PAUL TIMOTHY аnd JANICE TIMOTHY, Petitioners, v. PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD & MOSS, LLC, and BRENNAN MOSS, Respondents.
No. 20180228
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
December 16, 2019
2019 UT 70
Heard December
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter
Attorneys:
Nelson Abbott, Provo, for petitioners
J. Ryan Mitchell, John P. Mertens, William O. Kimball, Salt Lake City, for respondents
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 We granted certiorari in this case to address whether a law firm that deposited funds from a client into its trust account is a “transferee” under the former Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).1 However, while this case was before the court of appeals, Petitioners allowed the judgment that formed the basis of their fraudulent-transfer claim to expire. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness with this court. They argue that Petitioners have no remedy under the UFTA because they are no longer creditors, so even if Petitioners were to prevail on the transferee issue, it would not affect their rights.
¶2 We agree and dismiss the petition as moot. We further vacate the judgment of the court of appeals because Petitioners’ fraudulent-transfer claim became moot before that court‘s opinion was issued. The judgment of the district court stands.
¶3 Paul and Janice Timothy prevailed in a lawsuit against Thomas and Teri Keetch for, among other things, fraud and breach of contract. The Timothys obtained a judgment against the Keetches on May 6, 2009.3 But they were never able to collect it.
¶4 The record indicates that the Keetches took measures to avoid paying this debt, including depositing their money into an account held in a minor son‘s name.4 Despite this, the Keetches testified at a supplemental hearing in March 2011 that they had no assets. And Brennan Moss, an attorney with the law firm of Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss (PADRM), wrote letters stating that the Keetches did not have significant assets.
¶5 Although the Keetches claimed to have no assets, less than a week after the supplemental hearing, PADRM deposited into its trust account (IOLTA)5 a check for $50,000 drawn from the minor‘s bank account. The check had been written over a month earlier, and its memo line read: “Terry Keetch.” With representation from Moss, the Keetches later used $20,000 from those funds to make a down payment on a house.
¶6 The Timothys tried to access the proceeds in the IOLTA by obtaining a writ of garnishment against PADRM that required the firm to hold all funds owned by the Keetches.6 But PADRM twice refused to accept service of the writ. And by the time it did accept service, thе Keetches had moved all of their money out of the IOLTA.
¶7 Finally, in August 2012, the Timothys sued both Moss and PADRM, alleging various theories of fraudulent transfer under the UFTA, civil conspiracy, and wrongful conduct.
¶8 Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the district court, arguing that they were not “transferees” under the UFTA and were thus immune from liability on the fraudulent-transfer claims. The district court agreed and granted Respondents’ motion, holding:
Because the relevant provisions of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act were modeled on federal Bankruptcy law, the court is persuaded that “transferee” as used in the Act is most logically defined in the manner it has been defined in the Bankruptcy context. That is, a “transferee” must exercise dominion or control over the transferred asset. Here, [defendants] did not—and could not—exercise dominion and control over funds held in the firm‘s trust account. . . . Accordingly, [defendants were] not “transferee[s]” within the meaning of the Act and the [Timothys‘] fraudulent conveyance claims fail as a matter of law. Those claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
The Timothys timely appealed that ruling.
¶9 On August 24, 2017, while the case was pending before the court of appeals, the Timothys filed in the district court an application to renew their judgment against the Keetches. In its ruling, the district court noted that judgments are valid for a period of eight years pursuant to
¶10 However, neither party informed the court of appeals that the judgment had expired. And the court of appeals issued its ruling on February 23, 2018, affirming the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on the basis that PADRM “had no legal right to put the funds to its own use” and therefore “lacked the requisite dominion” to be considered a transferee under the UFTA. See Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss LLC, 2018 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 424 P.3d 937 (citation omitted).
¶11 The Timothys then petitioned for certiorari. We granted the petition on the issue of whether the court of appeals erred when it used the dominion-and-control test to determine whether PADRM was a “transferee” under the UFTA. Respondents then filed a suggestion of mootness, arguing that we should not reach the merits of the petition because the Timothys’ fraudulent-transfer claims became moot when their judgment expired. We exercise jurisdiction under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court.” Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm‘n, 2006 UT 58, ¶ 8, 147 P.3d 1189 (citation omitted). And where “the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness, affording no deference to the court of appeals’ legal conclusions.” Id.
ANALYSIS
¶13 The merits of this case call for us to review the court of appeals’ interpretation of the UFTA
I. MOOTNESS
¶14 The Timothys’ judgment against the Keetches was entered on May 6, 2009, and it expired as a matter of law eight years later on May 7, 2017. See
¶16 Although the Timothys concede that their judgment against the Keetches is void, they argue that their fraudulent-transfer claim against Respondents is not moot for a number of reasons. First, they assert that under Porenta v. Porenta, the UFTA requires a debtor-creditor relationship only at the time the action is filed—not throughout the entirety of the case—as evidenced by “the fact that the act uses present tense when defining the term ‘claim.‘” (Citing 2017 UT 78, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 487.) But the Timothys misread the holding of Porenta.
¶17 In Porenta, after a married couple filed for divorce, the husband transferred his interest in the couple‘s marital home to his mother to prevent that property from being distributed as part of the marital estate. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. While the divorce case was pending, the husband died, causing the divorce court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 5. Soon after, however, the wife sued the husband‘s mother under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 6. Following trial, the district court ruled that the husband‘s transfer of the marital home to his mother was fraudulent under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 8.
¶18 On appeal, the mother argued that a debtor-creditor relationship must exist at the time a UFTA claim is filed, and that any such relationship had been extinguished in that case because the husband died before the wife had filed her claim. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Relying on the use of present-tense language in the statute, see id. ¶ 12, we agreed with the mother that the UFTA does indeed “require[] an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship when a claim under the [UFTA] is filed.” Id. ¶ 1. But we ultimately determined that the wife‘s claim survived the husband‘s death because she had maintained a debtor-creditor relationship with his estate at the time of filing. Id. ¶¶ 36, 55. Specifically, the wife‘s claim for the entire marital estate, “including the right to preserve the joint tenancy,” extended to the husband‘s estate upon his death. Id. ¶ 36. So while Porenta does state that a debtor-creditor relationship must exist at the time of filing a UFTA claim, it does not follow that it is immaterial whether the debt is invalidated or satisfied during the pendenсy of the case.
¶19 Second, the Timothys point out that mootness is not concerned with whether all elements of a claim persist throughout the litigation, but instead, whether a court‘s decision can affect the rights of the parties. As the Timothys ask for money damages against Respondents, they argue that granting this remedy will certainly affect their rights.
¶20 The Timothys are generally correct that a claim does not become moot merely because the facts that satisfy the elements of the claim change during the litigation.9 So long as the requested judicial
¶21 The Timothys give the example of a statutory rape prosecution, which does not beсome moot if the victim turns eighteen while the case is pending. And while that is certainly true, it is not analogous to the situation presented.
¶22 Here, we must interpret the requirements of the UFTA and the remedies the statute provides to determine whether the Timothys’ claim is moot. When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is “to ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (citation omitted). “[T]he best evidence of the legislature‘s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “we look first to the plain language of the statute,” id. (citation omitted), while reading “the statute as a whole,” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 11, 217 P.3d 265.
¶23 A plaintiff in a UFTA action seeks to collect a debt from a transferee rather than the original debtor. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, a plaintiff must be a creditor with a claim against the debtor to obtain any remedy against the transferee. See
¶24 In defining what constitutes a fraudulent transfer, the UFTA makes clear that a transfer by an insolvent debtor is fraudulent only as to a creditor of that debtor. See id.
¶25 Further,
¶26 Once the district court denied the Timothys’ motion to renew judgment, the Timothys concede they no longer had a viаble judgment or a right to payment from the Keetches.10 Because they are not creditors with a claim, the Timothys can no longer obtain a remedy under the UFTA. Their fraudulent-transfer claim against Respondents is therefore moot.11
¶27 The premise of the Timothys’ argument to the contrary is that after an alleged fraudulent transfer, the transferee assumes independent liability for damages to the plaintiff even if the judgment expires. For this, the Timothys point to subsection
¶28 But this language does not make a transferee liable for money damages even where an underlying debt has become void. The same section clarifies that “to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under
¶29 We also note that the Timothys’ UFTA claim became moot before the court of appeals issued its opinion on February 23, 2018. The Timothys concede their judgment became invalid when it expired. By operation of
¶30 However, Respondents, who prevailed in the court of appeals, ask us to dismiss the petition but not vacate the court of appeals’ opinion. But when a case becomes moot before finаl adjudication, the proper result is vacatur and dismissal of the judgment. See Teamsters Local 222 v. Utah Transit Auth., 2018 UT 33, ¶ 22, 424 P.3d 892.
¶31 To be clear, this was not the court of appeals’ error, but a failure of Respondents to file a suggestion of mootness with the court of appeals after the judgment had expired. However, the result is the same: we must vacate the court of appeals’ opinion because the case became moot before the opinion issued.
II. THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION
¶32 Finally, the Timothys argue that even if their case is moot, we should reach the merits of the petition because an exception to mootness applies here. We have recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine when the case: (1) “affect[s] the public interest,” (2) “[is] likely to recur,” and (3) “because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, [is] likely to evade review.” State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 7, 357 P.3d 547. These elements form a conjunctive test, so one arguing for this exception to the mootness doctrine must establish the existence of each element.
¶33 The Timothys argue that the transferee issue affects the public interest and that it may recur. Assuming this is correct, however, the Timothys have not shown that the transferee issue is one of inherently short duration that is likely to еvade review. “The types of issues likely to evade review are those that are inherently short in duration so that by the time the issue is appealed, a court is no longer in a position to provide a remedy.” Guardian ad Litem v. State ex rel. C.D., 2010 UT 66, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d 724; see also Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 27, 16 P.3d 1233 (holding that violation of the election code is likely to evade review because the election would always be over before the violation could be litigated).
¶34 But the issue of how “transferee” should be defined under the UFTA is not one of inherently short duration. There was ample time for the district court to rule on this issue. And if the Timothys had timely renewed their judgment against the Keetches, we could have reached the merits of this question and the court of appeals’ opinion would not need to be vacated.
¶35 Accordingly, we conclude that the exceptiоn to the mootness doctrine does not apply in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶36 The Timothys’ UFTA claim against Respondents is moot. Because the court of appeals issued its decision after the claim became moot, we must vacate that opinion. The judgment of the district court remains in place.