United States v. OmotayoUnited States v. Omotayo
The sole question before us is whether, in the course of the wire fraud conspiracy, Omotayo also violated a federal law criminalizing “aggravated identity theft,”
Soon after Omotayo‘s conviction, the Supreme Court decided Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). Dubin established that
For the reasons set forth in our opinion, we agree with Omotayo: in light of Dubin, Omotayo‘s conviction cannot stand. First, the jury was instructed to apply a legal standard that is now plainly incorrect. Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2013) (“[A]n error is ‘plain’ even if the trial judge‘s decision was plainly correct at the time when it was made but subsequently becomes incorrect based on a change in law.“(emphasis in original)). Second, even if the jury had been correctly instructed under Dubin, the government‘s evidence was insufficient to show that Omotayo‘s possession or transfer of the invoice played a key role in the wire fraud scheme. We therefore REVERSE Omotayo‘s judgment of conviction as to the aggravated identity theft charge, and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.
Judge SULLIVAN dissents in a separate opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
REBECCA T. DELL, Assistant United States Attorney (Daniel H. Wolf and David Abramowicz, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for the United States of America.
MATTHEW J. KLUGER, Law Office of Matthew J. Kluger, Bronx, New York, for Defendant-Appellant Temitope Omotayo.
CARNEY, Circuit Judge:
Omotayo, along with at least eleven co-conspirators, participated in an international scheme aimed at defrauding businesses in the United States. For his role in the fraud, Omotayo was convicted by a jury on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. He concedes that substantial evidence supported those convictions.
The sole question before us is whether, in the course of the wire fraud conspiracy, Omotayo also violated a federal law criminalizing “aggravated identity theft,”
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Omotayo: in light of Dubin, Omotayo‘s conviction cannot stand. First, the jury was instructed to apply a legal standard that is now plainly incorrect. Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2013) (“[A]n error is ‘plain’ even if the trial judge‘s decision was plainly correct at the time when it was made but subsequently becomes incorrect based on a change in law.” (emphasis in original)). Second, even if the jury had been correctly instructed under Dubin, the government‘s evidence was insufficient to show that Omotayo‘s possession or transfer of the invoice was at the crux of what made the wire fraud scheme criminal. We therefore REVERSE Omotayo‘s judgment of conviction as to the aggravated identity theft charge, and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.
BACKGROUND
I. Arrest and Indictment
On April 25, 2019, Temitope Omotayo and eight co-defendants were arrested under a one-count federal indictment that charged conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of
On September 9, 2021, just over a month before trial, the government filed a Fourth Superseding Indictment (“S4“), adding two new charges against Omotayo and some of his co-conspirators: conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of
Under
Count Five of S4 alleged that Omotayo and a co-defendant, Bryan Eadie, “possessed and used the name and employer of another person . . . without [that person‘s] authorization, in attempting to obtain through fraud the proceeds of a wire
II. Trial
The government tried Omotayo jointly with Oluwaseun “Sean” Adelekan, his cousin and co-defendant. At trial, as detailed below, the government presented text messages exchanged by Omotayo and some of his co-conspirators; financial records from bank accounts controlled by the conspirators; testimony by victims of the fraud; and the testimony of two cooperating witnesses, who described the particulars of Omotayo‘s participation in the conspiracy.
A. The Structure of the Conspiracy
The government‘s witnesses described how participants in the scheme played one of three roles: in the group‘s terminology, these were called the “Plug,” the “Scout,” and the “Connect.” App‘x 166-67. A “Plug” would communicate with targeted victims and attempt to persuade them to transfer money to the conspirators. Plugs used several techniques to trick their victims, including romance scams, investment scams, and, as pertinent here, business email scams. In a business email scam, a Plug would pose as the employee of a legitimate business and attempt to persuade actual employees of that business or of its business partners to issue payments to bank accounts controlled by the conspirators.
The conspirators used accounts at legitimate U.S. banks to receive and hold the stolen funds. Maintaining a sufficient number of accounts at such banks, however, proved a challenge: banks would sometimes flag transfers as suspicious and freeze the accounts. When this occurred, the conspirators turned to their “Scouts.” Scouts were assigned to identify individuals who had or were willing to open U.S. business bank accounts that the conspirators could use to perpetrate frauds or hold the proceeds.
Finally, the “Connects” served as middlemen between the Scouts and the Plugs, handling communications between the two. Connects also provided Scouts with instructions on how to divide the fraud‘s proceeds.
B. Omotayo‘s Participation in the Conspiracy
On February 24, 2017, Omotayo came to the United States from Nigeria on a two-year work visa. He initially travelled to Chicago to visit relatives, but later moved to New York, where he found work in several factories. By the time Omotayo arrived in the United States, the conspiracy was underway, and Adelekan, Omotayo‘s cousin, was already an active participant. The record is unclear as to how Omotayo‘s involvement began. By May 2017, however, Omotayo had joined Adelekan in the scheme.
Bryan Eadie—who by the time of trial had become a cooperating witness—testified that Omotayo was a Connect, i.e., that he was responsible for facilitating the transfer and division of fraudulent funds in any particular transaction by passing information between the relevant Plug and the Scout. The government presented evidence that, after a Plug had persuaded a victim to transfer funds, Omotayo would notify Scouts that they should expect to receive wire transfers of funds into their business bank accounts. Then, after the money arrived, Omotayo would send instructions to Scouts on how to divide the proceeds among the conspirators. At times, Omotayo also requested that Scouts give him lists of new business bank accounts
The jury heard from several victims of business email scams that Omotayo participated in. To illustrate: Paula Hall, the Controller at Gregory Manufacturing, a midwestern company that manufactures steel dumpsters, among other products, testified as to her experience. As Controller, Hall was responsible for paying the company‘s vendors and had full access to its bank accounts. On October 3, 2018, Hall received an email that she believed came from Mike Walker, the company‘s President. In reality, the actual (and unidentified) individual who contacted her that day by email was using a “spoof” account resembling Walker‘s real email address. The email directed Hall to pay an invoice for $32,460 to a false business partner, “Gekeem‘s SMA,”1 and provided information for a Bank of America account that, unbeknownst to Hall, was controlled by
the conspirators. That same day, Omotayo contacted his Scout, Eadie, on WhatsApp to let him know to expect a transfer of $32,460.
Over the following week, Hall received two additional spoofed emails from the Walker account directing her to send wires totaling $143,800 to “Gekeem‘s SMA.” She followed the scammers’ instructions. Omotayo again messaged Eadie to let him know to expect the transfers and to instruct him as to how to divide the money. By October 15, when Hall discovered the scam, it was too late to recover the money.
Additional testimony at trial showed that Omotayo played a similar role in facilitating other frauds carried out in this fashion. No evidence was introduced that Omotayo himself interacted with the victim businesses.
C. Trial Evidence of Aggravated Identity Theft
The aggravated identity theft charge against Omotayo related to his preparations, in one instance, to help prevent a bank from detecting a fraudulent transfer such as the one Hall made above. As described, banks would sometimes flag wire transfers as suspicious and freeze the conspirators’ charade business bank accounts before the fraud‘s proceeds could be withdrawn and distributed. When a particular fraud was detected in this way, the conspirators would lose any funds remaining in the account and would also be forced to open new repository accounts. To help reduce these risks, Scouts sometimes prepared stories to tell bank employees who questioned the validity of the transfers.
Trial evidence showed that, on several occasions, Omotayo and Adelekan provided Scouts with documents, including invoices, that could be shown to bank employees if they became suspicious and started asking questions about the transactions. With regard to the aggravated identity theft charge, the government introduced evidence that, as part of a specific fraudulent transaction targeting the Canadian company JSS Medical Research (“JSS“), Omotayo “possessed” and “transferred” two invoices that contained the name of a real JSS employee that he shared with a co-conspirator for this purpose.
The JSS fraud took place in August 2018, when JSS was preparing to pay one of its vendors, MKR Clinical Research Consultants (“MKR” or the “Vendor“). An
On August 20, Omotayo sent Adelekan a WhatsApp message informing him that “[m]oney [would be] coming in from Canada.” Id. at 1017. He also sent Adelekan a screenshot showing JSS‘s Montreal address. On the same day, JSS transferred $24,354.31 to a business bank account nominally associated with Hair Judgment, a salon owned by the girlfriend of co-conspirator Bryan Eadie. JSS‘s Chief Operating Officer, Stella Boukas, testified that JSS understood that it was sending the $24,354.31 to the Vendor.
On August 21, Omotayo sent his confederate Eadie a counterfeit invoice, prepared to show that JSS “owed” $24,361.31 to its Vendor, MKR. The bank information listed on the counterfeit invoice was for a Hair Judgment business account, not any of the Vendor‘s accounts. The business address listed for the Vendor was Eadie‘s home address. Omotayo later sent Eadie an updated version of the false invoice; it showed payment due to “MKR Clinical Research Consultants/Hair judgement [sic].” Supp. App‘x 35.
Each of the two fabricated invoices directed “Bill To: Yulia Roytman.” Id. at 33, 35. JSS‘s Chief Operating Officer testified that Roytman was a real project manager at JSS in August of 2018 and that JSS‘s project managers were responsible for reviewing invoices received from vendors.
The second, revised invoice is reproduced below. Roytman‘s name appears on the upper left side of the
Id. at 35. During trial, Eadie explained that he believed Omotayo had sent him the false invoices to “verify in case the bank asks why . . . [he] receive[d] this $24,000.” App‘x 228. It is unclear from the record whether Omotayo himself manufactured the invoices or received them from some other source.
JSS made the $24,354.31 wire transfer to the Hair Judgment business account without having seen either invoice. Thereafter, HSBC Bank froze that account and returned the stolen funds to JSS. Ultimately, the parties agree, neither counterfeit invoice was ever provided to any bank, to JSS, or to the Vendor.
D. Omotayo‘s Rule 29 Motion
At the conclusion of the evidence, Omotayo moved (as relevant here) for a judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated identity theft charge, arguing that the government had not introduced sufficient evidence proving that charge. In response, the government pointed to the August 21 invoices that Omotayo possessed and sent to Eadie, highlighting the appearance on those documents of the name of Yulia Roytman, a “real person who was an employee of JSS Medical Research.” App‘x 838. The government maintained that the appearance of Roytman‘s name and place of business on the fabricated invoices “could lead a rational juror[] to conclude that Mr. Omotayo used the means of identification of another in furtherance of the wire fraud conspiracy charged in Count One without lawful authority, ‘without lawful authority’ being because he was using it in furtherance of [the wire fraud conspiracy].” Id. at 839. The District Court denied Omotayo‘s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count Five without explanation.
E. Closing Arguments and Jury Instructions
The government‘s closing argument on the aggravated identity theft charge again rested solely on the appearance of Roytman‘s name on the backup false invoices that Omotayo possessed. The government suggested that the co-conspirators purposefully chose the name of a real JSS employee to put on the invoice on the theory that, if bank employees ever saw the document, they might Google Roytman‘s name to see if she really worked at JSS. And if the bank “took it one step further and actually called JSS” to ask if Yulia Roytman worked there, the fraudsters “need[ed] to be sure that the bank was going to hear ‘yes’ to that [question].” App‘x 922-23. In this way, the government maintained, the appearance of Yulia Roytman‘s name “further[ed] the fraud[.]” Id. at 922.
The district court then gave the jury its final instructions. On the aggravated identity theft charge, the court told the jury that it could find Omotayo guilty only if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Omotayo “knowingly used, transferred, or possessed a means of identification of another person“; (2) his use, transfer, or possession was “in relation to the offense of wire fraud conspiracy charged in Count One of [the] indictment“; and (3) Omotayo “acted without legal authority.” Id. at 967-68.
Regarding the second element, the court explained that “[a] person uses, transfers, or possesses a means of identification in relation to a crime if the means of identification had a purpose, role, or effect with respect to the crime.” Id. at 969. As to the third element, the court told the jury that “‘without lawful authority’ means without authorization recognized by statute or regulation.” Id. The court elaborated:
To prove the “without lawful authority” element, the government need not prove that the means of identification [was] stolen. However, proof that [the] means of identification [was] stolen would satisfy the “without lawful authority” element. “Without lawful authority” includes situations in which a defendant comes into lawful possession of identifying information and had the lawful authority to use that information for a lawful purpose but used the information for an unlawful purpose. “Without lawful authority” also includes situations where
the person, whose identity was used in furtherance of a crime, consented to or gave permission for that use.
Id. at 969-70. The Court‘s jury instructions on the aggravated identity theft charge were substantively identical to those proposed by the government, to which Omotayo did not object.
F. Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
The jury convicted Omotayo on all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to forty-eight months on Counts One and Two. As to Count Five, the aggravated identity theft count, the court imposed on Omotayo the mandatory sentence of twenty-four months, to be served consecutive to the forty-eight month sentence he received on the other counts.2 Because the sentence for Count Five had to run after completion of the sentence for Counts One and Two,
Omotayo timely appealed his conviction on Count Five. He did not challenge his convictions on Counts One or Two.
In February 2023, Omotayo filed his opening brief on appeal. In it, he focused on the aggravated identity theft charge, arguing that the government‘s evidence was insufficient to establish (1) that he used, transferred, or possessed Yulia Roytman‘s name “during and in relation to” the wire fraud conspiracy, or (2) that he acted “without lawful authority.”3
When Omotayo filed his opening brief, the Courts of Appeals were divided about the correct understanding of
F.3d 624, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2018). But it also explained that, at least in the health care fraud context, aggravated identity theft covered “whole cloth” misrepresentations about the identity of the patient, id. at 629, but not misrepresentations about “‘how and why‘” a patient had received certain services, id. at 628 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Medlock, 792 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2015)).
Omotayo argued that our Circuit‘s rule, set forth in United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2021),4 required that the “use [of the means of identification] must at least facilitate—or be instrumental to—the predicate offense.” Appellant‘s Br. at 30. The evidence at trial, he contended, did not show that the placement of the name “Yulia Roytman” on the invoice facilitated the fraud.
Omotayo also noted in his opening brief that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari on a case that had the potential to resolve the circuit split regarding
Omotayo notified this Court of the Dubin opinion, and the government‘s opening brief and Omotayo‘s reply brief, both filed after Dubin issued, addressed whether the evidence against Omotayo met the standard articulated there.
DISCUSSION
Omotayo argues that the evidence that the government presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated identity theft because the use of Yulia Roytman‘s name on the backup invoices was not “at the crux” of the wire fraud conspiracy. We agree.
As an initial matter, the jury never found that Roytman‘s name met Dubin‘s “crux” test: the jury was instructed that it could find Omotayo guilty of aggravated identity theft if Roytman‘s name had any “purpose, role, or effect with respect to the crime[,]” regardless of whether that purpose, role, or effect was at the crux of the underlying criminality. App‘x 969. We determine whether a jury instruction is erroneous by looking to the legal standard that applies at the time of appeal. See Henderson, 568 U.S. at 269. In light of Dubin, the jury instruction was plainly erroneous. Further, on review of the record, we conclude that even if the jury had been instructed properly, the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that Yulia Roytman‘s name played a “key role” in the wire fraud. We therefore reverse Omotayo‘s conviction.
Section 1028A(a)(1) does not extend to “ancillary” uses of a means of identification.
Dubin is now the seminal case on
The question in Dubin was whether the defendant “used” his patients’ means of identification “in relation to” his healthcare fraud. The Court observed that both terms— “use” and “in relation to“—had “indeterminate” meanings; each could be read broadly or narrowly, depending on the statutory context. Id. at 118-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government argued that the statute “cover[ed] any time another person‘s means of identification is employed in a way that facilitates” a predicated offense. Id. at 122. The Court disagreed, concluding that the statutory context did not support the government‘s “boundless” interpretation of each term. Id. at 114.
The Court looked first to the title of the statute: “Aggravated Identity Theft.” Id. at 120-21. It pointed out that “[t]he government‘s broad reading . . . b[ore] little resemblance to any ordinary meaning of ‘identity theft.‘” Id. at 122. The phrase “‘identity theft,‘” the Court observed, “has a focused meaning“: the “‘fraudulent appropriation and use of another person‘s identifying data or documents[.]‘” Id. (quoting Webster‘s Unabridged Dictionary xi (2d ed. 2001)); see also id. (quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary definition, which resembles the Webster‘s definition and says that “identity theft” is “[t]he unlawful taking and use of another person‘s identifying information for fraudulent purposes“).
The Court also considered that
Further, the Court pointed out, a conviction based on
Thus, the Court determined that both “use” and “in relation to” took on more precise definitions in the context of
To determine whether the “at the crux” test is met, Dubin establishes several requirements. First, the means of identification itself must be a “key mover” in the predicate crime, id. at 122-23; that is, it must play some integral role in the success of the scheme. See United States v. Avenatti, No. 22-1242, 2024 WL 959877, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (summary order) (affirming aggravated identity theft conviction where “identity theft was an essential part of [the defendant‘s] criminal conduct“), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 408 (2024); see also discussion infra note 12 (discussing how other circuits have applied this rule). Second, the government must show “more than a causal relationship, such as facilitation of the offense or being a but-for cause of its success.”5 Dubin, 599 U.S. at 131 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At least where the predicate offense is fraud, “the means of identification specifically must be used in a manner that is fraudulent or deceptive.” Id. at 131-32. And this fraudulent use must be “at the locus of the criminal undertaking, rather than merely passive, passing, or ancillary employment in a crime.” Id. at 123 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Cuomo, 125 F.4th 354, 369 (2d Cir. 2025) (explaining that a defendant‘s use of victims’ social security numbers amounted to aggravated identity theft where his use was “both fraudulent and deceptive,” as the “entire [fraud] was about impersonating [the victims]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. De Los Santos, No. 22-3164, 2024 WL 3041944, at *2 n.3 (2d Cir. June 18, 2024) (summary order) (holding that “the misuse of another person‘s means of identification was ‘at the crux’ of the fraud”
where “the very nature of the scheme required the use of a person‘s identification“). Applying this test to Dubin‘s case, the Supreme Court concluded that his conduct did not fall within the ambit of
The Dubin Court focused on only one of the verbs in
Both “transfer” and “possess,” the Court observed, “connote theft” in the
predicate offense—it must be “at the crux of the criminality.” Id. at 127 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
II. In light of Dubin, the jury instruction was plainly erroneous
At the close of Omotayo‘s trial evidence, the district court instructed the jury that “[a] person uses, transfers, or possesses a means of identification in relation to a crime if the means of identification had a purpose, role, or effect with respect to the crime.” App‘x 969. In light of Dubin, this instruction was error.
Because Omotayo did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review the instructions for plain error.6 To reverse
Dubin explains that the “in relation to” element of
In light of Dubin, the jury instruction was plainly incorrect.7 See Henderson, 568 U.S. at 273-74 (2013) (“[A]n error is ‘plain’ even if the trial judge‘s decision was plainly correct at the time when it was made but subsequently becomes incorrect based on a change in law.” (emphasis in original)).
We also conclude that the error affected Omotayo‘s substantial rights: that is, we find that “there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Solano, 966 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result of the erroneous instruction, the jury did not consider the evidence and all of the elements of the aggravated identity theft offense under the correct standard. As discussed above, the government‘s evidence that Omotayo‘s “transfer[], possess[ion], or use[]” of Roytman‘s name was “at the crux” of the
Further, we are of the view that this error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 200. The jury convicted Omotayo of aggravated identity theft based on a far broader conception of
III. The government‘s evidence was insufficient to show that the invoice bearing Roytman‘s name was “at the crux” of the wire fraud conspiracy
The erroneous jury instruction constitutes reversible error: on that basis alone, we could vacate Omotayo‘s conviction and remand for retrial. But where a defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we “generally requir[e] reviewing courts to consider preserved sufficiency challenges before ordering retrials based on identified trial error.” Hoffler v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2013).8 Because a “reversal on the basis of insufficiency of evidence, like an acquittal, bars a retrial, . . . a reversal of a conviction on grounds other than sufficiency does not avoid the need to determine the sufficiency of the evidence before a retrial may occur.” United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 917 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). We therefore turn to Omotayo‘s argument that the government‘s evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated identity theft conviction. We agree with Omotayo: after Dubin, the government‘s evidence fell short.
A. Omotayo‘s transfer and possession of Roytman‘s name was “ancillary” to the wire fraud conspiracy
As a preliminary matter, we note that Omotayo‘s conviction for aggravated identity theft in this case must be premised on his “possession” and “transfer” of Roytman‘s name, rather than his “use.” The evidence at trial was that Omotayo never showed the invoice to the bank or to any other person besides Eadie, the co-conspirator to whom Omotayo transferred the document. So we cannot say that the invoice was “used” without giving that term an unworkably broad meaning, one that would render the words “possess” and “transfer” largely superfluous in the statute. See Berroa, 856 F.3d at 156 (cautioning that “in [the
Based on the evidence introduced at trial, no reasonable jury could conclude that Omotayo‘s possession or transfer of Roytman‘s name was “at the crux” of the fraud. The invoice was not a central part of the conspirators’ scheme. Eadie testified that Omotayo sent the invoice to him (Eadie) as part of a contingency plan: If the bank asked questions about why $24,354.31 was transferred into the Hair Judgment account, Eadie could show them the invoice. In many cases, including the attempted JSS fraud, the conspirators never needed to show the relevant bank any documents at all.
Further, for
The government offers several theories as to how including the name of a real JSS employee might have “advanced” the fraud by increasing the credibility of the invoice. Appellee‘s Br. at 21. It speculates, for instance, that the appearance of Roytman‘s name on the invoice “ensured that any bank representative who investigated the matter would learn not only that the invoice listed a real JSS employee, but that it listed a JSS employee who, as a project manager, was authorized to receive and review invoices from MKR.” Id. In its closing argument to the jury, the government described hypothetical scenarios in which bank employees would Google Roytman‘s name or call JSS to verify that she worked there. But the government introduced no evidence to support the notion that the bank would make so much of appearance of the specific employee‘s name on an invoice like this one. We can just as easily imagine that the bank would have overlooked Roytman‘s name entirely, focusing on the other information contained in the document. And even if we presume that placing Roytman‘s name on the invoice might have marginally “advanced” the conspirators’ fraud, id. at 21, Dubin teaches that “being at the crux of the criminality requires more than . . . facilitation of the offense,” 599 U.S. at 114 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).9
As a useful point of comparison, we can look to the evidence the government used to convict Omotayo‘s co-defendant Adelekan of aggravated identity theft. At trial, the government introduced evidence regarding a different plan of the conspirators, one to defraud a venture fund. As part of this scheme, a Plug exchanged emails with the venture fund‘s bank using a spoofed email account that resembled
Adelekan shared the banker‘s emails with Eadie and asked him to impersonate Girsky on the expected confirmation call. To ensure that Eadie could answer the bank‘s questions, Adelekan gave him Girsky‘s real name, address, social security number, and date of birth. Eadie testified that he refused to take part in this plan because he “didn‘t want to get involved in doing that.” App‘x 291.
We need not decide whether this evidence was sufficient under Dubin to support Adelekan‘s conviction for aggravated identity theft; that issue is not before us in this appeal.10 Adelekan‘s use of Girsky‘s identifying information nevertheless reveals some of the elements that are missing from the case that was presented against Omotayo. For Adelekan, impersonating Girsky on the confirmation call was not a backup plan—it was essential to the fraud. The banker told the conspirators that he would process the wire transfer only after speaking to Girsky. Cf. Avenatti, 2024 WL 959877, at *4 (holding that defendant‘s use of means of identification was at the crux of criminal conduct where the defendant forged his client‘s signature after learning that he could not steal funds from her without her signoff). It was Girsky‘s identifying information, moreover, that the fraudsters needed to complete this part of the plan. The banker testified that he would have used the confirmation call to ask, among other things, for Girsky‘s date of birth and social security number.
As the planned Girsky fraud illustrates, many of Omotayo‘s coconspirators impersonated or attempted to impersonate real people as part of the larger scheme. Some of the fraudsters (the Plugs) used hacked or spoofed email accounts to pretend to be employees of legitimate businesses in order to defraud those businesses, their banks, and their business partners. Indeed, in the JSS scam, a Plug impersonated an employee of JSS‘s Vendor in a successful attempt to persuade JSS to wire funds to the conspirators’ bank accounts. But there is no evidence that Omotayo himself ever communicated with anyone at JSS, the Vendor, or the bank (or with anyone else besides his co-conspirators), or presented the invoice to anyone else outside the conspiracy. Both at trial and in this appeal, the government‘s argument that Omotayo violated
Omotayo‘s role in the JSS fraud was to ensure that fraudulent funds were successfully transferred into and distributed from bank accounts controlled by the conspiracy. It was not to impersonate real employees in order to defraud businesses. His conduct made him criminally liable for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. But to convict him under
The government advances several responses. First, it argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Dubin, because Royman‘s name “had been stolen” by hackers who infiltrated JSS‘s system or that of its Vendor. Appellee‘s Br. at 18. Where a means of identification is “stolen or misappropriated,” the government asserts, a
Even if mere possession or transfer of a stolen means of identification could support a
The government next contends that Dubin “requires [no] more” than that Omotayo have employed Roytman‘s name “‘in a manner that [was] fraudulent or deceptive.‘” Id. at 21 (quoting Dubin 599 U.S. at 132). The invoices meet this standard, the government asserts, because Omotayo intended to use Roytman‘s name “to deceive the bank about ‘who was involved’ in reviewing and approving the relevant wire transfer on JSS‘s behalf.” Id. (internal alteration and certain quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dubin, 599 U.S. at 123). Or, as counsel for the government put it during oral argument, the invoice falsely suggested that “[Roytman] approved the wire transfer” to the conspirators’ bank account. Oral Argument at 14:27-34.
Even positing, however, that the government is correct as to why Roytman‘s name appeared on the invoice—a question the jury was not asked to consider—we do not agree that any fraudulent or deceptive use of a name necessarily goes to the “crux” of an underlying fraud. The government relies on the following language in Dubin:
A defendant “uses” another person‘s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when this use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. To be clear, being at the crux of the criminality requires more than a causal relationship, such as facilitation of the
offense or being a but-for cause of its success. Instead, with fraud or deceit crimes like the one in this case, the means of identification specifically must be used in a manner that is fraudulent or deceptive. Such fraud or deceit going to identity can often be succinctly summarized as going to “who” is involved.
Dubin, 599 U.S. at 131-32 (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted). As the quoted paragraph shows, the Supreme Court has recognized fraudulent use of a means of identification as a necessary element of at least some aggravated identity theft convictions: namely, those premised on “use” of a means of identification and for which the predicate felony involves “fraud or deceit.” Id. But we do not take Dubin to mean that any deceptive reference to a name, no matter how ancillary to the underlying crime, necessarily constitutes aggravated identity theft. Dubin also emphasized that “the means of identification specifically [must be] a key mover in the criminality.” Id. at 122-23. And, as we have explained, the mere appearance of Roytman‘s name on a fraudulent invoice that Omotayo showed only to his coconspirators was hardly a “key mover” in the wire fraud scheme.11
Thus, the government‘s efforts to distinguish the facts of this case from those of Dubin are unpersuasive. There are, of course, pertinent differences. Perhaps the jury could have found, based on the limited trial evidence about the invoices transferred by Omotayo, that some of the information on the invoices may have been stolen by hackers. And, arguably, any banker who saw the invoice might conceivably interpret Roytman‘s name as an indication she had approved the transaction. Neither of these points alters the fundamental flaw in the government‘s post-Dubin case: that the invoices themselves, and Roytman‘s name in particular, were not at the crux of the wire fraud.
C. Since Dubin, other circuits have also held that the means of identification must be critical to the underlying fraud
Our conclusion is consistent with our sister circuits’ recent applications of Dubin. In United States v. Ovsepian, for instance, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a defendant committed aggravated identity theft by keeping a patient‘s health care file “without her authorization” so that the defendant‘s medical clinic, which was engaged in health care fraud, could “protect against a possible audit.” 113 F.4th 1193, 1208 (9th Cir. 2024). While maintaining the patient‘s health care file on site “may have lent [the clinic] the air of legitimacy and thereby helped [it] to survive an audit,” the court explained, the defendant‘s possession was “not at the ‘crux’ of the conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud.” Id. Rather, it was “an ‘ancillary feature’ of the scheme that merely facilitated its commission.‘” Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that, because the government had made a “strategic choice” to base its
By contrast, in United States v. Croft, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the owner of a police dog handling and training school committed aggravated identity theft when he prepared and submitted a certification application that falsely represented that four qualified trainers would be serving as instructors at his school. 87 F.4th 644, 646 (5th Cir. 2023). The government introduced evidence that “the roster of instructors and their qualifications was ‘particularly important‘” to the certification application. Id. at 649 (quoting trial testimony). Those same misrepresentations about the identity of his instructors were “the basis” for the defendant‘s conviction for the predicate felony of wire fraud. Id. The inclusion of the four instructors was the “material misrepresentation[]” on the certification applications that Croft submitted. Id. Thus, the court concluded, the use of the instructors’ names was “at the crux of what made the underlying conduct fraudulent.” Id. (internal alterations adopted; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It affirmed the defendant‘s conviction.12
These cases are instructive here. As in Ovsepian, Omotayo‘s placement of the name Yulia Roytman on the contingency document served an ancillary purpose: for possible use if a bank might ask questions about the wire transfer. If a bank did so, Eadie could present the invoice and, as the government posits, the appearance of Roytman‘s name might lend “an air of legitimacy” to the invoice. Ovsepian, 113 F.4th at 1208. But Omotayo‘s use of Roytman‘s
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In sum, Omotayo‘s possession and transfer of Roytman‘s name did not “play[] a key role” in the fraud that “warrants a 2-year mandatory minimum.” Dubin, 599 U.S. at 129. The invoices bearing Roytman‘s name were intended to serve as part of a contingency plan, and, indeed, although the particular JSS fraud came close to being accomplished, the invoices were never used. Roytman‘s name had even less importance than the invoices themselves. We should not permit the Roytman invoices to become the “tail which wags the dog” of Omotayo‘s underlying fraudulent conduct. United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The two-year mandatory sentence is intended for a “particularly serious form of identity theft,” the Supreme Court has taught. Dubin, 599 U.S. at 124. We have been cautioned against reading
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the judgment of Omotayo‘s conviction as to the aggravated identity theft count,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the district court‘s jury instruction concerning the crime of aggravated identity theft is now plainly erroneous in light of Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). But I do not agree that Dubin requires a reversal of Temitope Omotayo‘s conviction for that offense. Because Omotayo did not object to the jury instructions at trial, he must establish not merely that there was plain error, but that there was “fundamental error” – error that prejudicially affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 317 (2d Cir. 2001). To my mind, he has not done so. Indeed, based on the evidence introduced at trial, I am confident that a properly instructed jury would have unanimously concluded that Omotayo‘s possession and transfer of Yulia Roytman‘s name on fraudulent invoices played a key role in the conspiracy to commit wire fraud and that the use of her means of identification was “at the crux” of what made the conduct criminal. Dubin, 599 U.S. at 131. I
As explained by the majority, Dubin established that under
Omotayo‘s conduct clearly satisfies this standard. Unlike in Dubin, where the government argued that
In order for the wire-fraud scheme underlying the conspiracy charged in Count One to succeed, Omotayo and his co-conspirators needed to deceive two distinct parties: (1) the victim companies duped into approving the transfer of funds from their accounts and (2) the banks that received the fraudulent transfer requests and executed the wire transfers to the co-conspirators’ bank accounts. The scheme could not be completed until funds were wired from the JSS Medical Research account to the bank account opened by Omotayo‘s co-conspirators; only then would the co-conspirators be able to access these funds. See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] scheme to defraud is not complete until the proceeds have been received.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In Dubin, the Court found that the defendant‘s use of patients’ names was merely “an ancillary part of the Medicaid billing process” in the petitioner‘s scheme to overbill for medical testing, since the testing was in fact performed on the patients in question. 599 U.S. at 114. In other words, the deception had nothing to do with the patients’ identities. Here by contrast, the possession and transfer of Roytman‘s name and employer were “integral to what made the conduct fraudulent,” because it was intended to lull the bank into believing that Roytman had actually approved the fraudulent transactions. Id. at 118. Omotayo‘s co-conspirator (Bryan Eadie) himself testified that the fake invoices bearing Roytman‘s name were prepared so that Eadie and his girlfriend would have them on hand in case the bank inquired about the legitimacy and purpose of the JSS wire transfer. See App‘x at 667–69, 677–80.
The majority contends that “no reasonable jury could conclude that Omotayo‘s possession or transfer of Roytman‘s name was ‘at the crux’ of the fraud” because the invoices bearing Roytman‘s name were “intended to serve as a part of a contingency plan” and were ultimately “never used.” Maj. Op. at 35. But liability under
Further, the majority‘s focus on whether the invoice was used or whether the bank requested the invoice ignores the fact that
Finally, because I believe that Omotayo‘s “possession” and “transfer” of Roytman‘s name was “at the crux” of what made his conduct criminal, I cannot agree that affirming Omotayo‘s conviction would improperly “extend”
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For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s opinion and would affirm the district court‘s decision as to Omotayo‘s conviction for aggravated identity theft under