UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, -against- KEVIN HAYNES, Defendant.
Case 1:93-cr-01043-RJD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
April 22, 2020
DEARIE, District Judge.
93 CR 1043 (RJD)
DEARIE, District Judge.
Defendant Kevin Haynes, convicted after trial of several crimes relating to his involvement in four bank robberies during an eight-month period from mid-1991 through early 1992, was sentenced in 1994 to 46 years and six months’ incarceration. A full 40 of those years are the mandatory consecutive terms for the two additional
For the reasons to be discussed, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
A. Haynes‘s Criminal Conduct
Haynes, a recently unemployed, 23-year-old father with no criminal history, was recruited by Virgil Rivers, a much older man with a substantial criminal history, to participate with him in four bank robberies, serious criminal conduct that was deserving of serious
B. District Court Proceedings: Indictment through Sentence
Haynes was indicted on September 14, 1993 on six counts: conspiracy to commit bank robbery, four substantive robbery counts under
By letter dated December 21, 1993, the government conveyed a plea offer to Haynes. The proposed agreement provided for Haynes to plead guilty to one substantive robbery charge
The December 21, 1993 plea transmittal letter also stated as follows:
This offer is conditioned upon the following: the defendant must inform the government of his intention to plead guilty on or before December 28, 1993 .... This condition will be strictly enforced. If the defendant fails to meet this condition, the government will seek to obtain a superseding indictment charging the appropriate additional counts under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) .
Haynes declined the offer, elected to exercise his right to trial, and within days the government carried out its threat: a superseding indictment returned on December 29, 1993 added a second and third
The late Judge Douglas Hillman of the Western District of Michigan, then visiting in this
Haynes has served almost 27 of the 46 1/2 years to which he was sentenced. To put that in context, he has served more than three times the length of the high end of the sentence he would have received had he pled guilty (101 months, or 8 years and five months). And he still has an additional 13 years to serve.4
The contrast between Haynes‘s fate and that of his codefendant Virgil Rivers is striking. As noted, it was Rivers, a much older man, with a substantial criminal history including four prior robbery convictions, who recruited Haynes. See generally United States v. Rivers, 50 F.3d 1126, 1127 (2d Cir. 1995). Rivers, however, accepted an offer to plead to a single robbery count and a single
Equally striking are the contrasts between Haynes‘s sentence of 46 1/2 years and the average sentences imposed on defendants convicted of robbery and other crimes. Statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission, for example, show that for fiscal year 2019, the average national sentence imposed for the crime of robbery is 109 months (9 years plus 1 month); for murder, 255 months (21 years, 4 months); for child pornography, 103 months (8 years, 7 month); and for “Extortion/Racketeering,” 32 months (2 years, 8 months).6 For a category labelled “National Defense,” which according to the Commission‘s Sourcebook includes the crimes of “treason, sabotage, espionage, evasion of military service, prohibited financial transactions and exports, providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and weapons of mass destruction,” the
C. Haynes‘s Requests for Holloway Relief
In a comprehensive submission dated January 9, 2017 to the Honorable Robert L. Capers, then United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Haynes implored Mr. Capers to consider what has come to be known as Holloway relief: a motion by the government to vacate one of his
In his Holloway application to Mr. Capers, Haynes addressed the origin and extent of
Mr. Capers declined the request. According to subsequent correspondence from Haynes‘s counsel, however, it appears that Mr. Capers was sympathetic. See Dkt. No. 99-3 at 16, 18-21. That letter—dated May 17, 2018 from Haynes‘s counsel to the Honorable Richard P. Donoghue, appointed interim United States Attorney for this district in 2018—renews the request for Holloway relief. The letter reported to Mr. Donoghue that Mr. Capers “appreciated the unfairness of the sentence” but “expressed concerns... including a concern about whether a United States Attorney has the authority to approve the relief” Haynes requested, and sought to address those concerns. The letter also reported that Mr. Capers believed that the only recourse for Haynes (and which Mr. Capers was inclined to support) was a petition to the President for clemency.
Several months after the renewed Holloway request to Mr. Donoghue, on December 13, 2018, the government and Haynes‘s counsel appeared before this Court for a conference. The Assistant United States Attorney expressed the government‘s doubts about the viability of
The Court did not disguise its view of the situation, advising the government that “if there‘s some sense that this sentence is woefully excessive then there‘s got to be a way to resolve it” and that the Court was “profoundly disappointed in [the government‘s] reaction to this.” (Tr. at 10, 11). The Court remarked that it found the government‘s position “astounding” and that “this is a problem that has to be corrected.” (Tr. at 11). The Court also asked whether there was at least “a recognition that the sentence imposed is greater than necessary given the legitimate and recognized purposes of sentencing,” and the government replied as follows:
I‘m not taking a position one way or the other on the substance of the claim...whether a similar decision would be made now that was made back in 1993...I think it is unlikely that a similar charging decision could be made now, but it is not the position I am in [sic] to reconsider the exercise of prosecutorial discretion made 25 years ago by Assistants and the United States Attorney at the time. (Tr. at 13).
Counsel for Haynes, however, reiterated the position stated in his Holloway letter to Mr. Donoghue. He conveyed that based on a conversation he had with the then-Chief of the Criminal Division in response to his letter to Mr. Capers, there was some recognition on the part of the government that the sentence exceeded the bounds of justice; the disagreement was limited to the question of what the appropriate procedural mechanism for relief might be. (Tr. at 14).
D. The Passage of the First Step Act (“FSA“)
The approaching enactment of the First Step Act was of course “in the air” during the December 13, 2018 conference; President Trump signed it into law only eight days later, on
The First Step Act of course did not make this critical change to
E. The Rule 48 and Compassionate Relief Motions
On January 7, 2019, Haynes formally moved under
At a post-briefing conference on April 26, 2019, the government clung to its hardline position, stating only that “the Office has not filed the Rule 48 dismissal that would trigger the Court‘s ability to opine on whether it was lawful to do so.” (Tr. at 3). Again, this Court did not mince words, advising the government during that conference that the Court “consider[s] [this] to be a pressing question of fundamental justice. And to hear this morning that the Office has not filed a motion...just blows me away.” (Tr. at 4). The only concession voiced was that “[i]t is true that other individuals have had Rule 48 dismissals filed by the government in other cases.” (Tr. at 5). The Court voiced that it was “gravely disappointed” in the government‘s refusal to
With the government persisting in its position that it would not consent to any form of relief in this case, Haynes then advised the Court by letter dated August 6, 2019 of his intention to seek relief under the FSA-amended compassionate release statute. Dkt. No. 97. On August 14, 2019, as a preliminary step and consistent with the requirements of
On the subject of his plans upon release, Haynes referenced his Nurses’ Aide Certificate (which he completed while incarcerated) and his then-current enrollment in the Black Stone Career Institute where he was training to become a paralegal. He noted that, in addition to the possibilities of health care and paralegal work, he could support himself financially in several other ways, including carpentry, construction work, and trucking.
A Summary Reentry Plan Progress Report dated August 13, 2019 and signed by his prison case manager, which was also part of his release petition, documents Haynes‘s work
The section of the Progress Report entitled “Discipline Reports” contains five entries. Three occurred during Haynes’ first two years of incarceration, a fourth occurred fifteen years later, and a fifth, five years after that. They are as follows: February 9, 1994: “interfering with taking count” and “being insolent to staff member;” July 24, 1995: “lying or falsifying statement” and “being in unauthorized area;” December 18, 1995: “encouraging refusal of work;” March 29, 2010: “possessing a dangerous weapon;” and July 9, 2015: “unauthorized physical contact.”
After the passage of time required to establish this Court‘s jurisdiction,16 on October 3, 2019, without any response from the Warden or BOP, Haynes formally moved this Court for relief under the FSA-amended compassionate relief statute. Accompanying materials include a letter from the Federal Defenders of New York detailing the support its social work department, experienced with re-orienting released prisoners, would provide Haynes. According to the letter, upon release Haynes would initially enter the New York City Department of Homeless Services’ Men‘s Intake Shelter in midtown Manhattan and, after intake, would be assigned a permanent shelter. Initial essentials such as clothing, food, and MetroCards would be provided. The
When briefing on the motion for compassionate relief complete, the Court offered the government an additional opportunity to reconsider its position, issuing the following order on November 13, 2019:
Before the Court addresses the issues now thoroughly briefed by the parties, it seems most appropriate that I once again offer the government the opportunity to choose the Holloway path to relief in this case. See United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). I especially urge the government to weigh the circumstances of the case in light of the significant changes in the law detailed in the briefs.
By letter dated February 13, 2020, counsel for Haynes advised the Court that “[a]fter contacting [the government] on February 12, 2020, we understand that the government will not consent to Holloway relief in this case.” Ten days later, by letter-brief dated February 22, 2020, the government confirmed the report from Haynes‘s counsel. The letter advised this Court that:
The United States Attorney has been provided a copy of the Court‘s November 13, 2019 Order, has reviewed the briefing in this litigation, and has determined that the briefing has revealed no new facts or law that would change the government‘s position with regard to Haynes‘s request to dismiss one of his
§ 924(c)(1) counts of conviction.
The government‘s February 22, 2020 letter addressed two additional pieces of business. First, the letter reported that, a full ten weeks earlier, the BOP issued a decision on Haynes‘s petition for compassionate relief. To the surprise of no one, BOP‘s action, signed by the facility warden and dated December 6, 2019, was to deny that request. The government‘s letter attaches copies of the memorandum prepared by Haynes‘s Unit Manager for the Warden to consider as
The Unit Manager‘s memorandum references “Program Statement 5050.50, Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence,” noting that it “provides provisions [sic] for requests based on extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” and that what Haynes offered (in his petition) as such circumstances was that “the mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines used to sentence him by the court was [sic] unjust.” The memorandum continues: “Based upon his supporting documentation he is not eligible for a [r]eduction in [s]entence at this time. No extraordinary or compelling circumstances was [sic] presented...” Handwritten comments follow these remarks, stating only as follows: “Does not meet criteria” and “no chronic medical conditions that cause difficulty performing activities of daily living.” Length of sentence was not addressed.
The disciplinary record that is part of this package—which was not cited by the Warden as grounds for denying Haynes‘s request for relief—contains the same five disciplinary events listed in the Summary Reentry Plan Progress Report included in Haynes‘s petition to the Warden with slightly more detail. The three disciplinary events that occurred in the period 1994-1995 hardly warrant attention; the possession of a dangerous weapon in 2010 and the unauthorized
In response, in a letter dated March 12, 2020, counsel for Haynes briefly addresses the 2015 incident. The letter asserts that Haynes restrained a fellow inmate in order to break up a fight among several prisoners, and that facility rules required that he be written up for unauthorized physical contact regardless of the reason. No record materials are included in support of counsel‘s assertions; as corroboration of sorts, however, the letter emphasizes—as plainly appears on the face of the BOP disciplinary record—that all components of the sanction imposed for this infraction (loss of commissary, phone and visitation privileges) were suspended; counsel asserts that this was because Haynes in fact assisted in minimizing the harm the fight might have caused.
As a “record” on this disciplinary incident, the Court, of course, has before it only the three items just reviewed (the government‘s February 22, 2020 letter, the redacted BOP disciplinary record, and Haynes‘s March 12, 2020 letter) and so makes no formal factual findings on the matter. The Court does note, however, that despite the government‘s hardline position in this matter, it has not disputed Haynes‘s characterization of the 2015 incident.
The other agenda item in the government‘s February 22, 2020 letter was a citation to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,
DISCUSSION
No reasonable observer could dispute the unfairness and excessiveness of the sentence Haynes is serving. Its length (in absolute and comparative terms, as reviewed above) and the principal reason for that length—the exercise of prosecutorial charging discretion in an oppressive and openly retaliatory manner—speak for themselves. The only relevant legal inquiry has been whether there exists a procedural vehicle not dependent on the consent of the government, as in the
A. The Compassionate Release Framework
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act on December 21, 2018, now provides in pertinent part:
(c) Modification of an Imposed Term of Imprisonment.—The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case—
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant‘s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant‘s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....
Thus, as is now well understood, before the First Step Act amended the compassionate release statute, a motion for reduction in sentence based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons” could only be presented to the Court by the BOP on a prisoner‘s behalf, whereas now, under the amended statute, a prisoner may bring the motion himself, provided the statutory exhaustion or lapse-of-thirty-day requirement is satisfied.18
The important legal question presented by Haynes‘s motion arises from the fact that the First Step Act amended only the compassionate release statute and only in the manner just noted—i.e., allowing a prisoner, rather than requiring BOP, to be the movant—but did not amend any other language in
That framework includes, first, the pre-FSA statute by which Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the authority to determine which circumstances are sufficiently “extraordinary and compelling” to warrant a reduction in sentence under
The Commission, in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.19
The Sentencing Commission‘s policy statement implementing these statutory directives appears in
Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) , the court may reduce a term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth in18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that—(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or
(B) the defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned.(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ; and(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.
The “Commentary” to this Guideline includes five “Application Notes.” Application Note 1 lists circumstances that qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” Subdivisions (A) though (C) of that Note list the defendant‘s medical condition, age and family circumstances. Subdivision (D), however, titled “Other Reasons,” provides as follows: “As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant‘s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).”
Application Notes 2 and 3 (part of the same Commentary) address other substantive standards, providing that “an extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been unforeseen at the time of sentencing” in order to qualify (Note 2), and that rehabilitation of the defendant standing alone, does not qualify as extraordinary and compelling (Note 3). Application Notes 4 and 5, however, both speak plainly to the BOP‘s exclusive gate-keeping authority pre-FSA. Note 4 states that, “A reduction under this policy statement may be granted only upon motion by the Director of the [BOP] pursuant to
Circling back to
B. The Parties’ Positions
Haynes asks this Court to find that, on the facts presented, the FSA‘s dramatic amending of
But, with respect to the language in the same Application Note that vests BOP with the authority to determine which “other reasons” qualify, Haynes says that language is inconsistent with the First Step Act‘s elimination of BOP‘s gatekeeper role and thus not binding on this Court. To be sure, Haynes‘s position would be susceptible to the attack that it smacks of a kind of cherry-picking of pre-First Step Act law, or that it is unduly inventive, even reckless, were his position not supported by a substantial body of recent district court decisions (to be discussed momentarily) inaugurating a new jurisprudence of compassionate release. Haynes is not so reckless, however, as to quarrel with the express mandate in
The government‘s position, naturally, is that the First Step Act merely enacted a procedural change—i.e., identifying who may be the movant under
C. Analysis
1. The Court‘s Authority to Determine What Qualifies As “Extraordinary and Compelling”
Haynes‘s position is hardly as radical as it first sounds. As a threshold matter, independent of the apparent conflict between a federal statute (
Although Congress empowered the Commission to issue policy statements regarding the appropriate use of the sentence-modification provisions under
§ 3582 ,28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C) , Congress may override the Commission‘s policy statements by statute. Because the Commission‘s statutory authority is limited to explaining the appropriate use of sentence-modification provisions under the current statute,28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C) , an amendment to the statute may cause some provisions of a policy statement to no longer fall under that authority, as they no longer explain an “appropriate use” under the amended statute. For example, at least one provision of the Commission‘s previously promulgated policy statement is clearly contradicted by the First Step Act‘s amendments to§ 3582 : The unamended policy statement still advises that “[a] reduction under this policy statement may be granted only upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” ... Yet§ 3582 allows the Court to grant a motion for extraordinary and compelling reasons upon a motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or by the defendant. ... The mandate that the Director of the BOP determine additional extraordinary or compelling reasons likewise fails to explain an “appropriate use” under the newly amended§ 3582 .23Where two statutes are in conflict, it is nearly axiomatic that the latter enacted is given preference over the former. That principle has especially strong force here where the Commission derives its power to promulgate the policy statement from Congress. Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor that must consider the entire statutory scheme. The Court‘s role is to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris....The corpus juris here consists of the statute (
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ), the relevant policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13), and the statute granting the Commission authority to promulgate that policy statement (28 U.S.C. § 994 ).Before the First Step Act‘s amendments to
§ 3582 , it made sense that the BOP would have to determine any extraordinary and compelling reasons—only the BOP could bring a motion for a reduction of sentence under§ 3582(c)(1)(A) . But defendants no longer need the blessing of the BOP to bring such motions. The BOP in fact may never weigh in or provide guidance when a§ 3582(c) motion is brought by a defendant. Given the changes to the statute, the policy-statement provision that was previously applicable to18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) no longer fits with the statute and thus does not comply with the congressional mandate that the policy statement must provide guidance on the appropriate use of sentence-modification provisions under§ 3582 .The title of the First Step Act section that amends
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ... is “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.” That title supports the reading that U.S.S.G § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D) is not applicable when a defendant requests relief under§ 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended because it no longer explains an appropriate use of that statute. For if the Director of the BOP were still the sole determiner of what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, the amendment‘s allowance of defendants’ own§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motions for reduction of sentence would be to no avail. Such a reading would contravene the explicit purpose of the new amendments.
Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d at 350-51 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphases added).
The Court concluded:
Thus, the correct interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A) —based on the text, statutory history and structure, and consideration of Congress‘s ability to override any of the Commission‘s policy statements “at any time“—is that when a defendant brings a motion for a sentence reduction under the amended provision, the Court can determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those delineated in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(C) warrant granting relief.
Id. at 352 (quoting, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 394 (1989)).
In following the reasoning of Cantu—as many cases (about to be discussed) have done—this Court emphasizes, as Cantu expressed, that this is an “holistic endeavor that must consider the entire statutory scheme,” that the Court‘s role is “to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris,” and that the latest enacted statute and its express purpose must be the keystone.
Since Cantu was issued in June 2019, at least twelve other federal district courts of which this Court is aware have considered the relationship between the FSA-amended compassionate release statute and Application Note 1(D) and have reached essentially the same conclusion as Cantu. See United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 450 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2019) (“the Court concludes [that] the Cantu, Fox, and Beck courts’ reading of
These decisions reflect, to borrow a term, the right side of history on the crucial legal questions they consider, which Haynes‘s motion also presents, and so today this Court joins them in concluding that it, too, has the authority to grant the relief sought in this case—namely, to determine what “Other Reasons” (as that term is used in Application Note 1(D)) qualify as
2. The Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances Here Warranting a Reduction in Sentence
The Court readily concludes, on the facts as detailed above—including the brutal impact of Haynes‘s original sentence, its drastic severity as compared to codefendant Rivers‘s ten-year term, its harshness as compared to the sentences imposed on similar and even more severe criminal conduct today, and the extent to which that brutal sentence was a penalty for Haynes‘s exercise of his constitutional right to trial—that the FSA’ elimination of the
Indeed, several of the reported decisions just catalogued have made precisely that finding with respect to similarly situated defendants, holding that this sea change in
There is no doubt that there is gross disparity between the sentence Mr. Redd received and the sentence he would have received after the First Step Act....That disparity is primarily the result of Congress‘[sic] conclusion that [stacked] sentences are unfair and unnecessary, in effect a legislative rejection of the need to impose sentences under
§ 924(c) as originally enacted, as well as a legislative declaration of what level of punishment is adequate... These are, the Court finds,extraordinary and compelling developments that constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction to [the defendant‘s] sentence.
Redd, 2020 WL 1248493, at *6.30 Incorporating its analysis of the effect of the FSA-amended statute on the existing Guideline commentary, the Redd Court further found that “the [circumstances] that it has determined ... [to be] extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction satisfy any requirement for consistency with any applicable policy statement.” Id. (emphasis added).
Other cases reaching the same result before Redd include Urkevich, 2019 WL 6037391, at *4 (“A reduction in ... sentence is warranted by extraordinary and compelling reasons, specifically the injustice of facing a term of incarceration forty years longer than Congress now deems warranted for the crimes committed“);31 Maumau, 2020 WL 806121, at *7 (“Like the Urkevich court, this court concludes that the changes in how
Of final note, the O‘Bryan decision, among others, specifically addresses the other principal objection raised by the government here and in other
Notably, the only rationale offered by the government for opposing the relief sought is the contention that Congress did not specify that Section 403 of the FSA [amending
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ] should apply retroactively. ... However, this simply establishes that a defendant sentenced before the FSA is not automatically entitled to resentencing; it does not mean that the court may not or should not consider the effect of a radically changed sentence for purposes of applying§ 3582(c)(1)(A) . That is, the fact that the FSA changes in§ 924(c) were not explicitly retroactive is “relevant [but] ultimately has little bearing” on whether the court is empowered to act under Section 3582, because “[i]t is not unreasonable for Congress to conclude that not all defendants convicted under§ 924(c) should receive new sentences, even while expanding the power of the courts to relieve some defendants of those sentences on a case-by-case basis.”
O‘Bryan, 2020 WL 869475, at *1 (quoting, Maumau, 2020 WL 806121, at *7).
Indeed, this Court would add: the Congressional decision not to make the
In sum, in the context of the prosecution of Haynes detailed above, the Congressional decision to outlaw the very weapon prosecutors used to punish Haynes with 30 additional years in prison for electing to go to trial—and to reiterate: as documented in the plea offer letter, the quid pro quo was explicit—is an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance warranting a reduction in sentence under
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 3142(g) Considerations
Only two steps remain. First, to comply with the applicable policy statement found at Guideline § 1B1.13(2), the Court must be satisfied that Haynes “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in
The government insists that Haynes would pose a danger to the community if released now, and therefore should serve the remaining 13 years of his sentence, because (a) the crimes he committed in 1992 were crimes of violence, and, (b) as detailed above, he was disciplined on March 29, 2010, for “possessing a dangerous weapon,” and again on July 9, 2015, for “unauthorized physical contact.”
The Court strongly disagrees. Indeed, refuting the government‘s recidivism argument is, again, the fact that the Congress has now decided that Haynes has served more than the appropriate sentence for his crimes. Whatever speculative risks of recidivism exist here are no greater than for any defendant who has served the time the legislature has decreed for the crimes committed.
Beyond that, despite how the government might seek to characterize Haynes‘s prison records, the BOP Summary Reentry Report described above plainly shows that Haynes has been
Section 3553(a) requires little additional discussion. The Congressional declaration of what is now considered adequate punishment for violations of
CONCLUSION
To conclude, one might well begin with the words of Haynes‘s counsel, who are to be commended for their persistence and for the remarkably high quality of their submissions.
As this order is signed, Haynes will have been in federal custody for almost 27 years as a result of his only foray into serious criminal behavior. Those years, as discussed, are far beyond what the United States Attorney determined was a suitable sentencing range when offering Haynes a plea, far beyond what Congress ever intended, as its recent clarification makes clear, and far beyond what the law now permits. And all because Haynes chose a trial over a plea and the prosecution retaliated, an action that the United States Attorney concedes could not be taken today.
The insistence of this first-time offender on a trial was no doubt ill-advised, more likely foolish in light of the available evidence and the government‘s distinct advantage in trying four robberies in a single trial. But it was his decision, and a choice firmly guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the government cannot be faulted for Haynes‘s poor judgment in making that election, the prosecution‘s plainly retaliatory reaction reflects patently flawed judgment and insensitive abuse, on its part, of the powers with which it is vested.
Congress has spoken. Loudly. It has clarified its intended deployment of
The Clerk of the Court is directed to prepare the appropriate amended judgement.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 22, 2020
/S/ Raymond J. Dearie
RAYMOND J. DEARIE
United States District Judge
Notes
Brown also engaged in its own plenary reasoning, concluding: “If the FSA is to increase the use of compassionate release, the most natural reading of the amended
As Maumau documents, however, there are explicit indicators to the contrary in the legislative history of the statute that first created compassionate relief and made BOP its gatekeeper. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, eff. Oct. 12, 1984) In the Senate Report accompanying that Act, Congress expressed its belief that
Maumau further observes: “Despite this intent, a 2013 Inspector General‘s report by the Department of Justice found that ‘although the BOP‘s regulations and Program Statement permit non-medical circumstances to be considered as a basis for compassionate release, the BOP routinely rejects such requests and did not approve a single nonmedical request during the 6-year period of our review.‘” Maumau, 2020 WL 806121, at *5 (citing the Department of Justice‘s April 2013 report, The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program, at ii).
The Court in Maumau concludes:
In other words Congress indicated [35] years ago that it would be appropriate to provide compassionate releases when sentences are “unusually long” but the [BOP] consistently declined to seek relief in those situations. Congress responded by eliminating the [BOP]‘s gatekeeping function over compassionate releases. Accordingly, the fact that the phrase “extraordinary and compelling reason” has not historically been interpreted to include exceedingly long sentences is an unpersuasive reason to exclude such an interpretation today.Id.