City was legislating pursuant to its codification power, rather than this general power to amend the Charter. Thus, Charter § 11.12s limitations did not apply when the City repealed the three-readings requirement. Because Dodd presents no other argument that Ordinance 12674 was not validly enacted, his challenge is unsuccessful.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

ON BRIEF: David S. Hoskins, HOSKINS, HILL & HILL, PLLC, Corbin, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, Ellen Kathleen Coffey, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, London, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: KETHLEDGE and WHITE, Circuit Judges; COHN, District Judge.*

OPINION

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.

Robert Cross argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release a second time based on conduct occurring before the first revocation. We reject that argument and affirm.

Cross was convicted of a federal marijuana offense in 2006 and sentenced to 60 months in prison, to be followed by 48 months of supervised release. In August 2010 Crosss prison term ended and his supervised release began. During the next 32 months, Cross committed two state-law offenses: drug possession and theft, both of which violated the conditions of Crosss supervised release. The district court learned about the drug possession first; on that ground the court revoked Crosss supervised release in April 2013 and ordered him to serve eight months in prison, to be followed by another 24 months of supervised release. In December 2013, Cross finished his eight-month post-revocation incarceration and resumed his supervised release.

The district court did not learn about Crosss theft offense until April 2015, after Cross pled guilty to that offense in Kentucky state court. By then Cross had completed about 15 months of his remaining 24-month period of supervised release. In June 2015 the district court held a revocation hearing, at which Cross argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release based on the theft offense. The district court rejected that argument, revoked Crosss supervised release, and sentenced him to a single days post-revocation incarceration and another 60 months of supervised release.

We review de novo the district courts June 2015 determination that it had jurisdiction to revoke Crosss supervised release. See United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 2008). The question, broadly stated, is whether a district courts supervisory authority over a defendant continues unbroken throughout the defendants supervised release, or whether, instead, when a court revokes the defendants supervised release, the court revokes its own supervisory authority along with it. Cross takes the latter view: as he sees it, his supervised release ended when the district court first revoked it in April 2013; a second, distinct term of supervised release then began in December 2013, when he finished his eight-month prison term; and the district court lacked authority to revoke that second term of supervised release based upon a crime (the theft offense) that Cross committed during the first.

Crosss argument misconstrues the nature of revocation as described in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Under that provision, revocation and termination of supervised release are distinct concepts. Termination “discharge[s] the defendant” and thereby ends the district courts supervision of him. Id. § 3583(e)(1). Thus, if the district court later discovered that the defendant had earlier violated some condition of his supervised release, the court would lack authority to send him back to prison for that violation qua violation. Revocation, in contrast, means that the defendant must “serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release[.]” Id. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, revocation does not terminate the defendants supervised release; quite the contrary, it requires him to serve “all or part” of it in prison. Indeed the Supreme Court has already held that “a ‘revoked’ term of supervised release survives to be served in prison.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 707 (2000).

Revocation therefore revokes only the release part of supervised release; the district courts supervisory authority continues until the defendants supervised release terminates or expires. See id. at 706; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (providing that a district court may extend supervised release or modify its conditions “at any time prior to expiration or termination“). And because the district courts authority continues throughout the defendants supervised release, so too does the courts ability to police violations of the releases conditions. Here, Crosss supervised release—and thus the district courts supervisory authority—had neither terminated nor expired by June 2015. The district court therefore had authority then to revoke Crosss supervised release a second time based upon its discovery that Cross had committed a second violation.

Although in Johnson the Supreme Court construed the 1994 version of § 3583, none of the amendments to that section since then liberate us to equate revocation of supervised release with termination of it. Section 3583(e)(3) says now, just as it did then, that revocation means the defendant must “serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release[.]” That is reason enough not to disregard the Supreme Courts interpretation of that very same language in Johnson.

Nor does the addition of § 3583(h) change the outcome. That section makes explicit what the Supreme Court in Johnson said was implicit: namely that, when the district court revokes a defendants supervised release, “the court may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Cross emphasizes—as the Ninth Circuit emphasized in United States v. Wing, 682 F.3d 861, 871 (9th Cir. 2012)—that § 3583(h) refers to the period of supervised release that a defendant serves in prison as a “term of imprisonment[.]” From that reference Cross infers that such periods are no longer part of the defendants supervised release; and that the defendants supervised release must end before this new term of imprisonment; and that the district courts supervisory authority must end with it; and that the courts authority (per its intrinsic nature, apparently) during any later period of supervised release for the same conviction does not extend to violations committed during the earlier period. The argument is more metaphysical than legal. More prosaically, its first premise—that time spent in prison (after a revocation) is not part of the defendants supervised release—conflicts with the plain terms of § 3583(e)(3).

A more straightforward reading of the statute is that “term of imprisonment[,]” as used in § 3583(h), simply refers to the period of supervised release that a defendant serves in prison. And apart from simplicity, that reading treats the respective texts of § 3583(e)(3) and § 3583(h) as compatible rather than contradictory. See Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 68 (2013). We see no basis, therefore, for us to take a different view of revocation than the Supreme Court took in Johnson. Accord United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 112-13 (4th Cir. 2012) (“a district court retains its § 3583(e) power to impose additional prison time post-revocation“); United States v. Johnson, 243 Fed.Appx. 666, 668-69 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).

The district courts judgment is affirmed.

Notes

*
The Honorable Avern L. Cohn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Robert Cross
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 18, 2017
Citations: 846 F.3d 188; 2017 FED App. 0012P; 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 867; 2017 WL 192961; 15-5641
Docket Number: 15-5641
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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