United States of America v. Christopher Ronald Martin
No. 20-1511
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
June 7, 2021
Submitted: January 15, 2021
Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
Before LOKEN, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Martin challenges the district court‘s1 denial of his motions to suppress and his objection to application of the career criminal enhancement in
I.
Martin robbed a Sprint Wireless Express store in Davenport, Iowa at gunpoint, making off with cell phones and tablets. Little did he know, he also left with a GPS tracker, courtesy of the store employee. The employee called police, describing the robber as “5’ 7” tall, heavyset, male, African American with a grey ski mask, a blue hooded sweatshirt and grey sweatpants.” D. Ct. Dkt. 67 at 2. The employee described the getaway car as a dark-green Pontiac Grand Am or Grand Prix driven by someone he did not see, and said the vehicle went north on Elmore Avenue. He also reported that the robber had a tiny, silver handgun.
Officers responded to the robbery within minutes. The first on the scene received a slightly more detailed description that the robber was 300 pounds or more and carrying a duffel bag. Dispatch also began receiving location reports from the GPS tracker, which updated every six seconds. The data, collected by a third-party provider, directed officers to the intersection of Kimberly and Spring streets, about 1.5 miles from the store.
At the intersection, officers saw two cars: a white one and a dark-blue, four-door Ford Contour. There were two black male passengers in the dark-blue car, and police noticed that the occupants were not looking around at the multiple squad cars. When the dark-blue car pulled through the intersection and into a gas station, one officer turned on his overhead lights.
After
Police brought the store employee to the scene for a show-up identification. Police removed a handcuffed Martin from the squad car and pointed a spotlight at him. The employee said he was ninety percent sure that Martin was the robber based on build and clothing.
Martin filed motions to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop and the out-of-court identification. The district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress the stop and denied the second motion as moot after the Government said that it would not use the out-of-court identification at trial. Martin pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of
II.
A.
Martin argues police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the car. He suggests police should not have relied on the GPS device and that the description of the vehicle by the store‘s clerk was not a match. On a motion to suppress, we review the district court‘s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Fourth Amendment secures the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A traffic stop is a seizure and “must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008). Police are permitted to make investigative stops of a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion that an individual in that vehicle recently committed a crime in a general area. See United States v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying reasonable suspicion standard to stop of a vehicle several blocks from crime scene); United States v. Juvenile TK, 134 F.3d 899, 900-04 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying reasonable suspicion standard for traffic stop where officers received two dispatch messages within forty-five minutes informing them that a vehicle had been involved in criminal activity in the area).
“A reasonable suspicion is a ‘particularized and objective’ basis for suspecting [criminal activity by] the person who is stopped.” United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is determined by “look[ing] at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing [based on his] own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “Reasonable suspicion must be supported by more than a mere hunch, but the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Roberts, 787 F.3d at 1209 (cleaned up).
The police had at least reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The GPS tracker indicated that it was at the intersection of Kimberly and Spring. Martin argues the GPS was unreliable. In support, he points to cases in which courts heard testimony about the reliability and accuracy of GPS devices. See United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 610-12 (1st Cir. 2012). But those cases are about the admission of the data at trial and do not address whether officers in the field can rely on third-party GPS data while pursuing suspects. Considering the tight window of opportunity officers have to locate a fleeing suspect, we find it reasonable for police to rely on third-party GPS data.
Other factors also supported the officers’ suspicion. The intersection of Kimberly and Spring is in the general area of the crime scene. United States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2012) (factors like the location of the parties may support an officer‘s decision to stop). When the five police cars arrived at the intersection, they saw two vehicles. Police could reasonably rule out one because it did not even remotely match the description given by the store employee. The Ford Contour roughly matched the description. While the employee said the vehicle was a coupe (the Ford Contour is a four-door), a Ford Contour has the same general shape as a Pontiac Grand Am and Grand Prix. Plus, the color (dark green) is close to the color of the Ford Contour (dark blue). Keeping in mind that the employee only saw the car briefly after dark, it was reasonable for officers to believe the employee made minor errors and that this was the car they were looking for. See United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We have held that generic suspect descriptions and crime-scene proximity can warrant reasonable suspicion where there are few or no other potential suspects in the area who match the description.“).
Police also noticed unusual behavior by the car‘s occupants, who did not acknowledge an overwhelming police presence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (irregular activities like repeatedly walking by the same store window can support reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (irregularity of purchasing $2,100 in plane tickets with a roll of $20 bills could support reasonable suspicion). The totality of the circumstances gave police at least reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, so stopping the vehicle to investigate that suspicion comported with the Fourth Amendment.
B.
Martin also challenges the district court‘s denial of his motion to suppress the use of the show-up lineup, which he says was unduly suggestive. The district court denied the motion as moot after the Government committed that it would not use the evidence at trial. While it may have been better for the district court to grant the motion as unopposed or defer ruling until the issue was raised at trial, see
III.
Martin last argues that the district court erred in finding that he was a career offender and subject to an enhancement under
Martin concedes as much. One of Martin‘s other prior convictions was for Illinois armed robbery. In United States v. Brown, 916 F.3d 706, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2019), we held that Illinois armed robbery is a crime of violence. Martin acknowledges this and says that he raises this argument “in order to preserve it.” Martin Br. at 19. In any case, we are bound by the ruling of a prior panel. See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Because Martin has two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, we do not address his Iowa robbery conviction. We affirm the district court‘s career criminal enhancement.
IV.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.