456 F.Supp.3d 496
E.D.N.Y
2020
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Background

  • Kevin Haynes, a first-time offender, participated as an armed lookout in four bank robberies (1991–1992) and was convicted at trial.
  • After rejecting a 1993 plea offer (which projected a total sentence of ~93–101 months), the government obtained a superseding indictment adding two § 924(c) counts; those stacked firearm convictions produced 40 mandatory consecutive years.
  • In 1994 Haynes was sentenced to 558 months (46.5 years); he had served ~27 years when the district court decided this motion.
  • Haynes sought executive/Holloway relief and then filed for compassionate release under the First Step Act (FSA) amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the FSA’s elimination of § 924(c) stacking is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for resentencing.
  • The government opposed, arguing (inter alia) that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement (U.S.S.G. §1B1.13) and BOP retain controlling force and that the FSA’s §924(c) change is non-retroactive. BOP denied Haynes’s administrative request.
  • The court followed recent district-court precedents (e.g., Cantu, Brown), found the court may independently assess "extraordinary and compelling" reasons post-FSA, held the §924(c) reform qualifies, found Haynes not dangerous, and reduced his sentence to time served.

Issues

Issue Haynes' Argument Government's Argument Held
1) Who decides what is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason under §3582(c)(1)(A) after the FSA? Courts may determine "other" extraordinary reasons under U.S.S.G. §1B1.13 App. Note 1(D) because FSA removed BOP gatekeeping. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement (and BOP gatekeeping language) remains applicable and courts should defer; only BOP may identify "other" reasons. Court follows Cantu/Brown line: district courts may independently determine "extraordinary and compelling" reasons when defendants move under the amended statute.
2) Does the First Step Act’s amendment to §924(c) (which eliminated stacking but was not made retroactive) nonetheless constitute an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release? Yes — the dramatic change that outlawed the prosecutorial weapon responsible for Haynes’s additional 40 years creates extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting reduction. No — allowing relief would circumvent Congress’s choice not to make the §924(c) change retroactive. Court held the FSA’s elimination of stacking is an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce Haynes’s sentence in his case.
3) Is Haynes a danger to the community (U.S.S.G. §1B1.13(2) / 18 U.S.C. §3142(g))? Haynes’ record, programming, education, and the circumscribed disciplinary incidents show he is not dangerous and has a viable reentry plan. Government points to violent convictions and two disciplinary incidents (2010 possession of a weapon; 2015 unauthorized physical contact) to argue danger and oppose release. Court found Haynes not a danger; disciplinary incidents insufficient to show present dangerousness and reentry supports release.
4) Must relief be achieved only by government action (Holloway / Rule 48) or may the court grant relief absent government consent? Relief may be granted by the court under the FSA-amended compassionate-release statute without government consent. Government refused Holloway/Rule 48 relief and urged deference to BOP/Commission; sought no consent. Court granted compassionate release (reduced sentence to time served) and denied the Rule 48 motion without prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

  • Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (plea‑bargaining reindictment threat is generally permissible; context for prosecution’s post‑plea charging)
  • Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing Guidelines are advisory; commentary not binding on courts)
  • Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (explains Sentencing Commission authority and that Congress may override Commission guidance)
  • United States v. Rivers, 50 F.3d 1126 (2d Cir. 1995) (appeal and sentencing history of Haynes’s codefendant; used to contrast sentences)
  • United States v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (held district courts may find "extraordinary and compelling" reasons independent of BOP after the FSA)
  • United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (joined Cantu’s reasoning that post‑FSA courts have discretion to assess compassionate‑release grounds)
  • United States v. Chen, 127 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (discusses the weight of Sentencing Commission commentary)
  • Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Sentencing Guidelines commentary entitled to deference unless inconsistent with statute)
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