Anthony Charles Saddler, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial on all five counts of a superceding indictment, which charged various narcotics distribution and firearms offenses. The district court 1 sentenced Saddler to 322 months’ imprisonment. Saddler now appeals both his convictions and his sentence, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his drug and firearm conspiracy convictions and his firearm possession conviction, that the district court improperly presumed the advisory sentencing guidelines range was reasonable and erred in considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that the sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. We affirm Saddler’s convictions and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 26, 2006, officers of the Waterloo Police Department executed a *884 search warrant at the residences at 630 West Mullan Avenue, 3853 Paige Drive and 112 Hartman Street, all in Waterloo, Iowa. The residences on West Mullan Avenue and on Hartman Street were within 1000 feet of a playground. Saddler, his cousin Marlon Earsery, Eddie Wade and Quintez Lotiker lived at the West Mullan Avenue residence. Saddler’s girlfriend lived at the Paige Drive residence, and Courtney Buis, Earsery’s girlfriend, rented the Hartman Street residence.
The search of the Hartman Street residence revealed significant quantities of crack cocaine, powder cocaine and marijuana. In the basement, officers discovered a locked safe, which contained $21,514.42 in cash, 122.56 grams of powder cocaine, 65.42 grams of crack cocaine, jewelry and documents. The documents included a title to Saddler’s red Chevrolet Blazer, a purchase agreement for the Blazer, an application for title and registration for the Blazer, and a traffic ticket issued to Saddler. Near the safe, officers found titles in Saddler’s name for a 1996 Chevrolet Tahoe and a 1994 GMC Suburban, 701.8 grams of marijuana and 80.26 grams of cocaine. In the basement rafters, officers recovered a laptop case that contained six pistols: a loaded .45 caliber Hi-Point with an obliterated serial number, a loaded 9mm Taurus, two loaded 9mm Bryco Jennings, a 9mm Luger, and a .22 caliber Sterling Arms. Throughout the rest of the house, the police seized 2212 grams of marijuana, 597.74 grams of powder cocaine, 217.1 grams of crack cocaine, baggies for packaging and a scale.
During the search of the 630 West Mul-lan Avenue residence, officers seized $1099.30 in cash, drug paraphernalia, certified mail addressed to Saddler and license plates issued to him. In the shed behind the house, the police found 13.2 grams of marijuana hidden behind some tires. Saddler’s Blazer was located outside the residence. Finally, at the Paige Drive residence, officers found Saddler inside with his girlfriend, $1369 in cash and 4.3 grams of marijuana that Saddler admitted belonged to him.
The grand jury indicted Saddler on five counts. Saddler pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict against Saddler on all five counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground and to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), 846, and 860; (2) possession with the intent to distribute cocaine within 1000 feet of a playground, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860; (3) possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base within 1000 feet of a playground, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 860; (4) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i); and (5) conspiracy to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o).
At trial, Earsery testified for the Government pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Earsery testified that he and Everette Richardson originally came to Waterloo in February 2003 for the purpose of making money by selling drugs. They lived with Richardson’s mother. Jessie Davis moved in with them by the summer of 2003. Earsery, Richardson and Davis then moved to 1112 Langley Road and lived with Buis and another woman. At these residences, Earsery, Richardson and Davis made and sold crack cocaine. Earsery also went to Chicago once a month to *885 obtain controlled substances from his source.
Earsery indicated that Saddler moved from Chicago to Waterloo in January 2005. By fall of that year, Earsery, Saddler, Rodell Leaks, Latiker and Wade all lived at 1264 West Mullan Avenue. They sold crack cocaine out of the 1264 West Mullan Avenue residence, and they shared customers. Eventually, Earsery, Saddler, Latiker and Wade moved to 630 West Mullan Avenue. Earsery testified that he, Saddler, Latiker, Wade, Leaks and Richardson all sold crack cocaine out of the 630 West Mullan Avenue residence. They again shared customers and gave each other drugs when needed for a sale.
Earsery, Richardson, Saddler, Latiker, Wade and Isaac Jackson all had access to the basement at the Hartman Street residence to store and retrieve their belongings. Although Earsery had stored the laptop case with the six guns in the basement, he testified that Saddler, Latiker, Wade, Leaks and Jackson also had access to the guns, which he referred to as “house guns” that anyone in the house could use. Earsery also testified that he had observed Saddler with firearms before and that Saddler preferred one of the 9mm Bryco Jennings pistols.
Jessie Davis also testified for the Government pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Davis stated that he, Earsery and Saddler had the same source for cocaine in Chicago. He indicated that a member of their group would go to Chicago to pick up cocaine two to three times a month and that he and Saddler had traveled to Chicago together once or twice to purchase cocaine from their source. Davis also saw Saddler in possession of three of the firearms, including one of the 9mm Bryco Jennings pistols, at different times when they sat out in front of the 1264 West Mullan Avenue residence and stated that he, Earsery and Saddler “would probably be the main ones strapped, ready, whatever.”
Finally, Buis testified that both Earsery and Saddler had keys to the Hartman Street residence because they kept drugs and money at the house and that Saddler was the main person to use the basement. Although she never saw anyone sell drugs out of the Hartman Street residence, she did see Saddler, Earsery, Wade and Latiker with drugs at this location. Specifically, she observed Saddler weighing crack cocaine on a scale in the kitchen.
At the close of the evidence, Saddler moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish any agreement to distribute drugs or to possess or use firearms, a necessary element of both conspiracy charges. The district court denied Saddler’s motion. In submitting the case to the jury, the district court instructed the jury that “crack cocaine and a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base refer to the same substance.” During deliberations, the jury asked the district court for “a clarification on the differences between ‘crack’ cocaine and cocaine.” The district court instructed the jury to recall the evidence. Subsequently, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Saddler on all counts.
At sentencing, the district court determined that Saddler’s base offense level for the drug conspiracy and possession convictions was 37 based on the quantity of crack cocaine, cocaine and marijuana involved in the drug conspiracy and a one-level increase for drug sales within 1000 feet of a protected location pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.2(a)(2). The district court also imposed a two-level upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l) because a dangerous weapon was possessed. As for the firearm conspiracy conviction, the dis *886 trict court determined that it was closely related to drug conspiracy and possession convictions and grouped them together under the same adjusted offense level. Therefore, Saddler’s advisory sentencing guidelines range for the drug convictions and firearm conspiracy convictions, based on a total offense level of 39 and a criminal history category of I, was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. On the firearm possession conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) required a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence.
Saddler requested a downward departure, arguing that he was a minimal participant in the conspiracy, lacked a criminal history, and suffered from Bell’s palsy. The district court stated:
I am aware that I have the power to depart whenever a case falls outside the Heartland of cases. And this one does not.
The Court finds that there is nothing unusual about this case that has not already been figured into the computation of the advisory guidelines.
For example, ... the fact that Defendant had no criminal history has been taken into consideration in the computation of the advisory guidelines sentence, and, therefore, the Court could not use that as a basis for a departure even if I wanted to.
There is nothing in the record here that, in my opinion, argues for a role in the offense. Whether it’s argued as a departure or an adjustment to the adjusted offense level, the Court finds that Defendant had not met his burden to prove a minor role in the offense.
As far as his medical condition, Bell’s palsy, there’s nothing that suggests that the defendant’s condition could not be handled in the Bureau of Prisons and treated there.
He will suffer no adverse consequences that are any more substantial than any other prisoner by virtue of having this condition.
So the Court, recognizing its power to depart downward, declines to do so and states that were the Court to depart downward, it would run afoul of the statutory factors at 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).
Sentencing Tr. at 12-13. The district court then considered the § 3553(a) factors and sentenced Saddler to 262 months’ imprisonment with a consecutive 60-month term, for a total sentence of 322 months’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Saddler argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support the drug conspiracy, firearm possession and firearm conspiracy convictions. We have recently summarized the standard of review for such arguments:
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and we draw all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor[.] We will uphold the verdict if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be the basis of a conviction. Furthermore, we must not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.
United States v. Garcia-Hernandez,
*887 1. Drug Conspiracy
“To establish that a defendant conspired to distribute drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. Rolon-Ramos,
Saddler argues that the Government failed to present evidence showing an agreement between him and Earsery, Davis, Leaks, Latiker, Wade, Richardson or Jackson to distribute crack cocaine, cocaine and marijuana. Rather, Saddler suggests that they each worked separately selling drugs out of the same houses. However, after reviewing the evidence presented to the jury,- we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Saddler’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his drug conspiracy conviction.
Davis testified that he, Earsery and Saddler had the same source for controlled substances in Chicago and that he and Saddler traveled to Chicago together to obtain cocaine from their source and transported the cocaine back to Waterloo. Ear-sery testified that all of the residents, including Saddler, sold crack cocaine out of the 1264 West Mullan Avenue and the 630 West Mullan Avenue residences. Earsery indicated that they shared customers and provided each other drugs when needed- to complete a sale. Two of Saddler’s customers testified that they purchased drugs not only from Saddler but also from others at the 630 West Mullan Avenue residence.
Additionally, the evidence presented to the jury ties Saddler to the 112 Hartman Street residence, where police seized large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, money, packaging materials and a scale.
See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez,
Saddler challenges the testimony of Earsery, Davis and Buis because these individuals were testifying in an attempt to avoid or reduce their own criminal sentence. However, our role is not to assess the credibility of the witnesses.
See Garcia-Hernandez,
*888 2. Firearm Possession and Conspiracy Convictions
The district court also did not err in denying Saddler’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his firearm possession conviction. “To establish that a defendant possessed a firearm in violation of § 924(c), the Government must prove that (1) he committed a drug trafficking crime, and (2) he possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Because we have already held that sufficient evidence supported Saddler’s drug distribution conspiracy conviction and because Saddler does not challenge his possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base convictions, we turn to the second element, whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Saddler possessed a firearm in furtherance of that conspiracy.
“Possession may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive.”
United States v. Williams,
Nonetheless, Saddler argues that there is no evidence of a nexus between his possession of a firearm and the drug trafficking convictions.
See United States v. Thorpe,
Finally, the district court did not err in denying Saddler’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to his firearm conspiracy conviction. To establish that a defendant conspired to use, carry or possess a firearm in violation of § 924(c) and (o), the Government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement either to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.
See
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (o);
cf. Garcia-Hernandez,
B. Sentencing Issues
Saddler contends that his sentence was both procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. “We review a defendant’s sentence for both the procedural soundness of the district court’s decision and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”
United States v. Tabor,
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, [we] should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence....
Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.-,
Although Saddler does not challenge the calculation of the advisory sentencing guidelines range, he does argue that the district court erred in denying his request for a downward departure. However, “the denial of a downward departure is unreviewable unless the district court had an unconstitutional motive or an erroneous belief that it was without the authority to grant the departure.”
United States v. Cole,
Saddler also argues that the district court improperly applied a presumption of reasonableness to the advisory sentencing guidelines range, contrary to the principles announced in
Rita v. United States,
551 U.S.-,
Saddler next argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. “We review the reasonableness of the district court’s sentence[ ] for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Canania,
Saddler was sentenced to 322 months’ imprisonment, consisting of a mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence added to a 262-month sentence, which was at the bottom of the undisputed advisory
*891
sentencing guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and provided sufficient reasons to satisfy us that it “has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
See Rita,
Nonetheless, Saddler claims that the district court failed to consider two relevant factors that should have received significant weight: Saddler’s health and the “Draconian penalties” associated with crack cocaine. However, the district court did indeed consider Saddler’s medical condition and determined that the Bureau of Prisons could handle and treat his Bell’s palsy. As for the “Draconian penalties” argument, because Saddler did not raise this issue with the district court, we review it for plain error.
See United States v. M.R.M.,
We recognize that during the pendency of Saddler’s appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided
Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S.-,
C. Sixth Amendment Violation
Finally, Saddler argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights because the jury did not determine a key fact that increased the statutory maximum penalty he faced.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey,
Saddler was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of “cocaine base” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Saddler contends that to be convicted of a § 841(b)(1)(A) offense, the jury must determine that the
*892
offense involved “crack cocaine” rather than some other form of “cocaine base.”
See United States v. Edwards,
We conclude that the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, because the jury determined that the offenses involved “crack cocaine.” The district court instructed the jury that “crack cocaine and a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base refer to the same substance.” This instruction was clear and followed our circuit’s precedent that “cocaine base” and “crack cocaine” are synonymous.
See United States v. Robinson,
Even had there been an error that was plain, we would conclude that Saddler’s substantial rights were not affected. Saddler was convicted for two separate offenses involving cocaine base: conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and possession with the intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Even if Saddler’s argument were entirely correct, he nonetheless received a sentence that is well within the statutory maximum available to the district court. Because each offense would have a statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment and because a district court may “run sentences from multiple counts consecutively, rather than concurrently, if the Guideline sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each count,” the statutory maximum for both offenses if run consecutively was forty years’ imprisonment.
See United States v. Zimmer,
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm Saddler’s convictions and sentence. 2
Notes
. The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
. We do recognize that since the pendency of Saddler's appeal, the United States Sentenc
*893
ing Commission adopted Amendment 706, which reduced the crack/powder cocaine sentencing ratio in § 2D 1.1(c). See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2007), App. C, Amend. 706. The Sentencing Commission has given retroactive effect to Amendment 706.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Saddler may move the district court for a reduced sentence in light of Amendment 706, and the resolution of this appeal does not prejudice Saddler’s ability to make such a motion.
See King,