UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert P. HUGHES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-1201.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: July 31, 2013. Decided and Filed: Oct. 25, 2013.
733 F.3d 642
Before GIBBONS, SUTTON, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which reduced the stat
In March 2008, Hughes‘s girlfriend called 911 to report that Hughes was physically abusing her. After the police arrived at her apartment, they found 64 grams of crack cocaine, a loaded 9mm pistol, and a loaded 9mm carbine rifle, among other contraband. Hughes later pled guilty to federal drug and gun charges.
The district court sentenced Hughes on April 30, 2009. At that time, Hughes was subject to two mandatory-minimum penalties: first, a ten-year mandatory-minimum sentence under
On appeal, we vacated Hughes‘s sentence and remanded his case for resentencing “in light of” United States v. Almany, 598 F.3d 238 (6th Cir.2010). In Almany, we held that the
The district court resentenced Hughes on January 28, 2011. Although Hughes acknowledged that Almany could no longer support a sentence shorter than the one he initially received, Hughes argued that another intervening circumstance did: Congress‘s enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act, which had taken effect four months earlier, on August 3, 2010. Under the FSA, Hughes‘s mandatory-minimum sentence for his crack offense would have been only five years, rather than ten. But Hughes‘s argument conflicted with a longstanding federal rule that a crime‘s penalties are normally those on the books when the crime was committed. The district court also noted that, pursuant to another federal statute, the sentencing guidelines applicable to Hughes‘s resentencing were the same ones applicable to his initial sentencing. See
Hughes brought this appeal, arguing that the district court should have applied the FSA retroactively to his case. The government initially filed a brief in opposition, arguing at some length that the general rule against retroactive application of federal sentencing statutes applied with full force to Hughes‘s resentencing. But
We review de novo the district court‘s decision not to apply the FSA to Hughes‘s resentencing. See Cnty. of Oakland v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 716 F.3d 935, 939 (6th Cir.2013). The question presented is whether the FSA applies to a defendant who is resentenced after the FSA‘s effective date, but who committed his crime and was initially sentenced before that date. The presumptive answer to that question is no. The federal savings statute—codified at
The FSA itself does not contain any such clear indication, since Congress elected not to include a retroactivity provision in the Act. Absent some other clear indication that the FSA should apply to Hughes‘s resentencing, therefore, the Act does not apply.
The parties here (i.e., the government and Hughes) argue that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dorsey sets forth some clear indications that the FSA should apply to Hughes‘s resentencing. In Dorsey, the defendant sold crack before the FSA‘s effective date, but—unlike here—was first sentenced after that date. The Court stated that the question whether the FSA applied to Dorsey‘s sentencing was “difficult in part because relevant language in different statutes argues in opposite directions.” Id. at 2330. One statute—namely,
But in Hughes‘s case these statutes point precisely the same way. For
Unlike Dorsey, who sought to apply the FSA to his initial sentencing, Hughes seeks to apply the FSA to his resentencing. Per the Court‘s manner of interpretation in Dorsey,
What the parties ask us to do in this case, then, is remarkable. The presumption created by
But the government offers three reasons why it thinks we should disregard that presumption nonetheless. First, the government argues that, taken together, three other statutory provisions—
The argument is more impressionistic than legal. It has little to do with what the statutes actually say, and more to do, apparently, with one‘s perception of their mood or animating purpose. But statutes are not artistic palettes, from which the court can daub different colors until it obtains a desired effect. Statutes are instead law, which are bounded in a meaningful sense by the words that Congress chose in enacting them. Here, we do not see—and the government does not explain—how, exactly, the directive in
Second, the government argues that, if we fail to apply the FSA to defendants resentenced after the FSA‘s effective date, we will create the kind of same-day sentencing disparities that the Court sought to avoid in Dorsey. There, the Court said that the imposition of “disparate sentences” by the “same judge” at the “same time” and in the “same place” were “a kind of unfairness that modern sentencing statutes typically seek to combat.” 132 S.Ct. at 2333. But this argument too is torpedoed by
It is true, of course, that in Dorsey the Court sought to avoid “imposing upon the pre-Act offender a pre-Act sentence at a time after Congress had specifically found in the Fair Sentencing Act that such a sentence was unfairly long.” 132 S.Ct. at 2333. But the Court‘s opinion cannot be fairly read to suggest that this point, standing alone, is reason enough to provide the relief that Hughes seeks here. Instead it took “[s]ix considerations, taken together,” to overcome the
Separately, we reject Hughes‘s argument that, during his resentencing, the district court failed to consider evidence of Hughes‘s post-sentence rehabilitation. The transcript of the sentencing hearing instead shows that the court did consider that evidence, but was unpersuaded that the evidence warranted a reduction in Hughes‘s sentence. See Tr. at 15.
The district court‘s judgment is affirmed.
