UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DARIUS KEYON BENSON, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 24-4489
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
May 29, 2025
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: May 19, 2025
Decided: May 29, 2025
Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jamie L. Schoen, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
In 2018, Darius Keyon Benson pled guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm and ammunition after convictions for a felony and a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of
At resentencing, the district court established a Sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment, sentenced Benson to time served, and imposed two years of supervised release. On appeal, Benson‘s counsel has filed a brief to pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning (1) whether Benson‘s sentence of time served is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and (2) whether the two-year term of supervised release is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Benson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
We review a criminal “sentence[]—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “first ensure ... the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as . . . improperly calculating[] the Guidelines range,
While Benson correctly notes that the district court‘s imposition of a time-served sentence amounted to an unexplained upward variance from the Guidelines range calculated at the resentencing hearing, any error is harmless. See
Next, Benson argues that the two-year term of supervised release is unreasonable. We disagree. The Supreme Court has observed that “[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration” and that “[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). Here, the district court properly explained the reasons for imposing supervision following Benson‘s release, including Benson‘s criminal history, the length of his incarceration, and the need to provide time for Benson to transition to society. In addition, the two-year term of supervised release falls within the statutory maximum and the advisory Guidelines range, and Benson has not rebutted the substantive reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines term of supervised release, see United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2020) (stating that the Gall “standard applies when considering a defendant‘s . . . term of supervised release“). We therefore discern no abuse in discretion in the court‘s imposition of two years of supervised release.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no potentially meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court‘s amended judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Benson, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Benson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel‘s
AFFIRMED
