UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Prince ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13-3275.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: June 13, 2014. Filed: Aug. 14, 2014.
763 F.3d 947
III.
Lastly, we address Meehan’s state-law battery and false imprisonment claims. We hold that Thompson is entitled to official immunity from these claims.
“[U]nder Minnesota law a public official is entitled to official immunity from statе law claims when that official is charged by law with duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion[,] . . . [unless] the officer acted maliciоusly or willfully.” Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Minn.1990). Malice involves the commission of a wrongful act that the police officer knows or has reason to know is prohibited. State ex rel. Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn.1994). This determination involves “a subjective standard, in contrast to the objective qualified immunity standard.” Nelson v. County of Wright, 162 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir.1998).
“Previously, we have rejected attempts to enter trunсated orders that did not provide a ‘thorough determination of [the defendant’s] claim of . . . immunity.’ ” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting O’Neil v. City of Iowa City, Iowa, 496 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2007)). The district court concluded that Thompson was nоt entitled to official immunity because “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that Defendant did in fact frisk Plaintiff, and that Defendant knew or should have known that his actions in frisking [and arresting] Plaintiff—whom he, by his own admission, did not suspect of criminal activity—were without justification.” D. Ct. Order of July 2, 2013, at 13.
As we explained above, however, a reasonable officer would not have known that arresting and frisking Meehаn would have violated her constitutional rights. Moreover, Meehan has presented no specific evidence that Thompson himself actually knew that he was violating her constitutional rights. See Semler v. Klang, 743 N.W.2d 273, 279 (Minn.Ct.App.2007) (“Mere allegations of malice are not sufficient to support a finding of malice, аs such a finding must be based on specific facts evidencing bad faith.”). Indeed, Thompson provided uncontroverted testimony that it was standard prаctice to transport intoxicated individuals to detox facilities. With no specific evidence that Thompson acted with malice, wе hold that he is entitled to official immunity.
IV.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case remanded for the entry of judgment dismissing Meehan’s complaint.
Anthony P. Gоnzalez, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jefferson City, MO, argued (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., Philip M. Koppe, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
A jury found Eddie Prince Roberts guilty of two counts of bank robbery, in violation of
In February 1993, Roberts pleaded guilty to four counts of bank robbery. The presentence report for this case explained that in three of the four robberies, Roberts threatened to shoot the bank teller if the teller failed to comply with his demands. In August 1999, a jury found Roberts guilty оf another bank robbery. This court affirmed Roberts’s conviction, noting that Roberts stipulated that Carl Mitchell, with whom Roberts committed the robbery, told the teller: “I want the money
In May 2012, a grand jury charged Roberts with two counts of bank robbery in violation of
Section 3559 also provides an affirmative defense: Onсe the government establishes that a defendant previously has been convicted of two or more serious violent felonies, the defеndant can avoid mandatory life imprisonment if he proves that his prior robberies were nonqualifying felonies.
In December 2012, a jury found Roberts guilty of both counts of bank robbery. At sentencing, the parties agreed that Roberts’s four 1993 convictions countеd as one conviction for purposes of § 3559, because the convictions did not occur “on separate occasions.”
Roberts argued, however, that his 1999 bank robbery conviction was not a qualifying serious violent felony under
Roberts advances two arguments on appeal, both based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). First, he argues that Alleyne and the Sixth Amendment require that a jury, rather than a judge, must find the fact of his prior convictions becausе it increased the maximum penalty to which he was exposed. This contention is foreclosed by precedent. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), held that recidivism is not an element of an offense that must be submitted to a jury, and Alleyne did not revisit that conclusion. 133 S.Ct. at 2160 n. 1; see United States v. Abrahamson, 731 F.3d 751, 752 (8th Cir. 2013).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.