UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MATTHEW ANDREW CARTER, a.k.a. Bill Carter, a.k.a. William Charles Harcourt, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-13518
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20350-JAL-1
(January 27, 2015)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Before HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,* District Judge.
After a jury trial, Matthew Andrew Carter, also known as William Charles Harcourt or Bill Carter, appeals his convictions for one count of travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a “sexual act” with a minor, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Six-Count Indictment
On January 12, 2012, a federal grand jury returned a six-count, second superseding indictment against Defendant Carter. While Counts One through Five each charged violations of
Count One alleged that Carter violated
A . . . United States citizen . . . who travels in foreign commerce . . . for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
In Counts Two through Five, the indictment alleged that Carter violated
(b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct.--A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
. . .
(f) Definition.--As used in this section, the term “illicit sexual conduct” means (1) a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex act (as defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.
Count Six charged an attempt offense, specifically that Carter violated
B. The Evidence at Trial
The case proceeded to trial, which lasted for more than three weeks. The government introduced evidence that Carter, an American citizen, ran the Morning Star Center (the “Center“), a residential facility in Haiti that provided shelter, food,
The Center and its clinic, however, were the façade Carter used to shield his abuse of young boys in Haiti for more than a decade and a half. Sixteen witnesses testified that Carter sexually abused them when they lived at, or frequented, the Center between 1995 and 2011. The abuse included Carter performing oral sex on children, requiring children to perform oral sex on him, touching the genitals of children, attempting to engage in anal sex with children, and requiring children to masturbate him. All of Carter‘s victims were male children. If the children complied with his sexual demands, Carter would provide them with gifts and treat them better than he would other children at the Center. But if a child refused to comply with his sexual demands, Carter would hit the male child with closed fists, spank him with sticks, and give him “the worst kind of chores.” The victims did not report the abuse to others or leave the facility because they were ashamed or
C. The Testimony of Witness G.S.
Among the witnesses to testify during the government‘s case in chief was G.S., who testified that he lived as a child at the Center in Haiti and that Carter repeatedly forced him to masturbate Carter.3 Carter also requested oral sex from G.S. and, on at least one occasion, made G.S. and other boys strip naked and touch their own genitals, ostensibly in an effort to locate five dollars that were missing. G.S. also testified that Carter sexually abused other boys and would beat or otherwise punish them if they refused to comply with Carter‘s sexual demands. On direct examination, G.S. admitted that he had not disclosed that Carter had forced him to masturbate Carter until two days before his testimony. G.S. testified that he had not previously disclosed that abuse “[b]ecause these are ugly things. For them to come out of me, they are very ugly things. And I have to tell the truth. I wanted to come and tell it to him in his face. I was waiting to see if I would be part of the trial so I could tell it to him in his face.”
On cross-examination, Carter‘s defense counsel began to question G.S. about the contents of his initial interview with law enforcement, which occurred on
The government objected on hearsay grounds, but Carter‘s defense counsel argued that the question was permissible impeachment based on prior inconsistent statements. Defense counsel referred to notes prepared by law enforcement from the May 22, 2011 interview with G.S., which indicate that G.S. told the interviewer that “[t]his guy never did anything to me because he never did anything to me.” Defense counsel also proffered that G.S. told law enforcement on November 30, 2011, that he never saw Carter do anything to any children, although G.S. knew that Carter did “bad things to some of the boys at night.” The government noted that those statements attributed to G.S. were “based on law enforcement [notes] . . . and not from any sworn statements taken under oath or any recorded statements.” The government then summarized its objection as not objecting to this line of inquiry, but only to the form of the question as hearsay, stating:
The Government doesn‘t object to the line of inquiry that defense counsel seeks to make. The Government would only object to the form of the question as characterizing it as hearsay: On such-and-such date, didn‘t you tell law enforcement X, Y or Z?
The Government would also object to the theatrical use of the law enforcement reports, as [defense counsel]
reads from them and waves them around to the jury. We think that‘s inappropriate. It gives the impression that he‘s reading from some sort of official document. It gives the impression to the jury that the defense counsel is actually reading the witness‘s actual statements when that is not, in fact, the case.
The district court ruled that Carter‘s defense counsel could question G.S. about those subject matters but not in the type of question form being used.
Defense counsel then continued his cross-examination of G.S. G.S. admitted that, at his first meeting with law enforcement, G.S. denied being involved in any sexual activity with Carter. The district court then sustained the government‘s objection to other questions about this meeting, directing the defense counsel to rephrase his questions: something that counsel never successfully did.
Defense counsel then began asking questions of G.S. about a later meeting with law enforcement, held on November 30, 2011. Defense counsel asked G.S., “You, in fact, denied again participating in any sexual activity with [Carter]. Correct?” The government objected, but the district court overruled the objection. G.S. then testified that he had, in fact, made that denial. Defense counsel continued asking G.S. about his statements to law enforcement.
During this line of questioning, the district court repeatedly overruled government objections on hearsay grounds. Finally, given the numerous
What I will allow you to do, [defense counsel], is detail with him how many meetings he had since he arrived in the country—how many meetings he had with the Government since he arrived in the country and up until two days ago he didn‘t reveal anything.
After this ruling, defense counsel elicited from the witness that the witness had first told agents about his sexual abuse only two days before trial and had not told agents before because he was embarrassed.
D. Mid-Trial Motions for Foreign Witness Depositions
On February 12, 2013, a week after the evidentiary portion of the trial began and during the government‘s case in chief, Carter moved to take four witness depositions in Haiti, pursuant to
testify how the defendant was an asset to the neighborhood and how [Carter] and the other residents of
the Morning Star Center helped the neighborhood both before and after the earthquake with donations of food, clothing and medical supplies. In addition, they will testify that due to the actions of Mr. Carter, many lives were saved both in the neighborhood and the nearby tent city after the earthquake. They will also testify that during their time in the neighborhood they interacted with both Mr. Carter and the residents of the Morning Star Center. They will testify that the residents were well treated by the defendant and they saw absolutely no signs of the sexual abuse that has been alleged.
They will also testify how the residents interacted with those in the neighborhood and there were no signs of sexual abuse that support the allegations against the defendant.
Additionally, Carter‘s counsel sought to take a deposition of Pastor Alan Randall, a witness in Haiti who was “unable to travel to the United States because his wife recently suffered a massive heart attack and he cannot leave her for an extended period of time.” Carter‘s counsel proffered that Pastor Randall would testify he visited the Center and saw no sign of sexual abuse:
Randall will testify that he has been to the Morning Star Center on many occasions. He had been invited to dinner many times. In addition, he visited the Morning Star Center with personnel from the United Nations. He will further state under oath that he saw absolutely no sign of any sexual contact or abuse from the defendant.
A day later, on February 20, 2013, Carter‘s counsel filed another, separate motion to depose a foreign witness pursuant to Rule 15. In that motion, Carter requested permission to depose Kate Jensen, who lived in Copenhagen, Denmark. Carter stated that Jensen was scheduled to travel to the United States on February 27, 2013, but that she suffered a setback in her recovery from a broken left shoulder and was no longer able to appear in person. Carter‘s counsel proffered that Jensen would also testify that she visited the Center and never suspected any sexual abuse was occurring:
Ms. Kate Jensen, if permitted to testify[,] would state that she is a criminal investigator/police officer with the Copenhagen Police Department who was on a leave of absence and assigned to the United Nations in Haiti from
approximately 2006 to 2011. She met the defendant in early 2009 at a BBQ with about 15 residents of the Morning Star Center. She would testify that the children were very well behaved and very respectful to all of the guests. Off[icer] Jensen was so impressed with the children‘s behavior that she visited the Morning Star Center on numerous occasions. During those visits she would stay for dinner but not spend the night. When she heard that Bill Carter (a male) was operating a children‘s home with only boys, her criminal investigators’ background kicked in and she wanted to make sure nothing illegal was going on. Ms. Jensen will testify that at no time did she ever suspect that any type of sexual abuse was going on at the orphanage. It appeared to her that all of the children loved being there.
Carter‘s defense counsel informed the district court that Jensen “is not an expert but is a fact witness.”
Before the defense presented its case in chief, the district court orally denied both motions to depose witnesses. The government offered to stipulate certain facts to which the foreign witnesses would allegedly testify, including that none of the witnesses personally observed Carter engaging in illicit sexual conduct with the Center‘s residents, but defense counsel rejected the stipulation, stating that “nothing could take the place of the Rule 15 depositions.” Carter‘s counsel then made a renewed, oral motion to take the five foreign witness depositions. The district court denied the renewed motion, saying that the testimony Carter sought was immaterial to the case and cumulative of other evidence. The district court
E. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
At the conclusion of the government‘s case in chief, Carter‘s defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, pursuant to
With regard to Count One only, Carter‘s defense counsel also argued that the
After hearing arguments, the district court denied Carter‘s motion for judgment of acquittal as to all counts.
F. The Introduction of Government Exhibit 105
Carter‘s counsel then put on Carter‘s defense, which included only one witness: Carter.
Carter denied every allegation of sexual abuse. Carter admitted that he traveled from the United States to Haiti on each of the dates alleged by Counts One through Five. But he testified that his purpose in traveling to Haiti was to support
During direct examination, Carter testified that he lived in Egypt for several years beginning in 1986. In Egypt, Carter lived in a house with a young boy, whose mother Carter paid so that the boy would live with him and perform certain tasks. Carter further testified that he was arrested by Egyptian law enforcement, who falsely accused him of being a spy. Defense counsel asked whether “there [were] any allegations of sexual impropriety made against” Carter. Carter replied, “Not that I know of at the time.” Nonetheless, according to Carter, an investigation commenced, and Carter was eventually deported from Egypt and sent back to the United States. On cross-examination, Carter denied that he was arrested on child molestation charges.
After the defense rested, the government prepared to call a rebuttal witness and sought to introduce evidence that would impeach Carter‘s testimony and prove that Carter knew that he had been arrested on suspicion of child molestation. Specifically, the government sought to admit into evidence Exhibit 105, a cable sent between State Department employees in February 1990, which documented Carter‘s arrest in Egypt. The cable contained two sections. The first section resembled a form, with more than 20 lines of information, including “Name,”
The government contended that the State Department, including its Embassy in Egypt, had a policy of making a record in this form of any arrest of an American citizen in a foreign country. Accordingly, the government argued that the cable was admissible as a business record, pursuant to
Carter objected to the admissibility of the cable on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds. Carter objected both to the admissibility of the cable itself, and more specifically to the admissibility of “the law enforcement activity of the Egyptian police and the Egyptian Government” that was recorded on the first section of cable. Carter contended that his arrest information should be excluded because such a report constituted hearsay from an Egyptian official, rather than information to which the State Department employee who filled out the form had personal knowledge.
After hearing arguments, the district court stated that it was impossible to know whether the statements attributed to Carter in the comments section of the cable were made by Carter to the Egyptian authorities, and that the State
The district court further stated that “the pro forma portion of the form, which is name, date of birth, arrest charge, date of arrest, medical condition—all of that information is the information made in the normal course of affairs to be collected by both the [U.S.] Embassy, in this instance in Egypt, and to be transmitted back to the Department of State in Washington, DC, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the [U.S.] citizen abroad.” Accordingly, the district court admitted a redacted version of the cable, which included the arrest information in the first section, but did not include the second (comments) section with the references to Carter‘s statements.6
G. The Jury Instructions
The government submitted proposed jury instructions, which provided, in relevant part, as to Count One:
Count 1 charges the Defendant, a United States citizen, with traveling in foreign commerce from the United States to Haiti for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act with a person under 18 years of age. . . .
The Defendant can be found guilty of Count 1 only if all the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the Defendant is a United States citizen;
(2) the Defendant traveled in foreign commerce; and
(3) the Defendant traveled for the purpose of:
- engaging in a sexual act with a person who is under 16 years of age and is at least four years younger than the Defendant; or
- causing a person under 18 years of age to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that person in fear; or
- causing a person under 18 years of age to engage in a sexual act by using force against that person. . . .
The Government does not have to prove that the Defendant actually engaged in a sexual act with a person under 18 years of age, but must prove that he traveled with the intent to engage in such conduct.
Carter‘s counsel objected to the proposed instructions as to Count One on two grounds. First, he requested that the phrase “if that sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” be added both to the introductory paragraph, after “18 years of age,” and to the elements of the offense, as the fourth element. Second, Carter‘s counsel requested that the word “knowingly” be added before the word “traveled” in the elements of the crime.
The district court overruled Carter‘s objections and charged the jury as to Count One, in relevant part:
Count 1: It‘s a federal crime for a United States citizen to knowingly travel in foreign commerce for the
purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a person under 18 years of age. The Defendant can be found guilty of Count 1 only if all the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
1: The Defendant is a United States citizen;
2: The Defendant traveled in foreign commerce; and,
3: The Defendant traveled for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a person who is under 16 years of age and is at least four years younger than the Defendant, or causing a person under 18 years of age to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that person in fear, or causing a person under 18 years of age to engage in a sexual act by using force against that person.
The term “sexual act” means contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus involving penetration, however slight; or contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; or the penetration, however slight, of another person‘s anal or genital opening by a hand, finger or any object with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass or degrade the person or arouse or gratify the sexual desires of the Defendant or any other person; or an intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of a person younger than 16 years old with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass or degrade the person or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant or any other person. . . .
The Government does not have to prove that the Defendant actually engaged in a sexual act with a person under 18 years of age, but must prove that he traveled with the intent to engage in such conduct. Proof of the Defendant‘s intent may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. . . .
The Government does not have to show that the sexual act is illegal in the country to which the Defendant traveled.
The district court did not specify that the jury must find that the sexual act, which was the defendant‘s purpose, would have been illegal if it occurred in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Rather, the district court defined “sexual act” according to the meaning given to that term by
As to the jury instructions for Counts Two through Five, Carter made only one objection, which was about certain evidence and was sustained.7
H. Guilty Verdict and Sentencing
On February 28, 2013, the jury found Carter guilty on all counts. After trial, Carter filed a Rule 29(c) motion for judgment of acquittal and a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. See
Carter timely appealed.
A. Denial of Carter‘s Rule 29 Motions on Count One
On appeal, Carter‘s first argument is that the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal on Count One.9 Carter contends that the version of the
It is clear from a review of the
The phrase Carter highlights—“if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States“—does not limit the territorial or jurisdictional reach of the statute. Rather, it defines what types of sexual acts a defendant must have traveled for the purpose of committing to be guilty of the crime: those sexual acts that would be unlawful if they occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Carter‘s argument that Count One should have been dismissed because the government failed to produce evidence that he engaged in any sexual acts in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States therefore lacks merit. That the defendant committed a sexual act in a particular jurisdiction simply is not an element of a violation of
B. Overruling of Carter‘s Objections to the Jury Instructions
On appeal, Carter‘s second argument is that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding the
Carter first argues that the district court erred by failing to include in the instruction for Count One “the element requiring the jury to find whether ‘the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‘” For the reasons explained in Part II.A, Carter‘s argument lacks merit. Neither the commission of the sexual act, nor its occurrence in a particular jurisdiction, was an element of the
2. Counts One through Five: Whether “Knowing Travel in Foreign Commerce” is an Element
Next, in his brief on appeal, Carter contends that the term “knowingly” should have been included in the elements under Counts One through Five “because
As an initial matter, where a defendant agrees to the “court‘s proposed instructions, the doctrine of invited error applies, meaning that review is waived even if plain error would result.” United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010). Because Carter‘s defense counsel at trial agreed to the jury instructions as to Counts Two through Five after the district court sustained his only objection to those instructions, Carter has waived his right to appeal the jury
In any event, neither version of
Notably, the language of the
And Congress has chosen not to include a “knowing” requirement in
Carter has offered no reason why we should deviate from the plain language of
The second decision Carter identifies, United States v. Robertson, includes only two passing references to the defendant pleading guilty to “knowingly traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with” a minor. 350 F.3d 1109, 1111, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003). In that case, the defendant did not challenge his conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence, the elements of the crime, or anything else that would have required the court to consider whether “knowing[ ] travel[ ]” was an element of the offense. See generally id. Rather, the only issue on appeal was the application of a sentencing guidelines enhancement. See id. at 1112. These two passing references do not persuade us that we should
Accordingly, the district court‘s jury instructions were legally correct, and its phrasing did not constitute an abuse of discretion, much less reversible error.15
C. Denial of Carter‘s Motions for Foreign Witness Depositions
Next, Carter argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to take five foreign witness depositions during the trial. Carter contends that “the five witnesses’ [sic] were going to testify to a material fact that was allegedly in dispute within Counts 1-6,” and “would have supported and[/]or corroborated Carter‘s testimony and the theory of the defense that he did not travel to Haiti to engage in sexual acts with persons under the age of eighteen, but instead to engage in acts of good will for the Haitian community.” Carter also argues that “the proferred witnesses’ testimony would have shown that there were no signs of sexual abuse”
District courts may grant a party‘s request to depose a prospective witness “because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice.”
First, to the extent that Carter sought to introduce testimony that he performed good deeds in the community, such testimony would have been cumulative. Here, other witnesses, including some of the victims, testified that Carter operated the clinic for the community; that the clinic provided free services; and that children whose families could not afford to support them received clothing, food, and education at the Center.17 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this deposition testimony. See United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of motion to depose witnesses where other witnesses “testified about the events” and “the defendants’ claims . . . were fully developed“).
Accordingly, the district court at best could have admitted only testimony that the witnesses did not directly observe abuse during their limited interactions with Carter. But the fact that certain witnesses did not see children being abused during particular times when they interacted with Carter does nothing to contradict the testimony of the victims who claimed Carter forced them, as children, to engage in sexual acts with him inside the Center when away from other adults. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this deposition testimony. Cf. Ramos, 45 F.3d at 1523 (stating that the absence of “testimony
Because the foreign witnesses’ proffered testimony consisted only of cumulative, immaterial, or inadmissible evidence, Carter failed to establish the second factor in the exceptional-circumstances test under
D. Admission of Exhibit 105
On appeal, Carter also argues that the district court erred in admitting Exhibit 105, a partially-redacted State Department cable reporting Carter‘s 1990 arrest in Cairo, Egypt, for alleged child molestation. Carter contends that “the Court erred in admitting Exhibit 105 with the fact that Carter had been arrested for child molestation in Egypt in 1990 as the government informed the Court that it probably came from the arresting authorities and the Court acknowledged that is a violation of the right to confrontation.” Carter argues that the admission of Exhibit 105 constituted “per se reversible error.”19
We conclude that Carter has abandoned arguments necessary for him to establish that the district court erred in its hearsay ruling or in its Confrontation Clause ruling, and his claims as to each therefore fail.
With regard to hearsay, the primary ground upon which the district court admitted the cable was that the cable constituted an admissible business record, pursuant to
Turning to Carter‘s Confrontation Clause argument, we first note the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of a declarant‘s out-of-court
Even if Carter had preserved the issues, his hearsay and Confrontation Clause arguments would be subject to harmless error review. See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2005) (hearsay); United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (Confrontation Clause) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986)).
Hearsay errors are harmless “if, viewing the proceedings in their entirety, a court determines that the error did not affect the verdict, or had but very slight
In this case, even if the admission of the cable was error, it was harmless under both standards. The evidence that Carter challenges was merely collateral to the offenses with which Carter was charged. Indeed, the government introduced the evidence for the purpose of impeaching Carter‘s testimony, not for the purpose of establishing that he engaged in the conduct referenced on the State Department cable. Furthermore, the evidence of Carter‘s guilt on all six counts was overwhelming. Accordingly, we readily conclude that any error regarding the admission of the State Department cable was harmless and is not grounds for reversal.
E. Limitation on the Cross-Examination of Witness G.S.
Carter contends that the district court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a government‘s witness, G.S., about prior statements that were allegedly inconsistent with his trial testimony. Carter argues that the district court erred by prohibiting Carter “from exploring the essence of the case and the
A district court has wide latitude to control the cross-examination of witnesses, subject to the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009). The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to impeach adverse witnesses through cross-examination. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2011). “A defendant‘s confrontation rights are satisfied when the cross-examination permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient to evaluate the credibility of the witness and enables defense counsel to establish a record from which he properly can argue why the witness is less than reliable.” United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1371 (11th Cir. 1994). However, “a witness may not be impeached with a third party‘s characterization or interpretation of a prior oral statement unless the witness has subscribed to or otherwise adopted the statement as his own.” United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 710 (11th Cir. 1993).
In this case, Carter‘s defense counsel sought to cross-examine witness G.S. regarding statements he allegedly made to law enforcement officers in his first meeting with them. Specifically, defense counsel referred to the notes from a May
Even if the witness‘s alleged prior statement to officers constituted a proper basis for impeachment, Carter‘s argument would nonetheless fail. Assuming that the district court limited the cross-examination in error, it did not infringe Carter‘s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination because defense counsel nonetheless elicited ample evidence to enable the jury to assess G.S.‘s credibility. After abandoning the line of questioning regarding the May 22, 2011 interview with law enforcement, defense counsel moved on to other prior statements that were allegedly inconsistent. During this line of questioning, defense counsel continued asking G.S. about his statements to law enforcement, and the district court overruled multiple government objections, on hearsay grounds, to Carter‘s attempts to impeach G.S. Importantly, too, G.S. admitted that, during a November 30, 2011 interview, he denied participating in sexual activity with Carter, even though he testified at trial that he had been forced to masturbate Carter.
F. Carter‘s Motion for Mistrial
Carter also contends that the district court “erred in denying Carter‘s motion for mistrial” when a witness “testified that Carter committed sexual abuse in Jamaica.” Carter‘s argument on this point is only two sentences long:
Carter moved for mistrial when [witness J.D.J.] stated Carter committed sexual abuse in Jamaica when such notice was not provided to the defense during discovery and which motion was denied by the District Court. As stated above, this matter concerns credibility findings between the government‘s witnesses who alleged sexual abuse and Carter who denied the allegations and therefore this error is not harmless.
(Citation omitted).
G. The Testimony of Witness I.M.
On appeal, Carter also argues that the district court erred in admitting a witness‘s testimony over Carter‘s objection on hearsay grounds. The witness, I.M., testified that Carter sexually touched and abused him in the 1970s when I.M. was 12 years old, but that he first reported the abuse to police in 2011 after his brother contacted him.
Once again, Carter‘s argument consists of only two sentences:
The District Court overruled Carter‘s hearsay objection when [I.M.] testified his brother contacted him first about Carter‘s alleged sexual abuse. As stated above, this matter concerns credibility findings between the government‘s witnesses who alleged sexual abuse and Carter who denied the allegations and therefore this error is not harmless.
(Citation omitted).
H. Alleged Cumulative Error
Carter‘s final argument on appeal is that the “cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of Carter‘s convictions even if this court finds that each individual error is insufficient for reversal.”
We disagree.
Carter has not established a single error, let alone the aggregation of “many errors” that may require for a reversal where the individual errors do not. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, his argument under the cumulative error doctrine fails.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carter‘s convictions for five counts of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of
AFFIRMED.
Notes
We note, however, that the language, “if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” was removed from § 2423(b) but was still included in the definition of “illicit sexual conduct” in § 2423(f).Count 1 charges that, on or about October 2nd, 2001, . . . the Defendant, a United States citizen, did travel in foreign commerce
from the United States . . . to Haiti for purposes of engaging in any sexual act, as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 2246], with a person under 18 years of age that would be a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 109A—and this is the language I want the Court to focus on—if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . . While the evidence that Mr. Carter may or may not have committed sexual acts with persons under 18 years of age during this time period is a jury question, the issue as to whether the acts occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States is also a question of law. . . . However, the evidence that came in through this—through the Government‘s case in chief failed to show that the acts occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
If the Court notes[,] the remaining counts, 2 through 6, do not have that requirement. Only Count 1 [includes the location as an element], based on the age of that count. . . . And, therefore, a judgment of acquittal, at a minimum, should be entered as to that count.
And abundant evidence of Carter‘s sexual conduct with minors in Haiti was more than sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict that Carter‘s travel to Haiti was in foreign commerce for the purpose of committing sexual acts with minors.
Rather, the only section admitted into evidence was the first section, which included the allegation that Carter was arrested on child molestation charges. The district concluded that the information included in the first section “is the information made in the normal course of affairs to be collected by both the [U.S.] Embassy, in this instance in Egypt, and to be transmitted back