United States of America v. Francis James Kistler
No. 22-1514
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
June 6, 2023
Submitted: October 20, 2022
SMITH, Chief Judge.
A grand jury indicted Francis Kistler, a former sheriff‘s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, in violation of
The district court1 filed a notice of departure, pursuant to
At sentencing, the district court sustained Kistler‘s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to
In the alternative, the district court also varied upward to the same 300 months based on the
On appeal, Kistler challenges his sentence‘s length. “When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review a district court‘s sentence in two steps: first, we review for significant procedural error; and second, if there is no significant procedural error, we review for substantive reasonableness.” United States v. O‘Connor, 567 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 2009).
Kistler argues that the district court procedurally erred by improperly considering the conduct underlying some of the dismissed counts of the indictment. He claims that the court erred by counting the enticement charges twice—in the Guidelines range calculation and in the departure—and by relying on Count 5 despite it not being proven by a preponderance of evidence.
However, “[w]e have held that any procedural error in granting an upward departure is harmless when the district court makes it clear that the sentence is also based on an upward variance under the section 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012). Here, the district court‘s extensive explanation for the appropriateness of its variance placed great weight on the seriousness of the offense and Kistler‘s abuse of his position as a law enforcement officer. It placed comparatively little weight on any of the dismissed counts. The
Kistler argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. In doing so, he reiterates his argument based on double counting the enticement counts and consideration of Count 5 but, as we have explained, the variance focused on the seriousness of his offense and his law enforcement status, not the dismissed counts.
Additionally, Kistler argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately weigh the mitigation points that he raised and failed to adequately justify the sentence. This claim is belied by the sentencing transcript, briefly summarized above. In any event, “[s]imply because the district court weighed relevant factors more heavily than [Kistler] would prefer does not mean the district court abused its discretion.” United States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2011).
In sum, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court‘s rationale for its alternative variance. Kistler has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error. We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.
