UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon Laron GREENWOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-1974.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 25, 2013.
544-549
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). Although certain forms of discipline, such as the stripping of good time credits, may implicate a liberty interest, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, other forms of discipline must rise to the level of an “atypical, significant deprivation” in order to create a liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Although the indefinite confinement of a prisoner to administrative segregation, see Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir.2008), or the transfer to a type of maximum security facility with virtually no sensory or environmental stimuli, see Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), can create a liberty interest due to its “atypical, significant deprivation,” a simple transfer, issuance of a major misconduct ticket, and a higher security classification does not trigger a liberty interest. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976); Nali v. Ekman, 355 Fed.Appx. 909, 912 (6th Cir.2009); Thompson v. Mich. Dept. of Corrs., 25 Fed.Appx. 357, 358 (6th Cir.2002). Without a demonstrated liberty interest or an atypical, significant deprivation, Guile‘s due process claim fails.
In regard to the administrative hearing process itself, Guile received notice, presented evidence, and had the ability to call witnesses. The Defendants complied with the requirements set forth in Wolff. Although Guile did not receive the incident report or the results of the rape kit, if one was performed, he is not entitled to full discovery as he would be at a criminal trial. We find that the procedures of the administrative hearing did not violate Guile‘s due process rights.
III. Conclusion
Guile did not present any facts in support of his claim of a due process violation that would entitle him to relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
BEFORE: MERRITT, SUHRHEINRICH and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Leon Greenwood (“Defendant“) appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to
I. Background
On June 5, 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of
Defendant‘s presentence report (“PSR“) determined that he was responsible for 4.3 grams of crack (3 grams, plus an additional 1.3 grams derived from the cash he possessed). The PSR used the 2008 edition of the Guidelines Manual. It calculated his total offense level for the drug charge at 19. Defendant also had 19 criminal history points, 6 points higher than the threshold level for a criminal history category IV designation. Defendant‘s criminal record included convictions for resisting arrest, domestic violence, domestic aggravated arrest, drug possession and drug distribution. Defendant also had other arrests, many of which were domestic assault charges that were later dismissed.
Defendant‘s resulting guidelines range for the drug charge was 63-78 months’ imprisonment. Based on his extensive criminal record, the PSR recommended a two-level departure because his criminal history category substantially underrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history.
Defendant objected to the two-level enhancement. Although the court felt that Defendant‘s record was “egregious,” it declined to impose the upward departure. (R. 42 ID# 129) The court imposed a 72-month sentence for the drug charge. When the consecutive 60-month sentence
On August 3, 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act was enacted, lowering the ratio for crack versus powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1. The Sentencing Commission promulgated emergency amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, which became permanent on November 1, 2011. Amendment 750 reduced the base offense levels in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) applicable to crack cocaine offenses, and Amendment 759 made Amendment 750 retroactive. See Dorsey v. United States, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2329, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012); United States v. Williams, 512 Fed.Appx. 594, 596-97 (6th Cir.2013).
On November 14, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for a sentence reduction, seeking a retroactive application of the new crack guideline pursuant to
Under “Public Safety Factors,” the SMR reported that Defendant has an eighth grade education and “virtually no employment history.” Defendant is an alcoholic, and he is addicted to marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and ecstasy. He has an “extensive violent criminal history,” which “paint[s] a picture of an extremely violent, out-of-control individual.” This includes seventeen prior adult convictions, including four felonies, four for domestic violence, and four drug-related offenses. In addition, Defendant has eighteen additional arrests; of these thirteen are assaultive in nature. The SMR noted that Defendant has attacked women, including a pregnant woman, his brother, and his mother, and that he once left his two-year old child sleeping in the back of a vehicle as he fled from law enforcement.
Under “Post Sentencing Conduct,” the SMR further reported that Defendant had completed numerous educational classes while incarcerated, including substance abuse treatment. However, he had been involved in two disciplinary incidents—on April 17, 2009, he threatened bodily harm, resulting in a loss of discretionary good time credit and thirty days in disciplinary segregation; and on January 27, 2011, he was insolent toward staff, resulting in a thirty-day loss of commissary privileges.
Defendant filed a response to the SMR, pointing out that he had made efforts to rehabilitate himself while serving his sentence, had received his GED, and had taken educational classes. He also described a difficult childhood. The Government opposed a reduction to Defendant‘s sentence, arguing that public safety factors supported a denial of a sentence reduction.
On July 17, 2012, the district court denied the motion stating,
Defendant has an extensive criminal history which includes 18 criminal convictions. His post-sentencing conduct, as detailed in the Sentence Modification Report, includes being Insolent Toward Staff and Threatening Bodily Harm.... Due to defendant‘s extensive criminal history, his post-sentencing conduct, and the public safety factors that the Court has to be mindful of, the Court will Deny defendant‘s motion for reduction.
(R. 53, ID # 182-83)
This appeal followed.
We review a district court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion to modify a sentence under
The commentary accompanying § 1B1.10 requires the court to consider public safety factors, and permits the court to consider post-sentencing conduct in whether a reduction in the defendant‘s term of imprisonment is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. (n. 1(B)(ii)-(iii)). Thus, the district court is required to consider both the § 3553(a) factors and “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant‘s term of imprisonment.” Curry, 606 F.3d at 330 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(B)(ii)). The court may, but is not required to, consider a defendant‘s post-sentencing conduct. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii)). Cf. Pepper v. United States, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 1242-43, 1249, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) (holding that when a defendant‘s sentence has been set aside on direct appeal, the district court may consider evidence of the defendant‘s postsentencing rehabilitation at resentencing, since such conduct may be relevant to several of the § 3553(a) factors).
It is undisputed that Defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. The issue here is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant‘s request at step two. Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider his rehabilitative efforts. At sentencing, the district court called him to “a higher duty ... to clean up this act ... and get back in the race.” (R. 42 ID# 138) The court addressed his
This argument must be rejected. As noted, Defendant is not entitled to a sentence reduction. Second, the district court considered the requisite “public safety consideration.” As the district court observed, Defendant‘s conduct during the underlying offense, his extensive criminal history, and his post-sentencing behavior all indicate that early release would pose a risk to public safety. The offense of conviction itself involved danger to the community—Defendant was involved in a fight, and fled police with a loaded handgun in his pocket. As detailed above, Defendant has an extensive criminal history, constituting both convictions and arrests, that involves violent and assaultive conduct. Furthermore, his post-sentencing behavior demonstrates that the behavioral trends continues: both of the disciplinary actions involved assaultive behavior and were sufficiently serious to warrant removal of privileges, and in the case of threat of bodily harm, resulted in his placement in disciplinary segregation.
This case is akin to United States v. Stevenson, 332 Fed.Appx. 261 (6th Cir. 2009). There, we affirmed the denial of a reduction based on public safety concerns where the defendant had a lengthy criminal history and created a great threat to public safety when he fled from police, because this behavior indicated “a danger to the community.” Id. at 262-63. Stevenson‘s post-sentencing conduct “did not help him either,” because he had two disciplinary violations while in prison, resulting in a loss of several privileges. Id. at 263. See also United States v. Monday, 390 Fed.Appx. 550, 554-55 (6th Cir.2010) (upholding a denial of reduction based on the defendant‘s criminal history and an incident of misconduct in prison, which involved a minor assault on a corrections officer and possession of a cellular phone in violation of prison rules).
The district court was not obligated to consider Defendant‘s post-sentencing conduct. The court did anyway, but focused on Defendant‘s misconduct in prison rather than his positive improvements. This is not an abuse of discretion, however, as we explained in a case where the defendant likewise complained that the memorandum opinion denying a reduction in sentence failed to mention “the defendant‘s efforts at bettering himself while in prison“:
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Dillon makes clear that sentencing modification is a discretionary, limited proceeding that does not involve full-scale re-sentencing. Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2692. While the district court could have given more weight to defendant‘s post-conviction efforts at rehabilitation, it chose to put more emphasis upon the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public, which are equally valid sentencing criteria under the guidelines. In short, we detect no abuse of discretion.
United States v. Daniel, 414 Fed.Appx. 806, 809 (6th Cir.2011). See also Curry, 606 F.3d at 330-31 (noting that this court has “not required the district court to articulate the applicability of each sentencing factor as long as the record reflects that
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
SUHRHEINRICH
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE