United States v. RayUnited States v. Ray
LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:
On motion of the defendant, the Court issued subpoenas, pursuant to
By letter dated January 10, 2022, defense counsel objected to the privilege and relevance assertions, and accompanying redactions, as overbroad and requested that the Court independently review the records and logs. Dkt. No. 284. Counsel for each of the alleged victims responded to the defense‘s letter explaining in further detail the bases and legal rationales for the redactions. See Dkt. Nos. 296, 299, 301, 302. The Government also filed a letter on the docket, writing that, “[h]aving not viewed any of the underlying records, the Government cannot speak to the basis for, or appropriateness of, the redactions” and “[a]ccordingly has no objection to the Court‘s conducting a review to determine the appropriateness of the proposed redactions.” Dkt. No. 297.
The Court heard oral argument on the matter on January 24, 2022. See Dkt. No. 321. Defense counsel made generally applicable
The Court also inquired at argument whether defense counsel contended that the psychotherapist-patient privilege had been waived with respect to the healthcare records. Counsel made only one argument regarding waiver: that, with respect to Jane Doe 3, the privilege had been waived for certain records because Jane Doe 3 had sent an email to Ray with those records attached. Id. at 18–19. Counsel asserted that the privilege had been waived with respect to the information disclosed by Ray in those records, but not more broadly. Dkt. No. 321 at 19.
The defense then moved on to relevance objections. Defense counsel argued that the records that predate 2010 are relevant to the second superseding indictment‘s allegations “that one of the means and methods of the alleged enterprise is exploiting the victim‘s mental health vulnerabilities and self-doubts to the аdvantage of the enterprise.” Id. at 20; see also Dkt. No. 292 ¶ 7(d) (listing as one of the “Means and Methods of the Enterprise” “[e]xploiting the Victims’ mental health vulnerabilities and self-doubts to the advantage of the Enterprise“).
The Court reviewed the submissions in camera.
LEGAL STANDARD
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court recognized a “psychotherapist privilege” under
In recognizing the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Jaffee Court explained that “[l]ike the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is ‘rooted in the
Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.
Id. The Court explained that such guarantees of confidentiality “serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem,” observing that “[t]he mental health of our citizenry . . . is a public good of transcendent importance.” Id. at 11. The Court relied by analogy on the attorney-client privilege and the spousal рrivilege for the existence and the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as well as on the practices on each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 12–13; see also id. at 10, 15 n.14; In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 133–34 (citing favorably Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), which analyzed the scope of waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by looking to the scope of waiver of the attorney-client privilege); Rosner v. United States, 958 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2020) (applying same rule relating to the collateral-order doctrine in the attorney-client privilege and psychotherapist-patient privilege contexts). Like the attorney-client privilege and the spousal privilege, the psychotherapist-patient relationship is absolute. When the privilege applies, it cannot be overcome by balancing “the relative importance of the patient‘s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure.” Id. at 17. As with the attorney-client privilege, for the privilege to serve its purpose, “the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected [and] [a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is letter better than no privilege at all.‘” Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)); see also Consolidated RNC Cases, 2009 WL 130178, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (Sullivan, J.) (“In Jaffee, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the psychotherapist privilege should be subject to a balancing test—thereby implicitly recognizing it as an absolute rather than qualified privilege.“); Kerman v. City of New York, 1997 WL 666261, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997).
Testimonial privileges are an exception to the “fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man‘s evidence.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). “[P]rivileges generally are construed narrowly,” In re Jakubaitis, 604 B.R. 562, 570 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), appeal filed (9th Cir.); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974), and the psychotherapist-patient privilege, like other privileges, may be waived by the privilege holder, In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
“A party invoking the psychotherapist-patient privilege must establish that
There is a dearth of caselaw on the scope of “communications” covered by the privilege and, specifically, whether and to what extent it extends to nonverbal conduct. The Jaffee Court based its recognition of the privilege on the need, in the psychotherapy contest, for the “patient [to be] willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears,” and a concern that if such communications were subject to later discovery, the “atmosphere of confidence and trust” which made the transmission of such confidences possible would be chilled. 518 U.S. at 10. It explicitly drew a distinction between the conveyance of “facts, emotions, memories and fears,” upon which psychiatric treatment depended, and the observation by a physician of information from a physical examination, which would not be subject to a privilege. Id.
There has been little written on what constitutes “communication” in this context. One treatise author has suggested that it reaches more broadly than verbal communication. “[T]herapist[s] depend[] on non-verbal information sources and forms of communication in both diagnosis and treatment.” Wright & Miller, 25 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5330 (1st ed.). One court noted that “psychotherapy is defined as the ‘[t]reatment of emotional, behavioral, personality, and psychiatric disorders based primarily upon verbal or nonverbal communication and interventions with the patient, in contrast to treatments utilizing chemical and physical measures.‘” In re Grand Jury Investigation, 405 F. Supp. 3d 643, 647–48 (W.D. Va. 2019) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting STEDMAN‘S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1461 (26th ed. 1995)). A leading treatise writes regarding Proposed Rule 504: “In the case of mental health professionals, the patient‘s privilege should cover non-verbal acts of the patient as well as the more traditional modes of communications.” Id.
There is considerably more caselaw regarding the second inquiry: Which professionals are covered by the privilege? In addition to the categories of mental-health providers explicitly called out by the Jaffee Court—licensed psychotherapists, psychiatrists, and social workers—courts have held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege extends to others who are licensed to
Courts have also held that the privilege is extended to communications made, for the purpose of obtaining psychotherapy treatment, to paraprofessionals and staff working under the
supervision and control of such a provider. See 3 Weinstein‘s Federal Evidence § 504.08 (“If, for example, the psychiatrist works closely with a paraprofessional who takes part of а patient‘s history, it should not matter whether a psychotherapist is present since the patient should treat the paraprofessional worker with the same trust. Thus, in general, a paraprofessional working under close supervision and control of a professional should be covered.“); Wright & Miller, 25 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5330 (1st ed.) (“Because the healing professions allow for greater use of ancillary personnel than was traditionally the case with lawyers, the sort of third person who will destroy confidentiality is often phrased in terms of ‘disinterested third persons’ . . . .“); Richardson v. Sexual Assault/Spouse Abuse Res. Center, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (D. Md. 2011) (extending privilege to communications made to unlicensed counselor providing mental-health treatment under the supervision of licensed social workers); cf. Oleszko, 243 F. 3d at 1158 (“To protect only disclosures made during psychotherapy while exposing those same disclosures to discovery when made to another member of the mental health team in order to access psychotherapy would significantly undermine the psychotheraрist-patient privilege.“). The privilege‘s application to such persons is implicitly recognized by Proposed Rule 504, which recognizes that a communication maintains its confidentiality so long as it is “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those who are [inter alia] participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.” Proposed Fed. R. Evid., 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972). Thus, courts have recognized that the privilege extends to the “entire team” of professionals necessary for delivering mental-health treatment. United States v. Robinson, 2014 WL 587850, at *3 (“[I]n Jaffee, the Supreme Court recognized that the privilege extends to the entire team necessary for delivering mental health treatment to a person voluntarily
As to the third inquiry, it is clear that not all communications made to mental-health providers fall within the privilege. In United States v. Romo, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]hether a meeting occurred ‘in the course of diagnosis or treatment’ is a factual determination that rests upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances.” 413 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). There, the court held that a confession made by a prison inmate to a licensed professional counselor in a private visitation room did not fall within the privilege. Id. In so holding, the court explained that, even though the statement was made to a counselor whose job included providing inmates with psychological counseling and who had previously provided the inmate with mental-health treatment during voluntary counseling sessions, the counselor—whose job title was “program director“—also had other duties that were not related to mental-health counseling, and the circumstances of the meeting did not suggest that the inmate was seeking counseling or that the counselor provided, or even intended to provide, mental-health care. Id. at 1048–49.
It is also important to state that the privilege applies, and the interests it serves are protected, regardless whether the party seeking the information is the prosecutor who wants to use a communication as evidence that the defendant has committed a grievous crime or the defendant who seeks evidence to use in defense against a serious charge. Thus, while the party seeking the records here happens to be the defendant, the principles the Court articulates would be equally applicable if the party seeking the information was the Government, and it asserted a need for it for a prosecution to be successful. See, e.g., Ghane, 673 F.3d at 775, 781–82 (upholding admission against defendant of statements made by defendant with a documented history of significant mental illness made to crisis hotline and to emergency room physician‘s assistant that he had cyanide in his
At issue is also the relevance of the redacted records. At this stage, in order to require production of records prior to trial, the defense must show that the records are, among other things, evidentiary and relevant. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699 (1974). The defense need only make a sufficient preliminary showing of admissibility and relevance. See id. at 700 (concluding that there was “a sufficient likelihood that [subpoenaed material] contаins conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment“). Admissibility is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under
DISCUSSION
I. Defense Objections
In its letter motion, Dkt. No. 284, and at oral argument, Dkt. No. 321, the defense raised several objections that were each applicable to sets of records produced for multiple of the alleged victims.
A. Privilege
As referenced above, the defense objects to privilege redactions to the extent that they reflect observations made by mental-health providers as opposed to the content of verbal communications from those individuals. See Dkt. No. 321 at 10. In the defense‘s view, information that indirectly reveals something about a communication—such as that a certain medication is prescribed or a particular test is administered—is not covered by the privilege because it does not reflect a “communication.” Id. at 13.
The Court agrees with the defense in part and disagrees in part. Although the Jaffee Court sрoke in terms of the interest in protect the “‘willingness and ability [of the patient] to talk freely,‘” 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Advisory Committee‘s Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 342 (1972)), there are many ways that a patient can communication information. See Communication, Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095627847 (describing communication as “[t]he result of any action (physical, written, or verbal) that conveys meanings between two individuals“). An individual may communicate his feelings in response to a question or set of questions by making a facial expression or a physical gesture. That a patient, in the course of treatment,
Mental-health professionals, likewise, “depend[] on non-verbal information sources and forms of communication in both diagnosis and treatment.” Wright & Miller, 25 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5330 (1st ed.). Thus, the fact that a patient chooses to communicate by gesture rather than words does not deprive the communication of protection. But the patient‘s act must be a volitional act by which the patient communicates information for the purposes of treatment. The Jaffee Court specifically distinguished information that a physician might obtain from a “physical examination” or as “the resul[t] of a diagnostic test” which is not privileged from information conveyed by the patient to a licensed therapist regarding “emotions” and “fears” which is protected by the privilege. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10. That distinction was not based on any notion that psychiatric medical care for conditions of the mind should enjoy in our society greater priority than non-psychiatric care for conditions of the body or by a bare desire to encourage patients to seek psychiatric care. The Court noted that “[t]he mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The distinction was based on the nature of the observation and the conduct that resulted in it. Although a psychotherapist may need to conduct physical examinations as well as conduct counseling sessions in order to make an effective diagnosis, the latter—which requires “an atmosphere of confidence and trust” is what is protected by the privilege. Id. at 10.
The Court thus agrees with the defense that the results of tests like bloodwork and urinalysis or the description of a patient‘s gait or general disposition would not fall within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Such information may be useful for treatment and may be obtained for the purposes of treatment but it does not reflect the communication of information dependent upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust. It is of the same character as bloodwork and urinalysis that may be taken by an orthopedist or a cardiologist; the only difference is that the care being provided is for the mind and not for a bone or the heart. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 765 (1966) (holding in Fifth Amendment context, that “the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis” is not communicative and an individual‘s communicative “capacities [are] in no way implicated“); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (holding that voice exemplars that are taken for a physical characteristic and not for their content are not protected by
The Court‘s orders will reflect those distinctions. For example, information regarding an
alleged victim‘s “appearance” in an examination may not be redacted, while that alleged victim‘s “mood” and “affect” during an assessment may be redacted based on the privilege.
The defense also objects to the breadth of providers covered by the privilege redactions. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the psychotherapist-patient privilege “include[s] members of a medical team that are ultimately providing mental health care.” Dkt. No. 321 at 11. The defense agreed that a nurse at a psychiatric institution collecting information for a psychotherapist would be covered by the privilege, id. at 17–18, but argued that intake notes from a general hospital reflecting communications made to a non-mental health care provider, for the purposes of admission or to determine what type of medical professional a patient should see would not necessarily be covered by the privilege. Id. at 16–17. In defense counsel‘s view, “[a]n individual going into a psychiatric facility and intake in a psychiatric facility is distinct from an individual seeking treatment, let‘s say, at a general hospital or an emergency room for a specific physical harm.” Id. at 18.
Given defense counsel‘s concession that the psychotheraрist-patient privilege extends to “members of a medical team that are ultimately providing mental health care,” Dkt. No. 321 at 11—a reading of the law with which the Court agrees—the Court need not consider whether records made by professionals supporting a patient‘s mental-health treatment, and reflecting communications made in the course of that treatment, are properly redacted. Under defense counsel‘s own reading of the law, they are. What is still in dispute is whether intake records from a psychiatric facility are covered by the psychotherapist-patient privilege and such records from an emergency room at a general hospital are not. The Court agrees with defense counsel that general-hospital intake records are not covered by the privilege when they reflect communications not made to a mental-health provider and before a mental-health provider has been engaged and not made by the patient for
In Ghane, a suicidal defendant called a crisis hotline, which in turn notified the local police department, who then dispatched officers to the defendant‘s apartment. When the officers arrived, the defendant requested to be transported to a medical center, where he checked himself into the emergency room. At the emergency room, a physician‘s assistant conducted a routine intake examination, but used a specific intake form based on the defendant presenting with depression and suicidal ideation. In the course of the intake interview, the defendant informed the physician‘s assistant that he had cyanide in his apartment; the defendant then sought to suppress the cyanide-related statements.
The Eighth Circuit determined that the statements made to the physician‘s assistant were not subject to the psychotherapist-patiеnt privilege, reasoning that the privilege “contemplates treatment. It does not encompass ‘care’ provided by an ER physician‘s assistant whose job is to assess incoming patients and conduct intake interviews and evaluations.” Ghane, 673 F.3d at 783. The court explained that the physician‘s assistant did not provide any therapy, diagnosis, or treatment to the defendant but was completing a form as part of a protocol and not to determine treatment. Id. While he facilitated the defendant‘s placement as a psychiatric patient, he was not working under the direction of, nor did he consult with, a psychiatrist during the relevant time period. Id. at 783–84.
The Court agrees that communications made to intake staff at a hospital who are not agents of a mental-health provider, and before a mental-health provider is engaged, are not covered by the privilege. At the time of admission to a general hospital, the patient enjoys the expectation of privacy that prospective patients generally enjoy—those conveyed by laws such as the
There are a limited number of documents that are not protected by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege and that are potentially relevant.
The defense objects to the relevance redactions of the alleged victim‘s medical records that predate the indictment period of 2010 through February 11, 2020. It argues that these records are relevant to the Government‘s theory that Ray “chose to befriend the complainants because of their fragile mental health states,” Dkt. No. 284 at 4, and “targeted the complainants who were vulnerable because of mental health illness,” Dkt. No. 321 at 20. It points out that the second superseding indictment and the Gоvernment‘s enterprise letter belie any assertion by the Government that “it didn‘t intend to ask the complainants questions about their mental health before meeting Mr. Ray.” Dkt. No. 321 at 19–20. The defense specifically points out that the second superseding indictment “alleges that one of the means and methods of the alleged enterprise is exploiting the victim‘s mental health vulnerabilities and self-doubts to the advantage of the enterprise” and that the “enterprise letter states that it will introduce evidence that Mr. Ray was aware that John Doe had attempted suicide in high school.” Id. at 20.
At oral argument, the Government responded that the alleged victims “will testify about vulnerabilities that they had and communicated to the defendant,” id. at 23, but not about vulnerabilities that they did not report to Ray, id. at 24. It also noted that it “expect[s] witness testimony to be [that] over the course of their relationship with Mr. Ray, their mental health was tremendously exacerbated, worsened,” meaning that “they had emerging conditiоns, instability, things like that that [it] will elicit as well.” Id. at 25.
II. Individual Considerations
The above principles apply to the proposed redactions as to multiple of the alleged victims. Simultaneous with this Opinion, the Court is issuing an order identifying the redactions it will permit and those it will not permit. Additional individualized concerns are reviewed below.
A. John Doe
There are three sets of responsive records regarding John Doe that were turned over to the defense in redacted form. The defense objects to the redactions of two sets, from Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital, both from 2008, on relevance grounds. For the reasons explained in Section I.B, supra, those records are relevant insofar as they relate to mental-health treatment received by John Doe.
For precisely the reason these records are relevant, they may also be subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The defense makes relatively narrow objections to the privilege assertiоns made by John Doe‘s counsel: It objects to the redactions to the Postgraduate Center for Mental Health records insofar as they redact a “referral information form,” “initial treatment plan,” “treatment plan,” “treatment plan update,” and “discharge information including referral source and summary notes,” and communications between John Doe and authors who are not psychotherapists or social workers. Dkt. No. 284 at 7–8. It also objects to the privilege redactions of St. Barnabas Hospital identified as “EMS 911 Patient Call Report entries,” “outpatient summary report,” “Emergency Department Documents Review,” “Patient lab results,” and “Patient Orders.” Id. at 8.
The Court has reviewed the appropriateness of the privilege redactions to the Postgraduate Center for Mental Health and St. Barnabas Hospital in light of the defense‘s specific objections and the principles set forth in this Opinion, and the Court agrees that certain records should be unredacted. For example, results of urinalysis do not reflect communications made by John Doe, and information recorded by EMS responding to a 911 call do not reflect communications made to a licensed mental-health provider or their staff in the course of treatment or diagnosis. The Court will identify specifically what should be unredacted by separate order.
The defense also “reserves the right to object to the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege concerning the[] records” of Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital in the event that the Court finds them to be relevant, Dkt. No. 284 at 7 n.7, which the Court does. The defense may make objections to the privilege redactions of Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital related to those records.6
B. Jane Doe 3
The defense argues that, to the extent the privilege applies to the set of records from 2008, that privilege is waived because Jane Doe 3 sent some of the records to Ray in an email but thаt
Jane Doe 3‘s attorneys have redacted two sets of intake records from a visit to an emergency room in 2008 on relevance grounds. One set is plainly not relevant: It сovers treatment sought by Jane Doe 3 in February 2008–before she is alleged to have even met Ray-for a common cold. The other set from April 2008, however, is claimed to be both irrelevant, because the records predate the period of the crimes charged in the indictment, as well as privileged under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. For the reasons explained in Section I.B, supra, these records are relevant insofar as they relate to mental-health treatment received by
produce the records of Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital with revised redactions in light of the Court‘s holdings regarding relevance and the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If it chooses to do so, it should inform counsel for the defense of its intention no later than 5 p.m. on Wednesday, February 9, 2022, and should produce any such records by February 14, 2022.
Jane Doe 3. They may, however, contained privileged material if they contain information reflecting communications made to a licensed mental-health provider or their staff in the course of treatment (i.e., after admission, if Jane Doe 3 was admitted for psychiatric care).
As it does with John Doe, the defense “reserves the right to object to the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege concerning the[] records” of New York-Presbyterian Hospital in the event that the Court finds them to be relevant. The Court will reserve decision on Jane Doe 3‘s records from New York-Presbyterian Hospital until defense makes such objections, which it shall do on or before February 21, 2022.7
C. Jane Doe 2
In its letter motion, the defense argued that redacted portions of Jane Doe 2‘s medical records from Planned Parenthood—relating to her “social and substance use history,” “sexual history,” “medical history and medications,” and “medical information“—are relevant to the case against Ray “[g]iven the anticipated scope of Jane Doe 2‘s testimony and the fact that she is the only alleged victim of sex trafficking in this case . . . .” Dkt. No. 284 at 4. At oral argument, defense counsel acknowledged that counsel for Jane Doe 2 was also invoking
Jane Doe 2 and could be used for impeachment purposes. Dkt. No. 321 at 22. At argument, counsel for Jane Doe 2 agreed with the defense‘s proposal to wait until the trial testimony stage to discuss the redactions. Id. at 41–42. The Court will therefore reserve decision on the appropriateness of the redactions of Jane Doe 2‘s Planned Parenthood records until hearing the testimony of Jane Doe 2 at trial.
D. Jane Doe 1
Counsel for Jane Doe 1 produced a categorical privilege log containing three categories of proposed redactions. The defense objects to these redactions on various grounds addressed above, including that the redactions cover Jane Doe 3‘s communications with those who are not licensed “psychotherapists” within the meaning of Jaffee. Dkt. No. 284 at 5. As the defense conceded at oral argument, however, the privilege extends beyond licensed mental-health professionals to those working at the direction of licensed mental-health providers and within the team of professionals providing such treatment.
The Court has reviewed the categorical privilege log provided by counsel for Jane Doe 1 and finds that the categories, as described in the privilege log, are permissible bases for redacting records to the extent that they reflect the substance of confidential communications between licensed mental-health providers, and those working under their direction, and Jane Doe 1. However, a cursоry examination of the underlying records indicates that the redactions are, in fact, broader than they are described. For example, with respect to the redacted information obtained from an insurance case manager, appearing on—among other pages—JANEDOE1_00000275, the redactions reflect communications made by Jane Doe 1 only in part; the name of the case manager and the first sentence following “collateral” plainly does not reflect a communication by Jane Doe 1. Counsel for Jane Doe 1 is directed to revise its redaction logs to contain the information for the Court to make a decision consistent with the principles set forth in this Opinion—both with respect to the records from New York Presbyterian and Harlem Bay Network. Counsel may also wish to produce a newly revised set of documents along with the more detailed privilege log. Any such production shall be made to the defense by February 14, 2022.8
CONCLUSION
Simultaneous with this Opinion, the Court will issue an Order setting forth the portions of the produced records that should be unredacted in accordance with the principles set forth herein. Counsel for
If counsel for John Doe and counsel for Jane Doe 3 choose to revise the redactions for the records from Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital, for John Doe, or from New York-Presbyterian Hospital, for Jane Doe 3, counsel must produce such records to the defense and the
Court by February 14, 2022, by 5 p.m. Any objections by the defense to the redactions to John Doe‘s records from Four Winds Hospital and St. Vincent‘s Hospital or Jane Doe 3‘s records from New York-Presbyterian Hospital shall be made by February 21, 2022.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 8, 2022
New York, New York
LEWIS J. LIMAN
United States District Judge