Thomas Schwintz v. StateThomas Schwintz v. State
OPINION
Thomas Schwintz appeals his felony conviction for driving while intoxicated. In two issues, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained through a traffic stop for an equipment violation, which he contends was not based on reasonable suspicion as Texas law requires only two stop lamps. We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
An officer stopped Schwintz after observing that the 1994 GMC Sierra Schwintz was driving had two working rear stop lamps but lacked an operable high-mounted stop lamp. The traffic stop resulted in an arrest for the offense at issue in this appeal. The historical facts are not in dispute and statutory construction is a question of law; accordingly, we review de novo the trial court‘s ruling on Schwintz‘s motion to suppress. Mahaffey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2012).
“The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to implement the will of the Legislature.” Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). “In construing statutory language, we always begin with the literal text, reading it in context and construing it according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Id. “We assume that every word was meant to serve a discrete purpose that should be given effect.” Id. We must adhere to the plain language of a statute that is clear on its face unless implementation would lead to absurd consequences the Legislature could not possibly have intended. Id.
The parties argue for different constructions of the sections of the Texas Transportation Code that require the Department of Public Safety to adopt rules that establish the number of stop lamps required on vehicles less than 80 inches wide. See
Schwintz argues section 547.101(d) means that the Department of Public Safety cannot adopt a standard for stop lamps that differs from the two rear-mounted stop lamps required by section 547.323. He argues this construction of the statute is supported by the motor vehicle inspec
Schwintz argues because section 547.101(d) prohibits the adoption of a “vehicle equipment standard inconsistent with a standard provided by this chapter[ ]” the Department of Public Safety could not require a third, high-mounted stop lamp. See
It is a violation of the law to operate a motor vehicle that “is not equipped in a manner that complies with the vehicle equipment standards and requirements established by” Chapter 547 of the Transportation Code.
The traffic stop is justified because the officer observed Schwintz operating a vehicle in violation of the Transportation Code. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schwintz‘s motion to suppress. We overrule issues one and two and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
AFFIRMED.