Uddin v. PuterUddin v. Puter
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under
On September 15, 2025, petitioner was detained by immigration officials, and removal proceedings were initiated. On March 31, 2026, an immigration judge (IJ) sustained the charge of removability, and in a lengthy opinion, rejected petitioner‘s claim that he is in fact a citizen born in the United States. On April 15, 2026, the IJ ordered petitioner‘s removal after petitioner failed to file any application for relief. On May 13, 2026, petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and that appeal remains pending. On April 14, 2026, petitioner filed the instant habeas
To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See
Petitioner appears to assert five claims in his petition. First, petitioner claims that he was arrested pursuant to an invalid field warrant, and he cites the case of Castanon Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, 806 F. Supp. 3d 823 (N.D. Ill. 2025), in which the court found that immigration officials had violated a class action settlement agreement by arresting aliens under a particular type of warrant (I-200 warrant) without issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA) with the removability charges. See id. Petitioner has not established, however, that he was arrested pursuant to an invalid warrant (he has not provided a copy of any warrant). Moreover, respondents have provided evidence that petitioner was not arrested with a field warrant and that he was issued an NTA at the time of his detention. Petitioner has not disputed that evidence of an NTA or addressed this claim in his traverse. The Court therefore denies this claim.
Second, although petitioner states in his traverse that he is not seeking review concerning his citizenship status in this Court, he claims in his petition that his detention is unconstitutional because the Government has not shown that he is not a citizen. The
Third, petitioner claims that the Government engaged in misconduct in his removal proceedings. The IJ rejected this claim, finding that petitioner had failed to support the claim with evidence and that documentary evidence contradicted the claim at any rate. Nor has petitioner provided evidence to support such a claim in this Court. Petitioner has not shown that his removal proceedings were constitutionally infirm, and the Court therefore denies this claim.
Fourth, petitioner claims that because of the Government‘s erroneous position on his citizenship status, his eventual removal is a “logical and practical impossibility,” and that his detention therefore does not serve a legitimate purpose. The immigration court has found that petitioner is subject to removal, however, and this Court lacks jurisdiction effectively to review the removal order by releasing petitioner based on a challenge to its merits. The Court denies any such claim that petitioner‘s detention lacks a proper purpose to effect removal.
Finally, in his traverse petitioner appears to assert a claim that he should be released because his detention has exceeded the presumptive-reasonable period of six months established by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). That case, however, involved detention under
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas corpus pursuant to
Dated this 21st day of July, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge