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United States v. Johnson
243 F. App'x 666
3rd Cir.
2007
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*1 UNITED STATES America JOHNSON,

Derrick Appellant.

No. 07-1454.

United States of Appeals,

Third Circuit.

Submitted under Third Circuit 34.1(a)

LAR May 2007.

Filed: June Leone,

George Jaso, S. Eric H. Office of Attorney, Newark, NJ, United States United States of America. F.

Maggie Moy, Office of Federal Public Defender, Camden, NJ, Appellant. RENDELL, Before: JORDAN and ALDISERT, Judges. Circuit OPINION OF THE COURT ALDISERT, Judge. Circuit I. 7, 2006, September

On the District Jersey Court for the District of re- New voked Derrick leased and him prison committed for 10 February months. On Aldisert, Judge, Circuit concurring filed Court revoked the same term of opinion. pris- vised released and committed him to on for an additional 36 months. appeals punishment. now He contends the District Court lacked during revoke hearing. argues second also by imposing erred single peri- terms for violations of a od of conclude We *2 John- taking After City. in merit case Atlantic argument second has that Johnson’s assault, the Dis- on the re- and, accordingly, guilty plea remand for son’s we will sentenc- immediately to turned trict Court sentencing. Judge revoked The District Court ing. II. released, committed supervised Johnson’s months, for 10 and prison him to facts The are familiar with the parties re- supervised 10 months of an additional only briefly proceedings, and so we will judgment, its rendering In March of 2003 lease. revisit them here. Between that it was “not dismiss- a reiterated April prison and Johnson served Court merely holding co- 1 and 2 but conspiring ing sentence for to distribute Counts ” abeyance.... caine of 21 In in in violation 846. them April from he was released custo- and took hearing The Counts three-year a dy began super- and term later, February 7, five months place vised release. he acknowledged orig- Johnson poor adjustment made a to life two-hearing proce- Johnson to inally agreed prison. outside of On December nonetheless, argued, dure. He Egg Township Harbor Police arrested him authority to consider District Court lacked assaulting He ex-girlfriend. plead- his in City. committed Atlantic the violations guilty ed state court and sentenced theory case, was According to Johnson’s probation to year one and in court super- $708 revoked his Judge once District May 2, 2006, costs. On Johnson ar- it lost to jurisdiction further vised release rested again. City police charged Atlantic revoke, modify extend same burglary, him with possession, cocaine rejected The of release. District sisting (1) police arrest and assault on a offi- that: argument, reasoning two- cer. hearing prejudice did not scheme (2) way, any parities and waived days later, the Three United States Pro- procedure. Turning from objection to bation Office a sought warrant John- merits, argument to the jurisdiction son’s arrest on the At- based incidents in that Johnson had assault- the Court found City. lantic petition alleged The warrant officer, City and that police ed an Atlantic violations of federal super- Johnson’s a this conduct constituted serious violation first, agreement: vised release that he this, For John- crime, second, a committed state term of 36 months son received probation he notify failed officer run and months’ August 30, an arrest within 72 hours. On 10-month concurrently with the earlier the Probation Office filed revised sentence. petition, alleged third which violation

based on Johnson’s assault conviction timely appeals. He asks Johnson now Egg Harbor. (1) three Did the questions: to decide us abey- hold 1 and 2 in agreement to Counts September ap- On jurisdiction grant ance the District Court peared before the District Court for (2) claims, a District to hear the does Jersey charges of New answer term of over a At Court’s that he defied the terms of his release. the term release end when revokes hearing, vised parties agreed that John- (3) Dis- plead guilty committing son would of im- assault, impose multiple trict Court terms Egg Harbor but that first and single for violations term abey- prisonment be held in second violations would ance the resolution of the state release? pending because, III. simply put, there was no supervised release to revoke.” The main thrust of argu jurisdictional. argues ment is He that the difficulty point with Johnson’s authority punish lacked *3 view that term does “revoke” not him for the supervised violations mean “terminate” in super- the context of release committed in Atlantic At City. Supreme vised release. The Court has hearing, however, the District Court rea recall,” concluded means “to “revoke” parties’ agreement soned that to con States, See Johnson v. United suspend. separate duct hearings prevents 694, 704-706, 1795, 529 U.S. 120 S.Ct. Johnson from raising jurisdictional a chal (2000). L.Ed.2d difference is not lenge. not agree We do with the District merely semantic. As Justice Souter ex- may Court’s conclusion. Parties not con plained, supervised the term of release jurisdiction court; fer “only a federal does not Instead, end with revocation. Congress can do so.” Weinberger v. Ben about term “something Pharm., tex 412 U.S. 93 S.Ct. release preceding order of survives (1973). 37 L.Ed.2d 235 may Neither revocation. very While this sounds meta- jurisdictional defects be waived. physical, metaphysics thing make one v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 58 clear: unlike a super- ‘terminated’ order of (1938) (“Since 82 L.Ed. S.Ct. lack release, vised one is contin- ‘revoked’ jurisdiction a court touching federal have some effect.” Id. at 705-706, ues subject matter of litigation cannot 120 S.Ct. 1795. by parties, be waived we upon reasoning, Supreme Armed this with appeal and, contention; this examine the if Court concluded that the District Court’s conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over super- the defendant’s jurisdiction cause, direct that the bill vised release does not end with the first dismissed.”). Accordingly, this Court revocation. The District may con- may jurisdictional consider arguments tinue to alter and extend the defendant’s though parties agreed even expressly punishment while he prison serves time. to resolve Johnson’s alleged violations with id. (“ See at 120 S.Ct. 1795 ‘Revoca- a two-hearing procedure. of parole by impris- tion’ followed further onment a mere termination

IY. liberty limited that a defendant could ex- We next turn to Johnson’s direct see perience conviction.”); only per once challenge jurisdic to the District Court’s (“If also id. less [pris- than the maximum tion over the terms of his re imposed, pre- term] has been a court acknowledges lease. Johnson sumably may, before revoking term, 3583(e) § allows a court “to revoke 3583(e)(2); § pursuant extend it this release, of supervised require term the term imprisonment would allow part the defendant to serve in all or equal term au- release____” of supervised offense.”). thorized for the initial contends, however, Johnson that a district Congress We also specifically court has no note previously over a gave authority district courts “modify, term of The main revoked thrust reduce, that, enlarge argument logic, of Johnson’s the conditions of by at time prior something district court not alter vised it has Specifically, expiration terminated. ... the term....” 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) added). See Judge (emphasis contends that lacked authority impose 32.1, “to a second sentence ... Federal Rules of Procedure Criminal here, conspiracy conviction for (outlining procedures for modifications release). Accordingly, John- to distribute cocaine. argument challenging son’s it seems legal regime, Under such authority post-revocation must fail. Court’s im- a district court could incongruous that imprisonment” when pose two “terms V. subject only Johnson—is defendant—like final brings one issue to position This to one federal conviction. He our attention that merits discussion. Sentencing finds in the Guidelines. support that the District Court erred contends 7Bl.l(b) there Section states that “[w]here impris terms of imposing two concurrent the conditions is more than one violation of *4 for the of his onment violations supervision, or the violation includes of Recall that the District Court re- than one conduct constitutes more that the incarcerated Johnson for 10 months offense, deter- of the violation is grade the he re first time violated his having the most by mined the violation then a concurrent 36- imposed lease and punishes defen- grade.” judge serious A the second violation. month term for for most infraction dant the serious Johnson, According to a District Court every not each and dole for may separate not out sanctions misstep. infraction of a release each case at principle the to the Applying no agreement. Although cites hand, 36 months imply do not that the we for we proposition, agree case law this necessarily inappropri- is incarceration argument. the core of with ate; the instead, only conclude begin analysis recap our We with impose punish- the District Court charges against Johnson. While original ment as modification supervised release for a conviction of con- sepa- imprisonment, rather than as to sell spiracy drugs, Johnson was arrest- rate, way, Put another second sentence. assaulting once for his ex-girl- ed twice: District Court considered when the assaulting friend and once for a police it modified City Atlantic crime should have prosecuted State officer. courts have under its 18 the reincarceration sentence for criminal these offenses. impos- § than powers, 3583 rather actions him exposed also prison terms. Defen- ing two concurrent punishment from the separate federal being punished dant for government violating conditions crimes but for the overall viola- themselves agreement. The central ques- provisions to the one tion the release as is these categorize tion how violations. federal will remand for crime. We post-revocation Do constitute sanctions pre- in accordance these sentencing with sentences, merely they or an ex- new are cepts. original punishment of the for a tension sjc ;j: ^ Johnson, Supreme In crime? Court pre- all We considered contentions have by “attribut[ing] pos- settled this matter no parties and by sented conclude original penalties to the con- trevocation judg- necessary. further discussion is 529 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 1795. viction.” be vacated ment will if, case, applies This rule even as this re-sentencing. case remanded the revocation is sparks the conduct for sepa- criminal nature and the basis ALDISERT, J., Concurring. Thus, prosecutions. See id. all rate disposition It penalties part may constitute post-revocation the re- the contours of original panel sentence for the crime— determines probation to the In mand an abun sentence Court. after the is ” added). is revoked caution, however, (emphasis dance of deem pru I it to request dent the District Court States, v. In Addonizio United 573 F.2d consider an issue that has not been (3d Cir.1978) (Aldisert, J.), 147, 151 this parties—the raised possible rele previously compared Court broad au- or application vance of the time limits set thority the 120- sentencing court in 35(a) forth Rule of the Federal Rules (“virtually day rule unlimited with power”) 35(a) Criminal Procedure. the restrictions inherent in 28 U.S.C. states, days Although “[w]ithin seven after sentenc other reversed ing, may grounds, Supreme the court made clear correct sentence time ... arithmetical, jurisdictional is technical, “[t]he that resulted from not be See, United extended.” e.g., clear Roman other error.” Addonizio, v. U.S. S.Ct. States, dine 206 F.3d (1979). L.Ed.2d 805 Similarly, (7th Cir.2000) (“The judge’s apparent be interpreting present seven-day courts lief that he could retain control over the it, too, jurisdic- limitation have held that sentence indefinitely just by announcing *5 See, e.g., v. Lopez, United States tional. sentencing at right that he the reserves (5th Cir.1994); 512 United 26 F.3d to alter cannot be reconciled with Wisch, (7th Cir.2001); v. 275 F.3d 620 Rule of [Federal Criminal Procedure Austin, v. 595, United States 217 F.3d 598 45(b) which ] forbids the extension of the (8th Cir.2000). Significantly, sister these 35.”). time limits in Rule Appeal interpreted have the sev- Courts original having The sentence im- been to en-day attempts rule include district posed September 7, 2006, the limitation sentence, enlarge original courts to as provision may precluded actions have Austin, Lopez in as decrease well as to pronouncing Court from a sec- it, as in Wisch. ond sentence on February because clear, recently As Justice Alito made this was over seven days after Johnson policy limitations serve a “[statutes violating was first sentenced conditions repose____ They ‘represent pervasive of supervised release. does not This issue judgment to fail legislative unjust that it is go to in Court’s adversary to put the notice defend the sense in previously described Part IV specified period within a of time....’” panel’s opinion, of the in rejected which Goodyear Ledbetter Tire and Rubber Appellant’s challenge. Neither does it — Co., Inc., -, -, U.S. 127 S.Ct. upon general encroach the District Court’s (2007) (quot 167 L.Ed.2d 982 power modify Kubrick, States v. ing 444 U.S. any time, at in as set 18 out (1979)). 117, 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 259 3583(e). Here, seven-day period was guarantee right to take an appeal with I leave it for the District to decide imposition in after sentence. days 10 of a in first instance whether limitation 4(b), See Rule Appellate Federal Rules of 35(a) provision of action applies Rule (providing that the appeal Procedure sentencing following revocation su- days entry of the filed within pervised I exam- ask the court to cases). in judgment order criminal ine this issue ab initio present because seven-day previous replaced Moreover, limitation I to lo- have been able 35(b) provided drafting version then Rule suggestion cate days days days, the court change could act “within from to seven in- Advisory on Criminal Rules Committee 35(a) apply not to that Rule

tended of su- imposed upon revocation

sentences F.R.D. See

pervised release. (1991) 32.1 (discussing

516-521 Revo- Probation or Su-

cation or Modification of

pervised Release and Rule 35 Correction Sentence, explaining Reduction (c) (a) is intend- ]

that “[subdivision [now part, from the adopt, suggestion

ed to Study

Federal Committee 1990 Courts Weis, Jr., by Joseph F.

[Chaired J.] recognize explicit-

Rule 35 be amended to sentencing

ly ability court to

correct a sentence ... if the error is dis- shortly after the sentence im-

covered

posed____ [Study] Committee be- correcting

lieved time for such should be the time

errors narrowed within sentence____”). appealing 35(a)

Because Rule is a limitations of I provision, presence

action that its believe ignored,

should not be and that the Dis- *6 should initial opportu-

trict Court have the

nity it. to consider BRANDEBURG, Appellant

Kenneth D. INCORPORATED PEN-

CORNING PLAN FOR HOURLY EM-

SION

PLOYEES; MCMC LLC.

No. 06-3755. Appeals,

Third Circuit. Third Circuit Submitted Under Paul, & Robert Peirce Asso- Gregory G. 34.1(a) 17, 2007. May LAR ciates, PA, Pittsburgh, Appellant. Filed: July Boston, May, Finnigan,

James T. Rich MA, for Appellees.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Johnson
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Jun 8, 2007
Citation: 243 F. App'x 666
Docket Number: 07-1454
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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