STATE OF OHIO v. HENRY E. BLADE
Court of Appeals No. L-22-1091
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
March 3, 2023
2023-Ohio-658
Trial Court No. CRB-22-00731
Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} The defendant-appellant, Henry Blade, was convicted in the Toledo Municipal Court of domestic violence and resisting arrest and sentenced to serve 40 days in jail. On appeal, Blade argues that the judgments must be overturned because the evidence does not support his domestic violence conviction and because the state failed to produce exculpatory evidence. As set forth below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Blade and “A.B.,” the victim in this case, were in a relationship and share a young son together. In early December of 2021, A.B. asked Blade to move out of her Burton Avenue home in Toledo. According to A.B., Blade‘s behavior “drastically changed,” after he stopped taking his medication used to treat his mental health conditions. For example, Blade became “very aggressive towards men” by picking fights in public, and also became “infatuate[ed]” about getting his “felonies * * * expunged [s]o that he [could] get a weapon.” A.B. “could not take it anymore” and felt “very concerned” and “nervous for [her] children” when Blade was around.
{¶ 3} In early January of 2022, A.B. was granted a civil protection order (“CPO“) from the domestic relations court. According to A.B., the CPO ordered Blade not to “threaten” or “cause physical harm” to A.B., but it did not prohibit him from contacting her or speaking with her. And indeed, A.B. continued to allow Blade to visit their son in her home, even after the CPO went into effect. During one such visit, however, an “altercation” ensued after A.B. told Blade that it was time for him to go. In response, Blade “threw a kitchen glass and shattered it in the family room” and took A.B.‘s “Xbox” and “threw it in the kitchen sink and turned the water on.” A.B. filed a police report the next day.
{¶ 4} As a result of that incident, “when [Blade] called [A.B.] * * * a few evenings later,” on January 21, 2021, she did not answer her phone. Later though, when
[A]ll, [he said was], if you don‘t want me to come over and see your son, I promise you‘ll end up in jail and lose your job, or you‘ll end up dead. And then he used some cuss words, and I didn‘t even continue the conversation with him. I just immediately hung up. And at that point, I called the police. Because I didn‘t know at any point he could have showed up at my house.
{¶ 5} Officer Paige Benson, of the Toledo Police Department, and her partner were dispatched to A.B.‘s home that night. During the fifteen-minute visit, Officer Benson witnessed A.B.‘s cell phone “go off * * * continually * * * over and over and over again.” Each time it did, a man‘s picture appeared on A.B.‘s cell phone, whom A.B. identified to police as Blade. At trial, Officer Benson also identified Blade as the person who appeared on A.B.‘s phone that night.
{¶ 6} A criminal complaint was filed against Blade, charging him with domestic violence, in violation of
{¶ 9} A bench trial, as to both cases, was held on March 2, 2022. A.B. and Officers Benson and O‘Connell, whose testimony is described above, testified on behalf of the state. After the state rested its case, the defense moved for an acquittal, which the court denied. Blade then testified in his own defense.
{¶ 10} Blade described himself as “homeless” and living out of his car. When A.B. forced Blade to move out in December, he began “camping out” in his car, which he parked “across the street from [A.B.‘s] residence * * * on Burton Avenue.”
{¶ 11} With regard to the charges related to his harassing and threatening phone calls, Blade testified that he did not remember having any interaction with A.B. that day, i.e. January 21, 2022. When asked a second time, Blade testified, “[y]ou know, I [will be] honest because I took a[n] oath. I don‘t remember that at all. But I do know that [A.B.] has an app [called] Spoof,” which allows the user to “make a number appear on
{¶ 12} As for the resisting arrest charge, Blade adamantly denied that he was asleep when the officers arrived to serve him with a warrant. Blade testified that he saw the patrol cars enter the library parking lot and then stop, temporarily, at the opposite end of the parking lot, from Blade. Blade thought that the officers were likely “waiting for [him] to run * * * because [he] knew [he] had warrants already.” So, when the police drove closer to him, Blade said that he “was like, oh man. At that time, * * * [he] opened the door half way * * * [a]nd * * * proceeded to step out.” Before he was “all the way out,” of his vehicle, “between * * * the door and [his] seat,” he heard a voice say, “‘[p]ut your hands up.‘” Blade did as he was instructed, and said, “[d]on‘t shoot.” Blade described what happened next: After that, a male police officer “came to my door, opened the rest of [the] door, * * * dragged me out of my car by my locks, whiplashed my back, my side, my ankle twisted, and threw me on the ground.” Blade insisted that neither of the other officers, both female, assisted in making the arrest, because he “never * * * resist[ed].” He described himself as fully “compliant.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I: Body camera footage of Blade‘s arrest was material to his defense as it would have been independent evidence of what actually occurred and the failure of the City to turn that footage over was a prejudicial violation of Brady v. Maryland that requires this Court to reverse Blade‘s conviction.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II: The weight of the evidence did not support a conviction for domestic violence.
III. Analysis
A. There is no evidence to support Blade‘s claim that the state committed a Brady violation.
{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Blade claims that the state violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.E.2d 215 (1963) by failing to “disclose the body camera footage of [his] arrest.” Blade argues that such footage would have
{¶ 15} “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87; See also, State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus (following Brady).
{¶ 16} To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the prosecution withheld evidence, (2) the defense was not aware of the evidence, and (3) the withheld evidence was material and exculpatory. State v. Hawk, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-265, 2021-Ohio-4533, ¶ 20. See also State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 19, quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.“).
{¶ 17} “When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility” falls within the Brady rule. (Internal quotation omitted.) State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180091, 2019-Ohio-4862, ¶ 59, quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).
{¶ 18} Here, the trial court record contains only one reference to the officers’ use of body cameras from the time of his arrest. That is, during cross examination, Officer O‘Connell confirmed that she was wearing a “body cam” at that time and that it was “active.” Defense counsel did not inquire further or request to see any footage from that night that might exist.
{¶ 19} Blade‘s Brady claim therefore fails for several reasons. First, Blade did not make any demand for discovery from the state, including any request for body camera footage, which he would have been entitled to had he requested it.
{¶ 20} Moreover, since Brady, the United States Supreme Court has “clarified” that the Brady rule only applies in situations involving the discovery of exculpatory information “after” trial. (Emphasis in the original.) Jones at ¶ 59 citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).
{¶ 21} In this case, because Blade learned of the possibility that exculpatory evidence could exist during the trial, there was no Brady violation. Accord State v. Beaver, 5th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0037, 2012-Ohio-871, ¶ 45 (“Because the photo was presented during trial, there could be no Brady violation in this case. Appellant‘s suggestion that the rule in Brady requires a mistrial is therefore misplaced.“); Jones at ¶ 61 (“[E]ven if promises were made [to witnesses who testified at trial] and not disclosed prior to trial, the rule in Giglio does not apply because the promises allegedly made were discovered during trial and [the defendant] had the ability to recall [them] and get the impeachment material into evidence.“); State v. Steele, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2011-CA-110, 2012-Ohio-3777, ¶ 68 (“As in Wickline, Steele was given access to the complete report during trial, and, therefore, a Brady violation did not occur. While it is unclear
{¶ 22} As explained by the court in Aldridge, the rationale for limiting Brady claims to those situations where the exculpatory evidence is not discovered until after the trial is that a defendant is not prejudiced where the exculpatory material is discovered before or during trial because there are other remedies available which allow the exculpatory material to be entered into evidence. Indeed, where the existence of previously undisclosed evidence becomes known at trial, a defendant may make a demand for the evidence, and “the court may ensure a fair trial by ordering inspection or discovery, granting a continuance or holding an in camera hearing.” State v. Goodwin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99CA220, 2001 WL 1740065, *14, citing State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 372 (2000); See also
{¶ 23} Finally, we note that, even though Officer O‘Connell‘s body camera may have been “active” at the time of Blade‘s arrest, there is no evidence that any footage from her body camera actually exists. Indeed, in his brief, Blade merely speculates that “body worn cameras are common for all officers now-a-days.” “Implicit within the first element of a Brady claim is that the evidence allegedly withheld must have actually existed.” State v. Black, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-180, 2022-Ohio-3119 ¶ 19-22, fn. 2, appeal not allowed, 168 Ohio St. 3d 1474, 2022-Ohio-4380, 199 N.E.3d 550 (“A defendant may allege a Brady violation based upon the loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence; however, in those cases the evidence must have actually existed at some point.“). Here, Blade cannot establish a Brady violation based solely on his unsupported assertion that exculpatory body camera footage could have existed without some evidence to suggest that such footage actually did exist. Accord Black at ¶ 21.
{¶ 24} For all of these reasons, Blade‘s argument that he was denied due process due to nondisclosure of body camera evidence by the state is without merit. Accordingly, we overrule Blade‘s first assignment of error.
B. Blade‘s conviction for domestic violence is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 25} In his second assignment of error, Blade argues that his conviction for domestic violence was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 27} Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight standard, we must, nonetheless, extend special deference to the trial court‘s credibility determinations, given that it is the trial court that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify, observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice inflections, and discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v. Fell, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1162, 2012-Ohio-616, ¶ 14. The trial court, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of a witness‘s testimony. State v. Caudill, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-009, 2008-Ohio-1557, ¶ 62, citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964).
{¶ 28} Here, Blade argues that his conviction for domestic violence is against the manifest weight of the evidence because (1) “A.B. admitted that she did not feel she was in imminent danger but instead she testified that he ‘could’ harm her,” and (2) Blade had no access to a firearm and “has no prior convictions for weapons charges so it is also unreasonable to believe that Blade would harm her with a weapon.”
{¶ 29} Blade was convicted of violating
{¶ 30} Additionally, “[t]he victim‘s state of mind is an essential element of domestic violence under
{¶ 31} Here, Blade argues that A.B. merely testified that she was afraid of what Blade “could” do to her—and, he argues, the trial court therefore lost its way by concluding this testimony, alone, indicated a fear of imminent physical harm. Blade does not accurately describe the record in this case.
{¶ 32} Blade told A.B., over the phone, that “if you don‘t want me to come over and see your son, I promise you‘ll end up in jail and lose your job, or you‘ll end up dead.” (Emphasis added.) At trial, A.B. testified that she understood Blade to mean that “he would kill [her].” Regarding the imminence of the threat and A.B.‘s state of mind, the following exchange took place between her and the state:
Q. [D]id you feel that that was an imminent physical threat to you?
A. Not at that immediate moment. Since he wasn‘t physically present.
Q. Okay.
A. But I wasn‘t sure of his location. So he could have well been down the street or outside my house. But I did take that as a threat. That‘s why I called the police immediately. * * *
Q. Okay. And were you in fear of your safety at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you in fear that he could cause you physical harm?
A. Yes, ma‘am.
{¶ 33} Importantly, the state did not have to prove that Blade was inside of her apartment or in a position to harm her in that moment because, again, “imminent” is not limited to the situation where the offender is able to “carry out the threat immediately or be in the process of carrying it out.” Tackett at ¶ 14. Moreover, as shown above, the state did show that Blade posed an imminent threat and that A.B. perceived it as such. That is, A.B. said that she feared for her safety at the time of the threat because, for all she knew, Blade could have been right “outside [her] house.” Certainly, the proximity of Blade, perceived or real, constitutes a threat that is “impending” or “menacingly near,” such that it may be said to be “imminent.” Moreover, the fact that A.B. contacted the police immediately “may serve as evidence” that A.B. believed that physical harm was imminent. Tackett at ¶ 15.
{¶ 34} In addition, we note that the police officer who was dispatched to A.B.‘s home said that A.B. appeared to be “truly afraid * * * [that Blade‘s threats] could be viable.” The officer observed the “shakiness [of A.B.‘s] voice,” her “nonstop hand gestures,” and peering “past [the officers] toward the door, as if maybe [Blade] would be
{¶ 35} Finally, Blade argues that even if A.B. feared imminent physical harm, her fear was unreasonable because Blade did not have access to a firearm and did not have any prior convictions for weapons charges. See Stevens at ¶ 19 (the “critical inquiry” is “whether a reasonable person would be placed in fear of * * * unconditional, non-contingent * * * physical harm * * *.“) (Emphasis added). We disagree.
{¶ 36} A.B. testified that, in the weeks preceding Blade‘s threatening phone calls, his behavior “drastically changed” from the “person [A.B.] knew” to someone who was “increasingly more aggressive.” Blade expressed “bizarre” and “violent” fantasies that resulted in A.B. fearing for her children. A.B. also sought legal protection, first from the domestic relations court which granted her a CPO, and then from the police, after Blade threatened her with “broken glass.” The events giving rise to the domestic violence charge occurred two days after the broken glass incident. A.B. testified that she took Blade‘s threat seriously, especially, given that Blade was living in his car, across the street from her home. By contrast, when Blade testified, he contradicted himself repeatedly, testifying that he had no memory of threatening A.B., then suggested that she framed him, and then changed his story yet again by claiming he did not, and would never, threaten her. Accordingly, we find that there is competent and credible evidence
{¶ 37} In sum, after carefully reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the testimony, we are not convinced that this is an exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. We find, therefore, that Blade‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For all of the above reasons, we find that Blade‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, the March 2, 2022 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court in case No. CRB-22-0731, and the June 1, 2022 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court in case No. CRB-22-0644, are affirmed. Blade is ordered to pay the cost of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgments affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
JUDGE
CONCUR.