Tylеr J. VEERKAMP, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 16A01-1310-CR-439
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
April 29, 2014.
Rehearing Denied June 18, 2014.
7 N.E.3d 390
PYLE, Judge.
Dr. Calloway testified that she looked for an “impaired” ability to appreciate wrongfulness, not a total inability to appreciate wrongfulness as is required by the statute. (Tr. at 531.) She conceded that she used the “impaired ability” and “total inability” standard interchangeably. (Id. at 554.) Her incorrect application of the “impaired ability” standard would permit the jury to give Dr. Calloway‘s testimony little or no weight.
Dr. Miller applied the correct standard, but her testimоny did nothing to help Gore‘s insanity defense. Dr. Miller originally filed a report stating that Gore could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, but she amended this report and testified at trial that she thought Gore‘s mental state “might” have interfered with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. (Id. at 677.) Her position on the issue was so equivocal that Gore moved to strike her testimony altogether for not being an opinion.
Gore argues Dr. Caruana also did not state an opinion. Dr. Caruana testified Gore was not insane at the time of the murder. He said Gore‘s behavior leading up to the shooting was сonsistent with mental illness, but Dr. Caruana still could not say Gore was insane at the time of the murder because his behavior did not reflect the “grossly and demonstrably impaired functioning of thinking” required by the statute.
The final expert, Dr. Prasad, testified he believed Gore was insane at the time of the offense based on his interviews with Gore‘s mother and cousin. Dr. Prasad interviewed Gore, but his conclusion Gore was insane was based not on his interview with Gore, but “based on what his mother and his cousin said.” (Tr. at 791.)
In summary, the testimony did not, as Gore asserts, reflect that three experts found Gore insane and one expert provided no opinion. On the сontrary, it showed Dr. Calloway applied an incorrect standard, Dr. Miller testified Gore‘s ability to appreciate wrongfulness “might” have been affected by his mental illness, (id. at 677), Dr. Caruana testified Gore was not insane, and Dr. Prasad testified Gore was insane based on his interviews with Gore‘s mother and cousin. The disagrеement among the experts as to whether Gore was insane at the time of his offense amounts to an evidentiary conflict. See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710. This is not a case of consistent testimony leading only to the conclusion Gore was insane. Therefore, Gore is essentially asking that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Id. at 709.
CONCLUSION
Gore has not shown that the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that he was insane when the crime was committed. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys fоr Appellee.
OPINION
PYLE, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tyler J. Veerkamp (“Veerkamp“) files an interlocutory appeal of the trial
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Veerkamp‘s motion to suppress evidence.
FACTS
At approximately 10:35 p.m. on March 2, 2013, Greensburg Pоlice Officer Justin Wells (“Officer Wells“) was driving westbound on Main Street in Greensburg, Indiana, when Veerkamp, driving his truck, turned onto Main Street a block in front of the officer. As Veerkamp‘s truck turned and accelerated, its exhaust system emitted “excessive” smoke. (Tr. 7). At one point, Officer Wells “could not even see [] the pаssenger side tail light of [Veerkamp‘s] vehicle because the smoke was so excessive.” (Tr. 7). After Veerkamp turned, his truck stopped emitting smoke, and Officer Wells was able to see again. However, Officer Wells initiated a traffic stop of the truck based on the smoke and discovered that Veerkаmp seemed to be driving while under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, on March 3, 2013, the State charged Veerkamp with Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
On April 15, 2013, Veerkamp filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. He argued that the stop had violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and that any evidence gained as a result of the search was, thus, inadmissible. Specifically, he contended that Officer Wells did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vеhicle because the smoke coming from his truck did not constitute a traffic violation. He argued that it only lasted for a brief amount of time and, in his view, was not excessive.
The trial court held a hearing on Veerkamp‘s motion on July 22, 2013. At the hearing, the State introduced the video from Officer Wells’ in-car video system into evidence. The video contained footage of Veerkamp turning onto Main Street, as well as the smoke coming from Veerkamp‘s truck. Officer Wells also testified and stated that he did not see Veerkamp driving erratically or speeding before the traffic stop. Nor did he notice any other driving behaviors that would have led him to believe that Veerkamp was driving while impaired. When Veerkamp‘s counsel asked Officer Wells how he differentiated between excessive and non-excessive smoke, he replied “if it obscures visibility, I think it‘s excessive.” (Tr. 12).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issuеd an order denying the motion to suppress evidence. The court found that Veerkamp had committed a Class C infraction by violating
DECISION
Veerkamp argues that Officer Wells’ traffic stoр violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and that any evidence gained as a result of the stop is, thus, inadmissible. We will address each of these constitutional arguments in turn.
First, though, we recognize that our standard of review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency issues. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court‘s decision. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court‘s deсision. State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1183 (Ind.2014). We review the trial court‘s conclusions of law, including determinations of reasonable suspicion, de novo. Id.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the privacy and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Sugg v. State, 991 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.2013). It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The trial court here determined that Officer Wells’ stop of Veerkamp was constitutionally pеrmissible because he had reasonable suspicion that Veerkamp had committed an infraction by violating
With respect to Veerkamp‘s first argument concerning whether he committed a traffic infraction, we note that the Indiana Code does not define the term excessive, and we have never interpreted it in the context of
Veerkamp‘s second argument is that Officer Wells did not have reasonable suspicion to instigate the traffic stop because he did not determine whether Veerkamp fell under an exception to
Because Veerkamp committed a traffic infraction, we conclude that Officer Wells had reasonable suspicion to stop Veerkamp and that the stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Article I, Section 11
Veerkamp also challenges his traffic stop under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 are worded identically, our Indiana constitutional standard “has evolved differently from the Fourth Amendment analysis.” Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind.2001). Under Article I, Section 11, “we focus on the actions of the police officer[] and employ a totality-of-the-circumstances
Here, Veerkamp argues that “[c]onsidering that the traffic stop occurred on a Saturday night at 10:30 p.m. in a rural town with little traffic on the streеt, the totality of the circumstances show that it was likely a pretextual stop.” (Veerkamp‘s Br. 11). A “pretextual” stop is a stop that police instigate “under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for other reasons.” Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 338 (Ind.1999). In support of this argument, Veerkamp points to Officer Wеlls’ testimony that his driving was otherwise appropriate.
Regardless of Veerkamp‘s performance driving, we find the traffic stop reasonable based on the condition of his truck and the three balancing factors listed above. When Officer Wells drove down the street, he saw Veerkamp‘s truck produсe an “excessive” amount of smoke, to the point that Veerkamp‘s passenger side tail light was not visible. (Tr. 7). As a result, Officer Wells had a high degree of suspicion that Veerkamp had committed a traffic infraction. In addition, Officer Wells’ degree of intrusion was minimal as he simply initiated a short traffic stop, аnd the need for law enforcement was high because the smoke was extensive and blocked visibility, thereby creating a potential traffic hazard. Based on our balancing of the above factors, we conclude that Officer Wells acted reasonably to investigate a suspected traffiс infraction and that his actions did not violate Veerkamp‘s rights under the Indiana Constitution.
Further, because we have determined that Officer Wells’ stop did not violate Veerkamp‘s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Veerkamp‘s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. David Lott HARDY, Appellee-Defendant.
No. 49A02-1309-CR-756.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
April 29, 2014.