UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARLOS
No. 22-12077, No. 22-13554
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
February 18, 2025
[PUBLISH]
[PUBLISH]
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar appeal their separate convictions for cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA“).1 On appeal, Lemus and Canario-Vilomar contend that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the MDLEA exceeds Congress‘s authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution. Both appellants argue that Congress overstepped its bounds by defining a “vessel without nationality” in
After careful review, we affirm. The Framers did not curtail Congress‘s authority under the Felonies Clause by incorporating any limitations under international law. Congress, therefore, did not act beyond
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Lemus‘s Proceedings
On December 30, 2021, officers on board a United States Customs and Border Patrol aircraft identified a boat called a “go-fast vessel,” or “GFV,” approximately 37 nautical miles north of Panama. Two United States Coast Guard cutters moved to intercept the GFV and, in their pursuit, saw four people jettisoning packages of suspected contraband into the water. A Coast Guard helicopter fired warning shots at the GFV, which then stopped. Coast Guard officers from the cutters conducted a right-of-visit and boarded the GFV. On board, the officers identified four people: Jorge Julian Martinez, Wayne Duke, Nedry McLean, and Antonio Lemus. Martinez identified himself as the master of the vessel and claimed Colombian nationality for himself, his three passengers, and the boat. A representative of United States Coast Guard District 7 contacted the Colombian Navy, which could neither confirm nor deny the GFV‘s registration. District 7 then granted a statement of no objection to treat the GFV as a vessel without nationality for the purpose of enforcing United States law. In the meantime, the officers from the two Coast Guard cutters collected 40 packages—totaling about 40 kilograms—from the water. Narcotics testing of two of the packages came back positive for cocaine. In a post-Miranda2 statement, Lemus admitted that he had been hired to participate in a drug-smuggling scheme directed at Panama and that he was supposed to be paid 20,000,000 Colombian pesos (about $4,881) upon completion of the crime.
A grand jury returned a two-count indictment charging Lemus and his three co-defendants with one count of conspiring to possess and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one count of possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of the MDLEA. Both counts were alleged to have occurred on the high seas, on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of
B. Canario-Vilomar‘s Proceedings
On December 6, 2021, a Dutch Maritime Patrol Aircraft spotted a GFV approximately 145 nautical miles north of Colombia. A helicopter and a small boat manned by the United States Coast Guard were dispatched to investigate. Once the boarding team reached the GFV, they identified three people on board: Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, Jesus Calle-Balbin, and Jose Antonio Canario-Vilomar. One of the detainees claimed Dominican-Republic nationality for the vessel. The Coast Guard contacted the Dominican Republic, which advised that it could neither confirm nor deny registration of the boat. Based on that response, the GFV was treated as a
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Canario-Vilomar and the other occupants of the GFV with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and substantive possession with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine on board a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction, all in violation of the MDLEA. Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to the conspiracy charge pursuant to a written plea deal under which the government agreed to dismiss the substantive charge and make certain sentencing recommendations. Before sentencing, Canario-Vilomar and his co-defendants moved to withdraw their guilty pleas and moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
Lemus and Canario-Vilomar timely appealed, and we have consolidated their appeals for adjudication.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW3
A district court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016). Likewise, we review de novo the constitutionality of a criminal statute. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Although a guilty plea generally waives a defendant‘s right to appeal his conviction, it does not waive the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute underlying the conviction. Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 178 (2018).
III. ANALYSIS
This case involves the scope of Congress‘s authority under the Felonies Clause, which empowers Congress to “define and punish ... Felonies committed on the high seas.”
Second, Canario-Vilomar contends that his conviction cannot stand because his crime occurred in an EEZ that falls outside the bounds of the “high seas” as defined by international law. Because he was not arrested on the “high seas” as defined by international law, he reasons, his offense “fell outside of Congress‘s powers under the Felonies Clause,” and the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case. Here, Canario-Vilomar‘s argument proceeds in two parts: first, the term “high seas” must be defined in accordance with international law; and second, under international law, the EEZ is not part of the high seas. As his primary support, Canario-Vilomar invokes the interpretive principle of noscitur a sociis, suggesting that because other portions of
Third, Canario-Vilomar argues that the MDLEA violates principles of due process because it allows the United States to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals for conduct that bears no nexus with the United States. Canario-Vilomar acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by our binding precedent in United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2014), and he raises it for preservation purposes only.
We take each issue in turn.
A. International Law and the Felonies Clause
Two of the issues presented—the classification of a “vessel without nationality” and the inclusion of the EEZ within the “high seas“—require us to address whether international law plays any role in Congress‘s definition and punishment of crimes under the Felonies Clause. We conclude, as we now explain, that it does not.
As an initial matter, a person charged with a violation of the MDLEA “does not have standing to raise a claim of failure to comply with international law as a basis for a defense.”
Nonetheless, “whether a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is not an element of [an MDLEA] offense, but instead is solely an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that should be
The Define and Punish Clause of Article I empowers Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”
We recently reaffirmed the same conclusion. See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 825–27 (11th Cir. 2024).4 In Alfonso, the appellants zeroed in on Bellaizac-Hurtado‘s recognition that Congress‘s authority under the Offenses Clause—the third grant of power we described above—is cabined within “the Law of Nations.” Id. at 824–25; Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1249–51. Those appellants asked us to extend the same limitation to the Felonies Clause—an invitation we declined because the plain language of these two Clauses differs in dispositive ways. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 825. Our reasoning was simple: while the Offenses Clause explicitly incorporates “the Law of Nations” as a boundary on Congress‘s authority, the Felonies Clause includes no such limiting language. See id.;
and punish ... Felonies committed on the high Seas“)). Finding no support for the appellants’ contention, we rejected their suggestion to extend Bellaizac-Hurtado‘s reach to the Felonies Clause. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 826.
This, we noted, is entirely consistent with our previous holding in Campbell. Id.; see Campbell, 743 F.3d at 810. As we explained above, Campbell reiterates that we “have always upheld extraterritorial convictions under our drug trafficking laws as an exercise of power under the Felonies Clause.” 743 F.3d at 810. Because Campbell postdated Bellaizac-Hurtado, we necessarily
Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior panel‘s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
As we concluded in Alfonso and conclude again today: “[T]he Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.” 104 F.4th at 826; see Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. In other words, we reject Lemus and Canario-Vilomar‘s contention that Congress was constrained by international law in crafting its definition of a stateless vessel or in defining the boundaries of the high seas. Armed with the knowledge that Congress was not restrained by international law in crafting the MDLEA, we turn to each of the appellants’ specific contentions.
B. A “Stateless” Vessel
The MDLEA prohibits possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The appellants insist that the MDLEA‘s definition of a vessel without nationality—specifically, the inclusion of vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration—is ultra vires. Not so. As we held in Campbell and reaffirmed in Hernandez, the “MDLEA was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority under the Felonies Clause.” Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1303 (citing Campbell, 743 F.3d at 809–10); see also Campbell, 743 F.3d at 810 (“We have always upheld extraterritorial convictions under our drug trafficking laws as an exercise of power under the Felonies Clause.” (alteration adopted and internal quotation omitted)) More importantly, we held in Alfonso that “the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.” 104 F.4th at 826. It follows that international law cannot limit Congress‘s authority to define “stateless vessel” for purposes of the MDLEA. It is true that in our prior cases, the defendants did not raise a specific challenge to the definition of a stateless vessel. But time and time again, “we have categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior-panel precedent rule.” In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015); see also id. (“[A] prior panel precedent cannot be circumvented or ignored on the basis of arguments not made to or considered by the prior panel.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our prior panel precedent rule, therefore, forecloses this argument from proceeding. See Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352.
C. The Exclusive Economic Zone and the High Seas
Turning next to the EEZ and the high seas, we likewise find ample binding
The EEZ, a term of relatively modern vintage, “sits just beyond a nation‘s territorial waters but within 200 miles of the coastal baseline.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 821; see also United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 300 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing the EEZ as “a 200 nautical mile zone extending from a coastal State‘s baseline in which the coastal State has priority of access to living resources and exclusive right of access to non-living resources“); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, pt. V, art. 55, 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1280 (defining the EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” that “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,” “under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention“);
We also recently held—following our examination of the role of international law in the Felonies Clause—that “the EEZ is part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 823. Alfonso did not break new ground in saying so. In United States v. McPhee, for example, we directly examined “whether, at the time of seizure, the [vessel] was a stateless vessel located within international waters.” 336 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003). And, we held, because the vessel was beyond the “twelve-mile ... territorial boundary” of Bahamian territorial waters, the vessel was “located within international waters” and thus subject to MDLEA jurisdiction. Id. at 1273, 1276. See also United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 (1969) (“Outside the territorial sea are the high seas, which are international waters not subject to the dominion of any single nation.“); Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1379 n.8 (the high seas “include all waters beyond the territorial seas of the United States and beyond the territorial seas of any foreign nation“); United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The question then becomes where exactly [a nation‘s] territorial sea ends and the high seas begin. The weight of authority points to an outer territorial limit of twelve nautical miles[.]“); United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 460 n.11 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting “the twelve-mile boundary set by international law today” that “demarcat[es] a nation‘s territorial waters from the high seas“).
In other words, “[n]othing about the modern EEZ as defined by customary international law disturbs in any way the Founding era concept of the term ‘high seas’ that informed the original meaning of the Felonies Clause.” Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 823. We, in sum, reject Canario-Vilomar‘s view that Congress could not reach him merely because he chose to traffic drugs in Colombia‘s EEZ rather than farther out into the open ocean.
D. Due Process and Nexus
We are left, then, with only Canario-Vilomar‘s due process argument. Here, Canario-Vilomar says that the MDLEA violates principles of due process because it allows the United States to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals for conduct that bears no nexus with the United States. He concedes, however, that this Court has rejected similar arguments. And we agree: Canario-Vilomar‘s due process argument is plainly foreclosed by our binding
IV. CONCLUSION
We thus find no merit in the appellants’ contentions that Congress acted beyond its grant of authority when defining either a “vessel without nationality” or the “high seas.” And, as we have explained, Canario-Vilomar‘s due-process challenge is squarely foreclosed by our binding precedent. We, therefore, affirm the appellants’ convictions.
AFFIRMED.