UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, COPS LOCAL 062 v. TOWN OF HAMDEN ET AL.
(AC 43739)
Connecticut Appellate Court
December 7, 2021
Prescott, Moll and Suarez, Js.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff union sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against E, a police officer represented by the plaintiff and employed by the defendant town, until the completion of a pending criminal prosecution against E. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment granting the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction. The named defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the court used an incorrect legal standard in granting the plaintiff‘s application. Held that the trial court improperly reviewed the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for adjudicating a motion for a stay of civil proceedings; moreover, unlike the decisions erroneously relied on by the court, Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. (116 Conn. App. 289) and Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler (115 Conn. App. 521), which involved motions to stay proceedings before the court, this case involved the court attempting to enjoin a separate proceeding conducted by another government entity, thus, the court erred in applying a balancing of the equities test; furthermore, pursuant to Nosik v. Singe (40 F.3d 592), the proper standard to apply in a case involving a request to enjoin ongoing administrative disciplinary proceedings is the standard for adjudicating a temporary injunction, and, as the court made no findings as to whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, the case was remanded for the court to apply the correct standard and to make the requisite findings.
Argued April 5-officially released December 7, 2021
Procedural History
Action, inter alia, seeking to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing of a police officer, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Hon. Jon C. Blue, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction, and the named defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Glenn A. Duhl, with whom were Adam J. Lyke, and, on the brief, Jason R. Stanevich and Maura A. Mastrony, for the appellant (named defendant).
John M. Walsh, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Eaton is a member of the plaintiff union. On April 16, 2019, Eaton, while on duty, was involved in an incident in which he discharged his service weapon at unarmed civilians, injuring one civilian (April 16, 2019 incident). Another police officer at the scene was also injured as a result of Eaton having discharged his service weapon. On April 26, 2019, the Hamden Police Department Ethics and Integrity Unit, directed by Acting Chief of Police John Cappiello, initiated an internal affairs investigation into Eaton‘s conduct during the April 16, 2019 incident. New Haven State‘s Attorney Patrick J. Griffin also authored a report concerning the April 16, 2019 incident and Eaton‘s use of deadly force. The report, dated October 17, 2019, concluded that, “[u]nder circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, [Eaton] recklessly engaged in conduct which created a risk of death, and thereby caused serious physical injury to [a civilian].” Following Attorney Griffin‘s recommendation, on October 21, 2019, Eaton was arrested and charged with assault in the first degree in violation of
On November 15, 2019, Acting Chief Cappiello brought formal disciplinary charges against Eaton. The matter was referred to the Hamden Board of Police Commissioners (board) for adjudication with a recommendation for termination. On November 21, 2019, the board notified Eaton, through his legal counsel, that a hearing would be held on December 6, 2019, to determine what discipline, if any, would be taken against him as a result of the April 16, 2019 incident. Notice and an opportunity for a hearing were provided in accordance with the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement that governs the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.3
On December 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint and an application seeking temporary injunctive relief to prevent the board from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing for Eaton while his criminal prosecution remains pending. See State v. Eaton, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CR-19-0224774-T. In support of its application for a temporary injunction, the plaintiff asserted that Eaton has a constitutional property interest in his continued employment with the defendant. The plaintiff argued that Eaton cannot be deprived of this interest without due process of law pursuant to the fourteenth amendment to the
On December 13, 2019, a hearing was held on the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction. During the hearing, the court specifically acknowledged the difference between the standards for adjudicating an application for a temporary injunction and a motion for a stay of civil proceedings. The court explained that, in determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the court‘s focus would be on the issue of irreparable harm. In determining whether to grant a stay of proceedings, however, the court‘s focus would be on the competing interests of the parties. The court asserted that the case law relevant to the present case “does not talk about irreparable harm . . . .” The court distinguished the present case from a civil case in which one party seeks to enjoin another party from “open[ing] [a] rendering plant or . . . build[ing] [a] [b]all field . . . .” The court further asserted that, “unlike the usual case of an order for [a] temporary injunction,” because the present case contemplates the staying of an administrative proceeding while a criminal proceeding is pending, the court‘s analysis must focus on the competing interests of the parties.
In its oral decision, the court explained that it was required “to balance some ponderable weights on each side.” The court weighed the interests of both parties as well as the interest of the public. The court cited Securities & Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S. Ct. 529, 66 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1980), asserting that the strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after the completion of criminal proceedings is when a party that has been indicted for a criminal offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same matter.
The court identified that the officer had two interests in the present matter-“a property interest in his continued employment . . . and . . . an interest in exercising or not exercising his fifth amendment right . . . .” The court also stated that the defendant and the public had several interests in the present matter. First, the defendant had an interest in “getting this officer off the street,” which had already been accomplished at the time of the hearing. Second, the defendant had an interest in not paying Eaton. The court acknowledged that Eaton was on unpaid leave, and, although the defendant continued to pay $1100 per month for Eaton‘s insurance, the court asserted that this cost was “relatively de minimis in the more global context of this action.” Third, both the defendant and the public had an interest in the quick resolution of the case given the legitimate public concern about Eaton‘s conduct. The court suggested that this interest would be more significant, however, if Eaton were still working as a police officer and ultimately determined that the public‘s demands for an immediate resolution did not outweigh Eaton‘s substantial legal interests.
After setting forth the foregoing reasoning, the court concluded that Eaton‘s interests in obtaining a stay outweighed the defendant‘s interests in obtaining a quick resolution of the case.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction, announcing its decision orally.4 This appeal followed.5 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant raises a claim of legal error. Specifically, it claims that the court incorrectly adjudicated the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for deciding whether to issue a stay of civil proceedings instead of the standard for issuing a temporary injunction. We agree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review that governs the defendant‘s claim. “When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omit-ted.) Barber v. Barber, 193 Conn. App. 190, 196, 219 A.3d 378 (2019). “[O]ur analysis of whether the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review.” Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591, 598, 930 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).
We also set forth the legal principles relevant to this claim. “The standard for granting a temporary injunction is well settled. In general, a court may, in its discretion, exercise its equitable power to order a temporary injunction pending final determination of the order, upon a proper showing by the movant that if the injunction is not granted he or she will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. . . . A party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that: (1) it has no adequate remedy at law; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) it will likely prevail on the merits; and (4) the balance of equities tips in its favor. . . . The plaintiff seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of proving facts which will establish irreparable
A distinct standard applies to the court‘s evaluation of a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings. To adjudicate a motion for a stay of civil proceedings, courts must apply a balancing of the equities test. See Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 196 Conn. 451, 459-60, 493 A.2d 229 (1985). In describing this test, our Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not possible to reduce all of the considerations involved in stay orders to a rigid formula . . . .” Id., 458. The court, however, did note that “[a]mong the ‘equities’ to be placed on the scales . . . are the general equitable considerations which are involved in the issuance of a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo pendente lite.” Id., 460.
This court has elaborated on the standard for evaluat-ing a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings. “In determining whether to impose a stay . . . the court must balance the interests of the litigants, nonparties, the public and the court itself. . . . The factors a court should consider include: [1] the interests of the plaintiff in an expeditious resolution and the prejudice to the plaintiff in not proceeding; [2] the interests of and burdens on the defendants; [3] the convenience to the court in the management of its docket and in the efficient use of judicial resources; [4] the interests of other persons not parties to the civil litigation; and [5] the interests of the public in the pending civil and criminal actions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, 115 Conn. App. 521, 529, 973 A.2d 163, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 920, 979 A.2d 493 (2009). “In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of an application or a motion for a stay of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court . . . . [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn. App. 289, 311-12, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).
We begin our analysis of the claim by clarifying what standard the court applied. During the hearing, the court stated that the temporary injunction standard applies in situations that differ from the present matter, such as when one party seeks to prevent another party from “open[ing] [a] rendering plant or . . . build[ing] [a] [b]all field . . . .” The court further asserted that, because the present case contemplates the staying of an administrative
In addition to making this distinction, the court, during the hearing and in its decision, repeatedly referred to weighing the interests of the parties, which reflects that it utilized the standard for adjudicating a motion for a stay of civil proceedings, as set forth previously. At the beginning of the hearing, the court stated that “the question before [the court], it seems pretty clear, rest[s] on . . . a weighing of the competing interest[s] involved . . . the interest in fact of those respective tribunals and of course of . . . Eaton himself . . . .” Throughout the hearing, the court continued to make reference to and inquire about the “competing interests” of the parties. Additionally, as the court announced its decision, it stated that “this is a case where the court has to balance some ponderable weights on each side.” The court then went on to identify, in its decision, the competing interests of the parties and ultimately determined that the interests of Eaton outweighed the interests of the defendant. This analysis mirrors the balancing of the equities test adopted in Griffin Hospital, which applies to the evaluation of a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings rather than an application for a temporary injunction. See Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, supra, 196 Conn. 459-60.
Further establishing that the court did not apply the standard for a temporary injunction is the fact that the court made no finding as to irreparable harm, a finding that is integral in the adjudication of an application for a temporary injunction. “A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. The allegations and proof are conditions precedent to the granting of an injunction.” Hartford v. American Arbitration Assn., supra, 174 Conn. 476. Nevertheless, the court stated that the “case law on this particular issue does not talk about irreparable harm . . . .” Counsel for the defendant specifically reminded the court that it was required to make a finding of irreparable harm, noting that the cases cited by the court “had to do with a stay of proceedings and . . . the weight of the discovery. It‘s different in this case. This is an injunction case, not a stay of civil proceedings, so I think irreparable harm absolutely is a factor that has to be reviewed . . . .” Despite these contentions, the court did not make a finding as to irreparable harm. Because the court did not make a finding as to irreparable harm, proof of which is a “[condition] precedent to the granting of an injunction“; Hartford v. American Arbitration Assn., supra, 476; it did not apply the standard for adjudicating an application for a temporary injunction.
We conclude that the court undertook an incorrect legal analysis. The standard for a motion to stay proceedings does not apply in the present case because the court attempted to enjoin a separate proceeding conducted by another governmental entity, rather than staying a proceeding before it. In reaching its decision, the court erroneously relied on Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., supra, 116 Conn. App. 289, which is distinguishable
In the present case, the court also cited Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App. 528-29. In Tyler, the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a marital dissolution action. Id., 523. Before the dissolution trial began, there was a structural fire at a vacation property owned by the parties, and, after an investigation, the defendant was arrested and charged with arson related to the fire. Id. The defendant then filed a motion to stay the marital dissolution trial that was pending before the court until after the disposition of his criminal case. Id. The court asserted that, in order to determine whether to grant a stay, it must “balance the interests of the litigants, nonparties, the public and the court itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 529. One factor to be considered was “the convenience to the court in the management of its docket . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Both Lee and Tyler are inapplicable to the present case because they involve motions to stay proceedings pending before the court. See Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., supra, 116 Conn. App. 311-12; Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App. 528-29. As we have stated, the requested “stay” in the present case did not involve an action pending on the court‘s docket but a disciplinary hearing pending before the board, an independent administrative agency. The court‘s reliance on Lee and Tyler, therefore, was misplaced.
We further find instructive a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which utilized the standard for granting a temporary injunction under an analogous set of facts.6 See Nosik v. Singe, 40 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1994). In Nosik, the plaintiff, a school psychologist who worked for the Danbury Board of Education, was arrested for allegedly defrauding car insurance companies by submitting false repair bills. Id., 594. Subsequently, the Danbury School Administration (administration) suspected that the plaintiff had fraudulently obtained employee health insurance benefits for her boyfriend by claiming that
The plaintiff in the present case, just as in Nosik, filed an application for a temporary injunction seeking to enjoin the defendant from continuing with the disciplinary proceedings against Eaton until the criminal proceedings are resolved. Both Nosik and the present case involve requests to enjoin ongoing administrative disciplinary proceedings-matters that were not pending on the court‘s own docket-premised entirely on the existence of parallel criminal proceedings pending in court. According to the Second Circuit, the proper standard to apply in such a case is the standard for adjudicating a temporary injunction. See id.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court improperly reviewed the plaintiff‘s application for a temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for adjudicating a motion for a stay of civil proceedings. The court should have applied the familiar standard that governs an application for a temporary injunction. Application of the proper standard involves factual determinations that must be made by the trial court, such as whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. The court made no such finding in the present case. Thus, the proper remedy is to reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the court applies the correct standard and makes the requisite findings.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.