Tracy Rose BAKER v. STATE of Tennessee.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
September 6, 2013.
May 30, 2013 Session.
417 S.W.3d 428
OPINION
CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from a judgment in a civil case finding her in criminal contempt and imposing sanctions, pursuant to
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Tracy Rose Baker, and Jeffrey D. Baker (Husband) were divorced on January 12, 2009. The relationship between the Bakers remained acrimonious, and a series of contempt petitions were filed by both parties over the course of the months following the divorce decree. Husband s attorney acted as prosecutor on Husband s petitions for contempt.1 On April 16, 2010, while the petitioner was represented by counsel, she signed an agreed order, drawn up by Husband s attorney, which was then filed by the trial court.2 By the April 16, 2010 order (Agreed Order), the petitioner: (1) agreed that she had been advised of and waived her constitutional rights as a criminal defendant; (2) acknowledged her guilt of eighteen acts of criminal contempt, including violations of various orders of protection and a temporary restraining order; (3) purported to enter a guilty plea to eighteen counts of willful criminal contempt, in accordance with
On July 20, 2010, Husband filed a petition seeking to revoke the petitioner s probation, requesting an ex parte order discontinuing the petitioner s visitation with the couple s minor children, and seeking adjudications of criminal contempt against the petitioner. Husband s July 20, 2010 petition alleged numerous violations against the petitioner, including that the petitioner was continuing to engage in harassing conduct of Husband, that she had failed to attend counseling appointments, and that she had sent text messages to the
On July 21, 2010, a temporary restraining order was issued against the petitioner, enjoining her from exercising any parenting time pending further orders of the court. After a hearing on August 19, 2010, the trial court signed an order on August 24, 2010, finding the petitioner in violation of her probation and ordering her to serve a 180-day sentence in the Sumner County Jail.
The petitioner appealed from the trial court s August 24, 2010 order to the Court of Appeals. Baker I, 2012 WL 764918, at *5. In her appeal, the petitioner challenged: (1) the failure of the trial judge to recuse herself;3 (2) the propriety of Husband s attorney acting as a private prosecutor of the contempt action; (3) the failure of the trial court to follow the mandatory procedures, as outlined in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977), and
The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 18, 2011, and an amended petition two days later, challenging the criminal contempt adjudications in the Agreed Order on three grounds. The petitioner first alleged that the guilty pleas to eighteen instances of contemptuous conduct should be set aside because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to assure the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty pleas, pursuant to the requirements of Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 & n. 5, and Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 344. The petitioner next alleged that the trial judge was biased against her because Husband s attorney was the judge s personal lawyer, former campaign treasurer, and a substantial donor to the judge s re-election campaign. Finally, the petitioner alleged that Husband s counsel improperly acted as a private prosecutor and, in that role, abused his prosecutorial discretion by unlawfully coercing the guilty pleas and sentences and by improperly conditioning the suspended sentence on the petitioner agreeing to surrender custody of her children and sell her house to pay his undocumented legal fee. The record does not indicate who received copies of the petition or amended petition. The district attorney general did not respond to the petition, but Husband s counsel answered the amended petition.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief for failure to state a colorable claim under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See
Standard of Review
The issue in this appeal whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from the Agreed Order is a question of law, involving the interpretation of statutes; thus, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness attaching to the rulings of the courts below. See Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn.2009).
The paramount rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent without broadening the statute beyond its intended scope. Id. at 564. We must always begin with the words that the General Assembly has chosen and give these words their natural and ordinary meaning. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn.2010). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the language.... Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citing Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Tenn.2008)). Statutes should be construed in a reasonable manner which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws. Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn.1997)).
Post-Conviction Procedure
Prior to 1967, habeas corpus was the primary remedy available in Tennessee for obtaining post-conviction relief from a criminal conviction. The scope of habeas corpus relief in Tennessee was, and continues to be, narrow, providing relief only if a judgment of criminal conviction is facially void or a term of imprisonment has expired. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn.2011) (discussing the history and current status of habeas corpus in Tennessee); House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn.1995); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.1993). Post-conviction remedies available in other states were also historically narrow in scope. House, 911 S.W.2d at 708-09 (citing Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 422 (1966)). As a result, persons convicted in state courts utilized federal habeas corpus petitions as the primary means of challenging state criminal convictions. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring). The sheer volume of federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state inmates, as well as principles of comity, eventually led the United States Supreme Court to suggest that states enact statutory post-conviction procedures, which would afford state inmates an avenue to litigate alleged constitutional errors in state courts, at least in the first instance. See Id. at 339-40.
The current version of the Act provides persons in custody under a sentence of a court of this state the automatic right to file one petition for post-conviction relief.
The Act further provides that a petition for post-conviction relief shall be limited to the assertion of claims for relief from the judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or proceeding.
Having reviewed briefly the origins of the relevant post-conviction statutes, we turn now to contempt.
Contempt
This Court has written on contempt on many occasions, yet the subject continues to stymy the bench and bar both in its definition and in its application. We take this opportunity to explain again the difference between civil and criminal contempt, the rights afforded contemnors, and the sanctions available upon an adjudication of contempt.
The power of courts to punish contempts can be traced back to twelfth cen-
The power of courts to punish for contempt is of immemorial antiquity, and is inherent in all courts as a necessary power belonging to them in order to enable them to accomplish the purposes for which they were designed; that is, the orderly trial and decision of causes, the enforcement of public order, the prevention of interferences with their proceedings, and the enforcement of the due respect belonging to them as institutions of the country. Graham v. Williamson, 128 Tenn. 720, 164 S.W. 781, 782 (1914).
However, at common law, the power of courts to punish contempts was vast and undefined, and with such unlimited and undefined discretionary power came the potential for abuse. Accordingly, in 1831, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted legislation to curb the contempt power of state judges. See Act of Dec. 19, 1831, ch. 19, 1831 Tenn. Pub. Acts 34; see also State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tenn.2012). The contempt power of Tennessee courts remains circumscribed by statute.
The power of the several courts to issue attachments, and inflict punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any except the following cases:
(1) The willful misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) The willful misbehavior of any of the officers of such courts, in their official transactions;
(3) The willful disobedience or resistance of any officer of such courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts;
(4) Abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the process or proceedings of the court;
(5) Willfully conversing with jurors in relation to the merits of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise tampering with them; or
(6) Any other act or omission declared a contempt by law.
Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are incidental to the case out of which they arise. Doe v. Bd. of Prof l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 474 (Tenn.2003). Although contempt proceedings are traditionally classified as civil or criminal, in point of fact, contempt proceedings are neither wholly civil nor criminal in nature and may partake of the characteristics of both. Gompers v. Buck s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); Bowdon v. Bowdon, 198 Tenn. 143, 278 S.W.2d 670, 672 (1955). It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. Tennessee courts are vested with the authority to punish both types of contempt with either a fine, a period of confinement, or both.
Criminal contempt, by contrast, is designed to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity and authority of the law and the court as an organ of society. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520 (quoting Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn.1996)); Daugherty, 191 S.W. at 974. Sanctions for criminal contempt are generally both punitive and unconditional in nature, designed to punish past behavior, not to coerce directly compliance with a court order or influence future behavior. See Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520; Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398. Therefore, when a court imposes a definite term of confinement for conduct constituting criminal contempt, the contemnor cannot shorten the term by agreeing not to continue in the behavior that resulted in his confinement. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. Such imprisonment operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience. Id. at 442-43.6
Criminal contempt is often regarded as a crime because certain substantial rights and constitutional privileges afforded criminal defendants are also afforded criminal contemnors. For example, indirect criminal contempt may only be punished after the accused contemnor has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations at a hearing.7
Additionally, unlike criminal prosecutions, general contempt proceedings do not require an indictment and subsequent prosecution by the State.
Why Post-Conviction Relief Is Not Available To Criminal Contemnors
The language of
are not intended to punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. In punishing contempt, the Judiciary is sanctioning conduct that violates specific duties imposed by the court itself, arising directly from the parties participation in judicial proceedings.
Id. (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987)). Despite imprecise language in prior Tennessee appellate decisions, a person found in contempt pursuant to
In contrast, post-conviction relief, by its very nature, presupposes the existence of a conviction for a criminal offense. Black s Law Dictionary defines conviction as follows: The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; ... [t]he judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime. Black s Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed.2009). Thus, a conviction cannot be based on conduct that does not violate one of the general criminal laws of this State. Criminal offenses are defined by the General Assembly, State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn.1996), which has declared that [c]onduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute,
Post-conviction relief, by its very definition, is a remedy for seeking relief from convictions of criminal offenses. It is not available to challenge findings of general criminal contempt arising from civil cases. Rather, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provide the avenues for seeking relief from judgments in civil cases. See
Conclusion
The plain language of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides a mechanism for seeking relief from criminal convictions. A finding of criminal contempt pursuant to
CORNELIA A. CLARK
JUSTICE