Toledo-Mendez v. Rodriguez-VegaToledo-Mendez v. Rodriguez-Vega
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendants Anaís Rodríguez-Vega (“Rodríguez-Vega”) and Damaris Miranda-Maisonave (“Miranda-Maisonave”), (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss or Transfer to Title III Court (the “Motion”). For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On August 3, 2020, the Government of Puerto Rico enacted Act 80-2020 (“Act 80”), providing early retirement fоr qualifying non-essential public employees with 50% of their salary, rather than 38% and waiting until age 65. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 6). Plaintiffs, a group of seventy-six employees of the Natural Resources Ranger Corps (the “Ranger Corps”) under the Department of Natural and
On December 20, 2021, The Financial Oversight Management Board (“FOMB”) filed an adversary proceeding (Adv. Proc. 21-119) against the Government of Puerto Rico within the Title III process of thе Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Case No. 17-3283, to stop the implementation of Act 80. Id. ¶ 7. The Parties to Adv. Proc. 21-119 reached a stipulation, which was approved by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on December 28, 2021 (the “December 2021 Stipulation”), whereby they agreed to “endeavor to reach an agreement on a means of implementing the incentivized early retirement provisions set forth in Act 80 for certain employees where doing so would create savings above and beyond the level of savings required in the currently certified fiscal plan.” Id. ¶ 8. Moreover, per its terms, the Court’s approval of the December 2021 Stipulation would thereby otherwise “invalidate” Act 80 pursuant to PROMESA. Id.
On October 6, 2023, Plaintiffs received a letter from the Secretary of the DRNA, co-defendant Rodriguez Vega, stating that the FOMB had determined that their position was essential and that they could not retire pursuant to Act 80. Id. ¶ 11. Following Plaintiffs’ request for additional information, the FOMB sent them a letter in February of 2024 explaining that the Government of Puerto Rico determined which positions were non-essential and thus could be eliminated permanently to ensure both savings and that essential services are provided. Id.
On March 22, 2024, the FOMB and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a Final Stipulation in the Adv. Proc. 21-119 providing the positions that were eliminated in each agency (the “Final
On October 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Rоdríguez-Vega and Miranda-Maisonave, the head of human resources department of the DRNA, alleging both procedural and substantive due-process violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to
Defendants filed a Motion seeking to dismiss the case or transfer it to the Title III Court on March 12, 2025. (Docket No. 16). Defendants argue that neither Act 80, nor the stipulations in Adv. Proc. 21-119, provided Plaintiffs with a protected property interest, and thus they cannot claim that they were deprived of an acquired right without due process, be it substantive or procedural. Id. at 11-16. Defendants further maintain that they
Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on March 27, 2025. Therein, they maintain that Act 80, the stipulations in Adv. Proc. 21-119, and the June 2022 letter gave them a property right to early retirement that was not changed by an act of the legislature but by Defendants’ determination that Plaintiffs’ positions were essential. (Docket No. 18 ¶ 14).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he sole inquiry . . . is whether, construing the well-pleaded facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the complaint states a claim for which relief cаn be granted.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011). The Court must first “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements.” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Then, the Court takes “the complaint’s well-pled (i.e.,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
Plaintiffs assert claims under
Therefore, “Section 1983 is a vehicle through which individuals may sue certain persons for depriving them of federally assured rights under color of state law.” Alston v. Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 574 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the complained-of
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs challenge the actions attributed to functionaries of the DRNA, an agency of the Puerto Rico Government. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 4-5). In their Motion, Defendants do not contest that they were acting under the color of state law but rather аrgue that (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they were deprived of an acquired right and (2) that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.2 (Docket No. 16 at 11-16; 18-20). Thus, the Court must first address whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their federal constitutional rights have been violated.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claims
In its relevant part, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due рrocess of law.”
Considering the above, the threshold inquiry is whether Plaintiffs have established a property interest to early retirement benefits. Property interests “are not created by the Constitution[,] [r]ather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent sоurce such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Supreme Court has made clear that:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. [They] must have more than a unilаteral expectation of it. [They] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.
“A statute will be found to have created contractual obligations ‘when the language and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State.’” Maine Ass‘n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n. 14 (1977)). “Although the underlying property interest may be a creation of state law, whether that interest is tangible enough to merit the status of an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause is a question of federal constitutional law.” Jackson v. Russo, 495 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D. Mass. 2007) (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)). To evince that a “statutorily created benefit is a property interest, a person must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Perez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).
Puerto Rico courts have previously held that retirement plans can give rise to property interests. See Perez Rivera v. Alemañy, No. 3:24-CV-01273-LTS, 2025 WL 2466476, at *9 (D.P.R. Aug. 27, 2025); Bayron Toro v. Serra, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 646, 649 (P.R. 1987) (noting that “a beneficiary of a retirement plan hаs a property interest of a contractual nature protected by the constitutional guarantee against impairment of contractual obligations[.]”). “Notwithstanding this general recognition, they have also held that the government “may amend the terms and conditions of the retirement, if suсh amendments are reasonable and seek to further the actuarial solvency of the system.” Id. (quoting Bayron Toro, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 660).
Plaintiffs claim that Act 80, coupled with the December 2021 Stipulation, the September 2023 Stipulation, and the July 2022 Letter, created a property right to early retirement. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 16, 22). This District evaluatеd, and rejected, nearly identical claims raised by similarly situated Puerto Rico Government employees in Perez Rivera v. Alemañy. 2025 WL 2466476, at *9-10. The Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in Alemañy and adopts it here.
First, as to Act 80, “the statute itself was not self-executing and Act 80 was invalidated prior to its partial implementation.” Id. at 9. Pursuant to the December 2021 Stipulation, Act 80 was invalidated save for the fact that the FOMB and Government agreed to endeavor to reach an agreement as to who to implement Act 80 for certain employees. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 8). “Under such circumstances, Act 80 could not have created any
Similarly, the Court finds that collectively, the Decembеr 2021 Stipulation, the September 2023 Stipulation, and the July 2022 Letter “did not confer on Plaintiffs a property interest in early retirement benefits, because none of those documents constituted a final agreement between the parties.” Id. at *10; “[I]ndeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory. Nor can someone be safely deemed ‘entitled’ to something when the identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 763 (2005) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, per Supreme Court precedent “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.” Id. at 756. As the Plaintiffs aсknowledge, it was the Final Stipulation filed on March 22, 2024 in Adv. Proc. 21-119 that ultimately determined what positions would be eliminated and, consequently, which employees would be eligible for early retirement. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 13). Plaintiffs’ positions were not included in this Final Stipulation and thus Plaintiffs were never entitled to eаrly retirement. Because the
D. Puerto Rico General Tort Statute Claim
First Circuit case law is clear “that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims when the anchor federal claims for those state law claims are dismissed.” Borrás-Borrero v. Corporación del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 958 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 2020). Where, as here, the federal claims are properly dismissed, a District Court is well within its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pending state-law claims. See e.g., Massó-Torrellas v. Municipality of Toa Alta, 845 F.3d 461, 469-70 (1st Cir. 2017); see also, Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Ins. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 748 F.3d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that where all federal-lаw claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will weight towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims).
Since Plaintiffs’ federal claims are being dismissed at the pleadings stage, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
IV. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 16. Plaintiffs’ due process claims under
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 10th day of August 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge