UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS
Nos. 19-108 and 19-184
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided December 10, 2020
592 U. S. ___ (2020)
Argued October 13, 2020
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
No. 19-108. Argued October 13, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020*
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has long provided that a military offense, “punishable by death, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation.”
Held: Respondents’ prosecutions for rape under the UCMJ were timely. Pp. 2-9.
(a) Respondents contend that the UCMJ phrase “punishable by death” means capable of punishment by death when all applicable law is taken into account. By contrast, the Government sees the phrase as something of a term of art, meaning capable of punishment by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ. Pp. 2-3.
(b) For three reasons, the phrase‘s context—appearing in a statute of limitations provision for prosecutions under the UCMJ—weighs heavily in favor of the Government‘s interpretation. Pp. 3-9.
(1) First, the UCMJ is a uniform code. As such, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provision within the UCMJ is other law in
(2) Second, respondents’ interpretation of
(3) Third, the ends served by statutes of limitations differ sharply from those served by provisions like the Eighth Amendment or UCMJ
No. 19-108, 78 M. J. 289; No. 19-184, 78 M. J. 415 (first judgment) and 79 M. J. 199 (second judgment), reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 19-108 and 19-184
19-108 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL J. D. BRIGGS
19-184 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RICHARD D. COLLINS
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. HUMPHREY DANIELS, III
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
[December 10, 2020]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide in these cases whether, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a prosecution for a rape committed during the period from 1986 to 2006 had to be commenced within five years of the commission of the charged offense or whether such a prosecution could be brought at any time, as is the rule at present. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), reversing its prior decisions on this question, held that the statute of limitations was five years and that it therefore barred the rape convictions of respondents, three military service members. See 78 M. J. 289 (2019); 78 M. J. 415 (2019); 79 M. J. 199
I
The question before us is important, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides, but resolving the question does not require lengthy analysis. During the period at issue, Article 120(a) of the UCMJ provided that rape could be “punished by death,”
The interpretation advocated by respondents and adopted by the CAAF finds support at first blush in contemporaneous dictionary definitions of the term “punishable.”
II
On balance, we find the Government‘s interpretation more persuasive. The meaning of a statement often turns on the context in which it is made, and that is no less true of statutory language. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 662 (2001); Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 167 (2012). And in these cases, context is determinative. The phrase “punishable by death” appears in a statute of limitations provision for prosecutions under the UCMJ, and for at least three reasons, that context weighs heavily in favor of the Government‘s interpretation.
A
First, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provision within the UCMJ is other law in the UCMJ itself. The UCMJ is, after all, a “uniform code,” one that reformed and modernized the old system of military justice “from top to bottom.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 141 (1953). No
B
Second, one principal benefit of statutes of limitations is that typically they provide clarity, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789 (1977) (“[S]tatutes of limitations . . . provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial delay . . . “); Artis v. District of Columbia, 583
If “punishable by death” in Article 43(a) means punishable by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ, the rule regarding the latest possible date for commencing a rape prosecution is clear: The prosecution may be brought “at any time without limitation.” By contrast, if “punishable by death” meant punishable by death after all applicable law is taken into account, the deadline for filing rape charges would be unclear. The deadline would depend on the answer to an unresolved constitutional question about which the parties in these cases vigorously disagree. Respondents argue that the logic of the decision in Coker applies equally to civilian and military prosecutions, but the Government contends that the military context dictates a different outcome. Among other things, the Government argues that a rape committed by a service member may cause special damage by critically undermining unit cohesion and discipline and that, in some circumstances, the crime may have serious international implications.
That also appears to have been the view of Congress and
If Article 43(a) meant what respondents claim and what the CAAF held, Congress would have adopted a statute of limitations provision without knowing with certainty what it would mean. Indeed, Congress would have adopted a statute of limitations provision the meaning of which would not be settled until this Court decided the disputed question of Coker‘s applicability to the military, and there was no reason to think at the time of Article 43(a)‘s amendment in 1986 that this Court would resolve that question any time soon. We have never considered a direct Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence of death for rape under the UCMJ. And it was predictable that we would not reach the statute of limitations question until cases like those now before us came up for review—that is, until we had occasion to consider cases in which defendants were convicted after being charged more than five years after the commission of the offense. That state of affairs virtually guaranteed that the statute of limitations for rape under the UCMJ would be up in the air for years.
And the uncertainty would not end there. This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment incorporates “evolving standards of decency.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); emphasis added). Thus, even if we were to hold that rape could be punished by death in the
Finally, if “punishable by death” under Article 43(a) meant punishable by death when all applicable law is taken into account, the statute of limitations would also turn on whether, as respondents now maintain, Article 55 of the UCMJ independently prohibits a death sentence for rape. Article 55 forbids “cruel or unusual punishment[s],”
In short, if we accepted the interpretation of Article 43(a) adopted by the CAAF and defended by respondents, we would have to conclude that this provision set out a statute of limitations that no one could have understood with any real confidence until important and novel legal questions were resolved by this Court. That is not the sort of limitations provision that Congress is likely to have chosen.
Third, the factors that lawmakers are likely to take into account when fixing the statute of limitations for a crime differ significantly from the considerations that underlie our Eighth Amendment decisions. We therefore should not lightly assume that Congress tied the meaning of the statutes of limitations in Article 43 to the Eighth Amendment. One factor that legislators may find important in setting the statute of limitations for a crime is the difficulty of gathering evidence and mounting a prosecution for that offense. This factor may have been influential in calibrating the statutes of limitations for rape and other sexual offenses in more recent years. The trauma inflicted by such crimes may impede the gathering of the evidence needed to bring charges. Victims may be hesitant for some time after the offense about agreeing to testify. Thus, under current federal law, many such offenses are subject to no statute of limitations. See
This factor—the difficulty of assembling evidence and putting together a prosecution—obviously plays no part in our Eighth Amendment analysis. As noted, in deciding whether the Eighth Amendment permits a death sentence for a particular category of offenses or offenders, the Court has looked to evolving societal standards of decency and has also rendered its own independent judgment about whether a death sentence would aptly serve the recognized purposes of criminal punishment in certain categories of cases. See Kennedy, 554 U. S., at 419-421, 441-446; Roper, 543 U. S., at 561, 571-575; Atkins, 536 U. S., at 318-321. Some Justices have eschewed aspects of those approaches and have looked instead to the original understanding of the Eighth
*
Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that “punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely.
The judgments of the CAAF are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 19-108 and 19-184
19-108 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL J. D. BRIGGS
19-184 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. RICHARD D. COLLINS
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. HUMPHREY DANIELS, III
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
[December 10, 2020]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
I continue to think this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF. See Ortiz v. United States, 585 U. S. ___ (2018) (ALITO, J., dissenting). But a majority of the Court believes we have jurisdiction, and I agree with the Court‘s decision on the merits. I therefore join the Court‘s opinion.