The WILLIARD LAW FIRM, L.P., Appellant v. John SEWELL, Appellee
NO. 14-14-00621-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
March 26, 2015
Mohammed continued his business on the property after the lease term expired in December 2005. Rankin continued to accept rent. Because Rankin consented to the holdover, Mohammed became a month-to-month tenant under the lease agreement. As such, he was a tenant at will until Rankin notified him to vacate the premises. See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 915-16. Based on the evidence presented, the county court properly found that Mohammed did not exercise either lease option.
Conclusion
We hold that the justice and county courts had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this forcible detainer action. We further hold that Rankin timely appealed from the justice court‘s judgment to the county court at law. We find no error in the county court‘s finding that Mohammed did not exercise an option to extend his lease, or in its conclusion that Mohammed was required to vacate the leased premises. We therefore affirm the judgment of the county court.
David Tang, Houston, TX, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.
OPINION
Martha Hill Jamison, Justice
The Williard Law Firm, L.P. (Williard) appeals from the trial cоurt‘s grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) favoring John Sewell. Sewell, a former client of Williard, sued for breach of fiduciary duty among other causes of action. In response, Williard alleged among other defenses that Sewell‘s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Sewell, in turn, pleaded the discovery rule. The jury found that Williard breached fiduciary duties it owed to Sewell but also found a date by which Sewell should have discovered the breach. Application of the date found by the jury would mean that Sewell did not timely file his lawsuit. Upon Sewell‘s motion for JNOV, the trial court disregarded the jury‘s discovery date finding and rendered judgment for Sewell based on breach of fiduciary duty. We reverse аnd render a take-nothing judgment favoring Williard.
Background
In February 2007, Sewell and Williard entered into an attorney-client agreement for Williard to represent Sewell in a matter against Panola Building Co., L.L.C., involving the alleged wrongful foreclosure of Sewell‘s property on Surratt Drive in Houston (the Surratt Property). This agreement contained the following two paragraphs аddressing the contingency fee to be paid to Williard in the event of a recovery in the lawsuit:
2. In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered to Client by Attorney, Client does hereby assign, grant and convey to Attorney the following present undivided interests in all his claims and causes of action against Panola for and as a reasonable contingent fee for Attorney‘s fees, and said contingent Attorney‘s fee will be one-half (1/2) of any net property settlement or recovery made (after deducting all third-party fees paid by attorney).
3 In the event Attorney is successful in having the title of the subject property transferred into Client‘s name, Client agrees to hold title along with Attorney аs tenants in common with tenant rights of survivorship as payment of the fee set forth in Section no. 2.
Sewell signed the agreement, and Stephen M. Williard (Attorney) signed on behalf of Williard.
The lawsuit against Panola was settled on July 26, 2007, with Panola agreeing to deed the Surratt Property back to Sewell, free and clear of any liens, and give Sewell
Sewell apparently first consulted with new counsel upon learning in March 2011 that Williard had foreclosed on the property.4 On April 2, 2012, he filed the present lawsuit against Williard, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unconscionability, wrongful foreclosure, and fraud involving real estate, and seeking a declaratory judgment. In response, Williard pleaded the four-year statute of limitations, among other defenses. Sewell then assertеd the discovery rule. The discovery rule exception to the statutes of limitations defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, the facts giving rise to a cause of action. Computer Assocs. Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996).
At trial, Sewell testified that he did not think that Williard was to receive 50 percent of the property in the event of success in the underlying lawsuit against Panola. Instead, he thought that Williard was only entitled to half of the cash proceeds from the settlement with Panola. Sewell further testified that he only received a third grade education and that he had vision problems that kept him from being able to read the documents Williard preрared. He said that the Attorney told him that he was getting a good deal and did not explain any of the details. Sewell stated he believed that the amount reflected in the promissory note was to compensate Williard for additional, post-settlement, legal work required to return everything regarding the property back “like it was” before Panolа foreclosed, i.e., a deed in Sewell‘s name, property tax issues remedied, etc.
Williard moved for judgment based on application of the statute of limitations and the jury‘s finding that Sewell should have discovered the breach of fiduciary duty by October 11, 2007. Sewell moved for JNOV, asking the court to disregard the jury‘s discovery date. The trial court granted Sewell‘s motion and awarded him judgment for $14,475.80, pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs of court. The trial court did not offer a specific date on which Sewell discovered or should have discovered the breach or provide furthеr explanation of its holding.
Legal Underpinnings
As stated above, in its sole issue, Williard contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury‘s discovery rule finding and granting Sewell a JNOV. A trial court may disregard a jury finding and render a JNOV if there is no evidence to support the jury‘s finding or if a directed verdict would have been proper. Brown v. Bank of Galveston, 963 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex.1998). We review such a ruling under a legal-sufficiency standard, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex.2009). When examining a legal sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005). The evidence is lеgally sufficient if it would enable a reasonable and fair-minded person to reach the verdict under review. Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 830. It is the court‘s charge, not some other unidentified law, that measures the sufficiency of the evidence when, as here, there was no objection to the relevant portion of the charge. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 530 (Tex.2002).
To be considered timely, claims fоr breach of fiduciary duty must be filed within four years of the date the cause of action accrues.
Neither party disputes that the discovery rule properly applies to this casе; however, they disagree as to the date by which Sewell should have known about the facts giving rise to his cause of action. A plaintiff who successfully invokes the discovery rule still must have sought information about his injuries and their likely cause once apprised of facts that would prompt a reasonably diligent person to make an inquiry that would lead to discovery of the cause of action. Seureau, 274 S.W.3d at 228. The specific date by which a plaintiff knew or should have known of an injury is generally a question of fact for the jury, see Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 47 (Tex.1998). Unless evidence conclusively establishes when a party should have known of facts giving rise to a claim, the question is one for the jury. See Barker v. Eckman, 213 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex.2006); Weaver & Tidwell, L.L.P. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA, 427 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2014, pet. filed). The party seeking to benefit from the discovery rule has the burden of obtaining findings to support its application. Barker, 213 S.W.3d at 312; Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1988).
Because fiduciaries are presumed to possess superior knowledge to that of the client, “it may be said [in the fiduciary context] that the nature of the injury is presumed to be inherently undiscoverable, although a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to ascertаin when an injury occurs.” Computer Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456 (citing Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d 197, 205 (1957)). “While a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is relieved of the responsibility of diligent inquiry into the fiduciary‘s conduct, so long as that relationship exists, when the fact of misconduct becomes apparent it can no longer be ignored, regardless of the nature of the relationship.” S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8. “Facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.” Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988). That said, even in a breach of fiduciary duty case, the claim accrues when the claimant knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should know, of the wrongful act and resulting injury. See Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex.1997); Dunmore v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 400 S.W.3d 635, 642 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Discussion
Here, the jury found that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, Sewell should have discovered the breach of fiduciary duty by October 11, 2007, the date on which he made his first payment on the promissory note. Sewell filed suit on April 2, 2012, which was more than four years past the date on which the jury found he should have discovered the breach of fiduciary duty. In his motion for JNOV, which the trial court granted, Sewell asserted that the evidence was legally insufficient to suрport the jury‘s discovery rule finding, and instead, the evidence conclusively established April 1, 2011—the day that he first conferred with his current counsel—as the date on which he should
Williard contends that the record contains legally sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding that Sewell should have discovered that Williard did not comply with its fiduciary duty by October 11, 2007, and the trial court therefore erred in granting the JNOV. See Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 830. We agree. As described above, the evidence demonstrated that Sewell made his first payment of $300 on that date to Williard on the promissory note. There is no way to tell whether the jury believed Williard or Sewell regarding the circumstances surrounding execution of the promissory note, i.e., whether the Attornеy accurately described the note and the related deeds to Sewell, whether Sewell actually signed the documents, or just what Sewell thought was the purpose of his $300 payments. Regardless, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, Sewell should have made inquiries at least by the time he was to begin paying additional money to Williard beyond the fee he knew Williard had already received and that diligent inquiries would had led Sewell to discover the nature of his injury. See Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40.6 The evidence establishing this date includes Williard employee Baird‘s testimony and a handwritten receipt.
Sewell insists that he did not have either the educational background or the physical ability to discover Williard‘s wrongful conduct until he consulted with his current counsel on April 1, 2011. As mentioned, Sewell testified that he did not have any formal education past the third grade and his vision had become so bad that he could not read the documents that Williard prepared. Sewell additionally argues that because Williard presented no evidence contradicting his clear, direct, positive testimony on these matters, which was free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon, the jury was compelled to take the testimony as true, citing Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1990). However, even if the jury was required to accept as true Sewell‘s testimony regarding his education and physical abilities—a question we need not and do not decide in this case—it still could have reasonably deduced that he should have discovered the nature of his injuries by the time he began making payments on the promissory note. The payment of money was, in short, a significant event that the jury could have reasonably believed should have caused Sewell to ask questions. See Trousdale, 261 S.W.3d at 234 (“Discovery occurs when a plaintiff has knowledge of such facts, conditions, or circumstances as would cause a reasonably prudent person to make an inquiry that would lead to discovery of the cause of action.“).
Sewell further asserts that he possessed no background or informаtion which would have allowed him to determine that his attorney was breaching a fiduciary duty.7 The focus of the discovery rule, however, is not on discovery of a
Because the evidence was sufficient to supрort the jury‘s finding that Sewell should have discovered the facts giving rise to his breach of fiduciary duty claim by October 11, 2007, more than four years before he filed his lawsuit, the trial court erred in disregarding this jury finding and awarding a JNOV favoring Sewell.8 Accordingly, we sustain Williard‘s sole issue.
We reverse the trial court‘s judgment and render a take-nothing judgment favoring Williard.
MARTHA HILL JAMISON
JUSTICE
Notes
By what date should Sewell, in the exercise of reasonable diligence have discovered that [Williard] did not comply with its fiduciary duty to Sewell?
Answer with a date in the blank below.
Answer: 10-11-07