UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON L. OSBORNE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-6760
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
March 29, 2018
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 18a0064p.06
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 3:13-cr-00125-3—Kevin H. Sharp, District Judge.
Argued: December 6, 2017
Decided and Filed: March 29, 2018
Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Andrew C. Brandon, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. John P. Taddei, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew C. Brandon, Ronald C. Small, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Stephanie N. Toussaint, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
CLAY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Aaron Osborne (“Osborne“) appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the district court for aiding and abetting the theft of government money in violation of
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (“G-RAP“), a civilian-run program designed to increase recruiting to the Air National Guard (“ANG“) during the “War on Terror.” The program was intended to incentivize airmen, officers, and retirees to serve as Recruiting Assistants (“RAs“). The program was run by Document and Packaging Brokers, Inc. (“Docupak“), a private corporation. Docupak was responsible for selecting RAs from the pool of applicants and training them. The RAs were to reach out into their communities to find potential future airmen, and then direct those potential airmen to full-time recruiters, who would sign up the new recruits. The program provided a monetary incentive to the RAs to sign up people to the ANG and encourage them to complete the training process. The RAs would receive a $1,000 pre-loaded Visa gift card upon actual enlistment of the potential airman and an additional $1,000 upon the airman‘s completion of basic training. The government argues that a central rule of the G-RAP program was that the RAs were required to “identify individuals that were not already working with a full time ANG Recruiter” and that the RAs were prohibited from splitting the G-RAP payment with full-time recruiters. (R. 1, Indictment, PageID at # 1–2.) This rule gave rise to the criminal charges against Osborne and his co-defendants.
Osborne was a full-time recruiter for the ANG. He was accused of working with two RAs, Arvalon Michelle Harleston (“Harleston“) and Max P. Andolsek (“Andolsek“), to share in the cash incentives offered by the program. Essentially, Osborne was accused of referring names of pre-existing recruits to Harleston and Andolsek so that they could claim the recruiting incentive. Harleston and Andolsek would then pay kickbacks to Osborne. Osborne, Andolsek, and Harleston were charged in a seven-count indictment. Relevant for this appeal is Count Four, which alleged that Osborne
At the close of the government‘s case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence, Osborne moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that the theft of the funds was not a prosecutable offense because the funds were stolen from a private contractor, and not a governmental agency, and because in doing so Defendants only violated Docupak‘s internal policy, and not a federal rule or regulation. The district court denied both motions. The jury convicted Osborne on the one count of aiding and abetting Andolsek in the theft of government funds (Count 4) and acquitted him on the remaining six counts. The jury acquitted Harleston on all counts.
On October 5, 2015, Osborne filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). In his motion, he argued that the verdict should be set aside because: “(1) the government failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the allegedly stolen funds were ‘government property‘; and (2) the jury‘s verdicts finding that Mr. Osborne did not conspire with Mr. Andolsek to steal from the government or to make false claims to the government are entirely inconsistent with their verdict finding that Mr. Osborne did aid and abet Mr. Andolsek in a ‘theft’ of government property.” (R. 136, Mot. for J. of Acquittal, PageID # 922.)
On April 5, 2016, the district court denied Osborne‘s motion. With regard to the first claim, the district court found that “a reasonable jury could have found that the finder fees paid in this case were a ‘thing of value’ to the United States.” United States v. Osborne, 180 F. Supp. 3d 507, 513 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). The district court reasoned that “the Department of Defense created the G-RAP program and Docupak executed it,” “Docupak received federal funds to run the G-RAP program,” “the Government placed restrictions on how G-RAP funds could be used,” and “Docupak was required to submit monthly, quarterly and annual reports to the Department of Defense, and agreed to comply with other mandatory reporting requirements as mandated by the Secretary of the Army and his designee.” Id. at 513–14. With regard to the second claim, the district court found that the verdicts were not mutually exclusive.
The district court sentenced Osborne to time served, two years supervised release, a $10,000 fine, and $9,000 in restitution. Judgment was entered against Osborne on December 5, 2016.
Osborne timely filed a notice of appeal that same day. On appeal, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for theft of government property because the government failed to prove that the money involved was “government property” or that it was “stolen.”
DISCUSSION
I. MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court‘s denial of a motion for judgment of
Courts have treated the ultimate question of whether something is government property as a legal question for a court to review de novo. See United States v. Foulks, 905 F.2d 928, 929–30 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. McKay, 274 F.3d 755, 759 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Littriello, 866 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Long, 996 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1993) (“When the question of ownership of property depends upon the construction or existence of a statute, it is a matter of law for the court‘s determination, and therefore subject to de novo review.“) (reversed on other grounds). Again, while we answer this question de novo, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury.
Analysis
Under
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .
Under
In order to convict someone of theft of government property under
In this case, at issue is whether the funds belonged to the United States, i.e., were “something of value” to the United States. This Court has observed that prior case law “discern[s] four types” of violations under
(1) where the stolen property clearly belongs to the government and federal jurisdiction is undisputed; (2) where the federal government, or one of its agents, acts as a custodian or bailee of property, so that the transitory possession makes it the property of the United States; (3) where property that originated with the federal government passes to private
hands, but the government retains sufficient control so that the funds remain federal property; and (4) where a government employee or agent has received property but fails to convey it to the United States and the question is whether the funds acquired the status of government property.
United States v. Hall, 549 F.3d 1033, 1038 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Klingler, 61 F.3d 1234, 1238 (6th Cir. 1995)). Because Osborne technically received the money from a private entity, this case falls under the third category.
We therefore ask whether the government retained sufficient supervision and control over the funds involved such that the funds retained their federal character. See Hall, 549 F.3d at 1038 (“[T]he issue is whether the government retained sufficient control over the funds involved.“); United States v. Barger, 923 F.2d 855, at *9 (6th Cir. 1991) (asking whether the government retained sufficient “supervision and control” over the property); Littriello, 866 F.2d at 715 (looking for “evidence of federal control and supervision” over the funds in question“); United States v. Wheadon, 794 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e look to see whether the federal government still maintained supervision and control over the funds at the point when the funds were converted.“); United States v. Johnson, 596 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1979) (looking for “proof of the supervision and control exercised by the government over the funds and their ultimate use“). To answer this question, courts engage in a fact intensive inquiry, looking for indicia of government supervision and control. See Hall, 549 F.3d at 1038; Barger, 923 F.2d at *9; Foulks, 905 F.2d at 930.
For example, in Hall, a private entity was awarded several cost-reimbursement subcontracts by a prime contractor funded entirely by the U.S. government. 549 F.3d at 1035. Under the terms of the subcontracts, the entity was reimbursed by the government in the form of a biweekly advance or “interim reimbursement.” Id. In the event that the government overpaid, the entity was required to return the extra money to the government. Id. Instead, Hall authorized payment for fictitious work so that he could keep all of the money from the government. Id. at 1036. We found sufficient control where, as a condition of obtaining the subcontracts, the entity was “required to demonstrate that it had an accounting system in place that could adequately track its projects and segregate its costs,” and its accounting software did in fact satisfy those requirements. Id. at 1039. Additionally, each subcontract contained certain terms including:
(1) a term requiring that [the private entity] acknowledge that it was being reimbursed by the prime contractor with funds advanced from the Department of Energy; (2) a term requiring that interim reimbursement funds be used only for costs that were reasonable, allocable and actually incurred, in accordance with
[specific federal regulations]; (3) a term stating that [the private entity‘s] final indirect cost rates were governed by [specific federal regulations] (4) a term requiring that [the private entity] be subject to records inspection and audit by the United States Comptroller General and the Department of Energy related to any transaction arising from the subcontract; and (5) a term requiring that [the private entity] return to the Department of Energy any interim reimbursements advanced, but not incurred, for overhead costs. Hall personally executed each of the subcontracts at issue.
Id. at 1040. We said “[i]mportantly, [the subcontractor] was required to track the
In Foulks, a Salvation Army director misappropriated checks drawn on a special emergency relief account, the funding for which came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA“). 905 F.2d at 929. FEMA “placed limits upon how the money could be spent, required certain record keeping and accounting procedures, and retained a reversionary interest in the funds.” Id. One of those limitations was that funds could be spent only for “procurement costs,” meaning employees or volunteers could not receive “any kind of benefit from the agencies’ allotment.” Id. We found that the funds retained their federal character even though they were in Salvation Army accounts because FEMA “limited or controlled the use of these funds in that the Salvation Army was required to report back to the federal agency, and any unused funds or misused funds were to be returned to the federal agency.” Id. at 930.
Other circuits similarly engage in a fact-bound inquiry, looking to whether the government maintained sufficient supervision and control over the funds. For example, in McKay, a housing authority received money from the U.S. Department of Housing and Development (“HUD“) and was to act as a middleman between HUD and the landlords who received Section 8 checks. 274 F.3d at 756. The nephew of the chairman of the housing authority was convicted of embezzling funds after he fraudulently received funds for an apartment that he did not own. Id. at 756–57. The Second Circuit found that the funds retained their federal character because “[c]ontrol was exercised [by HUD] at two levels“: (1) HUD placed restrictions on the housing authority for administering the Section 8 program; and, (2) HUD placed restrictions on the landlords receiving Section 8 money from the authority. Id. at 758–59. HUD‘s restrictions on the housing authority included requiring that the authority use the funds only to subsidize the rent of tenants who fell within HUD‘s income guidelines and prohibiting the authority from giving money to landlords who occupied a “policy-making position” within the authority. Id. HUD‘s restrictions on the landlords included that the landlords comply with HUD regulations as a condition of receiving the funding, that the amount of rent be an amount determined by the authority in accordance with HUD regulations, that the rent be adjusted based on an annual HUD publication, and that the landlord provide HUD with “reasonable information pertinent to the contract” and “permit HUD to have access to the premises and the ability to access business records to determine compliance with the contract.” Id. at 759. Consequently, the Second Circuit found that “HUD continued to exercise substantial control over the funds and their ultimate use.” Id.
In Littriello, the defendants were convicted of embezzling from a health insurance plan operated by the American Postal Workers Union Health Plan under contract with the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM“). 866 F.2d at 713. The contract stated that premiums were to be paid by the government. Id.. The contract required that all funds given to the Plan by OPM, but not paid out in premiums, be invested. Id. at 713–14. The defendants invested the money in high-risk/high-interest investments, recorded the investments as low-interest, and then kept the difference
In Wheadon, a housing authority received money from HUD to implement housing projects. 794 F.2d at 1279. The executive director of the authority was part of a kick-back scheme involving a building company that sought contracts with and false reimbursements from the authority. Id. at 1279–80. The Seventh Circuit found that HUD maintained sufficient supervision and control over the funds. Id. at 1284–85. It noted that “HUD retained control through: quarterly reports; HUD‘s access to all Housing Authority records; the Housing Authority‘s responsibility to maintain and keep accurate records; HUD‘s right to terminate any contract; HUD‘s right to cut off funding and to approve any and all disbursements; HUD‘s right of prior approval on all contracts, proposals, and appropriations; and HUD‘s right to conduct on-site inspections.” Id. at 1284–85. HUD did not retain a reversionary right to the funds, but the court found that “such evidence is just one type of evidence, albeit a particularly compelling one, that the government can use to prove that it maintained supervision and control.” Id. at 1285.
In Johnson, a public redevelopment agency received grants from HUD and then contracted with a union for certain services using the funds from HUD. 596 F.2d at 843–44. The defendant was an officer of the Union who charged HUD thousands of dollars for the salaries of two fictitious employees. Id. at 844. The Ninth Circuit found that the government retained “substantial supervision and control over the funds.” Id. It cited the following facts in support of its conclusion: (1) federal regulations required the Agency to “maintain detailed financial records, file annual financial and progress reports, and adopt government-prescribed financial management systems“; (2) federal regulations required the Agency to return interest earned on funds to the federal government; (3) regulations required the Agency to record the receipt and expenditure of revenues; (4) federal regulations allowed funds not required to be retained, but mandated they be applied to other projects pursuant to specified regulations; and (5) the contracts required that HUD have access “at all reasonable times” to records, reports, work schedules, and any other materials that pertained to services under the contract. Id. at 844–45. The Ninth Circuit found that, clearly, the government
The cases from inside and outside of this Circuit suggest that courts address a number of factors when considering the nature of funds that have been transferred to a private party by the federal government. These include:
(1) Did the government retain a reversionary interest in the funds?
(2) Did the government place restrictions on how the funds are used, spent, or maintained?
(3) Did the government impose internal controls like record keeping requirements, audit requirements, accounting procedures, or reporting requirements?
(4) Did the government require that it have the right to inspect or access the private entity‘s records or perform audits?
(5) Are the funds governed by federal regulations or statute?
(6) Did the government retain the right to terminate the contract or cut off funding to the private entity?
(7) When there is a contract between the private entity receiving the federal funds and a third party receiving funds from the private entity, did the contract have a federal character or subject the third party to federal restrictions?
While courts have consulted a number of different factors, they have not explicitly indicated the relative importance or weight of the various factors. However, it seems this Circuit has placed an emphasis on the first three factors.1
On appeal, Osborne argues that the government failed to prove that the money involved in this case was “government property” because it did not prove that the government retained sufficient control over the money. He argues that even if Andolsek “stole” money, it was from Docupak and not the government, because the money had passed out of the hands of the government to Docupak before the alleged theft and the government did not retain sufficient control over the funds involved. He argues that there were no regulations governing the G-RAP program, there was no documentation of a government rule against the conduct that occurred in this case, and that Docupak would retain its fees and pay the RAs their funds for any recruit even if they were recruited in violation of the Docupak rules. The government, on the other hand, argues that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. It argues that the funds in question were money “of the United States or any department or agency thereof” because the government exercised sufficient control over the funds inasmuch as the program was created by the DOD, funded with federal money, and subject to federal restrictions and oversight, even though it was administered by a third-party contractor.
It seems to us that the prosecution made the most unremarkable attempt to prove its case, relying on general testimony from Docupak instead of finding and producing specific evidence. However, “the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction,” United States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 2012), and “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict,” United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). Consequently, even though the government should have introduced the actual contract and evidence of reimbursement, because the jury did hear testimony about both, the jury could have concluded that the task order evidenced the terms of the actual agreement between the parties and that Docupak invoiced and was reimbursed for the payments at issue in this case.
Thus, the question for us is whether the facts established the requisite degree of governmental supervision and control over the funds so that the funds retained their federal character. With an eye to the factors referenced above, we will review the relevant evidence adduced at trial, which includes an unexecuted “task order” between Docupak and the ANG, a “representation” of the G-RAP website created by Docupak, Docupak‘s online training materials and online quiz, and the testimony of Docupak‘s president (Phillip Crane), the Docupak program manager in charge of the G-RAP program (William Stewart), and some other Docupak employees.
First, the government did not retain a reversionary interest in the funds. For instance, there was no evidence indicating that Docupak was required to return any unused or misused funds. Crane testified that “the only written terms that [defined]
Next, the evidence shows that the government placed few restrictions on the funds. The district court relied on the fact that the task order sets out the contours of the G-RAP program, including information about the goals and scope of the program, the players involved, and the role Docupak was to play in administering the program. However, those things do not demonstrate that the government exercised supervision or control over the funds. Instead, the task order would appear to describe every situation in which the government gives money to a private entity in order for it to carry out certain goals and objectives. Generally providing the details of a program does limit the private entity, but it is not the same thing as placing limits on the funds themselves.
While the restrictions placed on Docupak funds generally were minimal, the government argues that additional restrictions were placed on the RA-reimbursement funds. Specifically, the government cites to the rule restricting RAs from splitting fees with recruiters and the line-item in the task order providing funds specifically for “payments to the recruiting assistant.” (Def. Ex. 1 at 2.)
However, the fee-splitting rule does not appear to be a government mandated rule, but instead a rule imposed by Docupak. Docupak‘s training materials stated that RAs should not split money with recruiters. The materials provided that “[t]his is theft and cause for immediate termination and civilian criminal prosecution for you as a civilian. The Recruiter will face possible separation from service and prosecution under state militia laws.” (Gov‘t Ex. 1, Website, 18.) Crane and Stewart initially testified that these rules were included in “one of the guidelines that was set forth by the government in [the] base contract.” (R 200, Trial Tr., PageID # 1498; R. 202, Trial Tr., PageID # 1795.) However, they both later admitted that the task order did not actually contain any of those rules. And the task order did not include any of these rules or any similar language—the document was silent on the fee-splitting issue. The rules published on the website were merely Docupak‘s “interpretations of [the] contract.” (Id. at # 1720.) Furthermore, Crane could not say when the fee-splitting rule contained in the training materials would have gone into effect. Nor did he know whether it was included in the original 2006 training materials or added later.
Even assuming that the fee-splitting rule was imposed at the behest of the government, the government retained no ability to enforce this rule, nor any ability to ensure that Docupak enforced this rule, and Docupak did not in fact enforce this rule. The relationship between the government, Docupak, and the RAs makes clear that this is not an instance of supervision and control “contemplated and manifested on the part of the government.” Long, 996 F.2d at 732 (citation omitted). The government could have effectively restricted the
The government did, however, exercise control over the stolen funds to the degree that it mandated that they be spent to pay for “the recruiting assistant[s], the contractor cost[s] of any kind associated with payment to the RA[s], and any premium payment adjustment premiums.” (Def. Ex. 1 at 2.) Requiring that the stolen funds be used for one of these purposes constitutes the exercise of some degree of supervision or control over those funds, see Foulks, 905 F.2d at 929, but not so much control as would have been exercised had the government mandated the specific amount to be paid to RAs or limited the expenditure of the funds to the payment of the RAs.
Third, there is some evidence that Docupak did maintain certain internal controls. For example, the task order stated as follows:
“Docupak actively manages data for accuracy and validity as follows: [examples]” (Def. Ex. 1 at 20.)
“Docupak has a system of internal controls to prevent inappropriate payment of funds. Our controls are strong and compliant. In addition, Account Executives conduct random quality assurance procedures to eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. These controls include . . . [p]eriodic internal audits of payments[,] [v]alidation of RA status and eligibility for payment[,] [and] [v]erification of financial system integrity and security.” (Id. at 20.)
“Docupak capitalizes on the GRAP database to manage and verify the disbursement of RA funds. . . . The GRAP financial database will be utilized to track and report on this task order.” (Id. at 10.)
“Our approach focuses on four major elements . . . [including] processing the RA payments in an efficient manner with effective financial controls.” (Id. at 9.)
Docupak also committed itself to “perform in accordance with the following Performance Requirements Summary.” (Id. at 30.) Among these requirements were to “[e]xercise [f]iscal [r]esponsibility” and sufficiently update “task order performance records” “to ensure the most current information is accessible.” (Id.) However, it is not clear that any of these were requirements or that they were imposed by the government.
The task order also included a section called “Deliverables.” (Id. at 27–28.) This seems to provide that different budget and cost reports and summaries would be submitted at various times to the government. Among these documents are an annual budget summary, a quarterly budget report, and a semi-annual budget summary. Finally, the task order included a section regarding “Accounting for Contract Services.” (Id. at 14.) It provides: “The Secretary of the Army has implemented Accounting for Contract Services. This initiative has been put in place to obtain better visibility of the contractor service workforce.” (Id.) The task order further provided that “[t]hese contract reporting requirements are mandatory. By acceptance of this contract and performance under this contract, the contractor
Fourth, there is some evidence that Docupak would give the government access to information, but there is no evidence that the government retained the right to conduct audits. For example, the task order said “Our approach focuses on four major elements: . . . (3) providing NGB-ANG Recruiting and Retention leadership access to management reports and on-line charts to more effectively predict long-term plans.” (Id. at 9.) It also said, “In addition to providing data relevant to managing the financial and performance of RAs [sic], we are able to provide important financial information to NGB-ANG Recruiting and Retention leadership that projects future contracts and payments in the G-RAP pipeline (i.e., run rates).” (Id. at 23.) Though the language does indicate that the government had some access to Docupak‘s information, it is not clear that the government had the right to access the information. The language does not suggest that Docupak was required to provide this access or that the government imposed this requirement. Again, this is problematic inasmuch as the supervision and control should be “contemplated and manifested on the part of the government.” Long, 996 F.2d at 732 (citation omitted).
Fifth, there were no federal regulations governing the G-RAP program. The basis for the government‘s relationship with Docupak was the task orders, not statute or regulation. There were no Air Force Instructions or Regulations promulgated regarding any of the “rules” for the G-RAP program. There were no statutes or regulations providing a punishment for any violations of the “rules.” For instance, Docupak representatives acknowledged that there were no Air Force instructions or regulations providing punishment for fee splitting.
Sixth, the government may have retained the right to terminate the contract. However, there is nothing that explicitly reserved this right; under “Recommended Timeline,” the task order says “Contractor should provide in the proposal a date this contact will take effect and continue until notified by NGB/AIR to terminate.” (Def. Ex. 1 at 7.)
Finally, the agreement between Docupak and the RAs appeared largely extra-governmental. For instance, when individuals signed up to be an RA, they would apply online through a website created and maintained by Docupak. At trial, the government did not produce the website itself, but produced a “representation of the website.” (R. 200, Trial Tr., PageID # 1488.) Apparently, this represents the training the RAs in this case would have received. The RAs would have endorsed their online application with an e-signature, but Docupak did not preserve these signatures. Docupak also had no documentation about when the RAs in this case completed training.
The online materials provided basic information about the program. This included information that the RAs would be “an independent contractor for Docupak,” and would “not act[] in a military capacity.” (Gov‘t Ex. 1, Website, at 9.) Under a section called “G-RAP and its relationship to the Air National Guard,” the materials made clear that the G-RAP program and the ANG were separate. (Id. at 8–9.) For example, it said, “G-RAP is not a required program and has no bearing on your status in the Air Guard or you military career. You act as an independent contractor for Docupak,” “your performance as a Recruiting Assistant, whether successful or not, will not affect your career in the ANG,” “Your actions in a G-RAP capacity are independent of your role as a member of the Air National Guard and have no
These training materials stated that RAs were prohibited from fee splitting. The website further provided that RAs should “report any such activity to Docupak.” (Id.) The website provided a number to call to report abuse of the program. That number was a Docupak number, not a government number, and was manned by Docupak representatives, not government representatives.
In all, there is evidence that the government placed some limits on the expenditures of the funds, that Docupak had certain internal controls, that Docupak gave the government access to certain financial information, and that the government retained the right to terminate the contract. But this is a substantially lower degree of supervision and control than existed in Hall, Foulks, and the other out-of-circuit cases. And it was shown with substantially less evidence than provided in those cases, a point noted by the district court:
[T]he evidence presented at trial was not what one would normally expect in a case alleging that stolen funds were Government property. The Government could have (and likely should have) submitted the actual signed contract that governed the relationship between Docupak and the Air National Guard. The introduction of a Couple of DD Form 250s would have been helpful as well.
Osborne, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 515.
Importantly, in this case, there is no evidence that the government retained a reversionary interest in the funds. There is no evidence that the program or the funds were governed by statute or regulation. There is no evidence that the government imposed a right to perform audits. There is little to no evidence suggesting that the agreements between Docupak and the RAs were of a governmental nature. These are significant deficiencies. The prosecution produced negligible evidence of government supervision or control, and the task order does little to help the government‘s case. Although failing to retain a reversionary interest alone may not be fatal, it does require showing a greater exercise of supervision or control via other means, and we do not think sufficient other indicia of those means are present. We hold that, on these facts, the government did not retain sufficient supervision and control over the funds such that the funds retained their federal character. Because we find insufficient indicia of government supervision
II. THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, OR CONVERSION
Preservation of the Issue
Although specificity is not required in a Rule 29 motion, “when a defendant makes a motion on specific grounds . . . all grounds not specified in the motion are waived.” United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 617 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1357 (6th Cir. 1993)). “The specification of grounds in the motion is an indication that counsel has evaluated the record and has these particular reasons for his motion.” Dandy, 998 F.2d at 1357 (citations omitted). Unlike in his appellate brief, Osborne‘s motion for judgment of acquittal did not argue that the evidence failed to show that Andolsek “embezzled, stole, purloined, or converted” property of the government, and thus Osborne could not have aided and abetted him in that crime. (R. 136 Mot. for J. of Acquittal, PageID # 922.) Because Osborne made a motion for judgment of acquittal on specified grounds, and those grounds did not include the claim that is on appeal, Osborne cannot now raise this argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE Osborne‘s conviction and VACATE his sentence.