TRUMAN ARNOLD COMPANIES, Petitioner v. MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, Respondent
No. CV-16-233
Supreme Court of Arkansas
March 16, 2017
2017 Ark. 94 | 513 S.W.3d 838
Wyly-Rommel, PLLC, by: Sean F. Rommel, for petitioner.
Leslie Rutledge, Little Rock, Att‘y Gen., by: Michael A. Cantrell, Ass‘t Att‘y Gen., for respondent.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
Petitioner Truman Arnold Companies (“TAC“) seeks a writ of prohibition following the entry of an order by the Miller County Circuit Court denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of its former employee, Teresa Jones. TAC argues that the Workers’ Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to make factual inquiries regarding jurisdiction, which leaves the circuit court without jurisdiction, at this stage, over Jones‘s claims against TAC for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager who Jones alleges sexually harassed her. We grant the
Jones alleges she was sexually assaulted by John Kelly, a store manager, in a carwash of a TAC convenience store where she and Kelly worked. She initially brought suit against TAC and Kelly in the Miller County Circuit Court alleging outrage, battery, and defamation. However, she nonsuited that case and filed a separate action in federal district court for federal and state sexual harassment and retaliation, outrage, battery, negligent supervision and retention, and defamation. Jones later nonsuited her claims against Kelly. TAC filed a motion for summary judgment against all of Jones‘s claims. Jones abandoned her claims against TAC for outrage, battery, and defamation, and the federal district court entered summary judgment in favor of TAC on the remaining federal and state law sexual-harassment and retaliation claims. The federal court declined to continue exercising jurisdiction over the remaining state negligent-supervision and retention claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
Jones then filed the present action in the Miller County Circuit Court, alleging that TAC was negligent in its supervision, retention, and hiring of Kelly. TAC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in reliance on the exclusive remedy afforded by
A writ of prohibition is extraordinary relief that is appropriate only when
An employer who has secured for its employees the benefits of workers’ compensation is immune from liability for damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2014 Ark. 506, at 6, 452 S.W.3d at 84. This rule, known as the exclusivity doctrine, arises from
This court settled the question of who decides whether an employee has a right or remedy under the Act in VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises, 334 Ark. 12, 16, 970 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1998). Prior to VanWagoner, this court had held that the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction to determine whether the Workers’ Compensation Act was applicable in a given case. See, e.g., Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996). In VanWagoner, we recognized the perils of this approach. We explained that the Commission has vast expertise in this area and that the goals of uniformity, speed, and simplicity would best be achieved by granting the Commission exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act. VanWagoner, 334 Ark. at 15, 970 S.W.2d at 812. Therefore, we held that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission “has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law, such as an intentional tort.” Id. Since VanWagoner, this court has consistently held that if there are questions of fact about whether the Act provides a right or remedy, those questions of fact are solely within the jurisdiction of the Commission to decide; therefore, a writ of prohibition is warranted when a circuit court encroaches on the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Commission. See Entergy, 2014 Ark. 506, at 7, 452 S.W.3d at 85.
TAC argues that because there are questions of fact regarding the Act‘s applicability, VanWagoner requires that the Commission, not the circuit court, have the exclusive “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.” We agree. First, Jones‘s complaint alleges claims of negligence, not intentional tort. In her complaint, Jones
In addition, the causal relationship between the physical and mental injuries raises numerous factual questions.
Moreover, while addressing whether Jones‘s mental injuries were a result of a crime of violence, the circuit court stated that this exception might be applicable “depending upon the facts and circumstances as they arose in the claims.” It further stated that although it could not determine at that time whether there had been a crime of violence that “this does not mean, however, that upon further discovery and development of the case” that it may apply. Accordingly, given the facts as alleged in the complaint, the circuit court reserved its power and continued to exercise jurisdiction to make additional factual determinations regarding whether the action was covered under the Act. Factual inquiries into whether the Act applies are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
“The issue is one of ‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,’ as distinguished from ‘jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case.‘” Int‘l Paper Co., 375 Ark. at 130-31, 289 S.W.3d at 106 (citing Nucor Corp. v. Rhine, 366 Ark. 550, 555, 237 S.W.3d 52, 57 (2006)). Because the facts as presented in the complaint cannot be determined to fall outside the Act as a matter of law, the issue of jurisdiction resides exclusively with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Therefore, the circuit court acted without jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Workers’ Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act to the matters alleged in the complaint, and the circuit court is therefore wholly without jurisdiction.
Petition granted.