999 F.3d 636
8th Cir.2021Background
- Martin robbed a Sprint Wireless Express store at gunpoint; a store employee covertly left a GPS tracker on the stolen goods and called police with a brief physical and vehicle description.
- GPS data from a third-party provider led officers to an intersection about 1.5 miles from the store; officers observed a dark-blue Ford Contour and another car.
- Police stopped the Ford Contour after observing occupants who did not react to multiple squad cars; a search of the vehicle recovered the stolen phones and tablets.
- The store employee performed a show-up identification and said he was ~90% sure Martin was the robber; the Government later agreed not to use the out-of-court ID at trial.
- Martin moved to suppress the stop and the identification; the district court denied the stop suppression and deemed the ID motion moot; Martin pled guilty to offenses but preserved the right to appeal suppression rulings.
- At sentencing the PSR classified Martin as a career offender based on prior convictions (including Illinois armed robbery and federal bank robbery); the district court applied the §4B1.1 enhancement and Martin appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Martin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of vehicle stop (reasonable suspicion) | GPS was unreliable and vehicle description did not match; stop lacked reasonable suspicion | GPS location + proximity to crime, rough vehicle match, and occupants' behavior created reasonable suspicion | Stop lawful; reasonable suspicion existed |
| Reliance on third-party GPS data in the field | Third-party GPS is unreliable; courts examine GPS accuracy | Officers may reasonably rely on third-party GPS in the field given the exigency and frequent updates | Field reliance on third-party GPS was reasonable for locating suspects |
| Admissibility of show-up identification (unduly suggestive) | Spotlighting and handcuffed presentation made the show-up suggestive and inadmissible | Government represented it would not use the out-of-court ID; district court signaled ID likely inadmissible | Any error was harmless; ID effectively excluded and defendant could reassert at trial |
| Career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1 | Some prior convictions are overbroad and should not count toward career-offender status | Two prior felony convictions (including Illinois armed robbery and federal bank robbery) qualify as crimes of violence | Affirmed: Martin is a career offender; enhancement applies (binding precedent controls) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality-of-circumstances test for reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Roberts, 787 F.3d 1204 (8th Cir. 2015) (reasonable-suspicion standard for vehicle stops near crime scene)
- United States v. Robinson, 670 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2012) (location/proximity supports stop)
- United States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2016) (generic descriptions plus proximity can warrant reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2013) (cases addressing GPS data reliability at trial)
- United States v. Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2012) (court examined GPS accuracy issues at trial)
- United States v. Juvenile TK, 134 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 1998) (reasonable-suspicion standard for traffic stop after dispatch reports)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police may investigate based on observed suspicious conduct)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (aggregate innocuous facts may support reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Eason, 643 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for career-offender application)
- United States v. Harper, 869 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2017) (federal bank robbery is a crime of violence)
- United States v. Brown, 916 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2019) (Illinois armed robbery is a crime of violence)
- Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2011) (panel precedent binds later panels)