UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jamillo Donte SPIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-1116.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Oct. 23, 2015. Filed: April 4, 2016.
1099
The judgment is affirmed.
Carol M. Kayser, AUSA, Saint Paul, MN, for appellee.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Jamillo Donte Spight challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him of being a fеlon in possession of a firearm in violation of
I. Background
In September 2013, a nightclub security cаmera recorded Spight enter the establishment with a loaded handgun. In addition, several eyewitnesses observed him in possession of the weapon. In fact, an unarmed security guard, Eric Wasson, wrestled the gun frоm Spight‘s grasp. The gun discharged twice during the scuffle. Fortunately, the shots injured no one. Wasson then handed the gun to Jonathan Price, the nightclub‘s owner, who had rushed to the commotion. Standing nearby, Annikki Davis, another unarmеd security guard, witnessed the entire incident.
Spight was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of
As part of its case, the government had to show that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. The district court allowed ATF Special Agent Martin Siebenaler to testify as an expert witness. Based on his review of an ATF firearm trace report; the place of manufаcture stamped into the firearm; and the fact that Smith & Wesson, the firearm‘s manufacturer, was not licensed to manufacture firearms in Minnesota, Agent Siebenaler opined that the firearm that Spight possessed was manufactured in Connecticut and Massachusetts and had traveled in interstate commerce to Minnesota.
The district court concluded on the basis of the admitted evidence that “the United States has proven, by proof beyond a reasonble doubt, that on or about September 21, 2013, [Spight] did knowingly and voluntarily possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm ... in violation of
II. Discussion
Spight brings four challenges to his conviction: (A) thе sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, (B) the admission of expert testimony with respect to whether the firearm that he possessed had
A. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Spight‘s Conviction
Spight argues that the district court erred in finding the three witnesses who testified at thе trial to be credible and therefore based its guilt finding on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he points to Wasson‘s and Davis‘s criminal history and the inconsistency between Wasson‘s and Price‘s testimony, arguing that thе events recounted by all three are “downright preposterous.” We disagree.
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” United States v. Johnson, 745 F.3d 866, 868-69 (8th Cir.2014) (citation omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, and affirm if any rational [factfinder] could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ojeda-Estrada, 577 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Moreover, in “[r]eviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is axiomatic that [this court does] not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony” because “[c]redibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact, and are entitled to special deference.” United States v. Goodale, 738 F.3d 917, 923 (8th Cir.2013) (second alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
Spight‘s attempt to have this court rеevaluate the credibility of the witnesses is unavailing. The district court specifically considered the question of credibility and nonetheless found the testimony to be credible because it was confirmed by video evidence. The district court found the following:
With respect to both the testimony of Eric Wasson and Annikki Davis, the Court has taken into account their criminal records, including their prior felony records, and, bаsed upon the Court‘s evaluation of their testimony, in light of all of the evidence before the Court, including the DVD video, the Court finds and concludes that their testimony was credible with respect to their observations and identification of [Spight] and their testimony regarding his possession of a firearm.
And where testimony was in disagreement with the video evidence, the district court deferred to the events depicted on the vidеo. For example, the district court noted that
while there is a conflict between Jonathan Price‘s and Eric Wasson‘s testimony, based upon the evidence before the Court, ... [t]his minor conflict in the testimоny does not create a reasonable doubt as to whether [Spight] was in possession of a firearm, especially given the fact that [video evidence] was admitted which confirmed Eric Wasson‘s testimony.
Moreover, the district court found that the video evidence independently “establishes ... that [Spight] returned to the bar with a handgun in his hand.”
In short, the district court expressly addressed the credibility of the witnesses, noting thаt Spight‘s guilt was confirmed by the surveillance video. Moreover, the video footage leaves no reasonable doubt that Spight possessed the firearm and is thus sufficient to establish Spight‘s guilt. The district court‘s harmonization of the testimony adequately addresses any contradiction between the witnesses, and the court was well within its discretion as the factfinder to credit the witnesses’ testimony despite their criminal history. Aсcord-
B. The Court Properly Admitted the Expert Testimony of Agent Siebenaler
Spight argues that the district court abused its discretion in permitting expert testimony from ATF Special Agent Siebenaler. He essentially argues that Agent Siebenaler‘s testimony lacked foundation and was therefore inadmissible. We disagree.
We review a “decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion, according it substantial deferеnce.” United States v. Holmes, 751 F.3d 846, 849 (8th Cir.2014) (citation omitted). A district court may permit a firearms expert to offer an opinion that a firearm has traveled in interstate commerce on the basis of an independently prepared firearm tracing report, the identity of the manufacturer and place of manufacture stamped into a firearm, and the location where the firearm was seized. See United States v. Maddix, 96 F.3d 311, 315 (8th Cir.1996). We have also hеld that evidence that the manufacturer of a firearm is not licensed to manufacture firearms in the state in which the firearm was seized is sufficient to satisfy the interstate-commerce element. United States v. Cox, 942 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.1991).
In this case, Agent Siebenaler testified that he used several bases to form his opinion that Spight‘s gun had traveled in interstate commerce: an ATF tracing report for the firearm indicating that the gun was not manufactured in Minnеsota; the identity of the manufacturer—Smith & Wesson—and the place of manufacture—Massachusetts—stamped into the firearm; and the fact that the firearm was a Smith & Wesson seized in Minnesota, a state where Smith & Wesson is not licensed to manufacture firearms. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Siebenaler‘s expert testimony because he based his opinion on the kinds of evidence we have previously considered sufficiеnt.
C. We Decline to Consider Spight‘s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim
Spight argues that his counsel acted ineffectively under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). But “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is generally not a basis for direct appeal and instead should be рroperly raised in a
D. Spight Has Not Established a Brady Violation
Finally, Spight argues that the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). We review an unpreserved Brady claim for plain error. United States v. Horton, 756 F.3d 569, 575 (8th Cir.2014). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt оr to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm Spight‘s conviction.