UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Phillip Bradley SADLER, Defendant-Appellant
No. 16-3946
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 25, 2017
Submitted: May 8, 2017
861 F.3d 902
III.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court‘s sentence.
Counsel who represented the appellant was Douglas Olson, AFPD, of Minneapolis, MN.
Counsel who represented the appellee was Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, AUSA, of Saint Paul, MN.
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), the district court1 resentenced Phillip Bradley Sadler to an above-Guidelines range sentence of 102 months’ imprisonment for bеing a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Sadler argues that the district court considered an improper sentencing factor when it commented that although “Sadler does not technically qualify as an armed career criminal, . . . he is exactly the type of defendant that Congress had in mind when it passed the [Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)].” We affirm.
I. Background
Sadler was charged in a one-count indictment with being a felon in possession of a firеarm, in violation of
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Johnson thаt the ACCA‘s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2557. Because of Johnson, Sadler‘s prior conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle no lоnger qualified as a predicate violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. As a result, Sadler no longer had three predicate felonies аnd was not an armed career criminal. In Sadler‘s appeal of his 180-month sentence, the government conceded Johnson error and moved to remand the case for resentencing. We granted that motion.
At resentencing, the district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment. The government sought a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range, stating that “the upper end of the guidelines range is . . . appropriаte at least as a beginning point when it comes to . . . an applicable sentence in this case.” After hearing from the parties, reviewing the case filings, and considering the presentence report, the district court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 102 months’ imprisonment.
The court arrived at this sentence after “consider[ing] all of the Section 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The court justified the upward variance based on Sadler‘s “very long and . . . very violent criminal history,” noting that this is “his
Although the court acknowledged the “terrible tragedy” that Sadler experienced “as a young teenager when he found his father‘s bоdy after his father had taken his own life” and Sadler‘s struggles “with significant mental, emotional, and substance abuse problems,” the court found it time for Sadler to “tаke responsibility for his own decisions.” Because Sadler had done so poorly on supervision in the past and because the court saw “no еvidence that a lower sentence would do anything except expose the public to more danger,” the court did “not believe that a sеntence below 102 months would be adequate to protect the public or to accomplish the other objectives of 3553(a), particulаrly in light of the failure of multiple prior prison sentences.”
II. Discussion
On appeal, Sadler argues that the district court considered an improper sentencing factor when it commented that although “Sadler does not technically qualify as an armed career criminal, . . . he is exactly the type оf defendant that Congress had in mind when it passed the [ACCA].”
“We review a district court‘s sentence in two steps: first, we review for significant procedural error; аnd second, if there is no significant procedural error, we review for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. O‘Connor, 567 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 2009). We review for an abuse of discretion, the substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Saddler, 538 F.3d 879, 890 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Sadler does not expressly characterize the district court‘s consideration of an allegedly improper factor as a procedural error or as a substantive challenge to his sentencе. “We recognize the existence of a . . . line of authority that categorizes a district court‘s consideration of an alleged-ly improper or irrelevant factor as a procedural error rather than a challenge to substantive reasonableness.” Id. at 397 n.3. Even if we construe Sadler‘s objection to his sentence as procedural error, we would review it only for plain error because Sadler did not raise this objection during sentencing. Id. at 397. “Plain error is an error that is plain and that affects a defendant‘s substantial rights.” Id. Only if the plain error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or publiс reputation of judicial proceedings” will we correct the error. Id. (quoting United States v. Roundtree, 534 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Here, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court‘s imposition оf Sadler‘s 102-month sentence, nor do we find the sentence substantively unreasonable. Contrary to Sadler‘s claim, the district court did not indicate that it was using the ACCA as the basis for its decision. Instead, the record shows that the
As to the district court‘s ACCA refеrence, the court correctly recognized—consistent with Johnson—that Sadler did not “technically qualify as an armed career criminal.” The district court‘s passing remark that Sadler “is exactly the type of defendant that Congress had in mind when it passed the Act” did not undermine this recognition. Prior to Johnson, Sadler‘s Guidelines range under
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.