United States of America v. Oliver Sonny Maupin
No. 19-3550
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
July 1, 2021
Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Davenport
Submitted: January 12, 2021
Filed: July 1, 2021
Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted Oliver Maupin of conspiring to manufacture and distribute marijuana in violation of
I. Background
In 2015, Maupin, a Las Vegas resident, purchased two properties in Selma, Oregon, “Deer Creek” and “Draper Valley,” to grow marijuana. Under Oregon‘s Medical Marijuana Program, licensed growers recruit patients who have consulted with a doctor and obtained a medical marijuana card from the State and then cultivate plants on behalf of the patients. Lamai Szklanecki, Maupin‘s ex-girlfriend, and Rick West agreed to be the on-site operators of the grows at Draper Valley and Deer Creek, respectively. The three agreed to split the profits from these medical marijuana endeavors. Maupin reimbursed Szklanecki and West for the costs of getting the operations up and running -- renovating the properties, purchasing growing equipment and plants, and obtaining licenses from state authorities to legally grow marijuana. In addition to paying for the grows’ infrastructure, Maupin reimbursed Szklanecki and West for expenses incurred in signing up patients, such as paying for their doctor visits. Some patients were Oregon acquaintances
The trio began cultivating marijuana at Deer Creek and Draper Valley in Fall 2015; cultivation continued at both properties until law enforcement raids in 2017. After establishing the grows, Szklanecki, in violation of federal and state law, began mailing marijuana to out-of-state customers. On three occasions, she mailed marijuana to Maupin‘s home, which he and a tenant distributed to customers in the Las Vegas area. In late 2015 or early 2016, Szklanecki began providing marijuana from the Selma grows to a group unlawfully distributing marijuana in Davenport, Iowa. Szklanecki would mail marijuana directly to Davenport, or representatives of the Iowa group would travel to Selma to pick it up. To collect payments, Szklanecki regularly met with members of the group at Las Vegas casinos. Maupin drove her to these meetings and received portions of the cash payments as his share of the profits. On one occasion, Szklanecki was unable to travel from Oregon and sent Maupin to collect the payment. At this Las Vegas meeting, members of the Iowa group gave Maupin $12,000; he provided a sample of the marijuana Szklanecki would send them.
In late 2016, a Quad Cities task force began investigating a large marijuana distribution conspiracy in Davenport. Investigators determined that the Iowa group was selling marijuana grown at Deer Creek and Draper Valley and that Maupin owned these properties and funded the grows. Warrant searches of Maupin‘s properties in Selma and Las Vegas uncovered more evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy, such as expense receipts for equipment used to grow marijuana and payments to marijuana customers. A federal grand jury indicted Maupin, Szklanecki, and members of the Iowa group for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana. After trial, the jury convicted Maupin of the charge in Count 1 of the indictment, conspiracy to manufacture and distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana and 100 marijuana plants “in and about Scott County in the Southern District of Iowa and elsewhere.” At sentencing, the district court found Maupin ineligible for safety valve relief and sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence.
II. The Federalism Issue
On appeal, Maupin first argues his prosecution violated principles of federalism because marijuana production is legal under Oregon law. Maupin was convicted of violating federal law when he knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to manufacture and distribute marijuana in Scott County, Iowa and elsewhere. See
Acting under the Commerce Clause, Congress in the CSA “designate[d] marijuana as contraband for any purpose” and “expressly found that the drug has no acceptable medical uses.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005); see United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491-93 (2001); Americans for Safe Access v. D.E.A., 706 F.3d 438, 449-52 (D.C. Cir.) (upholding Attorney General‘s decision to not reschedule marijuana), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 885 (2013). The Court in Raich held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power” under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 9. Maupin does not challenge that conclusion. “Where there is a conflict between federal and state law with respect to marijuana, ‘[t]he Supremacy Clause [in Article VI of the Constitution] unambiguously provides . . . federal law shall prevail.‘” United States v. Schostag, 895 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018), quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 29.
Maupin argues that marijuana has been used for medicinal purposes since ancient times, marijuana prohibition in the United States “is marked and muddied by propaganda and racial discrimination,” and therefore “[p]ublic policy dictates that this Court should not permit the Government to prevail in this action.” Whatever the merits of Maupin‘s policy grievances (we express no view on that controversial subject), he directs them to the wrong branch of government. As the Supreme Court said in the landmark case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). The Court held in Youngstown that the President had exceeded his executive powers in seizing the nation‘s steel mills to end a crippling labor dispute without the consent of Congress. The principle applies equally -- perhaps more strongly -- when federal judges, who are appointed not elected public servants, are asked to “redraft laws to implement policy changes.” Doe v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affs., 519 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 136 (2009). “[T]he judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.” United States v. Fogarty, 692 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Maupin‘s prosecution does not offend principles of federalism and the challenge to his conviction fails.
III. Supplemental Jury Instruction Issues
Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, several jurors posed questions to the
A. One of the indicted conspirators, Phi Thanh Nguyen, pleaded guilty some months before Maupin‘s trial, was on the government‘s witness list, but was not called to testify. In closing, defense counsel argued:
Phi Nguyen, if you remember, his name was on the government‘s witness list. Why do you think they didn‘t call him? Think about it. He‘s the guy who met [Maupin] face to face. He‘s in custody. He‘s a defendant . . . he pled guilty to this. . . . Isn‘t it funny how he wasn‘t called?
* * * * *
That‘s not right. That‘s just not right. That‘s -- that in and of itself kills the case. It really does.
The jury‘s first question during deliberations was: “Can the defense attorney call witnesses to the stand that are on the government [witness] list? We are specifically asking about Phi Nguyen.” The district court proposed to counsel the following response:
Yes, the defendant has the right under the Constitution to “Compulsory Process“, which means he can call witnesses whether they are on the government‘s witness list or not.
But also remember that a defendant has no burden of proof here or any duty to call witnesses or present evidence.
Maupin objected to the first paragraph:
[I]t is not that it is an incorrect statement, the defense has the ability to subpoena witnesses, et cetera . . . but we are placed in a tough spot here because I am assuming the jury is thinking I made a point about Phi Nguyen not testifying and him being an important witness. . . . [I]f we get into, yes, the defendant can call witnesses, there‘s all this stuff, strategy issues . . . that we can‘t put in the answer and . . . [this] lessens [the] keystone concept in our system [that] the defense has no burden of proof in a case.
The district court overruled the objection. “It is a simple question. I feel the obligation to answer it.”
On appeal, Maupin argues this response relieved the prosecution of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it suggested to the jury that he had some duty to call Nguyen in his defense and that he was hiding something by failing to do so. We disagree. The instruction did not imply Maupin should have called Nguyen. It accurately stated that Maupin had a constitutional right to call witnesses in his defense while emphasizing that he need not exercise that right because he had no burden of proof. It did not relieve the government of its burden of proof. As in United States v. Morrison, “[t]he district court‘s supplemental instruction was an accurate statement of the law that was clearly within the limits of the question the jury posed.” 332 F.3d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). As in Cox, the supplemental instruction was “accurate, clear, neutral, and non-prejudicial” because it “was not factual in nature [n]or did it comment on the evidence.” 627 F.3d at 1086 (citation omitted). There was no abuse of the district court‘s substantial discretion.
B. Jury Question #3 asked whether Maupin must “be in conspiracy w/ all members or just a single member” of the established Iowa conspiracy, and whether he must “have knowledge of intent of pot to be sold/sent/delivered to Iowa.” The district
- In Final Instruction #7 under the heading “Agreement,” it says that the government must prove that the defendant reached an agreement or understanding “with at least one other person.” If he voluntarily and intentionally enters into such an agreement or understanding and knows the purpose of it, then he is in a conspiracy with every other person who voluntarily and intentionally joins it.
- No.
After defense counsel made a long statement complaining “that it needs to be made clear that . . . [Maupin‘s] got to have . . . knowledge of the Iowa conspiracy,” the district court said:
It has been charged as a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute, the jury has to determine whether that agreement was in place and what the objects of it were and that‘s what I am trying to get them to focus on here so I didn‘t get whether you are objecting or not.
Counsel replied, “Well, okay.” When the court then said it would give the supplemental instruction, counsel stated:
I still believe that there has to be an additional statement . . . . this is the language: . . . “A person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one, does not thereby become a member.”
The court replied: “that person can‘t meet the element two or three of the conspiracy elements because he can‘t voluntarily join one when you don‘t know it exists and you can‘t know the purpose of one that you don‘t know exists.” Defense counsel responded, “True, but I think that it needs to be made clear to the jury.” The court then ruled that defense counsel‘s proposed addition “doesn‘t answer the question that has been posed. I am giving this one.”
On appeal, Maupin argues the court‘s response “effectively abrogated an element” of the conspiracy offense because it relieved the government of its burden to prove he had a “specific intent to conspire to sell marijuana in Iowa.” We reject this contention for two reasons. First, it was not preserved. Maupin‘s “objection” to the court‘s proposed supplemental instruction was to propose additional language. But the jury had been provided the substance of that proposed language in the main instructions. Failure to repeat it in a supplemental instruction was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Robertson, 709 F.3d 741, 745-46 (8th Cir. 2013).4
Second, the contention misstates federal conspiracy law. Count 1 charged Maupin with conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana “in and about Scott County in the Southern District of Iowa and elsewhere,” not just an “Iowa conspiracy.” (Emphasis added.) Maupin correctly notes that conspiracy is a specific intent crime. Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016). But “[o]ne does not have to have contact with all of the other members of a conspiracy to be held accountable as a conspirator. . . . [A] defendant can be held liable as a co-conspirator if he shares the same common purpose or goal of the other conspirators.” United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1570-71 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1139 and 520 U.S. 1133 (1997). The “common
IV. The Sentencing Issue
Maupin argues the district court erred in finding he was ineligible for safety valve relief under
The district court found there was “overwhelming evidence” Maupin supervised, managed, and recruited individuals for the Oregon grow operations, including West. We agree. Although Maupin characterized his involvement as “solely financial,” the trial evidence included Maupin‘s admissions that he purchased the Deer Creek and Draper Valley properties to cultivate and sell marijuana; that he entered into agreements with Szklanecki and West to accomplish that goal; paid West to travel to Oregon to confirm the properties would be fertile locations for growing marijuana; reimbursed Szklanecki and West for the costs of getting the grows up and running; spoke with Szklanecki on a daily basis about the Draper Valley grow; helped recruit customers for the grows; drove Szklanecki to meetings with the
Maupin argues “he did not direct or recruit others or make any plans or organizational decisions,” and “it was Szklanecki who managed the operation.” But the district court was free to reject this self-serving characterization and credit the contrary testimony and other evidence of Maupin‘s greater involvement. The court‘s credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” Gamboa, 701 F.3d at 267. The district court did not clearly err in applying the
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.