Toth v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Mar 9, 2015
Civil Action No. 2014-0395
Versions:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 7, 2015 [## 4, 8]

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff William Toth, proceeding pro se, brings this action against defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Bank of America, N.A., (collectively, “Bank Defendants“), as well as several other defendants,1 challenging the foreclosure of his property located in Michigan. See Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. Before this Court are defendant Justine Smith‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint [Dkt. # 4] and Bank Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint [Dkt. # 8], for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper service of process, and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Def. Justin Smith (Pro Se)‘s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Pl.‘s Compl. [Dkt. # 4]; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Bank Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 8-1]. Because this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the motions will be GRANTED and the case DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Michigan resident whose complaint challenges the foreclosure of his property located at 7539 Elm Highway, Posen, Michigan 49776, as well as the eviction proceedings pending in a Michigan state court. See Compl. ¶¶ 19-21, at Ex. A (alleging “Wells Fargo Bank, NA participated and assisted Bank of America, NA in the foreclosure on my property and they are attempting to seize the subject property through an eviction“). Plaintiff‘s property was foreclosed by advertisement and sold at a Sheriff‘s sale on January 20, 2012. See id. Ex. G (Sheriff‘s Deed on Mortgage Sale (Jan. 20, 2012)); see also Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 600.3201 (Foreclosure of mortgage by advertisement). Thereafter, the state court ratified the foreclosure by issuing a possession judgment on July 2, 2013. See Consent Possession Judgment, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Toth, Case No. 13-6249-LT (89th District Court, Rogers City, Mich.).

Plaintiff filed his first federal complaint in this Court on July 31, 2013, which I dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on July 3, 2014. See Toth v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 13-01211(RJL), 2014 WL 2993575, at *1 (D.D.C. July 3, 2014). Prior to the dismissal of plaintiff‘s first suit, plaintiff filed his second suit—the present case—on March 12, 2014. In this case, plaintiff makes many of the very same allegations that I previously dismissed, i.e., that defendants’ handling of the mortgage note and their foreclosure of the property were improper for a variety of reasons, including that the defendants violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, violated a consent decree issued in United States v. Bank of America, No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), and violated his constitutional due process rights. See Compl. ¶¶ 44-81. Based on these allegations, plaintiff seeks monetary damages, a declaratory judgment nullifying the foreclosure, and equitable relief. See id. ¶¶ 94-111.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se complaints are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); United States v. Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C.Cir.2004), this Court must have jurisdiction in order to adjudicate a claim, and “the party claiming subject matter jurisdiction ... has the burden to demonstrate that it exists,” Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2008). On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the factual predicates of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Erby v. United States, 424 F.Supp.2d 180, 182 (D.D.C.2006) (citing, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “[T]he plaintiff‘s factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” United States ex rel. Digital Healthcare, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 778 F.Supp.2d 37, 43 (D.D.C.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, in deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, a court need not limit itself to the complaint; rather, it “may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction in the case.” Bank of America, N.A. v. FDIC, 908 F.Supp.2d 60, 76 (D.D.C.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

Just like plaintiff‘s previous complaint, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff‘s claims because he is, in effect, challenging a state court judgment. Under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party‘s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser‘s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)); see also Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C.Cir.2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.“). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently clarified further that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Indeed, our Circuit Court itself has noted that district courts lack authority to either (1) “review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings,” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, or (2) decide federal constitutional claims that are “so inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision that “the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision,” Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, of course, applies in the instant case, too, because plaintiff effectively seeks to collaterally attack the state court possession judgment ratifying the foreclosure and sale of the Michigan property (and permitting eviction proceedings). That plaintiff presents such a challenge is apparent from the complaint, which, although incomprehensible in many respects, seeks as relief an order “abat[ing] and revers[ing]” the foreclosure sale, declaring the Sheriff‘s Deed “null and void,” and affirming plaintiff‘s title to the property. See Compl. ¶¶ 103-04. Moreover, all of plaintiff‘s various claims are “inextricably intertwined” with this state court judgment and the foreclosure; they do not present any independent claim. See Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 698 F.Supp.2d 94, 99-100 (D.D.C.2010) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied where plaintiff‘s claim was “based entirely on the alleged impropriety of the foreclosure” because all of the alleged injuries stemmed from the foreclosure and plaintiff explicitly sought a judgment that would have effectively modified the state court‘s judgment of foreclosure). This case is therefore similar to numerous decisions in this district barring claims challenging the results of state court judicial foreclosure actions. See Fontaine v. Bank of America, N.A., 43 F.Supp.3d 1, 3-4, 2014 WL 1999532, at *2 (D.D.C.2014); Silva v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-273, 2014 WL 905447, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2014); Glaviano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13-2049, 2013 WL 6823122, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013); Hunter, 698 F.Supp.2d at 99-100; Tremel v. Bierman & Geesing LLC, 251 F.Supp.2d 40, 44-46 (D.D.C.2003). Consequently, this court clearly lacks jurisdiction to proceed further and this case must be DISMISSED.2

CONCLUSION

Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Bank Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A separate Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

RICHARD J. LEON

United States District Judge

records, the Court cannot order the amendment of the J & C even if it is contained in the USMS‘s filing system.5

Finally, plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to verify “the fact[]” that the execution of the J & C was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(c). Compl. at 2. To the extent that the Privacy Act applies, the exemption of the applicable filing systems from the accuracy provisions “suggests [that] the BOP [and the USMS] ‘ha[ve] no duty to act on [plaintiff‘s] challenge and verify his record until the agency uses the record in making a determination affecting his rights, benefits, entitlements or opportunities.‘” Elliott v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 521 F.Supp.2d 41, 55 (D.D.C.2007), quoting Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm‘n, 85 F.3d 655, 660 (D.C.Cir.1996). The only plausible determination at issue here is plaintiff‘s initial incarceration caused not by the named defendants but by the sentencing court‘s J & C. As plaintiff should know from the litigation history set forth in the complaint, any mishap with the execution of the J & C that might suggest that his custody is unconstitutional or in violation of federal law is the province of habeas. The fact that plaintiff has obtained no relief through that channel does not give rise to a claim through some other channel. See, e.g., Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 757-58 (6th Cir.1999) (“Simply because a sentencing court has already denied relief to the petitioner under § 2255 does not render his remedy under § 2255 inadequate or ineffective” to open the door for habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 705-06 (D.C.Cir.2008) (discussing the courts’ general inability to create new remedies simply because the available remedy Congress has enacted fails to provide complete relief or any relief at all).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

William Stephen Toth, Posen, MI, pro se.

Thomas R. Lynch, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Justine Smith, Royal Oak, MI, pro se.

Notes

1
Plaintiff‘s complaint also identifies the following entities and individuals as defendants: Justine Smith; District Court for the State of Michigan for Presque Isle County; Robert W. Paschke; Presque Isle County Sheriff‘s Office; Blue Mountain Homes, LLC; Blue Mountain Air, Inc.; Polymathic Properties, Inc.; and “Does 1 Through 15.”
2
To the extent plaintiff challenges eviction proceedings that are ongoing in Michigan state court—to which the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine does not apply, see Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284 (stating Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to only “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced“)—I abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); see also Tremel, 251 F.Supp.2d at 44 n. 6 (noting the court would abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger if the matter were still pending in the state court system).
5
Since plaintiff has stated no claim for relief under the Privacy Act, the Court need not address the defenses of whether this case is barred under the Act‘s two-year statute of limitations or is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; nor could the Court resolve those contested questions without a factually developed record. See Defs.’ Reply at 2 (asserting claim accrual date as January 25, 2012 and claim expiration date as January 25, 2014); but see Compl. at 1 (“Plaintiff has exhausted the applicable Adm. Remedies” via letters dated in January 2014); cf. Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C.Cir.1998) (statute of limitations defense may be raised in a Rule 12(b) motion and decided only “when the facts that give rise to the defense are clear from the face of the complaint“); see Chung, 333 F.3d at 274 (Privacy Act‘s two-year statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling).
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