United States of America v. Juan Carlos Castellanos Muratella
No. 19-1219
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: January 17, 2020; Filed: April 15, 2020
Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
Juan Carlos Castellanos Muratella (“Castellanos“) was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy. Castellanos had previously been convicted of two felony drug crimes under
I. Background
Castellanos pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine under
Without the career-offender designation, Castellanos argues his offense level would be 27 and his criminal history level would be VI. With the career-offender designation, Castellanos‘s criminal history level remains at VI, but his offense level is 34. In effect, the designation increased his recommended prison sentence from 130-162 months to 262-327 months. At sentencing, Castellanos requested a shorter-than-recommended sentence of 120 months. Ultimately, the district court sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 200 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release.
Castellanos makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that
A. Career Offender
We review career-offender classifications de novo. United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 2014). Castellanos qualifies as a career offender if he (1) “was at least eighteen years old at the time [he] committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is . . . a controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.”
To qualify as a predicate offense,
Castellanos argues
But to adopt this reasoning, Castellanos implicitly asks us to disregard a prior Eighth Circuit decision. See United States v. Brown, 638 F.3d 816, 818-19 (8th Cir. 2011). We are not free to do so. See Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.“). We held in Brown that counterfeit substances under the Guidelines include the simulated controlled substances mentioned in section 124.401.2 638 F.3d at 819. By looking at the plain meaning of the word “counterfeit,” this court noted that “if a substance is ‘made in imitation’ and ‘with an intent to deceive,’ the substance ‘is “counterfeit” for the purposes of § 4B1.2 and qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the career offender provision.‘” Id. at 818 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 474 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 2007)).
We found both of these elements present in
Castellanos attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Brown is no longer binding on this court after the Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, which explained how to conduct categorical and modified-categorical tests. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). But Brown‘s holding — that counterfeit substances under the Guidelines include simulated substances under Iowa law — is unaffected by whether the presence of a simulated controlled substance is an alternative element of a section 124.401 conviction or a mere means of committing a section 124.401 offense. Mathis only affects cases in which the state offense of conviction is broader than its federal counterpart. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248-49. Because Brown clearly held section 124.401 is no broader than
And, subsequent to Mathis, this court has again determined section 124.401 fits within the Guidelines definition of a controlled substance offense. See United States v. Wadden, 774 F. App‘x 346, 347 (8th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“[W]e conclude that Wadden‘s specific challenge to his career-offender classification lacks merit, as the specific argument he advances has been rejected by this court.“) (citing Brown, 638 F.3d at 818-19). In sum, when we apply the categorical test in light of Brown, we must conclude
B. Reasonable Sentence
This court reviews the imposition of sentences under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, this court takes “into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of the variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007)).
Castellanos argues the district court improperly counted his 13-year methamphetamine addiction as an aggravating factor, not a mitigating factor. But the district court did no such thing. Rather, it used Castellanos‘s addiction to illustrate the seriousness of methamphetamine-dealing. The district court specifically noted that Castellanos‘s “addiction is reasonable to consider” when “trying to reach a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary.” It thereafter ordered a sentence five years shorter than the presumptively reasonable Guidelines range. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (“If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may . . . apply a presumption of reasonableness.“). There is no indication that the district court counted his addiction against him; the generous variance suggests just the opposite. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
III. Conclusion
The district court rightly classified Castellanos as a career offender. It also applied a substantively reasonable sentence. We therefore affirm the sentence.