TURNER v. COUNTY OF SISKIYOU ET AL.
No. 82-6758
Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist.
November 21, 1983
464 U.S. 928
No. 82-6765. UNTERTHINER v. DESERT HOSPITAL DISTRICT OF PALM SPRINGS. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until November 21, 1983, within which to pay the docketing fee required by
No. 82-6778. BROWN v. HERALD CO., INC., DBA GLOBE DEMOCRAT PUBLISHING CO. C. A. 8th Cir.;
No. 82-6907. ALEXANDER v. TEXAS ET AL. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
No. 82-6956. CROSS v. SECRETARY OF STATE. Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist.;
No. 83-5040. ENO ET AL. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ET AL. C. A. 1st Cir.;
No. 83-5100. LINFIELD v. BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. C. A. 2d Cir.; and
No. 83-5349. MILLER v. PIERCE, SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL. C. A. 9th Cir. Motions of petitioners and appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners and appellant are allowed until November 21, 1983, within whiсh to pay the docketing fee required by
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
In each of these cases, the Court has denied petitioner‘s or appellant‘s motion to proceed in forma pauperis without initially addressing the issue whether the questions presented in the petition for certiorari or jurisdictional statement merit our plenary review—and the Court is apparently announcing today that this will
Ordinarily, a $200 filing feе must be paid before a petition for certiorari or a jurisdictional statement, properly conforming to the requirements of this Court‘s
Each year, roughly 1,000 motions suppоrted by affidavit are made for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.3 These motions usually accompany a petition for a writ of certiorari or a jurisdiсtional statement, and our practice heretofore has almost always been not to pass on the in forma pauperis motion but to proceed directly to grant or deny the petition based on the merits of the questions presented in the petition or statement. Yet in the instant cases, each of which presents quеstions so lacking in merit as to have virtually no chance of receiving a plenary hearing, the Court has chosen instead to focus initially on the affidavits suрporting the in forma pauperis motions and to deny the motions.
I cannot concur in this treatment. Not only does the Court fail to provide the parties with any guidance as to how their affidavits may be considered in the future, it also prescribes no standards by which litigants and those screening the motions may determine when an individual is sufficiently poor to warrant a grant of in forma pauperis status. The only statement the Court has ever made on this subject is that an affiant must show he is unable to “‘pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide’ himself and dependents ‘with the necessities of life.‘” Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U. S. 331, 339 (1948). This is hardly a meaningful standard; it indeed suggests that a wide array of factors must be considered before ruling on a motion.4
But, even with an articulated set of standards against which to make decisions, under today‘s procedure we lose, not gain. Certainly that should be clear to those of us who perceive that we engage in a nеver-ending struggle to find time needed for important work. The likely result of disposing of cases as the Court does today will be to encourage parties bringing these motions to resubmit their petitions or appeals with a new affidavit they hope will strike a more sympathetic chord—thus increasing the time we must spend to disрose of frivolous cases. Where it is clear that the merits involved are almost certainly insufficient to demand full review (as has been our experience in all but a handful of in forma pauperis cases each year) no purpose is served by indulging in that waste. It is important that we try to avoid the waste of the parties’ time, but pеrhaps even more important that this Court‘s
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Although I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that we should simply deny unmeritorious certiorari petitions without scrutinizing the petitioner‘s right to proceed in forma pauperis, I would not grant any suсh petition without making sure that the petitioner is unable to pay the required costs. If such examination disclosed the kind of disrespect for our rules that has mоtivated the Court‘s unusual action in these cases, I would deny the petition even if it would otherwise have merited review. That would remove any incentive a petitioner might otherwise have to seek in forma pauperis status although ineligible for such status, without requiring the Court to assume the burden of examining every motion for leave to prоceed in forma pauperis. In borderline cases the petitioner should, of course, be given an opportunity to pay the required costs before final action is tаken on his application. I see no purpose, however, in insisting that these petitioners—none of whom is represented by counsel who could advise them that their petitions stand no chance of being granted—pay a fee for the privilege of having their petitions denied.