UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE et al. v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION et al.
No. 18-1584
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued February 24, 2020—Decided June 15, 2020
590 U. S. 604
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic), sought to construct an approximately 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina along a route that traversed 16 miles of land within the George Washington National Forest. As relevant here, Atlantic secured a special use permit from the United States Forest Service, obtaining a right-of-way for a 0.1-mile segment of pipe some 600 feet below a portion of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian Trail or Trail), which also crosses the National Forest. Respondents filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit, contending, inter alia, that the issuance of the special use permit for the right-of-way under the Trail violated the Mineral Leasing Act (Leasing Act). Atlantic intervened. The Fourth Circuit vacated the permit, holding that the Leasing Act did not empower the Forest Service to grant the right-of-way because the Trail became part of the National Park System when the Secretary of the Interior delegated its authority over the Trail‘s administration to the National Park Service, and that the Leasing Act prohibits pipeline rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System.
Held: Because the Department of the Interior‘s decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit. Pp. 609–624.
(a) These cases involve the interaction of multiple federal laws. The Weeks Act provided for the acquisition of lands for inclusion in the National Forest System, stating that such lands “shall be permanently reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands.”
(b) An examination of the interests and authority granted under the Trails Act shows that the Forest Service “right-of-way” agreements with the National Park Service for the Appalachian Trail did not convert “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act into “lands” within the “National Park System.” Pp. 612–619.
(1) A right-of-way is a type of easement. And easements grant only nonpossessory rights of use limited to the purposes specified in the easement agreement: They are not land; they merely burden land that continues to be owned by another. The same principles that apply to right-of-way agreements between private parties apply here, even though the Federal Government owns all lands involved. A right-of-way between two agencies grants only an easement across the land, not jurisdiction over the land itself. Read in light of basic property law principles, then, the plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands crossed by the Trail. Pp. 613–616.
(2) The various duties described in the Trails Act—that the Secretary of the Interior (through the National Park Service) administers the Trail “primarily as a footpath,”
(3) This conclusion is also reinforced by the fact that Congress spoke in terms of rights-of-way in the Trails Act rather than in terms of land transfers, as it has unequivocally and directly done in multiple other statutes when it has intended to transfer land from one agency to
(c) Respondents’ theory—that the National Park Service administers the Trail, and therefore the lands that the Trail crosses—depends on presuming, with no clear congressional command, a vast expansion of the Park Service‘s jurisdiction and a significant curtailment of the Forest Service‘s express authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way on “lands owned by the United States.”
911 F. 3d 150, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which GINSBURG, J., joined except as to Part III–B–2. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined, post, p. 624.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for petitioners in No. 18–1584. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Grant, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Andrew C. Mergen, J. David Gunter II, Avi M. Kupfer, Sarah Kathmann, and John M. Henson. Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioner in No. 18–1587. With him on the briefs was Erin E. Murphy.
Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Rapawy, Bradley E. Oppenheimer, Austin D. Gerken, Jr., Amelia Burnette, J. Patrick Hunter, Gregory Buppert, and Nathan Matthews.†
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE et al. v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION et al.
No. 18-1584
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued February 24, 2020—Decided June 15, 2020
590 U. S. 604
OPINION OF THE COURT
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.*
We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority
I
A
In 2015, petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic) filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to construct and operate an approximately 604-mile natural gas pipeline extending from West Virginia to North Carolina. The pipeline‘s proposed route traverses 16 miles of land within the George Washington National Forest. The Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian Trail or Trail) also crosses parts of the George Washington National Forest.
To construct the pipeline, Atlantic needed to obtain special use permits from the United States Forest Service for the portions of the pipeline that would pass through lands under the Forest Service‘s jurisdiction. In 2018, the Forest Service issued these permits and granted a right-of-way that would allow Atlantic to place a 0.1-mile segment of pipe approximately 600 feet below the Appalachian Trail in the George Washington National Forest.
B
Respondents Cowpasture River Preservation Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. They contended that the issuance of the special use permit for the right-of-way under the Trail, as well as numerous other aspects of the Forest Service‘s regulatory process, violated the
The Fourth Circuit vacated the Forest Service‘s special use permit after holding that the Leasing Act did not empower the Forest Service to grant the pipeline right-of-way beneath the Trail. As relevant here, the court concluded that the Appalachian Trail had become part of the National Park System because, though originally charged with the Trail‘s administration,
II
These cases involve the interaction of multiple federal laws. We therefore begin by summarizing the relevant statutory and regulatory background.
A
Congress enacted the Weeks Act in 1911,
What is now known as the George Washington National Forest was established as a national forest in 1918, see Proclamation No. 1448,
B
Enacted in 1968, the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), among other things, establishes national scenic and national historic trails.
Under the statute, the Appalachian Trail “shall be administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture.” Ibid. The statute empowers the Secretary of the Interior to establish the location and width of the Appalachian Trail by entering into “rights-of-way” agreements with other federal agencies as well as States, local governments, and private landowners.
The Trails Act currently establishes 30 national historic and national scenic trails. See
C
In 1920, Congress passed the Leasing Act, which enabled the Secretary of the Interior to grant pipeline rights-of-way through “public lands, including the forest reserves,” § 28,
III
We are tasked with determining whether the Leasing Act enables the Forest Service to grant a subterranean pipeline right-of-way some 600 feet under the Appalachian Trail. To do this, we first focus on the distinction between the lands that the Trail traverses and the Trail itself, because the lands (not the Trail) are the object of the relevant statutes.
Under the Leasing Act, the “Secretary of the Interior or appropriate agency head” may grant pipeline rights-of-way across “Federal lands.”
We conclude that the lands that the Trail crosses remain under the Forest Service‘s jurisdiction and, thus, continue to be “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act.
A
We begin our analysis by examining the interests and authority granted under the Trails Act. Pursuant to the Trails
1
A right-of-way is a type of easement. In 1968, as now, principles of property law defined a right-of-way easement as granting a nonowner a limited privilege to “use the lands of another.” Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 604, 64 S. E. 2d 606, 613 (1951); Builders Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey, 282 N. C. 261, 266, 192 S. E. 2d 449, 453 (1972); see also R. Powell & P. Rohan, Real Property § 405 (1968); Restatement (First) of Property § 450 (1944). Specifically, a right-of-way grants the limited “right to pass . . . through the estate of another.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 1489 (4th ed. 1968). Courts at the time of the Trails Act‘s enactment acknowledged that easements grant only nonpossessory rights of use limited to the purposes specified in the easement agreement. See, e. g., Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 681, 684, 222 S. E. 2d 522, 525 (1976). And because an easement does not dispossess the original owner, Barnard v. Gaumer, 146 Colo. 409, 412, 361 P. 2d 778, 780 (1961), “a possessor and an easement holder can simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land,” J. Bruce & J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, p. 1–5 (2015). Thus, it was, and is, elementary that the grantor of the easement retains ownership over ”the land itself.” Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 257, 177 N. W. 2d 786, 789 (1970) (emphasis added). Stated more plainly, easements are not land,
If analyzed as a right-of-way between two private landowners, determining whether any land had been transferred would be simple. If a rancher granted a neighbor an easement across his land for a horse trail, no one would think that the rancher had conveyed ownership over that land. Nor would anyone think that the rancher had ceded his own right to use his land in other ways, including by running a water line underneath the trail that connects to his house. He could, however, make the easement grantee responsible for administering the easement apart from the land. Likewise, when a company obtains a right-of-way to lay a segment of pipeline through a private owner‘s land, no one would think that the company had obtained ownership over the land through which the pipeline passes.
Although the Federal Government owns all lands involved here, the same general principles apply. We must ascertain whether one federal agency has transferred jurisdiction over lands—meaning “jurisdiction to exercise the incidents of ownership“—to another federal agency. Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 22–23, n. 2. The Trails Act refers to the granted interests as “rights-of-way,” both when describing agreements with the Federal Government and with private and state property owners.
The dissent notes that the Federal Government has referred to the Trail as an “area” and a “unit” and has described the Trail in terms of “acres.” See post, at 630–633, 635–636 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In the dissent‘s view, this indicates that the Trail and the land are the same. This is not so. Like other right-of-way easements, the Trail burdens “a particular parcel of land.” Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, at 1–6. It is thus not surprising that the Government might refer to the Trail as an “area,” much as one might mark out on his property the “area” of land burdened by a sewage easement. The fact remains that the land and the easement are still separate.
The dissent also cites provisions of the Trails Act that discuss “lands” to be included in the Trail. See post, at 634–635. But this, too, is consistent with our conclusion that the Trail is an easement. Like all easements, the parcel of land burdened by the easement has particular metes and bounds. See, e. g., Carnemella v. Sadowy, 147 App. Div. 2d 874, 876, 538 N. Y. S. 2d 96, 98 (1989) (“[T]he subject easement . . . reasonably described the portion of the property where the easement existed“); Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S. W. 2d 193, 195–196 (Ky. 1958). In fact, without such descriptions, parties to an easement agreement would be unable to understand their rights or enforce another par-
In sum, read in light of basic property law principles, the plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses. It gave the Department of the Interior (and by delegation the National Park Service) an easement for the specified and limited purpose of establishing and administering a Trail, but the land itself remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. To restate this conclusion in the parlance of the Leasing Act, the lands that the Trail crosses are still “Federal lands,”
The various duties described in the Trails Act reinforce that the agency responsible for the Trail has a limited role of administering a trail easement, but that the underlying land remains within the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. The Trails Act states that the Secretary of the Interior (and by delegation the National Park Service) shall “administe[r]” the Trail “primarily as a footpath.”
The dissent resists this conclusion by asserting that the National Park Service “administers” the Trail, and that so long as that is true, the Trail is land within the National Park System. See post, at 637–638. But the National Park Service does not administer the “land” crossed by the Trail. It administers the Trail as an easement—an easement that is separate from the underlying land.5
Finally, Congress has used unequivocal and direct language in multiple statutes when it wished to transfer land from one agency to another, just as one would expect if a property owner conveyed land in fee simple to another private property owner. In the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, for instance, which was enacted the same day as the Trails Act, Congress specified that “[a]ny component of the national wild and scenic rivers system that is administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service shall become a part of the [N]ational [P]ark [S]ystem.”
B
1
Respondents take a markedly different view, which is shared by the dissent. According to respondents, the Trail cannot be separated from the underlying land. In their view, if the National Park Service administers the Trail, then it also administers the lands that the Trail crosses, and no pipeline rights-of-way may be granted.
Respondents’ argument that the National Park Service administers the Trail (and therefore the lands that the Trail crosses) proceeds in four steps. First, the Trails Act granted the Department of the Interior the authority to administer the Trail.
This circuitous path misses the mark. As described above, under the plain language of the Trails Act and basic property principles, responsibility for the Trail and jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses can and must be separated for purposes of determining whether the Forest Service can grant a right-of-way. See supra, at 612–616.
2
Even accepting respondents’ argument on its own terms, however, we remain unpersuaded. Respondents’ entire theory depends on an administrative action about which the statutes at issue are completely silent: the Department of the Interior‘s voluntary decision to assign responsibility over a given trail to the National Park Service rather than to the Bureau of Land Management. To reiterate, respondents contend that the Department of the Interior‘s decision to delegate responsibility over a trail to the National Park Service renders that trail an “area of land . . . administered by the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the [Park Service.]”
Respondents’ theory also has striking implications for federalism and private property rights. Respondents do not contest that, in addition to federal lands, these 21 trails cross lands owned by States, local governments, and private landowners. See also post, at 643 (acknowledging that the Trail alone “comprises 58,110.94 acres of Non-Federal land, including 8,815.98 acres of Private land” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under respondents’ view, these privately owned and state-owned lands would also become lands in the National Park System.6 Our precedents require Congress to
Finally, reliance on the Department of the Interior‘s delegation of its Trails Act authority is especially questionable here, given that Congress has used express language in other statutes when it wished to transfer lands between agencies. See supra, at 618. Congress not only failed to enact similar language in the Trails Act, but it clearly expressed the opposite view. The entire Trails Act must be
In sum, we conclude that the Department of the Interior‘s unexplained decision to assign responsibility over certain trails to the National Parks System and the
IV
We hold that the Department of the Interior‘s decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Accordingly, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the permit here.7
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, dissenting.
The majority‘s complicated discussion of private-law easements, footpath maintenance, differently worded statutes, and policy masks the simple (and only) dispute here. Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail “lan[d] in the National Park System“?
By definition, lands in the National Park System include “any area of land” “administered” by the Park Service for “park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”
The Appalachian Trail, in turn, is “administered” by the Park Service to ensure “outdoor recreation” and to conserve “nationally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities.”
By contrast, today‘s Court suggests that the Trail is not “land” in the Park System at all. The Court strives to separate “the lands that the Trail traverses” from “the Trail itself,” reasoning that the Trail is simply an “easement,” “not land.” Ante, at 612, 613. In doing so, however, the Court relies on anything except the provisions that actually answer the question presented. Because today‘s Court condones the placement of a pipeline that subverts the plain text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trail, I respectfully dissent.
I
Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, seeks to construct a natural-gas pipeline across the George Washington National Forest. The proposed route traverses 21 miles of national forests and requires crossing 57 rivers, streams, and lakes within those forests. See 911 F. 3d 150, 155 (CA4 2018) (case below in No. 18–1584); App. in No. 18–1144 (CA4), p. 1659. The plan calls for “clearing trees and other vegeta-
A
Three interlocking statutes foreclose this proposal. The
Although the
In turn, the
By statutory definition, the Appalachian Trail is land in the National Park System, and the
B
Statutory history reinforces that the Appalachian Trail is land in the National Park System. When the
In 1970, after the Park Service had begun its role as the Trail‘s land-administering bureau, Congress enacted the
In 1973, having broadly defined lands in the Park System, Congress amended the
Put simply, “any area of land and water administered by” the Park Service is a unit of the Park System and must be “regulate[d]” through “means and measures” that “conserve” and “provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” in ways “as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”
C
Agency practice confirms this conclusion. For a half century the Park Service has acknowledged that the Appalachian Trail is a unit of (and land in) the Park System. Recall that a year after the
More recently, a 2005 Park Service history stated that the Appalachian Trail was “brought into the National Park System” by the
Still taking cues from statutory text, the Park Service continues to refer to the Appalachian Trail as land in the Park System. Just last year, the Park Service issued a reference manual describing the Appalachian Trail as a “land protection project” that has “been formally declared [a] uni[t] of the National Park System.” NPS, National Trails System: Reference Manual 45, pp. 28, 221 (2019) (NPS, Reference Manual 45). The Park Service‘s compendium of regulations similarly explains that the
The Government has even brought this understanding to bear against private citizens. For example, the Government (including the Park Service and the Forest Service) filed a damages lawsuit against an individual, invoking the
Here, at least before they reached this Court, both the Park Service and Forest Service explained in proceedings below that the Trail is land in the Park System. The Park Service noted that the Appalachian Trail is a “protected corridor (a swath of land averaging about 1,000 feet in width . . . )” that the Park Service “administers.” App. 97. Thus, the Park Service detailed, “the entire Trail corridor” is a “park unit.” Ibid. For its part, the Forest Service acknowledged that the Park Service “is the lead federal administrator agency for the entire [Appalachian Trail], regardless of land ownership.” Id., at 126. Again, this statement echoes the
The agencies’ common ground does not stop there. The Park Service‘s Land Resources Division estimates that the
As federally owned land administered by the Park Service, the Trail segment that Atlantic aims to cross is exempt from the
II
The Court resists this conclusion for three principal reasons. Each tries to detach the Appalachian Trail from land, but none adheres to the plain text and history described above.
A
First, the Court posits that the Forest Service granted the Park Service only an “easement” for the Trail‘s route through the George Washington National Forest. See ante, at 613–616. Because private-law “easements are not land,” the Court reasons, nothing “divest[ed] the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses.” Ante, at 613, 616.
That reasoning is self-defeating. Despite recognizing that the Park Service “administers the Trail,” the Court insists that this administration excludes “the underlying land” constituting the Trail. Ante, at 617. But the Court does not disclose how the Park Service could administer the Trail without administering the land that forms it.
Neither does the Court explain how the Trail could be a unit of the Park System if it is not land. The Court declares that the Trail‘s status as a System “‘unit‘” does not “indi-
The Court‘s analysis of private-law easements is also unconvincing. In the Court‘s words, a private-law easement is “a limited privilege” granted to “a nonowner” of land. Ante, at 613; see also 613–614 (adding that “the grantor of [an] easement retains ownership” over the land and that “easements are not land, they merely burden land that continues to be owned by another“). But as the Court recognizes, “the Federal Government owns all lands involved here,” ante, at 614, so private law is inapposite. Precisely because the Government owns all the lands at issue, it makes little sense to ask whether the Government granted itself an easement over its own land under state-law principles. Between agencies of the Federal Government, federal statutory commands, not private-law analogies, govern.
In any event, the
Tellingly, the Court recognizes that
The Court also appears to assume that the Park Service‘s administrative jurisdiction over lands making up the Appalachian Trail must be mutually exclusive with the Forest Service‘s jurisdiction. See ante, at 613–616 (focusing on whether “jurisdiction over the lands” making up the Trail was “transferred,” “convert[ed],” or “divest[ed]“). But this is not a zero-sum inquiry. The question is “not whether those portions of the [Appalachian Trail] were removed from the George Washington National Forest; the question is whether they were added to the National Park System.” Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council et al. as Amici Curiae 2. As explained above, the lands making up the Appalachian Trail were indeed added to the National Park System.
That the Trail may fall within both the Forest System and the Park System is not surprising. The
The Court also cites a 1983 amendment to the
For one thing,
This distinction between administration and management tracks the
At bottom,
Second, the Court maintains that Congress should have used “unequivocal and direct language” had it intended for the Trail to be land in the Park System. Ante, at 618. The Court cites the
Indeed, neither example lends the Court much support. Certainly the
The Blue Ridge Parkway statutes also undermine the Court‘s conclusion. The Court cites a 1952 statute and some more recent laws, see ante, at 618, but the enactments that originally created the Blue Ridge Parkway did not include language about “transferring” land from one agency to another. Rather, they stated that the parkway “shall be administered and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service” and be “subject to” the
For similar reasons, it is not significant that the
C
Last, the Court objects on policy grounds that hewing to the statutes’ plain meaning would have “striking implications for federalism and private property rights.” Ibid.
Not so. For starters, the pertinent provisions under the
True, that the Appalachian Trail is land in the Park System means the Park Service has some power to regulate nonfederal property. But that authority is not new. For decades the Park Service has regulated waste disposal on “all lands and waters within the boundaries of all units of the National Park System, whether federally or nonfederally owned.” 36 CFR § 6.2 (1995). It also has power to regulate the entire Appalachian Trail, including lands that the Government does not own.
* * *
Today‘s outcome is inconsistent with the language of three statutes, longstanding agency practice, and common sense. The Park Service administers acres of land constituting the Appalachian Trail for scenic, historic, natural, and recreational purposes.
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the State of Vermont et al. by Thomas J. Donovan, Attorney General of Vermont, Benjamin D. Battles, Solicitor General, and Eleanor L. P. Spottswood and Rachel E. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Karl A. Racine of the District of Columbia, Clare E. Connors of Hawaii, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Hector Balderas of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, and Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island; for the Commonwealth of Virginia by Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Donald D. Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor General, Martine E. Cicconi and Michelle S. Kallen, Deputy Solicitors General, and Jessica M. Samuels, Assistant Solicitor General; for the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation by James J. Devine, Jr.; for the City of Staunton et al. by Douglas Guynn and Cale Jaffe; for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Sarah E. Harrington, Erica Oleszczuk Evans, and Sharon Buccino; for The Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead; for the Wintergreen Property Owners Association et al. by Daniel L. Geyser, Carolyn Elefant, and Michael J. Hirrel; and for Pamela Underhill et al. by William S. Eubanks II and Kristin H. Gladd.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the Appalachian Trail Conservancy by Keith Bradley, Peter S. Gould, Kelly Mihocik, Benjamin Beaton, and Brendan Mysliwiec; for the Niskanen Center by David Bookbinder; and for Richard J. Pierce, Jr., by Mr. Pierce, pro se.