U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIG APPLE CONSULTING USA, INC., MJMM Investments, LLC, Marc Jablon, Mark C. Kaley, Defendants-Appellants, Matthew Maguire, et al., Defendants.
No. 13-11976.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 9, 2015.
783 F.3d 786
Judge MATHESON joins in all but footnote 6 of the opinion. Judge MORITZ joins in all but Section II, C of the opinion.
Theodore Weiman, Dominick V. Freda, Jeffery T. Infelise, Cheryl J. Scarboro, Thomas A. Sporkin, Duane Kenneth Thompson, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission Office of the General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Mark C. Kaley, Orlando, FL, pro se.
Carl Francis Schoeppl, Jr., Brenda Marie Nelson, Schoeppl & Burke, PA, Boca Raton, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Keith Jablon, Winter Garden, FL, pro se.
Matthew Maguire, Sanford, FL, pro se.
SILER, Circuit Judge:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought this civil enforcement action against defendants Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc. (Big Apple), MJMM Investments, LLC (MJMM), Marc Jablon (Jablon), and Mark C. Kaley (Kaley) (collectively, the defendants) for violations of the
On appeal, the defendants assert six claims of error involving both the district court‘s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC and the district court‘s rulings in the jury trial. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
a. The Players
Big Apple and its wholly owned subsidiary, MJMM, provided investor relations and public relations services to microcap companies. Management Solutions International, Inc. (MSI), another wholly owned subsidiary of Big Apple, offered a variety of services, including marketing, business planning, and e-commerce website development and maintenance. Jablon was president and CEO of Big Apple, as well as CEO of MSI. Jablon and Maguire co-founded MJMM; Maguire also served as the vice president of Big Apple. Kaley was president of MJMM and an officer of Big Apple. Kaley was also an attorney. Keith is Jablon‘s brother and was vice president of MSI.
The SEC‘s allegations stem from the defendants’ relationship with CyberKey Solutions, Inc. (CyberKey), previously
Under the terms of the original consulting agreement, CyberKey paid MJMM $50,000 per month either in cash or in “free-trading shares”1 of CyberKey, which was calculated based on the previous ten-day average closing bid price. This sort of exchange was typical for Big Apple; at least ninety-five percent of Big Apple‘s clients paid in stock. The consulting agreement between MJMM and CyberKey was extended twice—once on November 14, 2005 and again on October 9, 2006. Kaley signed both agreements. The October 2006 extension required CyberKey to pay $80,000 per month or a number of CyberKey shares calculated based on a fifty percent discount of the ten-day average closing bid price of CyberKey stock. Thus, assuming a constant closing bid price in CyberKey stock over the previous ten-day period, MJMM received CyberKey stock that had a market value of $160,000 in exchange for $80,000 worth of services. During the entire period that CyberKey contracted with MJMM, CyberKey paid exclusively in stock for services provided. MJMM also negotiated the option to purchase additional CyberKey stock at a significant discount, initially forty percent in July 2006 and increasing to fifty percent shortly thereafter. Ultimately, MJMM received approximately 77 million CyberKey shares for services rendered, and at the direction of Jablon and Kaley, MJMM purchased a total of approximately 648 million more shares by exercising options on a regular basis.
As part of its public relations services to CyberKey and other clients, Big Apple operated a telephone call room that contacted registered securities brokers and dealers to disseminate public information in order to create interest in client companies and their stock. Maguire supervised the call room on a day-to-day basis, but Jablon bore ultimate oversight and was both aware of and authorized all the policies and procedures used in the call room. Big Apple staffed the call room with as many as fifty employees, who used internally-drafted press releases and “bullet sheets” to draw attention among the broker-dealer community to its clients.
b. The Department of Homeland Security Contract
At first, there was no demand for CyberKey stock, but that changed when Plant began reporting fabricated contracts. First, Plant falsely informed Big Apple—
The newly-announced, fictitious DHS contract was a game changer. Jablon characterized it as “[o]ne in a million,” and both he and Kaley thought the contract would significantly increase demand for CyberKey stock.
Plant showed Jablon and Kaley a document he purported was the DHS contract, and it contained several obvious inconsistencies. Neither Jablon nor Kaley looked closely at the contract. Although the contract was supposedly with DHS, a federal entity, the eight-page document contained multiple references to the State of Connecticut, including a mailing address in the state, a state e-mail address for the purchasing contact, and several contract terms that expressly identified the “State of Connecticut” or “the State” as the counter-party. In fact, only the cover page and the header of each page of the document referred to the DHS. Further, the contract‘s stated value—$24,494,412.15—differed from the amounts Plant had previously reported to the defendants relating to the original MPX deal. The contract award date was also internally inconsistent. On the first and second pages of the contract, the award date was listed as October 31, 2005, but two pages later it was listed as August 12, 2005.
CyberKey publicized the DHS contract in a December 8, 2005 press release that announced “the Company [had received] a multi-million [d]ollar purchase order from the Department of Homeland Security [for over] 150,000 units.” MSI drafted the press release and Big Apple was listed as the primary contact, along with the telephone number 1-866-THE-APPL(E). Incoming brokers’ calls were routed to Big Apple‘s sales floor, and investors’ calls were routed to MSI‘s investor relations team. Over the next fifteen months, the defendants conceived, drafted, edited, or reviewed numerous press releases emphasizing the $25 million DHS contract or aspects related to it. The defendants also drafted press releases announcing the first two shipments of USB devices to DHS and CyberKey‘s receipt of two $4.2 million payments from DHS.
During this time, Big Apple used its call room to aggressively promote CyberKey to broker-dealers; Big Apple routinely designated CyberKey the “on focus” client, making it a priority in salespeople‘s calls. For example, out of a given sixty day period, CyberKey was “on focus” for thirty to forty-five of those days. The defendants prepared or approved the preparation of “bullet sheets” detailing talking points about CyberKey and circulated them to its salespeople in the call room. Generally, Big Apple and MJMM did not disclose to brokers or investors that com-
c. The Scheme Unravels
Additional signs of Plant‘s dishonesty surfaced in the coming months. In January 2006, Plant sent CyberKey‘s first financial statement for public release, and, according to Jablon, the financial statements looked like they “were prepared by a third grader [and] there was a lot missing.” Despite landing the fabricated DHS contract and supposedly being in receipt of the first $4.2 million payment, CyberKey‘s checking account held a balance of around $6,000. Plant explained CyberKey‘s cash shortage was due to the nature of the DHS contract, which was “front-loaded” and that CyberKey would make all its money “on the back end.” Jablon unsuccessfully attempted to have a third-party auditor review CyberKey‘s financials, but Plant kept “pushing it off.” Plant regularly went “AWOL” and would be unreachable for days or even a week at a time. Kaley and Keith flew to San Diego for several meetings with Plant and potential buyers, but shortly before each meeting was scheduled to occur, Plant would indicate the meeting was rescheduled or canceled.
During the summer of 2006, because of Plant‘s repeated problematic behavior, Jablon asked his brother Keith to draft a list of problems that employees were having with Plant so that Jablon could discuss the issues with Plant. This became known as the “broken promises” memorandum. The memorandum detailed thirteen separate “missed promises” made by Plant. After Jablon received the broken promises memorandum from Keith, he emailed it to Kaley.
On August 3, 2006, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), sent a fax to Plant informing him that it was reviewing CyberKey‘s trading activity. NASD requested that CyberKey provide it with the “documents and information” concerning: (1) the DHS contract; (2) an explanation of how the DHS contract was negotiated; (3) a list of CyberKey‘s contacts at DHS; and (4) details of CyberKey‘s relationship with Big Apple. Plant e-mailed the fax to Jablon and Kaley, and they advised Plant to have his securities attorney handle the matter. Jablon and Kaley did not follow up on the status of the inquiry.
Five days later, after speaking with Plant, a DHS official called an employee at MSI, Kelson Monks (Monks), to inquire about CyberKey‘s claimed relationship with DHS. The DHS official informed Monks that he was unable to locate the purchase order relating to a press release CyberKey had recently issued, and the DHS official faxed a confirmation of the conversation seeking any identifying information about the DHS contract from CyberKey. The press release in question announced that DHS had added a $600,000 order for biometric drives to an existing $25 million order. Monks sent the fax from the DHS to Kaley and Jablon, but they did not respond to the request and opted to let Plant handle the matter.
On February 5, 2007, the SEC issued an order suspending the trading of CyberKey stock due to concerns as to the accuracy of assertions made by CyberKey and others in press releases and public statements to investors. From February 20, 2007, the date that CyberKey‘s trading suspension was temporarily lifted, to March 20, 2007, the date CyberKey was de-listed and could no longer be traded, MJMM was a heavy seller of its holdings in the stock. Over the course of the defendants’ relationship with CyberKey, Big Apple and MJMM sold more than a combined 720 million CyberKey shares for approximately $7.8
The SEC brought suit against Plant for his role in the scheme. Plant was also indicted and convicted on charges of securities fraud. In 2009, he was sentenced to ninety-seven months imprisonment in connection with the criminal charges.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The SEC filed its complaint in federal court and alleged that not later than August 8, 2006, the defendants “knew, or were severely reckless in not knowing, that CyberKey did not have a $25 million purchase order from the DHS or any other [f]ederal government agency, and thus had very little legitimate revenue at all.” Nonetheless, the defendants “persisted in promoting CyberKey and selling hundreds of millions of unregistered CyberKey shares to unsuspecting investors.” The SEC asserted that the defendants violated various sections of the
After the Supreme Court decided Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 180 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2011), which defined what it means to “make” a false statement under
Ultimately, the SEC‘s amended complaint asserted that: (i) all defendants violated
Only the claims under (i)—that the defendants violated
The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendants violated each of the three subsections of
Defendants raise six errors on appeal. They claim the district court erred by: (1) submitting the
ANALYSIS
1. Primary Violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act
We review the district court‘s rulings concerning questions of law de novo. SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 754 (11th Cir. 2007).
The defendants argue that the decision in Janus—a case that defined the word “make” as it relates to
Our conclusion is driven by an adherence to the statutory text.
unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Indeed, the Court recognized in Cent. Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1994), that, despite foreclosing private aiding and abetting liability under
The defendants’ primary contention is that because
One final aspect of the Court‘s decision in Janus solidifies our conclusion that the Court‘s definition of “to make” in
We therefore decline the defendants’ invitation to supplant the language of
...
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
SILER
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
