UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RENADO SMITH, RICHARD DELANCY
No. 17-13265; 17-13330
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
July 2, 2019
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-13265; 17-13330
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20908-JAL-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RENADO SMITH,
RICHARD DELANCY,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 2, 2019)
Before ROSENBAUM, HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
After a jury trial, defendants Renado Smith and Richard Delancy appeal
their convictions for conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, alien smuggling, and
attempted illegal reentry. Both defendants argue that at trial the district court erred
in admitting the videotaped deposition testimony of passenger Vanessa Armstrong
Vixama, a smuggled alien in their boat. Smith also argues that the prosecutor’s
improper comments to the jury during closing argument warrant a new trial. After
careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm Smith and Delancy’s convictions.
I. TRIAL EVIDENCE
We recount the overwhelming trial evidence of alien smuggling in this case.
For starters, on November 4, 2016, defendants Smith and Delancy, both
Bahamian nationals, set out from Freeport, Bahamas on a 24-foot Grady White
boat with 21 passengers. Smith was the operator of the vessel, and Delancy
assisted him.
Vixama, and one was a Bahamian national. Sometime after leaving Freeport, this
small boat ran out of fuel and drifted at sea for approximately six days. There was
little water and no food on the boat.
Fortunately for the passengers, on November 9, 2016, a U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) aircraft, conducting a routine border security patrol,
spotted the boat drifting about 24 miles off the coast of Key Largo, Florida. The
boat was also about 24 miles to the southwest of Bimini, Bahamas and was drifting
in a northerly direction with the Gulf Stream current. The CBP aircraft personnel
notified the U.S. Coast Guard of the boat’s position and continued to monitor the
boat from the air until a Coast Guard vessel arrived.
A Coast Guard cutter was dispatched to the boat’s location and used a small
boat to ferry passengers from the disabled boat to the cutter. The passengers, who
were tired and dehydrated but otherwise in good health, were eager to leave the
disabled boat. Smith and Delancy, however, asked Coast Guard personnel to
supply the two of them with water and fuel to continue their trip. A Coast Guard
officer advised them that the Coast Guard could not provide them with fuel, and
Smith and Delancy agreed to board the cutter.
At the time, Smith and Delancy claimed that they were taking the passengers
to Bimini, Bahamas. Coast Guard officers testified, however, that they were
skeptical of the defendants’ claims because they “didn’t make sense.” The officers
explained that the boat was found south of Bimini, approximately halfway between
Bimini and Key Largo. Because the current in that area generally travels north, it
would not make sense for the boat to have drifted south past Bimini after becoming
disabled. Both officers acknowledged, however, that because the boat had been
adrift for six days, it would be difficult to determine what the boat’s original route
had been.
The CBP aircraft pilot who located the boat testified that, in his experience,
vessels traveling from the Bahamas to the United States do not always take a
straight route and sometimes take evasive actions to “disguise exactly what they’re
doing.” Similarly, Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Agent Craig
Nowicki, the case agent, testified that people involved in smuggling aliens “find
various routes to avoid law enforcement detection.”
The Coast Guard processed all 23 people who were taken off the boat
(including Smith and Delancy). None of the 21 passengers had any identification
documents with them, nor did they have permission to enter or reside in the United
States. Smith and Delancy both were previously removed from the United States
and did not have permission to reenter.
In addition to the location of the boat, there was other considerable evidence
showing that the defendants were bringing the aliens to the United States, not
Bimini. For example, this was not even the defendants’ first attempt to illegally
enter the United States. Smith had a prior June 2013 conviction for alien
smuggling for profit, and Delancy had a prior November 2013 conviction for
illegal reentry after deportation. As discussed later, the first page of each judgment
of conviction was admitted into evidence at trial. Among other things, those
judgments reflected: (1) that both defendants’ prior convictions took place in the
West Palm Beach Division of the Southern District of Florida; (2) the dates of each
defendant’s prior offense and conviction; (3) the statute under which each
defendant was convicted; and (4) the nature of the offense.
headed to the United States. Specifically, two passengers gave videotaped
depositions that were played for the jury and admitted into evidence at trial. As
discussed in greater detail below, the defendants did not object to the admission of
one passenger’s deposition (that of Davidson Francois), but did object to the other
(that of Vanessa Armstrong Vixama). We review what Francois said first.
Passenger Davidson Francois testified that he is from Cap-Haitien, Haiti. In
2016, Francois left Haiti and traveled to Freeport, Bahamas. After arriving in
Freeport, Francois’s father told him that a trip was being planned to bring Francois
to the United States so that Francois could go to school. A few months later, in
November 2016, Francois boarded the defendants’ boat and left Freeport with
about 21 other passengers. Francois testified that it was night time when he
boarded the boat and that Smith drove while Delancy “help[ed] out.” After leaving
Freeport, the boat got lost and spent six days at sea.
Francois expressly testified that other passengers on the boat said they were
headed to the United States, and Francois likewise believed the boat was going to
the United States. Francois admitted, however, that he did not personally know
where the boat was heading when he left Freeport because the defendants “didn’t
tell [the passengers] anything.” Notably though, Delancy did discourage the
passengers from waving at other boats or using their cell phones.
Specifically, during those six days, Francois saw several other boats pass by.
One boat stopped and provided them with bread and water, but no other boats
came to their aid. But when the passengers attempted to get the attention of the
other boats that were passing, Delancy told them not to wave at the other boats or
attract their attention “because we don’t know what kind of boats they are.”
Delancy also told the passengers to turn their cell phones off during the trip and
that he did not want them using their phones for any reason. Some of the
passengers did attempt to use their phones but were unable to get a signal at sea.
While Francois’s testimony was admitted without objection, the defendants
objected to the government using the videotaped deposition of passenger Vanessa
Armstrong Vixama, who also was from Haiti. Vixama’s testimony was strikingly
similar to Francois’s. Vixama traveled to Freeport, Bahamas from Haiti in April
2016. Her plan was to travel then from the Bahamas to the United States illegally,
as she previously had applied for and been denied student visas to the United
States on three separate occasions. A friend of Vixama’s mother arranged the trip
for Vixama, and Vixama’s family paid $5,000 for her passage.
Late one night in November 2016, Vixama got on a boat in Freeport with 20
to 22 other people to come to the United States. Vixama testified that she believed
she was going directly from Freeport to Miami, and one of the defendants told her
it would be about a three-hour trip. Smith drove the boat while Delancy held a
GPS device and talked to Smith.
After leaving Freeport, the boat got lost and ran out of gas. When a fishing
boat passed by, the passengers pooled their money to buy gas so they could
continue their trip. There was no food on the boat, and they ran out of water after
the first day at sea.
Vixama and other passengers had cell phones with them on the boat and
attempted to use them while the boat was lost, but could not get any signal. When
Delancy noticed the lights from their phones, he told the passengers to turn their
phones
the police wouldn’t see us.” Initially, Delancy also told the passengers not to wave
their life jackets in the air to attract the attention of other boats, but by their sixth
day lost at sea, Delancy relented and the passengers used the life jackets to attract
the attention of the Coast Guard cutter, which rescued them after their six days at
sea with little food or water.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Indictment
A federal grand jury indicted both Smith and Delancy on (1) one count of
conspiracy to encourage and induce an alien to come to, enter, and reside in the
United States, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to,
entry, and residence is and will be in violation of law, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) (Count 1); and (2) 21 counts of knowingly encouraging and
inducing an alien to come to, enter, and reside in the United States, knowing and in
reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, and residence is and will
be in violation of law, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (v)(II) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 2-22). The grand jury also charged Smith and Delancy with
one count each of attempted illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
(b)(2) (Counts 23 (Delancy) and 24 (Smith)). Both defendants pled not guilty and
proceeded to trial.
B. Material Witness Complaint Against Vixama
Many of the aliens on the boat were never brought into the United States, but
were sent back to Haiti after being processed by the Coast Guard. However, four
aliens, including Vixama and Francois, were brought into the United States to be
interviewed in connection with Smith and Delancy’s criminal conduct. Initially,
Vixama was detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody
at the Broward Transitional Center.
In December 2016, Agent Nowicki met with Vixama while she was in
immigration detention at the Broward Transitional Center. During that meeting,
Vixama was anxious and provided Agent Nowicki with the phone number of her
uncle, and then she called her uncle to put herself at ease. The uncle’s phone
number was the only U.S. contact information Vixama provided.
Subsequently, on December 22, 2016, the government filed a material
witness complaint against Vixama and obtained a warrant for her arrest. On
January 12, 2017, Vixama was arrested on the material witness complaint.
Because she was now under arrest, Vixama was then transferred into the custody
of the U.S. Marshals Service at the Federal Detention Center in Miami (“FDC
Miami”). When Vixama was transferred to FDC Miami, ICE personnel within its
Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ICE ERO”) lodged an immigration
detainer against Vixama to ensure that she would be transferred back into ICE
detention for immediate deportation once the material witness complaint was
dismissed as to the criminal case.
On January 19, 2017, a magistrate judge appointed attorney David Raben to
represent Vixama on the material witness complaint. On January 27, 2017, and by
agreement of the defendants, the government took a videotaped deposition of
Vixama to preserve her testimony for trial.1 Defendants
respective defense counsel were present and cross-examined Vixama.
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a) to take Vixama’s deposition. Rather than
having Vixama, an incarcerated material witness, wait in jail until the defendants’ trial, the
parties agreed she would be deposed and then deported back to Haiti.
At that time, the parties expected that after Vixama’s deposition was taken
two things would happen: (1) the material witness complaint would be dismissed
(releasing her from the U.S. Marshals’ custody at FDC Miami), and (2) ICE would
then deport her back to Haiti and she would be unavailable to testify at trial. If the
deposition had not been taken, then Vixama would have remained in the U.S.
Marshals’ criminal custody until Smith and Delancy’s trial. The deposition,
however, would allow Vixama to get out of the U.S. Marshals’ criminal custody,
and then ICE would deport her back to Haiti. Smith and Delancy never objected to
the taking of Vixama’s videotaped deposition. Smith and Delancy do not dispute
that their counsel had a full and adequate opportunity to cross examine Vixama.
Once Vixama’s videotaped deposition was completed, a magistrate judge
dismissed the material witness complaint against her on February 3, 2017. At the
time, Vixama was still in the U.S. Marshals’ custody at FDC Miami.
C. Vixama’s Release from Custody
Once the material witness complaint against Vixama was dismissed as to the
criminal case, ICE ERO personnel had 48 hours to pick Vixama up and take her
into detention pursuant to the immigration detainer ICE had filed against her. See
18 U.S.C. § 3144; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). ICE ERO personnel did not pick Vixama
up within the required 48-hour time period. As a result, on February 6, 2017, the
U.S. Marshals released Vixama from their custody.2
D. Government’s Multiple Attempts to Locate Vixama
On February 7, 2017, Agent Nowicki learned of Vixama’s release and began
his efforts to locate her. Nowicki contacted Vixama’s uncle (whose number
Vixama previously had provided), and he was at work. Later that night, Nowicki
contacted the uncle again and obtained the uncle’s address in Coral Springs,
Florida. The next day, Nowicki passed on the uncle’s contact information to ICE
ERO personnel.
On February 21, 2017, ICE ERO agents went to the uncle’s house and
searched the house for Vixama, but were unable to locate her. The ICE ERO
agents could not get a straight answer from the occupants of the house as to
whether Vixama was staying there. The occupants of the house told the ICE ERO
agents “they’re not sure if [Vixama’s] residing there,” but the ICE ERO agents
“felt like they were getting the runaround.”
complaint, his videotaped deposition was taken with the government, the defendants, and
defense counsel present, and then Francois was deported back to Haiti. The only difference as to
Vixama is that she was mistakenly released and then absconded from the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
In March 2017, Agent Nowicki followed up with the ICE ERO agents to see
if they had located Vixama but “was told by a supervisor there that they did not
have the manpower to go look for her again.”
On the morning of April 12, 2017, the government attempted to locate
Vixama a third time. The government emailed Vixama’s former counsel, David
Raben, to see if he knew where Vixama was and to obtain her contact information.
Specifically, the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) wrote to attorney
Raben:
former client, Vanessa Armstrong Vixama, is currently residing. It is
my understanding that she was released from the custody of the US
Marshalls [sic] before ICE ERO officers came to pick her up at FDC.
ICE ERO officers have been unable to locate her to date. Since she
hasn’t been deported yet, we are working to determine if she can be
located to testify at trial or if she is unavailable to testify.
Less than an hour later, attorney Raben responded: “I sent an email to family
member. I never heard from client after release. Will keep you advised.” The
following morning, April 13, 2017, attorney Raben sent another email to the
AUSA, stating: “She is in Delaware[.] She doesn’t have a phone[.] I gave your
contact info to her boyfriend[.]”
Later that same day, April 13, 2017, the AUSA sent a trial subpoena for
Vixama to attorney Raben via email and again asked for an address or phone
number as follows:
Please find attached a trial subpoena for Vanessa Armstrong Vixama.
Please let me know if you have an address or phone number to reach
her or know of any other means of serving this subpoena to her.
Please provide Ms. Vixama[’s] contact information for the case agent,
Craig Nowicki . . . .
The subpoena directed Vixama to appear at trial on April 19, 2017, six days later.
A few minutes after the AUSA sent the trial subpoena, attorney Raben responded:
“I am forwarding info to boyfriend[.]”
On April 15, 2017, the AUSA emailed attorney Raben again, indicating that
if Vixama did not appear at trial on April 19, the AUSA would then seek a bench
warrant for Vixama. The AUSA’s April 15 email asks:
Have you heard anything back from Ms. Vixama or her boyfriend? If
she doesn’t appear on Wednesday, April 19th as indicated in the
subpoena, we will be seeking a bench warrant.
About an hour later on April 15, attorney Raben sent the AUSA an email with the
name and phone number of Vixama’s boyfriend, stating: “You can call her now at
this number.”3 In a separate email, attorney Raben stated: “I just emailed you her
number. I believe she will cooperate.” (emphasis added) From this exchange, it
appeared that attorney Raben had successfully gotten the trial subpoena to Vixama
through her boyfriend and that Vixama would cooperate.
Thus, we do not know the area code of the phone number.
Later that same day, Agent Nowicki attempted to call Vixama’s boyfriend,
but the call “went to an unset-up voicemail box” and Nowicki was not able to leave
a message. Agent Nowicki then sent a text message to the boyfriend identifying
himself as a Homeland Security agent, advising the boyfriend that Vixama was
needed in Miami, and requesting that Vixama call him back. Agent Nowicki did
not receive a response to this text message.
On April 17, 2017, the first day of trial, the government informed the district
court that it intended to present Vixama’s deposition testimony. The government
explained that, after her deposition was taken, Vixama was released from the U.S.
Marshals’ custody and was not picked up by ICE ERO personnel to be returned to
immigration detention. The government described the various steps it had taken to
locate Vixama. The government stated that it still considered her to be
“unavailable” because it had not been able to locate her.
Smith moved that Vixama be required to testify, arguing that she was “available”
because she was still somewhere within the borders of the United States and was
not yet deported. The district court directed the parties to file memoranda and
caselaw on the admissibility of Vixama’s deposition testimony.
E. Parties’ Motions Regarding Admission of Vixama’s Deposition
On April 18, 2017, the government filed a motion in limine to use Vixama’s
videotaped deposition at trial. The government argued that it had made good-faith
efforts to locate Vixama and compel her attendance at trial but had been unable to
do so. The government therefore asserted that Vixama should be deemed
“unavailable” for trial, and her videotaped deposition should be admitted pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 804 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324. In the meantime, Agent
Nowicki attempted to call and text Vixama’s boyfriend again on April 18 but again
received no response.
That same day, defendant Smith filed a motion to exclude Vixama’s
deposition, which defendant Delancy adopted. Smith argued that the government
had not demonstrated Vixama was “unavailable” under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, because it knew she was in Delaware, and had not made a reasonable,
good-faith effort to ascertain her precise whereabouts.
The next day, April 19, 2017, the government asked the district court to
issue a bench warrant for Vixama’s arrest in light of her failure to comply with the
trial subpoena. The district court issued a bench warrant but did not rule on the
motions regarding the admissibility of Vixama’s deposition. The bench warrant
was entered into the National Criminal Information Center (“NCIC”) database.
The government also sent a copy of the bench warrant to Vixama’s former
counsel, Raben. And Raben again attempted to contact Vixama’s boyfriend but
received no response. In an email on April 20 at 6:05 a.m., Raben informed the
prosecutor that “I spoke to boyfriend this morning and explained consequences of
her failing to contact agent.”
F. Hearing on Admissibility of Vixama’s Deposition
On April 20, 2017 (the fourth day of trial), after the day’s testimony
concluded, the district court dismissed the jury and held a hearing on the
admissibility of Vixama’s deposition testimony. At the hearing, Agent Nowicki
testified regarding the above-described events and the government’s multiple
attempts to locate and contact Vixama. The government emphasized (1) that
Vixama was a deportable alien, (2) that if she now contacted law enforcement
(such as Agent Nowicki), she could be deported, and (3) that she had every
motivation to hide from the AUSA and law enforcement and to not make herself
available at trial. The government argued that it made reasonable, good-faith
efforts to obtain Vixama’s presence at trial. Defendants Smith and Delancy
asserted that the government’s efforts to locate Vixama were insufficient to
establish good faith.
The district court found that Vixama was “unavailable” and that the
government had made good-faith, reasonable efforts to secure her presence at trial.
The district court rejected the defendants’ contention that the government’s efforts
were “merely perfunctory” and found, based on Agent Nowicki’s credible
testimony, that the government’s efforts to locate Vixama were reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances. On April 21, 2017, Vixama’s videotaped
deposition was played for the jury over the defendants’ objection.
The jury found both defendants guilty as charged on all counts. At
sentencing, Smith had a total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of
III, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment.
Delancy had a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of V,
resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment.
The district court sentenced Smith to 87-month prison sentences on Counts 1
(conspiracy) and 24 (illegal reentry) and 60-month sentences on Counts 2 through
22 (alien smuggling), all to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to
Smith’s revocation sentence in a separate federal case related to his prior alien
smuggling conviction. The district court sentenced Delancy to 90-month sentences
on Counts 1 (conspiracy) and 23 (illegal reentry) and 60-month sentences on
Counts 2 through 22 (alien smuggling), all to run concurrently with each other but
consecutive to Delancy’s revocation sentence in a separate federal case related to
his prior illegal reentry conviction.4
III. VIXAMA’S VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION
the reasonableness of their sentences.
A. Standard of Review
Typically, we review challenges to the district court’s rulings on the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gari, 572
F.3d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009). But we review de novo a defendant’s claim that
his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See id.; see also United States v.
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1227 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A defendant’s claim that his
Sixth Amendment rights were violated is reviewed de novo.”); United States v.
Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“[W]e review de novo
Defendants’ claim that their Sixth Amendment rights were violated.”); United
States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We . . . give plenary
review to claims of constitutional error for a failure to show the unavailability of
an out-of-court declarant.”). Such claims, however, are subject to harmless error
review. United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 625-26 (11th Cir. 1990).
Here, defendants Smith and Delancy challenge the admissibility of
Vixama’s videotaped deposition only on the ground that it violated their
Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, we review
their claim de novo.
B. Applicable Federal Rules
Before addressing the Confrontation Clause issue, we review the relevant
federal rules as background.
Federal law provides for the admission at trial of a material witness’s
videotaped deposition testimony in alien smuggling cases if the witness has been
deported. See
and expected that Vixama would be deported immediately to Haiti after that
deposition, meaning that her videotaped deposition would then be admissible at
trial under
preserved) deposition of a witness to a violation of subsection (a) who has been
deported or otherwise expelled from the United States, or is otherwise unable to
testify, may be admitted into evidence in an action brought for that violation.”).
Contrary to the expectations of both the defendants and the government,
Vixama
detainer, because ICE missed the 48-hour deadline to take Vixama into custody
upon dismissal of the material witness complaint. That being so, upon her release,
Vixama was able to escape deportation.5
Because Vixama had not been deported at the time of trial, we look to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(f), which provides that a witness’s
deposition testimony may be used at trial if the witness is “unavailable,” as
admission of that deposition at trial so that the alien witness may be promptly deported and not
have to suffer prolonged detention until a defendant’s criminal trial.
deposition to be admissible, the illegal alien has to be deported by the time of trial. No one
disputes that Vixama was to be deported as soon as she gave her deposition.
determined by Federal Rule of Evidence 804. See
may use all or part of a deposition as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5)(A) provides that a witness is
considered to be “unavailable” if, among other things, the witness is absent from
the trial and the government “has not been able, by process or other reasonable
means, to procure . . . the declarant’s attendance.”
witness is “unavailable,” the Federal Rules of Evidence do not exclude as hearsay
the witness’s former testimony given in a lawful deposition at which the defendant
had an opportunity for cross-examination.
As explained below, unavailability must ordinarily also be established to
satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, which we discuss next.
C. Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.”
that a witness must appear in person and give live testimony at trial if her
statements are to be used against the defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004).
The defendant’s right to a witness’s live testimony in the courtroom serves
many important purposes, including allowing the jury to observe closely the
witness’s demeanor, expressions, and intonations, and thereby determine the witness’s credibility. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-38 (1980), abrogated in part on other grounds by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69, 124 S. Ct. at 1369-74. The Supreme Court has emphasized that in-court confrontation not only allows the defendant to test the witness’s recollection, but also compels the witness “to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1320 (1968) (stating same).
Of course, the Supreme Court has also told us that the right to a witness’s presence at trial is not absolute. In Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly held that the testimony of a witness who does not appear at trial is still admissible, in the constitutional sense, if these two conditions are met: (1) the witness “was unavailable to testify”; and (2) “the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. Accordingly, prior cross-examination alone cannot substitute for the defendant’s right to live testimony in the courtroom unless the witness meets the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of “unavailability.” See id.; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S. Ct. at 2538 (noting that the “Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation”
requires the proponent of recorded testimony to demonstrate unavailability of the witness, “including [in] cases where prior cross-examination has occurred.”). The integrity of the fact-finding process is at stake because the Confrontation Clause is a procedural protection. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S. Ct. at 1370.
The parties do not dispute that the government was authorized to take Vixama’s videotaped deposition, that both the defendants and their counsel were physically present during the videotaped deposition, or that the defendants’ counsel had an adequate and full opportunity to cross-examine Vixama at her deposition. Her testimony was taken precisely for use at trial, given she would be deported before trial. In fact, the government’s direct and redirect examination of Vixama totals approximately 32 pages, whereas the cross-examination by defense counsel, together, totals 79 pages of the deposition transcript. Defense counsel tested Vixama’s testimony and credibility with sufficient cross-examination.
Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether Vixama was “unavailable” to testify at the time of trial.
D. “Unavailable” Witnesses
A witness is “unavailable” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause if the witness does not appear and the government has “made a good-faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial. Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 69, 132 S. Ct. 490, 493 (2011); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S. Ct. at 2543 (examining
whether the prosecution “made a good-faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (internal quotation marks omitted)); Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1324. Because Vixama did not appear at trial, our inquiry here narrows to whether the government made “a good-faith effort” to obtain her presence.
We do not write on a blank slate as to what constitutes “a good-faith effort.” The Supreme Court has told us that whether “a good-faith effort” has been made is “a question of reasonableness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75, 100 S. Ct. at 2543 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, “[t]he lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness.” Id. at 74, 100 S. Ct. at 2543 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hardy, 565 at 70, 132 S. Ct. at 494 (quoting same).
The Supreme Court has also held that the prosecution bears the burden to show it made a good-faith effort to produce the witness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75, 100 S. Ct. at 2543. And the “‘possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff.’” Id. at 76, 100 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1322 (1968)). A good-faith effort, however, does not require futile acts. Id. at 74, 100 S. Ct. at 2543.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hardy emphasized that, “[w]hen a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness’ presence, but the Sixth
Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71-72, 132 S. Ct. at 495. The Supreme Court in Hardy also pointed out that in Roberts, “[w]e acknowledged that there were some additional steps that the prosecutor
Although our Circuit has little precedent in this area, we have applied Roberts’s reasonableness standard before. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1324 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74, 100 S. Ct at 2543 and acknowledging that “[t]he lengths to which the government must go to produce a witness is a matter of reasonableness”). Siddiqui involved two foreign witnesses who resided in Japan and Switzerland and were outside of the United States at the time of the trial. See id. at 1320-21. After the depositions of both witnesses, the government sent them letters urging them to come and testify in person, but the witnesses declined to do so. Id. at 1324-25. Our Court recounted other facts in the case, such as that during their depositions, the witnesses already indicated an unwillingness to travel to attend the trial. Id. at 1324. Given all the factual circumstances, this Court concluded that the government had shown that the foreign witnesses were
unavailable despite the government’s good-faith efforts to obtain their presence at trial. Id.
Of course, Siddiqui involved foreign witnesses outside the United States at the time of trial. Here, we must address the different factual situation6 of a foreign witness, like Vixama, who resides in Haiti and is a Haitian citizen, but is temporarily within the United States at the time of trial. Yet that is far from the whole story. In this case, the missing foreign witness Vixama (1) has no cell phone or address in the United States, (2) is illegally here, and (3) has absconded from the jurisdiction of the trial court in Florida to avoid detention and immediate deportation to Haiti. Although the government successfully sent a trial subpoena to the witness Vixama, through her former attorney and her boyfriend, and her former attorney reported back to the government that she would cooperate, Vixama still refused to appear at trial.
We are unaware of a similar factual case, but we do know from the Supreme Court that there is no brightline rule for reasonableness, and that a reasonableness inquiry necessarily is fact-specific and examines the totality of the factual circumstances of each particular case. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-77, 100 S. Ct. at 2543-45 (basing its reasonableness determination on all the “facts
presented”); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2003) (treating “reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case”); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (eschewing “bright-line rules,” emphasizing “the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry,” and instructing courts to examine “the totality of the circumstances”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1629-30 (1963) (emphasizing “there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness” and “[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).7
E. Discussion
Given the specific facts of this case recounted at length above, we are convinced that the district court did not err in admitting Vixama’s videotaped deposition testimony.
We start with how Agent Nowicki attempted to locate Vixama multiple times. Immediately after learning of Vixama’s release on February 6, 2017, Agent Nowicki on February 7 contacted her uncle, whose name and phone number Vixama had previously provided. During Agent Nowicki’s two efforts to contact the uncle, he was successful in obtaining the uncle’s address. After doing that, Agent Nowicki requested that ICE ERO agents visit the uncle’s house to look for Vixama.
The ICE ERO agents then did that on February 21, 2017. They even searched the house, but were unable to locate Vixama and found her relatives to be uncooperative. And after the ICE ERO agents failed to locate Vixama at the uncle’s house, Agent Nowicki followed up with them again about Vixama in March 2017. Ultimately, Agent Nowicki was told ICE ERO did not have the manpower to look for her again at that time.
Importantly, at this juncture, Vixama had given her deposition, the material witness complaint had been dismissed, and Agent Nowicki had no basis to take her into custody. Significantly, though, there was still an immigration detainer against
Vixama. It was plainly reasonable for Agent Nowicki to turn initially to ICE for help in locating Vixama.
Even so, the government’s efforts to locate Vixama did not stop. In the week leading up to the April trial, the government continued its efforts to locate Vixama by reaching out to her former counsel Raben four times, issuing a trial subpoena, and thrice attempting to communicate with Vixama using her boyfriend’s cell phone number. It was patently reasonable for the government to contact Raben, as Vixama’s former counsel, to try to locate her. Raben had represented Vixama regarding the material witness complaint against her in this very case. As such, Raben had an established relationship with Vixama and access to her in a way that the government did not. And Vixama had no address or cell phone.
Moreover, the government’s efforts through attorney Raben did not fall on deaf ears. As evidenced by the email communications recounted above, former counsel Raben advised the government that although Vixama did not have a
how promptly and helpfully Raben contacted her boyfriend and responded, it was also reasonable for the government to rely on these efforts through Vixama’s former lawyer.
Further, given that Raben had represented Vixama as to the material witness complaint, it was also reasonable to rely on her former attorney’s assessment and representation that she “will cooperate.” When Vixama did not appear the third day of trial on April 19, the government obtained a bench warrant and also sent it to her former attorney, once again in an effort to secure her presence at trial. Her attorney then tried to contact the boyfriend again (who had been responsive to Raben about the trial subpoena). But this time, the boyfriend did not respond to even attorney Raben.
We also cannot ignore Vixama’s obvious determination to go into hiding and to elude capture. She had three times before failed to obtain a visa to the United States, which led to her attempt to sneak to the United States via the defendants’ illegal smuggling scheme. Then, when she was mistakenly released, she immediately capitalized on that mistake by absconding and fleeing from the jurisdiction of the trial court in Florida. While her boyfriend was reportedly in Delaware and initially cooperative with Vixama’s former lawyer, he then stopped responding to calls or texts to his cell phone. Given these undisputed circumstances, it was reasonable for the government to try to locate Vixama
through her former lawyer, which is confirmed by the facts that the lawyer quickly and helpfully responded to the government and then successfully sent the trial subpoena to Vixama through her boyfriend. And once Vixama failed to appear at trial, it was also reasonable for the government to send the bench warrant to her former lawyer in an effort to obtain her presence.
Simply put, the Confrontation Clause does not require the government to make every conceivable effort to locate a witness; it requires only a good-faith effort that is reasonable under all of the circumstances of the case. See Hardy, 565 U.S. at 69-70, 132 S. Ct. at 493-94; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-76, 100 S. Ct. at 2543-44. As the Supreme Court has told us, “[o]ne, in hindsight, may always think of other things.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75, 100 S. Ct. at 2544. “[G]reat improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their execution.” Id. at 75-76, 100 S. Ct. at 2544; see also Hardy, 565 U.S. at 70-72, 132 S. Ct. at 494-95.8
At bottom, a reasonable, good-faith effort is case-specific and contextually driven. Vixama had no phone or address, had absconded outside the State of Florida, was in hiding, and had a strong incentive not to be found. The government had extremely
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s admission of Vixama’s videotaped deposition at trial. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-77, 100 S. Ct. at 2543-45 (affirming the admissibility of prior recorded testimony of a witness outside the state where the prosecutor sent subpoenas to the home address of the witness’s parents although the prosecutor knew the witness was not there and the parents had no way to reach her); United States v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming the admissibility of prior recorded testimony where the two witnesses vanished and the government attempted in vain to locate them).
IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Smith also argues that the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during closing argument. We review this prosecutorial misconduct claim de novo. See United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
A. Prosecutor’s Statements During Closing Argument
Prior to trial, the government noticed its intent to introduce, under
During closing arguments, Smith’s counsel argued that a true alien smuggler likely would take the most direct route from the Bahamas to the United States to
avoid detection by law enforcement on the open seas. That route, counsel asserted, would be the one directly west from Freeport, Bahamas to Boynton Beach, Florida. Counsel noted that was not the route Smith took and contended that Smith’s explanation that he was going to Bimini made the most sense given where his boat ultimately ended up.
In rebuttal, the government pointed to the fact that Smith’s prior conviction occurred in West Palm Beach (which is near Boynton Beach) to explain why the defendants chose not to take the most direct route from the Bahamas to Florida. Smith’s counsel objected and reserved a motion for mistrial. The district court overruled Smith’s objection, and the government continued its argument, stating:
It’s not an accident that they’re down south of Bimini as opposed to going straight across. When you bring 21
aliens into the United States, you don’t come into a marina, a port, a harbor. You’re smuggling these aliens into the country illegally. So . . . to go down south away from where you’re last caught, it’s not an accident or mistake. You’re trying to get in undetected.
After the government concluded its rebuttal, Smith moved for a mistrial based on the government’s comments. Smith contended that it was inappropriate for the government to argue that his prior conviction occurred in West Palm Beach simply because the judgment came from the West Palm Beach division. Smith explained that the Southern District of Florida extends from Key West to Fort Pierce, and activity that occurs in one division within the district may be indicted
in a different division. Smith asserted that it was “extremely misleading” to say his prior offense was committed in West Palm Beach.
The government responded that the case number for Smith’s prior conviction also indicated the case originated in West Palm Beach. The government further asserted that Smith opened the door with his argument that smugglers would take the most direct route between the Bahamas and Florida.
The district court denied Smith’s motion for a mistrial, finding the government’s statement that the prior conviction occurred in West Palm Beach was accurate and not misleading. The district court further determined that Smith opened the door by emphasizing that it made no sense for Smith not to take the shortest route, and the government’s argument in response to that point was fair.
B. Discussion
To show prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and (2) the remarks prejudicially affected his substantial rights. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected when there is a reasonable probability that, absent the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id.
The prosecutor’s comments during closing argument must be viewed in the context of the trial as a whole. United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th
Cir. 2014). Though the prosecutor may not exceed the evidence presented at trial in closing arguments, he may state conclusions drawn from the evidence. Id. The prosecutor is also entitled to make a fair response to defense counsel’s arguments, and issues raised by the defendant in his closing argument are fair game for the prosecution on rebuttal. Id.
Here, the district court did not err in denying Smith’s motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s comments about Smith’s prior conviction during closing arguments. The prosecutor’s statement that Smith’s prior alien smuggling conviction occurred in West Palm Beach was accurate—the judgment of that conviction, which was admitted into evidence at trial, indicates that it was entered in the West Palm Beach division of the Southern District of Florida. And as the district court noted, the prosecutor’s remarks were made in direct response to Smith’s argument during his closing that it would make no sense for an alien smuggler not to take the most direct route from the Bahamas to Florida. Given that argument by Smith, it was not unfair for the prosecutor to point out, as a potential motive for taking a different route, that Smith’s prior conviction occurred in the same area where the most direct route would lead. See id. at 505.
Even assuming arguendo that Smith showed the prosecutor’s comments
jury’s verdict that Smith was engaged in alien smuggling. Francois and Vixama both testified that the boat left Freeport late at night, under cover of darkness; that they believed they were traveling to the United States; and that the defendants instructed them not to draw attention to their boat while they were lost at sea. Vixama also testified that her family paid $5,000 for her passage to Miami. The Coast Guard witnesses testified that Smith’s story—that he was traveling to Bimini—was suspicious, given the location in which the boat was found and the direction of the currents in that area. And both the CBP pilot and Agent Nowicki testified that alien smugglers do not always take a direct route and often take evasive actions to disguise their activities. There is not a reasonable probability that, but for the prosecutor’s comment on rebuttal, the jury would have found Smith not guilty. Id. at 1294.10
V. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Under the cumulative error doctrine, an aggregation of otherwise nonreversible errors can warrant reversal where the combined effect of the errors denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. See United States v. Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032, 1052 (11th Cir. 2018). But “where there is no error or
only a single error, there can be no cumulative error.” United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, as explained above, the district court committed no error. Smith’s claim of cumulative error therefore lacks merit.11 Id.
VI. RESPONSE TO DISSENT ABOUT VIXAMA’S DEPOSITION
Our colleague concurs in our majority opinion except as to the admission of Vixama’s videotaped deposition. The dissent does not dispute that (1) the defendant’s counsel, with the defendants present, had a full opportunity to cross-examine Vixama during her videotaped deposition, (2) that Vixama’s deposition is admissible if she was unavailable, and (3) that a witness is unavailable if she does not appear at trial and if the government demonstrates it made a good-faith, reasonable effort to obtain her presence. The dissent parts company, however, with the majority opinion’s affirmance of the district court’s admission of Vixama’s videotaped deposition based on its determination that the government made a good-faith, reasonable effort to obtain Vixama’s presence at trial but she failed to appear.
We respond to the dissent’s 43-page criticism of this portion of our majority opinion, in three parts below: (1) why the dissent’s claim—that the majority
opinion “does not heed the lessons of Hardy and Roberts”—is just flat wrong; (2) why the dissent’s analysis of what constitutes a good-faith, reasonable effort is flawed in multiple ways; and (3) why the four decisions of other circuits, discussed by the dissent, demonstrate the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry and why the majority opinion properly applies the reasonableness standard to the facts of this case.
We start with the dissent’s accusations that our majority opinion “does not heed the lessons of Hardy and Roberts,” and “completely misses th[e] lesson from Hardy and Roberts.” Dissenting Op. at 94, 96. Because the dissent cherry picks a phrase or two from those decisions out of context, those two Supreme Court decisions warrant a full discussion. These decisions actually support the majority opinion. In fact, in both Roberts and Hardy, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s admission of prior recorded testimony of a witness who did not appear at a criminal trial, just as we do here in upholding the district court’s admission of the prior recorded testimony of Vixama, who likewise did not appear at trial.
More specifically, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness, Anita, who did not appear at trial. See 448 U.S. at 60, 77, 100 S. Ct. at 2536, 2545. Between November 1975 and March 1976, the criminal case was set and reset for
trial four times with repeated continuances leading to new trial dates. Id. at 59, 100 S. Ct. at 2535. Each time, the government sent trial subpoenas to the witness, Anita, at her parents’ Ohio address, resulting in five subpoenas sent there. Id. Although the government knew the witness (Anita) had not been at that residence for a long time, her parents’ home was her “last-known real address.” Id. at 59, 76, 100 S. Ct. at 2535, 2544.
After the preliminary hearing on January 10, 1975, Anita had left for Arizona, and, a year before trial, a San Francisco social worker communicated with the parents about Anita’s welfare application. Id. at 59-60, 100 S. Ct. at 2535-36. After that time, though, the witness had called her parents only once and had not been in touch with her siblings. Id. During that last phone call, which occurred about seven or eight months before trial, the witness Anita told her parents that she “was traveling” outside Ohio, but she did not advise them of where she was. Id. The witness’s mother attested that she knew of no way to reach the witness, even in case of emergency, and that she did not “know of anybody who knows where she is.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In holding the preliminary hearing testimony was admissible, the Supreme Court stressed that “[g]iven these facts, the prosecution did not breach its duty of good-faith effort.” Id. at 75, 100 S. Ct. at 2544. The Supreme Court emphasized that, “[t]o be sure, the prosecutor might have tried to locate by telephone the San
Francisco social worker with whom [Anita’s mother] had spoken many months before and might have undertaken other steps in an effort to find Anita.” Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[one], in hindsight, may always think of other things” to do. Id. But the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor had sent multiple subpoenas to Anita’s “last-known real address” and “had no clear indication, if any at all, of Anita’s whereabouts.” Id. at 76, 100 S. Ct. at 2544. Her last known address, of course, was her parents address in Ohio, where the witness had not been since the preliminary hearing in January 1975, some 14 months before the trial. See id. at 59-60, 76, 100 S. Ct. at 2535-36, 2544.
For sure, Roberts is not on all fours with this case. Nonetheless, it teaches that the prosecutor is not required to pursue every lead or step in order to be deemed to have acted reasonably. Importantly, Roberts illustrates that reasonableness depends on the particular facts of each case and makes clear that it is not our job to second guess, in hindsight, the prosecutor’s efforts. Plus, Roberts upheld the admission of the prior preliminary hearing
The dissent also relies heavily on Hardy v. Cross, but there again the Supreme Court upheld the state trial court’s admission of a victim’s prior
testimony when she did not appear at trial. 565 U.S. at 70-72, 132 S. Ct. at 494-95.12 In Hardy, the defendant was charged with the kidnapping and sexual assault of victim A.S. Id. at 66, 132 S. Ct. at 491. A.S. testified and was cross-examined at Cross’s first trial, which ended in his acquittal on the kidnapping charge and a mistrial on the sexual assault charges. Id.
Victim A.S. initially indicated that she was willing to testify again at the retrial, and the prosecutor “remained in constant contact with A.S. and her mother” leading up to the retrial. Id. at 66, 132 S. Ct. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, before the retrial, A.S.’s mother and brother informed the state’s investigator that they did not know where A.S. was, and A.S.’s mother stated that A.S. was afraid to testify again. Id. The investigator later spoke to A.S.’s father, who did not know where A.S. was. Id. at 66-67, 132 S. Ct. at 492. Thereafter, the state undertook various efforts to locate A.S., including keeping in contact with her family members, visiting A.S.’s last known address (her mother’s house), and conducting checks with various government agencies. Id. at 67-68, 132 S. Ct. at 492-93. On a final visit to the mother’s house on the day before the retrial, A.S.’s mother told police that A.S. had called two weeks earlier and said
she did not want to testify and would not return to Chicago for the retrial. Id. at 68, 132 S. Ct. at 493. A.S.’s mother also told police she did not know where A.S. was or how to reach her. Id.
The state trial court admitted A.S.’s prior testimony at Cross’s retrial. Id. at 68-69, 132 S. Ct. at 493. Cross was convicted of sexual assault. Id. Affirming, the Illinois Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that A.S. was unavailable and that the state made a good-faith effort to locate her. Id. at 69, 132 S. Ct. at 493. The Illinois Court of Appeals agreed A.S. was unavailable because “[i]t is clear from her telephone conversation with her mother that she was not in the city” and “also evident that she was in hiding and did not want to be located.” Id. at 69, 132 S. Ct. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cross then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing in part that the admission of A.S.’s prior testimony violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Id. After the district court denied Cross’s petition, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Id.
The Seventh Circuit faulted the prosecutor for failing to contact A.S.’s current boyfriend or her other friends in the Chicago area, for not contacting the cosmetology school where A.S. was once enrolled, and for neglecting to even serve A.S. with a subpoena after she expressed fear about testifying at the retrial. Id. at 70-71, 132 S. Ct. at 494-95.
In reversing the Seventh Circuit in Hardy, the Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois Court of Appeals’ holding—that the state had made a good-faith effort to locate A.S. and that the trial court did not err in
The dissent lifts this phrase—“reason to believe”—from Hardy out of context and remolds that dicta into her proposed legal or per se rule: that the
government does not make a good-faith, reasonable effort as a matter of law unless it, in effect, pursues each and every lead it has “reason to believe” might assist in locating a missing witness. See Dissenting Op. at 70, 71-72, 75, 77, 80-81, 84, 91, 94, 96-97, 99, 105. Having crafted that rule, the dissent argues that because database searches are easy, the government was required to take the additional investigatory step of searching databases in an attempt to discover the boyfriend’s address in Delaware. Then, on top of that, the dissent surmises that if the government had used databases, it might have found an address for the boyfriend in Delaware, and then it might have found Vixama. The dissent argues a “database search . . . stood a decent chance of leading the prosecution straight to the boyfriend—and likely, to Vixama.” Dissenting Op. at 64.
In short, because the government did not attempt to find the boyfriend’s address through a database search, the dissent argues its efforts were unreasonable as a matter of law. To be clear, the record contains no evidence that the boyfriend ever had an address in Delaware or that a database search would have revealed an address for him in Delaware. No matter, we will nonetheless respond to the dissent’s arguments that a database search might have revealed an address for the boyfriend in Delaware and, thus, the government’s lack of a database search made its other efforts unreasonable as a matter of law.
Four responses. First, and most telling, is that the Supreme Court in Hardy upheld the admission of the prior testimony and actually reversed the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the prosecutor was required to take the additional investigatory steps identified by the Seventh Circuit. One of those steps included failing to contact A.S.’s current boyfriend or her friends in the Chicago area. Second, the Supreme Court did so even though the government had not served, or even attempted to serve, the witness A.S. with a trial subpoena in Hardy.
Third, here the prosecutor did follow up on the boyfriend lead and contacted the boyfriend through Vixama’s former attorney (as opposed to using databases). Through Vixama’s former attorney, the government successfully sent the trial subpoena to the boyfriend, who was reportedly with Vixama, and then the government
In short, in both Roberts and Hardy, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s admission of prior recorded testimony of a witness who did not appear at a criminal trial. It is our majority opinion—upholding the admission of Vixama’s videotaped deposition testimony—that comports with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roberts and Hardy, not the dissent.
B. Dissent’s Flawed Analysis of What Constitutes a Good-Faith, Reasonable Effort
The dissent’s analysis too narrowly constricts the type of efforts that may qualify as a good-faith, reasonable effort in a Confrontation Clause case. For example, instead of crediting his efforts, the dissent chastises Agent Nowicki for not personally going to the home of Vixama’s uncle in Coral Springs, Florida to look for her and for requesting the assistance of ICE ERO in Miami. Certainly, Agent Nowicki and the prosecutor, not ICE, had the responsibility to produce their own witnesses at trial. But that does not mean Agent Nowicki should not have sought the help of ICE ERO in doing so. (In fact, had Agent Nowicki neglected to contact ICE ERO, we have little doubt that the dissent would now add this omission to her list of fault-finding.) The dissent ignores that the material witness complaint was dismissed after the deposition, that Vixama had committed no crime, and that Agent Nowicki had no warrant to take her back into custody. Instead, it was only ICE that held a detainer. Although the dissent apparently disagrees, we think it was plainly reasonable for Agent Nowicki to ask ICE to help
locate Vixama, given that the detainer allowed ICE to take her back into custody. Agent Nowicki sought ICE’s assistance not once, but twice. ICE assisted Agent Nowicki the first time, but, through no fault of Agent Nowicki, said it lacked manpower to go back to the uncle’s house a second time.14
Further, instead of crediting the prosecution’s successful efforts in getting the trial subpoena to Vixama, the dissent excoriates Agent Nowicki and the prosecutor for not finding the boyfriend’s address in Delaware and for calling him only twice. Repeated ten times, the dissent’s mantra is “find the boyfriend’s address in Delaware, find Vixama.” Dissenting Op. at 64, 77-78, 79, 80, 81, 86, 87, 91, 97, 105.
The dissent’s rhetorical flourish ignores the facts and reality of this case. First, similar efforts had already failed in Florida. Indeed, “find the uncle’s address, find Vixama” had entirely failed. When Agent Nowicki on February 7 learned of Vixama’s release on February 6, her uncle in Florida was a promising lead to find Vixama because before her mistaken release, Vixama personally had given Agent Nowicki
then successfully secured the assistance of ICE ERO in going to the uncle’s house to locate Vixama. But despite that good lead in the local Florida jurisdiction, ICE ERO on February 21 searched the uncle’s home and looked for Vixama, to no avail given her relatives’ lack of cooperation. Given that failed outcome in Florida, it is unclear why Agent Nowicki would think that even if he got lucky and found the boyfriend’s address in Delaware, the latter would reveal Vixama’s whereabouts and help ICE snatch and jail her in Delaware.
In fact, let’s unpack the multiple investigatory steps necessarily underlying the dissent’s mantra of: “find the boyfriend’s address in Delaware, find Vixama.” Attorney Raben first sent the boyfriend’s name and telephone number to the prosecutor on Saturday, April 15. The trial began on Monday, April 17. By 1 p.m. on Friday, April 21, both the government and the defense had rested.15 Even if we accept that a database search might have revealed a street address for the boyfriend in Delaware, the government would still have faced other investigatory hurdles under the particular facts of this case. Miami federal officials would have had to secure the ready help of either their federal HSI counterparts, or state law enforcement, in Delaware to attempt to find the boyfriend at that street address. The federal HSI agents, or state law enforcement, in Delaware would then have had to get lucky and actually find the boyfriend at that address, and then persuade
him to reveal Vixama’s whereabouts so they could more formally serve the trial subpoena on Vixama. Assuming that the boyfriend would help them find the girlfriend he had presumably been hiding, ICE ERO, which had the detainer, would have to be on the spot at just the right moment to grab her, else Vixama would once again go on the run. (Vixama had not yet failed to appear at the trial for the bench warrant to issue.) The reality is that the dissent’s mantra sounds easy until one actually goes step-by-step through this process that the dissent says is mandated by her reasonableness standard as a matter of law.16
Contrary to the dissent’s touted tactics, the government used the boyfriend lead in a different, more strategic way. The government tried to work with the boyfriend through Vixama’s former lawyer to get the trial subpoena to Vixama and tried to have her cooperate. The government successfully did so and, right before trial, the former lawyer even reported back on April 15 that she “will cooperate.”17
The dissent’s suggestion in footnote four—that we should not consider at all the ICE ERO’s efforts to locate Vixama in our good-faith effort analysis—also runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s clear mandate that we evaluate the reasonableness of the government’s efforts to obtain a witness by looking to the totality of the factual circumstances of each particular case. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-77, 100 S. Ct. at 2543-45 (basing its reasonableness determination on all the “facts presented”). In addition, we are loathe to suggest that government agencies cannot work together to accomplish a common goal—here, find Vixama—even if the agencies’ ultimate “interests” are not perfectly aligned. The dissent also misapprehends the significance of the ICE ERO agents’ trip to Vixama’s uncle’s house. It is not that the ICE ERO agent’s attempt to find Vixama relieved the prosecution of its obligation to make a good-faith effort to obtain her presence at trial. What is significant is that, at the uncle’s house, the ICE ERO agents got the runaround from her relatives, who were not helpful at all in assisting them to locate her. Context is important. Because of that interaction, it was manifestly reasonable for the government to reach out to Vixama’s former counsel for assistance in trying to find her, rather than again approaching her relatives.
the benefit of hindsight. Given the record as a whole and all the investigatory steps that had to succeed to capture her in Delaware on the immigration detainer (before the bench warrant issued on April 19), the government has shown that its working through her former attorney before the trial was a good-faith, reasonable effort to get the trial subpoena to her and to secure her presence at the trial.
Another flaw in the dissent’s critique is the contradictory treatment of the boyfriend. On one hand, the dissent advocates that the boyfriend was key to locating Vixama. But on the other hand, the dissent complains that the trial subpoena was emailed to the boyfriend, who apparently could not be trusted to give the document to Vixama (but who could be trusted to hand Vixama over to the police), instead of serving the subpoena on Vixama, whose whereabouts were unknown. Specifically, the dissent complains that the government’s communication of the trial subpoena to Vixama’s former lawyer and then to her boyfriend “is not ‘service’ under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Dissenting Op. at 80. Admittedly, the government’s efforts did not succeed in having Vixama appear at trial, but we cannot conclude they were unreasonable. Indeed, the dissent does not seem to contest that Vixama actually received the trial subpoena through the government’s efforts in contacting her former lawyer or that, given the trial subpoena, the district court
While the dissent presumably would have taken different actions had the dissent been the case agent or the prosecutor in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every possible means of producing a witness at trial, and in hindsight it is also possible to think of “additional steps” the prosecutor might have taken. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-76, 100 S. Ct. at 2544; see also Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71-72, 132 S. Ct. at 495. Our role is not to Monday-morning quarterback, but instead to assess whether the agent’s and the prosecutor’s actions constituted good-faith efforts that fell within a zone of reasonableness. We conclude that the government’s actions met this test.
Still another flaw in the dissent’s critique is its isolation of the actions of Agent Nowicki and the prosecutor, without considering their efforts cumulatively. The dissent contends the government’s efforts were unreasonable because Agent Nowicki considered the fact that Vixama’s videotaped deposition was already taken. While the Agent candidly admitted he considered that fact, he also testified that he took other steps outlined above and, ultimately, he weighed multiple other factors, including that: (1) she had received a subpoena (through her boyfriend), (2) he had attempted to contact her boyfriend on several occasions, (3) she was in the country illegally, (4) there was no longer a criminal action against her for the Agent to take her into criminal custody, and (5) ICE was the only agency who
could take her into custody before she failed to appear at trial.18 We reject the dissent’s position that the government’s cumulative efforts become unreasonable simply because the case agent considers, as one factor in his continued efforts, that a videotaped deposition is available.
In fact, neither the case agent, nor the prosecutor, nor this Court is required to pretend Vixama was never deposed for the express purpose of having her deposition presented at trial as allowed for deported aliens under
This was not testimony presented at a preliminary hearing or on the off-chance the witness might become unavailable later. Rather, the defendants’ counsel cross-examined Vixama as if she were testifying at trial because everyone assumed this would be
The dissent segregates one-by-one the facts used in our analysis and contends we are using that one fact to somehow “excuse” or “relieve” the government of its obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure Vixama’s presence at trial. See, e.g., Dissenting Op. at 84-102. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have taken great pains to emphasize there are no brightline or per se rules when evaluating the government’s good-faith efforts. Lest there be any confusion, we reiterate that we reach our conclusion that the government’s efforts here were reasonable only after considering all of the particular circumstances of this case together—that is, in their totality or cumulatively.
In sum, our majority opinion faithfully follows that fact-bound reasonableness standard, as it must. And given the totality of the circumstances here, the government has demonstrated that it made good-faith, reasonable efforts
to obtain Vixama’s presence at trial.19 We readily agree with the district court in Miami, who carefully considered the case, conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and found that Vixama was “unavailable” before admitting Vixama’s videotaped deposition on the last day of the trial.20
C. Dissent’s Citations to our Sister Circuits
The dissent cites four decisions from our sister circuits. We take the time and space to set forth in great detail the facts of
awareness of those facts negates the dissent’s reliance on these cases for her argument that the district court erred in admitting Vixama’s videotaped deposition.
The dissent cites Cook v. McKune, where the defendant Cook, convicted of first-degree murder, received a sentence of life without parole. 323 F.3d at 828. These six facts were important to the Tenth Circuit’s reversal in Cook: (1) the trial court had admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of the missing witness Rudell; (2) Rudell was the only witness to testify that Cook committed the murder; (3) though a trial subpoena was issued, no attempt was ever made to serve process on, or even send the subpoena to, Rudell; (4) Rudell had been granted immunity in exchange for his cooperation, and thus the Court said he had a special reason to favor the prosecution; (5) Cook had not had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Rudell at the preliminary hearing; and (6) Rudell lived on social security, which is how the government originally tracked him down for the preliminary hearing, but the government made no effort to locate him (through Social Security records or otherwise) to appear at trial. Id. at 826-28, 832, 834-37, 840.
In light of these highly specific facts, the Tenth Circuit concluded the government’s “feeble exertions” could not “be called a good-faith effort.” Id. at 840. Obviously, the facts in this case in no way resemble the facts in Cook.
Without setting forth any of its facts, the dissent also cites McCandless v. Vaughn, another first-degree murder, life sentence case, where the government
also used the preliminary hearing testimony of Barth, the only eyewitness to the murder, at trial. 172 F.3d at 258-59. Witness Barth, arrested in connection with the murder, agreed to serve as a cooperating witness in exchange for (1) being released on bail and (2) having the charges against him dropped at the successful conclusion of that case. Id. After testifying at the preliminary hearing and being released on bail, Barth was rearrested twice for failing to appear, but the government did not seek to adjust the terms of his bail. Id. at 267-68. Barth was released again, and Barth failed to appear at trial. Id. at 268. The government did not contact Barth’s father, who had served as the surety for Barth’s bail. Id. at 268-69. The Third Circuit concluded that, given the seriousness of the murder charges, Barth’s crucial importance as the only eyewitness to the murder, and his lack of impartiality, defendant McCandless had a very strong interest in confronting Barth at trial, and thus the government’s efforts were insufficient. See id. at 266-70.
Unlike the witnesses in Cook and McCandless, the witness Vixama did not receive any consideration from the government for her testimony. Just the opposite. Vixama was to be deported back to Haiti, after having tried unsuccessfully to come here three times before. Also notable is the fact that this case did not involve a preliminary hearing, as in Cook and McCandless, but instead here the defendants themselves and their counsel were all physically present at the
videotaped deposition, which all expected to be admitted at trial and where defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Vixama.
Also unlike Cook and McCandless, this is not an only-witness-to-a-murder case. Apart from Vixama’s deposition testimony, there was compelling evidence that the defendants’ boat was headed to the United States. The boat was 24 miles from Key Largo, Florida when found. The witness Francois (also on the boat) testified that (1) his father told him a trip was being planned to bring him to the United States, (2) other passengers told him the boat was
Without setting forth its facts, the dissent also cites United States v. Lynch, where the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. Similar to Cook and McCandless, the district court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of
missing witness Brown, the only eyewitness to identify defendant Lynch as the shooter. 499 F.2d at 1014, 1020-21. During the trial, a detective attempted to locate Brown at a friend’s apartment, but no one answered the door. Id. at 1023. Detectives returned to the apartment the following day, but did not find Brown. Id. It was later discovered that Brown had been in the friend’s apartment when the first detective knocked on the door, had stayed that night, and had left before the second set of detectives arrived the next morning. Id. at 1023-24. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the government’s efforts were insufficient, pointing out (1) that a preliminary hearing is less likely to produce extensive cross-examination and impeachment of a witness than a trial,21 and (2) that the missing witness was
still within the jurisdiction of the district court.22 Id. at 1023-24. Those two factors influenced the D.C. Circuit’s decision and they are entirely absent in this case. Indeed, the dissent does not disagree that the defendants’ cross-examination of Vixama during her deposition testimony was thorough nor that Vixama
We also discuss the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2009), because the defendants cite it and the dissent discusses it too. In our view, Tirado-Tirado, if anything, readily demonstrates why
Reversing, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that (1) the government had not attempted to remain in
when the government had good reason to believe that Vixama was with
I have already explained above why the existence of Vixama’s deposition
testimony could not relieve the government of its obligation to engage in reasonable
efforts to find Vixama. See
First, the emailed subpoena forwarded by Vixama’s former attorney to her
boyfriend did not relieve the government of its
Importantly, though, that the government thought the boyfriend would pass the subpoena to Vixama has tremendous relevance to the reasonableness analysis; it underscores the fact that the government had reason to believe—and did in fact believe—Vixama was with the boyfriend in Delaware, as Vixama’s former attorney
had advised the government. So the government also had reason to believe that if it found the boyfriend, it would find Vixama. And that required the government to undertake reasonable efforts to try to find the boyfriend.
Nor did Vixama’s illegal presence in the country somehow absolve the government of satisfying the constitutional requirement to undertake reasonable efforts to find Vixama. If it did, then the Confrontation Clause’s right to the witness’s presence at trial would have a hole large enough to drive a Bagger 2938 through whenever the witness was illegally present in the United States at the time of trial. Yet nothing in the Constitution or Confrontation Clause jurisprudence supports the notion that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the witness’s presence at trial depends upon the witness’s immigration status.
The government’s excuses that no pending criminal action allowed the agent to take Vixama into custody and that only a bench warrant would enable it to produce Vixama fare no better. Even assuming, arguendo, that no arrest warrant could be obtained,9 that circumstance would not justify the government’s failure to produce
Vixama. The government knew since February 7, 2017, that Vixama was in the country and had not been deported.
But it did not tell Smith and Delancy that for more than two months. In fact, the government waited until the first day of trial, April 17, to so inform them, failing even to reveal it at the calendar call on April 12. Instead, at the calendar call, without advising the court or Smith and Delancy that Vixama was still in the country, the government told the court that it intended to introduce Vixama’s videotaped deposition. The court asked Smith’s attorney if he was objecting to the video deposition’s
So when the government finally revealed Vixama’s presence in the country on the first day of trial, it was not surprising when Smith and Delancy objected. As Smith’s attorney aptly put it, “[T]he whole notion of her being unavailable was because it was presumed that she would be deported and that would make her beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.”
. . . shall, for the first commission of any such offense, be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both . . . .”). Clearly, it had probable cause to do so. And had it obtained such a warrant and arrested Vixama, it could have exercised prosecutorial discretion to drop the charges and deport her before trial with the consent of Smith and Delancy (in which case, she would have been unavailable) or to have her testify and then drop the charges and deport or release her.
Also on the first day of trial, the government told the court that it had sent a subpoena to Vixama through her former attorney to appear on the third day of trial, even though the government expected the trial to take only “[f]our to five days.” But almost immediately after telling the court about the subpoena, the government betrayed its doubt that Vixama would comply with it, telling the Court, “At this point we still consider her unavailable.” And no wonder, since beginning on April 15, the agent had called and sent a text to the boyfriend, and he had received no response at all.
Of course, nothing prevented the government from subpoenaing Vixama to appear on the first day of trial and obtaining a bench warrant then if she did not comply. At least that way, the government would have had the remaining five trial days (counting April 17) to execute the bench warrant. Instead, however, the government kept Smith and Delancy in the dark and unilaterally chose to limit itself to obtaining a bench warrant only when, by its own calculation, much of the trial would have already concluded. So to the extent that a bench warrant was the only way for the government to compel Vixama’s attendance and that there was insufficient time to execute the warrant, the government put itself in that position. It cannot therefore benefit from that self-imposed disadvantage. And if the government had no intention of following up on the bench warrant in the first place,
that it even sought one is irrelevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the government’s efforts.
Put simply, the government had reason to believe that undertaking routine law-enforcement steps to find Vixama by locating her boyfriend might well succeed. No reason the government offered for failing to take such steps undermines this fact. For this reason, the government’s efforts to find Vixama were not “reasonable” under the Sixth Amendment’s unavailability standard as the Supreme Court has construed it.
III.
The Majority Opinion protests that I ask too much of the government. It throws a kitchen sink of rationalizations in its attempt to justify the government’s failure to conduct routine tasks that it had reason to believe might locate Vixama. Specifically, the Majority Opinion argues that (1) it would be “Monday-morning quarterbacking” to predict whether finding the boyfriend would have led to Vixama, Maj. Op. at 44-45, 52; (2) the government was “plainly reasonable” in asking ERO for help, id. at 46-47; (3) it was reasonable for the government to rely on the former attorney to obtain Vixama’s presence at trial, rather than engaging in its own efforts to find Vixama, id. at 49-50; (4) this dissent is internally inconsistent, id. at 51; (5) Vixama was cross-examined, id. at 54; (6) Vixama had great incentive not to be found, id. at 16, 31; and (7) caselaw supports the conclusion that the government’s
efforts were reasonable. But even brief consideration of these arguments—both alone and together
(1) The Majority Opinion’s “Monday-morning quarterbacking” criticism is riddled with flaws, most notably because it shows the Majority Opinion impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto Smith and Delancy.
First, the Majority Opinion asserts that this dissent engages in impermissible Monday-morning quarterbacking. In doing so, the Majority Opinion also raises questions about the efficacy of looking for Vixama’s boyfriend. Maj. Op. at 44-45. This argument suffers from four problems.
First, it impermissibly places the burden of proof on Smith and Delancy. As the Majority Opinion correctly notes, the government—not the defendant—bears the burden of proof to show that it acted reasonably. Maj. Op. at 23 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75). And as the Majority Opinion further correctly acknowledges, although we can always think of more steps the government could have taken, the government can neutralize any intimation that reasonableness required those steps by showing the “great improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness.” Maj. Op. at 30 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75-76). So Smith and Delancy were not required to show that the boyfriend was a promising lead; rather, the government bore the burden of proving that finding the boyfriend was unlikely to lead to Vixama.
Yet the Majority Opinion ignores these rules and improperly places the burden of proof on Smith and Delancy, to show that Vixama would have been found if law enforcement had adequately followed up with the boyfriend. For example, the Majority Opinion criticizes this dissent for “surmis[ing] that if the government had used databases, it might have found an address for the boyfriend in Delaware, and then it might have found Vixama.” Maj. Op. at 44 (bold added; italics in original).
Here, though, the government, which has the burden of proof, never gave any reason to doubt the efficacy of a database search. Just the opposite. When asked whether it had used databases to search for the boyfriend’s address, the government’s response was “[n]ot yet,” suggesting the potential usefulness of the technique.
Nor did the government give any reason to doubt that Vixama was with her boyfriend. In fact, Vixama’s former attorney told the government she was, and the government even sent a subpoena to the boyfriend so Vixama would see it. Only the Majority Opinion manufactures doubt about the likelihood and effectiveness of finding the boyfriend. Then it improperly thrusts the burden of allaying that doubt on Delancy and Smith.
And the burden the Majority Opinion wrongly saddles Smith and Delancy with is also an impossible one for them: law enforcement has unique access to tools and resources that are not available to Smith and Delancy. For that reason, only law
enforcement can make the showing the Majority Opinion demands. Smith and Delancy cannot, for example, use law-enforcement databases to search for Vixama’s boyfriend’s address. So they have no way of removing the doubt the Majority Opinion creates about the efficacy of a database search. Ultimately, the Majority Opinion invents a problem the government never raised and drowns Smith and Delancy in an impossible burden that is not theirs.
Second, the Majority Opinion’s argument depends in part on illogical reasoning. The Majority Opinion inexplicably concludes that because “efforts [to find Vixama] had already failed in Florida,” they would also necessarily fail in Delaware. Maj. Op. at 47-48. This is irrational.
Third, in support of its argument, the Majority Opinion opines that following up with the boyfriend would have been a difficult and involved process. See Maj. Op. at 48-49. Not so. No matter how much the Majority Opinion draws out and
exaggerates the steps it would have taken for law enforcement to look up the boyfriend’s address and follow up with him, the reality is that this is a routine and feasible technique that law enforcement uses all the time—analogous, as the Majority Opinion recognized, to looking up and going to Vixama’s uncle’s address (which was one of the very first things law enforcement did in this case).
Fourth, as for the concept of “Monday-morning quarterbacking,” I agree that a court, with the benefit of hindsight, should not be unreasonably demanding. Maj. Op. at 44-45. I likewise agree that the “Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every possible means of producing a witness at trial.” Maj. Op. at 52. But our aversion against Monday-morning quarterbacking does not mean that we never review what the government did. And that the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to take every conceivable step to find a witness is not a talismanic phrase to excuse inadequate efforts. Those two points carry weight only when it is unreasonable to demand more of the government.
Here, the government presented Vixama’s recorded testimony in a trial that carried potential maximum sentences of decades in prison for Smith and Delancy. But the government’s efforts to follow up on a fresh, promising opportunity to secure the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to the witness’s presence at trial essentially consisted of only two calls and a text—even though other reasonable means to find
the boyfriend were readily available and inexpensive to undertake. The Sixth Amendment demands more.
(2) That it was reasonable for the prosecution to ask ERO for help does not excuse the prosecution’s failure to take other reasonable steps to find Vixama.
Moving on to the Majority Opinion’s second justification for why the government’s efforts here were reasonable, the Majority Opinion says that the government was “plainly reasonable” in asking ERO for help. Maj. Op. at 46. I don’t disagree. But taking one reasonable step is not enough when that step fails and other reasonable avenues for finding the witness emerge. Here, the case agent’s reasons for not doing more once he learned that ERO was not going to look for Vixama—because the government already had her deposition testimony and because he thought he “could have been turned down” had he asked for help—were not reasonable. So the government’s request for ERO’s assistance did not relieve the government of its obligation through the end of the trial in April to engage in additional efforts to find Vixama when ERO came up short in February.
As its third rationale, the Majority Opinion asserts that “[b]ecause it appeared that the boyfriend (and Vixama through him) was cooperating with attorney Raben, it was reasonable for the government to rely on attorney Raben to communicate with
him rather than to try to track the boyfriend down independently through databases.” Maj. Op. at 50. I agree that the government was right to contact Vixama’s former attorney. But when it became clear that the government’s earlier communications with the attorney were unlikely by themselves to result in Vixama’s presence at trial, and other promising leads for finding Vixama remained, the government did not have the discretion under the Sixth Amendment to refuse to engage in reasonable efforts to locate Vixama just because it had previously contacted her former attorney.
The government knew very quickly that it was not reasonable to assume, based solely on its communications with the attorney, that Vixama would show up for trial; from the very beginning, the boyfriend had not responded to the government. That’s why the government noted on the very first day of trial that it anticipated Vixama would be “unavailable”—just two days after the attorney gave the government the boyfriend’s phone number. If the government thought the attorney’s earlier communications with Vixama would yield her appearance at trial, it obviously would not have made this announcement.
Despite the government’s knowledge that Vixama probably would not comply with the subpoena, it did no more before trial than once call and once text Vixama’s boyfriend—its current, promising lead. It declined to take basic, inexpensive, and obvious law-enforcement steps like running a database search. And when, just as
the government had anticipated, Vixama indeed failed to appear, the government did almost nothing to try to execute the bench warrant it obtained for her.
So while the Majority Opinion is right that it was reasonable for the government to initially rely on Vixama’s former attorney, that did not excuse the government’s subsequent unreasonable lack of action.
(4) It is logical to conclude that Vixama’s boyfriend was such an important lead that, to adequately follow up with him, the government should have done more than just ask someone to forward a subpoena to him.
Fourth, contrary to the Majority Opinion’s suggestion, it is not internally inconsistent for this dissent to emphasize the need to adequately follow up with Vixama’s boyfriend while also asserting that the government’s efforts in sending the subpoena to the boyfriend through Vixama’s former attorney were insufficient under the circumstances. Maj. Op. at 51. To be sure, as I have noted, the government was right to try to find Vixama through her former attorney and even to try to send her a subpoena in that way.
But when that effort failed to yield Vixama’s cooperation, the government could not just rest on its laurels. Rather, as I have explained, the government believed the boyfriend provided Vixama with the subpoena because it believed Vixama was with the boyfriend. As a result, the government had reason to believe that if it found the boyfriend, it would find Vixama. And that required the government to engage in reasonable efforts to find the boyfriend. See supra at 81.
Fifth, while paying lip service to the notion that “[f]or sure, the defendants have not waived their Confrontation Clause claims,” the Majority Opinion wrongly dismisses the unavailability requirement’s independent importance, stressing that defense counsel “cross-examined Vixama as if she were testifying at trial because everyone assumed this would be her testimony at trial,” and that this fact is “relevant and important” in assessing the reasonableness of the government’s actions. Maj. Op. at 54. This justification for excusing the government’s less-than-reasonable efforts to find Vixama misses the point of the Confrontation Clause’s independent right to the witness’s presence—a right that is separate from the right to cross-examination. See supra at 66-67. If robust cross-examination were enough to excuse the government from engaging in reasonable efforts to present a witness at trial, the Supreme Court would not have explained that admission of recorded testimony requires two separate showings: unavailability and cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
The Majority Opinion’s reliance on cross-examination to lower the reasonableness bar of the Sixth Amendment’s right to the witness’s presence at trial impermissibly conflates these requirements. It fails to recognize that the witness’s live testimony at trial serves purposes that cross-examination alone simply cannot.
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court has never excused the government from undertaking reasonable efforts to find a missing witness simply because the preserved testimony included thorough cross-examination. Nor does the Majority Opinion point to a single case where any other court has concluded that thorough cross-examination can somehow relieve the government of its obligation under the Sixth Amendment to engage in reasonable efforts to find a witness before it may present that witness’s recorded testimony.
(6) That a witness may not want to be found does not relieve the government of its responsibility to take reasonable actions to find the witness.
Sixth, the Majority Opinion repeatedly emphasizes that Vixama “was in hiding, and had a strong incentive not to be found.” Maj. Op. at 16, 31. But evasiveness is not unavailability, and law enforcement cannot create a self-fulfilling prophecy by abbreviating search efforts just because the witness does not want to be found. See Lynch, 499 F.2d at 1024 (“We are not prepared to equate ‘unavailability’ with ‘evasiveness.’ The government failed to establish that [the witness] could not have been located and brought to trial by a reasonably diligent search. Accordingly we hold that the witness was not ‘unavailable’ . . . .”). Many witnesses would prefer not to be hauled into court. That’s often the very reason why the government must undertake efforts to find them in the first place. So allowing a witness’s evasiveness
to excuse unreasonable government efforts to find that witness would essentially render meaningless the Confrontation Clause’s unavailability requirement.
(7) The Majority Opinion’s ruling runs squarely against the caselaw.
Finally, the Majority Opinion suggests that caselaw supports the conclusion that the government’s efforts here were “reasonable.” Most respectfully, I disagree.
First, the Majority Opinion repeatedly relies on Hardy for the proposition that “the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.” Maj. Op. at 23-24, 43 (quoting Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71-72). I take no issue with Hardy’s statement in that regard. But as I have explained, that is not the beginning and end of Hardy’s significance. As expressed in its reasoning and alluded to in the last phrase of the sentence quoted above, Hardy teaches that the government must undertake reasonable efforts to follow up on leads it does have “reason to believe” might be fruitful in locating a missing witness. See Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71-72; see also supra at 69-71.
Roberts supports this same lesson. There, about a year before the trial, the missing witness’s parents were able to reach the witness through information a social worker in San Francisco had provided, since at the time, the social worker was in communication with the parents about a welfare application the witness had filed. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60. After that time, though, the witness had called her parents only once and had not been in touch with her siblings. Id. During that last phone call, which occurred about seven or eight months before trial, the witness told her parents that she “was traveling” outside Ohio, but she did not advise them of where she was. Id. The witness’s mother attested that she knew of no way to reach the witness, even in case of emergency, and that she did not “know of anybody who knows where she is.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
As for the government’s efforts to find the missing witness, it contacted the mother four months before trial and sent five subpoenas over time to the witness at the parents’ address. Id. at 75. The government further noted that the witness’s parents had “not been able to locate her for over a year.” Id.
Based on these facts, the trial court declared the witness unavailable and admitted the witness’s prior testimony. Id. at 59. The defendant was convicted and appealed, asserting that the use of the prior testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Id.
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s decision. Id. at 76. In reaching this conclusion, significantly, the Supreme Court explained that “the great improbability that [additional] efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their execution.” Id. Immediately following that statement, the Court reaffirmed the “general rule” that “the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, under the particular circumstances in Roberts, there was no reason to believe that additional efforts would have located the witness. But when reason to believe additional reasonable efforts may be successful exists, the government must engage in those efforts.
The Majority Opinion completely misses this lesson from Hardy and Roberts. Instead, it inaccurately accuses this dissent of cherry-picking phrases out of context. Compare Maj. Op. at 38 (accusing this
because there was no “reason to believe” those leads would have been fruitful. Maj. Op. at 43 (quoting Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71). But remarkably, the Majority Opinion then fails to engage with the fact that, in this case, there was reason to believe that Vixama was with her boyfriend.
Similarly, the Majority Opinion explains that in Roberts, the trail had effectively gone cold for the missing witness: the government’s most recent information about the witness’s whereabouts was seven-to-eight months old, and the government knew only generally that the witness was, at that time, traveling outside Ohio. Maj. Op. at 38-39. That’s why the Supreme Court opined that it was “great[ly] improbab[le]” that further government efforts would yield the missing witness.
Again, though, the Majority Opinion fails to register the significance in Smith and Delancy’s case that it was not “great[ly] improbab[le]” that additional government efforts would be useful. As I have noted, the government here believed—and had good reason to believe—based on Vixama’s former attorney’s representations, that Vixama was physically present with the boyfriend in Delaware.
Had the Majority Opinion actually applied the reasoning of Hardy and Roberts here, it necessarily would have reached the conclusion that the government
did not undertake reasonable efforts to follow up on the promising lead that was Vixama’s boyfriend.10
The Majority Opinion makes its second significant mistake relating to caselaw when it does not account for important Sixth Amendment-specific caselaw on “reasonableness.” In explaining the “reasonableness” standard, the Majority Opinion relies heavily on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Maj. Op. at 25-26 & n.7 (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 (2013); Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2017); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2002)).11
And while Fourth Amendment caselaw can be helpful to understanding the meaning of “reasonableness,”
For example, significantly, the Supreme Court has explained that, in the Confrontation Clause context, the Framers “were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands” and that “open-ended balancing tests” are disfavored because “[v]ague standards are manipulable.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. So it is not surprising that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence provides guidelines—like the government need not engage in futile search efforts; it may need to perform actions that have a possibility of finding a witness; and it must perform reasonable tasks that it has reason to believe might be successful—that assist us in determining whether law enforcement’s efforts were “reasonable.” See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74; Hardy, 565 U.S. at 71.
To be sure, the Majority Opinion mentions the cases that give us these rules. But it ignores the Sixth Amendment-specific instruction to avoid “open-ended balancing tests.” Instead, the Majority Opinion relies on Fourth Amendment law to justify its touchy-feely, I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach to determining whether the government’s efforts to find a witness were reasonable. And as I have noted, even when the Majority Opinion pays lip service to the Sixth Amendment-specific rules on reasonableness, it ignores many of the rules most important to this case. As a result, the Majority Opinion fails to recognize the insufficiency of the government’s actions here.
Finally, the Majority Opinion makes a third caselaw-related mistake when it asserts that Tirado-Tirado “demonstrates why the government has shown a good-faith, reasonable effort here.” See Maj. Op. at 60. In fact, Tirado-Tirado compels the opposite conclusion—that the government’s actions here did not satisfy its reasonableness obligation. The Majority Opinion’s view to the contrary results from two errors.
First, the Majority Opinion notes that the Tirado-Tirado witness’s deposition was taken “only as a precaution” because the government expected the witness to return to the United States to testify at trial. Id. at 61. But to the extent this discussion suggests that the reason it was wrong in Tirado-Tirado to present the missing witness’s testimony was because Tirado-Tirado may have foregone more rigorous cross-examination of the witness in anticipation that the witness would appear again at trial, Tirado-Tirado expressly nixed that idea. Tirado-Tirado explained that the use of the deposition testimony at trial violated the Confrontation Clause “not because Tirado-Tirado did not have a full and fair opportunity to cross examine [the witness]”—indeed, the Fifth Circuit found he did—but because “[the witness] was not ‘unavailable’ for trial.” Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d at 125-26. As I have noted, the right to the witness’s presence at trial and the right to cross-examination are distinct rights that protect the defendant in different ways. See supra at 66-67. Once again, the Majority Opinion improperly conflates these rights.
Second, the Majority Opinion tries to distinguish Tirado-Tirado, emphasizing that “in Tirado-Tirado, the government ‘made no effort’ whatsoever to keep in touch with the alien witness” until about eight days before trial. Maj. Op. at 61 (citing Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d at 125). But what we have here, the Majority Opinion asserts, “is not a case in which the government ‘made absolutely no effort’ to locate Vixama and obtain her presence at trial.” Id. at 62. These statements are true,
In Tirado-Tirado, as the Majority Opinion notes, the government took no action to remain in contact with the witness in Mexico for five months, waiting until eight days before trial to act. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d at 124. And as the Majority Opinion correctly notes, the government here did undertake some action in the two months prior to its last-minute activities five days before trial—it asked ERO to go to the uncle’s house. So yes, we have this modest distinction.
But in the eight days before trial, when the government finally began its efforts to obtain the witness’s presence at trial in Tirado-Tirado, the government sent the witness a letter with explicit instructions concerning arrangements for the witness to testify and be reimbursed; spoke to the witness’s brother about the witness’s
attendance; obtained the name and telephone number of Tirado-Tirado’s common-law wife in the United States; examined the call log of Tirado-Tirado’s seized phone for calls to the witness; subpoenaed Western Union for transactions made in Tirado-Tirado’s name that could relate to the witness, after discovering in Tirado-Tirado’s phone log a call made to Western Union; and reviewed immigration and criminal records for the witness—all in an effort to find the witness. Id. at 120. Even after doing all this, when the government could not come up with the witness, the Tirado-Tirado Court decided that the government had not done enough overall. Id. at 125.
Here, in contrast, the government did little to follow up on the leads it had: it did not revisit the uncle’s home, even though the agent believed as late as within a week of trial that Vixama was “perhaps” there; it did not run Vixama’s boyfriend’s name or number through any database; and it did not attempt to send an agent to find Vixama’s boyfriend, even though doing any—or all—of these things to follow up on fresh leads would not have required significant government resources.
Thus, the real distinguishing feature between Tirado-Tirado and this case is how much more overall the government did in Tirado-Tirado to locate a witness outside the country than it did in this case to locate one inside the country—a distinction that especially dooms the sufficiency of the government’s efforts here.12
IV.
Since the government’s efforts here were unreasonable and Vixama’s testimony should not have been admitted, we must consider whether admitting Vixama’s deposition testimony was harmless error. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). A Confrontation Clause violation is harmless only if we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
Here, the admission of the deposition testimony was not harmless. Even the Majority Opinion does not argue that it was.
Indeed, although the Majority Opinion asserts that “there was compelling evidence that the defendants’ boat was headed to the United States,” Maj. Op. at 58,
conspicuously absent from that Opinion is an alternative holding that even if the district court erred in admitting Vixama’s testimony, the error was harmless. And for good reason: Vixama’s testimony provided the clearest, non-circumstantial evidence that the boat was bound for the United States. Specifically, she testified in her deposition that her mother’s friend had arranged for her to be smuggled into Miami for $5,000 and that she understood the boat was going from Freeport directly to Miami.
Aside from the unclear and confusing deposition testimony of Davidson Francois, another material witness, the government presented no other direct evidence that the boat’s intended destination was the United States.13 Rather, the other evidence on which the government relied for this necessary element of the crime was entirely circumstantial: that the migrants were told to turn off their cell phones for the trip and to not wave down other vessels once their boat stalled; that none aboard were legally authorized to be in the United States and lacked identification documents; and that Smith’s explanation for the boat’s track did not make sense. Certainly, these facts are more than sufficient to suggest an illegal operation and even a human-smuggling scheme. But they do not demand or even
reasonably support the inference that the boat was United States-bound. Even the case agent agreed in his testimony that Vixama was an “essential” witness. Particularly in view of where the boat was intercepted, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Vixama’s testimony did not contribute to the jury’s conclusion that the boat was headed for the United States. As a result, the Confrontation Clause violation was not harmless and requires vacatur of the judgment and remand.
V.
To protect Smith’s and Delancy’s Sixth Amendment right to confront Vixama, the government was required to engage in reasonable efforts to produce Vixama at trial. But the government failed to do so. Among other deficiencies, though the government had good reason to believe that Vixama was physically present with her boyfriend, it did almost nothing to locate the boyfriend—even though it had the boyfriend’s phone number and knew he lived in Delaware. Following up on the boyfriend’s location would have involved routine, inexpensive law-enforcement techniques such as searching databases or running basic internet searches and sending an agent out to follow up on any resulting leads. Because
since that was not harmless error on this record, the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded. I therefore respectfully dissent.