United States v. Jamie Ballard
872 F.3d 883
8th Cir.
2017
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Docket

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamie L. BALLARD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-4053

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

October 5, 2017

884 F.3d 884

Submitted: September 18, 2017

the federal court, in relation to such an enterprise, is hardly the instrument of a distant, disconnected sovereign.” at 41, . Therefore, suits against bistate entities do not present the same issues of sovereign immunity as those against a state, cf. (addressing sovereignty interests where parties do not dispute that defendant is an arm of the state), and allowing Bi-State to be sued in federal court poses “no genuine threat to the dignity of Missouri or Illinois, , . We therefore “presume [Bi-State] does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity [u]nless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose.” , (second alteration in original) (quoting , ).

In determining whether a good reason exists to find that Bi-State is entitled to immunity, “the most important factor ... is ‘whether a judgment against the entity [could] be satisfied out of a State‘s treasury.‘” (quoting , ); see also , (referring to the “prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State‘s treasury” as the “impetus for the Eleventh Amendment” and collecting cases where appellate courts have “recognized the vulnerability of the State‘s purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations“). As noted, Bi-State‘s records indicate that state funding comprises less than two percent of its operating budget, in contrast with “the situation of transit facilities that place heavy fiscal tolls on their founding States.” , . And, though Missouri and Illinois may volunteer to assist paying a judgment against Bi-State, they are not obligated to do so. See (compact language allowing availability of funding not construed to mandate funding).

Though Missouri has modified its sovereign immunity statute, the considerations underlying the other Barket factors remain largely unchanged. Furthermore, all factors involving the states’ financial obligations to Bi-State weigh in favor of finding that Bi-State is more like a local governmental entity. Therefore, while the factors point in different directions, we find that the changes in the underlying considerations of Barket‘s analysis fail to provide “good reason to believe” that Illinois and Missouri structured Bi-State to allow it to “enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose.” , .

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court‘s denial of Bi-State‘s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Carie Allen, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

Bradley K. Kavanaugh, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, (Thomas M. Larson, Acting U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jamie L. Ballard challenges the substantive reasonableness of the 121-month sentence the district court1 imposed after she pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. We affirm.

After Ballard entered her guilty plea, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report that calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months in prison. At the sentencing hearing, Ballard sought a downward variance. She acknowledged that she had numerous prior misdemeanor convictions, but emphasized that her most recent convictions were for non-violent offenses and that she was addicted to drugs. She also pointed out that she had never served prison time, that the amount of methamphetamine she had possessed was only slightly above the threshold for a two-level increase to her Guidelines offense level, that she had children, that she was attending school at the time of her arrest, and that she had a history of consistent employment. The government noted, among other things, that Ballard had tested positive for methamphetamine several times since her initial arrest, and that, as a result, the magistrate judge had revoked her pre-trial release.

The district court sentenced Ballard to 121 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. The court noted that Ballard—who was only 31 years old at the time she was sentenced—had no fewer than 31 prior convictions, and reasoned that, although they were all misdemeanors, the convictions reflected a continued course of criminal conduct and a lack of effort on Ballard‘s part to stop using drugs or to otherwise rehabilitate herself. The district court referenced 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and explained that it was imposing a 121-month sentence “for punishment, deterrence and to serve the ends of justice, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct by [Ballard], to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

On appeal, Ballard contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable. In her view, the district court failed to consider mitigating factors that should have received considerable weight, and committed a clear error in judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, considering the totality of the circumstances. (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” (quoting ).

We disagree with Ballard‘s assertion that the district court failed to consider important mitigating factors. District courts “need not specifically respond to every argument made by the defendant or mechanically recite each § 3553(a) factor.” (citation omitted). Ballard‘s counsel clearly articulated several mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing, and the sentencing record reflects that the district court considered those factors but gave them little weight relative to other § 3553(a) factors.

The district court also did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” . Here, the district court did not clearly err by giving great weight to Ballard‘s extensive history of criminal conduct, or by giving little weight to her history of drug addiction and the fact that her previous offenses were all misdemeanors. See (“A district court‘s choice to assign relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant is well within its wide latitude in weighing relevant factors.“). The district court imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors, giving great weight to Ballard‘s extensive history of relatively minor offenses, and consider-ing—but finding unpersuasive—her arguments in favor of mitigation. The district court did not fail to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, give significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commit a clear error of judgment in considering the appropriate factors. See . Accordingly, we affirm.

Notes

1
The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
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