UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfonso Gerardo Villa GUILLEN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-50286
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
August 09, 2016
Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016 Pasadena, California
Regarding the third circumstance, Guzman contends that the warrant affidavit is so bare bones that reliance on it was unreasonable. “The test for reasonable reliance is whether the affidavit was sufficient to ‘create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.‘” United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405). The affidavit here meets this test. The document contains the following information presenting a “colorable showing of probable cause,” id. at 140: On May 31, 2013 (the date of the warrant application), law enforcement agents in San Diego alerted agents in Honolulu that an individual under investigation was onboard a flight from San Diego to Honolulu. The San Diego agents provided the Hawaii agents with a description and photo identification of the individual, who Hawaii agents identified upon his arrival in Honolulu at approximately 1:20 p.m. Agents secretly followed the individual to his hotel where they observed an encounter between the individual and Perez, who was carrying a backpack that appeared to be empty at the beginning of the encounter but appeared full when the two parted ways. Agents then followed Perez to an apartment building and, with the help of the resident manager, determined that Perez lived in unit #601. They knocked on the door of the unit. Perez opened the door and a strong odor of marijuana from the apartment caught the agents’ attention, as well as a bong observed in plain view. The agents inquired whether others were inside the apartment, but Perez lied, stating that no one else was present. Agents continued to ask in a loud voice until Guzman and another male emerged from the apartment. The three were identified and detained, and the apartment secured pending a warrant to search the residence for controlled substances and other indicia of drug trafficking. Given these allegations, application of the good faith exception was proper. See Crews, 502 F.3d at 1137.
AFFIRMED.
Jean-Claude Andre, Bilal Essayli, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Jay Howard Robinson, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Jeremy M. Friedman, Peter Carl Swarth, Attorney, The Law Office of Peter Swarth, West Hills, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: VANASKIE,* MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. The district court correctly concluded that officers lacked sufficient justification for the warrantless protective sweep of Alfonso Gerardo Villa Guillen‘s apartment. The government asserts that Guillen‘s suspected involvement in a large drug-trafficking organization and his refusal to reveal whether anyone was in the apartment gave officers cause to fear for their safety and to believe evidence would be imminently destroyed. But there was no evidence to suggest that anyone other than Guillen was in the apartment at the time. See United States v. Suarez, 902 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, even if officers did have probable cause to believe there was evidence of a crime inside the residence, there was no reasonable basis for believing that exigent circumstances existed. See id. at 1467-68.
2. The district court did not err in denying Guillen‘s motion to suppress evidence obtained by the search conducted pursuant to a warrant. Even after striking the information obtained during the improper protective sweep, see United States v. Barajas-Avalos, 377 F.3d 1040, 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004), the warrant affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis to establish probable cause.
The warrant affidavit detailed a long-standing investigation that had already es
The next day, officers observed Guillen arrive at the Anaheim apartment and pull his truck into Gallegos‘s garage, just after an unknown male moved Gallegos‘s truck from the garage. Officers observed Guillen walking with Gallegos outside the Anaheim apartment. The officers then followed Guillen as he drove to his apartment in Ontario.
We need not decide whether these observations of Guillen, without more, would have been sufficient to establish probable cause to search his Ontario apartment. Shortly after Guillen left his apartment (which he had entered for only seconds), the officers stopped Guillen and told him that they were conducting a narcotics investigation and were in the process of obtaining a search warrant for his home and vehicle. Guillen responded by asking the officers how much time he was looking at, and he advised the officers that they would “find a lot of stuff” in his apartment. These statements, in conjunction with the officers’ previous observations, established a fair probability that contraband would be found inside Guillen‘s home and vehicle. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The statements may be used to determine whether probable cause existed even if Guillen should first have been administered Miranda warnings. See United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987).
3. Since the search conducted pursuant to a warrant of Guillen‘s Ontario apartment was valid, the arrest warrant and criminal complaint were supported by probable cause. Therefore, Guillen‘s post-arrest statements were not fruit of the poisonous tree and the district court properly refused to suppress them.
AFFIRMED.
Appellant‘s September 21, 2015, Motion to File Physical Exhibits Under Seal is GRANTED.