*1 WILLIS, Petitioner, MAVERICK, Respondent. Chilton
No. C-6225.
Supreme Court of Texas.
July 1988.
Rehearing Denied Dec. *2 of
by the statute
limitations because
legal injury
years
occurred more than two
malpractice
before the
action
filed.
was
disagree
Willis testified
trial that
as-
Maverick
KILGARLIN, Justice.
that, despite
deletion,
her
sured
she
agree
still
any
would
have
beforе
sale of
upon
This case calls
us to determine the
place.
home
take
could
time
accrual of a
cause
action for
legal malpractice.
19, 1979,
Yvonne Willis sued
agreement
Chil-
On
November
Maverick,
ton
who
represent-
incorporated
was
into the divorce decree.
action,
ed
in a
alleging legal
her
divorce
By
per-
November
Maverick had
malpractice
handling
in the
of that action.
his
оn
formed
last act
behalf
the Willises
Willis additionally
Ms.
deceptive
proceeding.
claimed
incident to
De-
the divorce
On
practice
10, 1979,
trade
violations. The
was
case
cember
Maverick drafted a will
jury
Willis,
negligence
submitted to the
on the
for Yvonne
his
as her
last act
attor-
only.
jury
claim
The
ney.
September
answered
issues
On
Ms. Willis
Willis, finding
of Yvonne
Henry
favor
Maverick
received notice of
Willis’intention
negligence
partition
and such
tо have
force
the marital home.
$26,568.44
proximately
damages.
caused
Yvonne Willis testified at trial that she had
jury
exemplary damages
The
also
partition
prohibited
awarded
believed
was
that a
suit
$610,000.
agreement.
under the
court, however,
The trial
granted Maver-
On October
Yvonne Willis filed
judgment
ick’s motion for
equitable
non obstante ve-
review to set aside
bill
Henry
nothing judg-
property
redicto
rendered a take
divorce and
settlemеnt.
against
partition
ment
next
Willis.
Willis filed the
suit
holding
judgment,
day.
affirmed that
cases
consolidated.
two
were
(Subsequently,
pre-
that Ms.
cause of
Willis’
action was barred
Yvonne ^Villis
vailed,
legislative
and the
decree
vacated
In the absence
definition
divorce
was
aside.)
21, 1981,
specification,
the ... courts have
and set
On December
often been called
to delineate the
Yvonne Willis filed
action
statute;
they
consciously sought
against Mаverick.
underly-
regard
with due
outset,
express agreement
At
without,
ing statutory policy
repose,
*3
appeals’
with the
of
determination
court
however,
unnecessary
permitting
individ-
two-year
that
the
statute of limitations
injustices.
ual
governs
present case. Tex.Civ.Prac. &
the
Robinson,
20;
550 S.W.2d at
Gaddis v.
(Vernon 1986). A
Ann.
Rem.Code
16.003
Smith,
(Tex.1967).
417 S.W.2d
580-81
legal malpractice is in
cause of action for
discovery
legal prin
is
The
rule
the
governed
the
of a
and is thus
nature
tort
which,
ciple
applicable, provides
when
by
two-year
the
limitations statute. First
plaintiff
limitations run from the date the
Levine,
Eagle
National Bank
Pass
of
discovered, in
should
the
discovers or
(Tex.1986).
Were we to follow the
this
We note that
Texas
fully
protect
only by
increasing
client could
himself
majority
line with
ever
ascertaining malpractice
recognized
at the moment of
states that have
the inherent
so,
its
he
incidence. To do
would have to
commencing
unfairness of
attorney
hire a second
to observe the work
legal malpractice
causes
costly
impracticаl
of the first. This
action on the date of the occurrence of the
solution would
but serve
undermine
omission,
legal
act or
or of the
relationship
attorney
confidential
between
therefrom, notwithstanding
injury caused
See id.
and client.
491 P.2d at
fiduciary relationship
between
Cal.Rptr.
at 844.3
knowledge,
and client and
lack of
actu
constructive,
part
or
al
client.
Weaver,
Citing Robinson v.
twenty-four
judicially
At least
states have
(Tex.1977),
have us
Maverick would
de-
adopted
remedy
cline to
rule to
Corp.
problem.
Distribution
involving professional
malpractice cases
di-
Amfac
Miller,
v.
138 Ariz.
673 P.2d
agnosis,
judgment,
This
and discretion.
(1983);
Magana, Olney, Levy,
Neel v.
court’s
to four decision
that case
five
Gelfand, Cathcart &
491 P.2d
Cal.3d
discovery rule to
refused to extend the
(1971);
Morris v.
Cal.Rptr.
misdiagnosis
in a medical
case.
Geer,
Pio-
(Colo.Ct.App.1986);
647
210,
(1983);
5 Ohio
450
684
have asked when the claimant dis-
St.3d
N.E.2d
would
Jones,
(Okla.1985); covered,
discovered,
v.
P.2d 105
Funnell
737
or should have
Mensing,
Or.App.
diligence,
739
Smith v.
86
of reasonable care
exercise
(1987);
Killian,
P.2d 595
v.
S.C.
establishing
Mills
273
the facts
the elements
(1979);
254
556
requested
S.E.2d
v. Gil
of action. Ms. Willis’
is-
cause
Wolfe
reath,
(Tenn.Ct.App.1985);
implied justice are ac- cause of vic- warranties likewise countless future DTPA) profes- legal malpractice, to include tims of but for Willis tionable under Allison, justice. is no When she went sional conduct. Dennis v. 698 herself there (Tex.1985). try remedy obtain a for the Our determination attorney, lawyer’s professional wrong conduct of her first attor- of whether a Willis’ ney request jury under the DTPA must failed to a issue in is actionable await trial See, wording. day. Melody substantially correct On this e.g., another Home Man- ba- sis, Barnes, that Willis still loses. ufacturing the court holds Co. (Tex.1987). says The essence of what this court Willis is this: “Now turn the other cheek aрpeals is judgment of the court of I and that Willis will swallow hard.” doubt affirmed. purely much comfort from the aca- derive knowledge persistence demic that her GONZALEZ, J., concurred and trying through the courts to seek redress opinion joined dissented and filed significant step has resulted in forward a CULVER, J. jurisprudence in the of this state. MAUZY, J., concurred and dissented Appellate Texas Rule of Procedure opinion joined by and filed an expressly a authorizеs this court reverse ROBERTSON, J. judgment remand appeals’ court of MAUZY, Justice, concurring and appear “if it shall cause to the trial court dissenting. justice the cause demands an- de- emphatically agree I the court’s with con- I aware of case law other trial.” am rule in the cision fashion; how- struing this Rule a narrow alleged legal malpractice causes of action. ever, simply follow the I would choose to However, I from the court’s deci- dissent language the Rule. straight-forward affirm take-noth- sion to nevertheless twice has now been victim- Because Willis against ing judgment I would re- Willis. attorneys the court’s ized and because for a new trial. mand change represents opinion this case law, judgment of I reverse the arose would Willis’ cause action because and, handling interest of court for a only justice, remand it to the trial jury found that her divorce. 180; Tex.R.App.P. Brown v. he new trial. negligent but that Chilton Maverick was cf. National, (Tex.1988) Republicbank First knowingly heedless acted with C.J., dissenting). (Phillips, rights disregard to the of Yvonne reckless upon its that Wil- Willis. Based conclusion retrial, that, Willis I would also hold wronged, jury awarded lis had been *7 jury issues as should be allowed submit Notwithstanding her damages in favor. clearly claims. This court has to her DTPA verdict, has been unable jury Willis that con lawyer’s unconscionable held that a judgment of the court obtain a beсause DTPA. DeBa under the duct is actionable her action was appeals’ conclusion that (Tex.1981). key Staggs, v. of limitations. the statute barred Moreover, expressly re this court has implied warranty that an injustice denying jected re- the notion Recognizing “the may performance victims,” good and workmanlike unknowing court now of lief this legal services. provision disapproves to the absolutely and affirmatively Barnes, 741 Mfg. Co. v. Melody Home reasoning appeals. of the court (Tex.1987). Nevertheless, S.W.2d 349 goes the court affirm take-nothing judgment against Willis affirm the take- The court’s decision her failed trial for the reason produces a against Willis nothing judgment discovery rule issue in sub- request a unjust" so absurd and is “so result that wording. stantially correct Hays possible.” “ought not to be that it (Tex.1973). I 412, Hall, Thus, this through fighting battle judgment the would reverse years, has furthered eight Willis and, appeals justice, the interest of re-
mand the cause to the trial court for new
trial on all causes of action.
ROBERTSON, J., joins in this
concurring dissenting and opinion.
GONZALEZ, Justice, concurring and
dissenting.
For the reasons stated Chief Justice dissenting opinion,
Cadena’s
262, I judgment would reverse the
court of and remand this cause for trial. new
CULVER, J., jоins concurring in this dissenting opinion. LINDSEY, Appellant,
Johnnie Earl Huff, Dallas, Wayne appellant. C. Texas, Appellee. The STATE of Wade, Henry Former Atty. Dist. No. 960-86. Vance, Atty., Alyce John Dist. Kathi Drew, Scott, Dick Miller and Winfield Asst. Texas, Court of Appeals Criminal Dallas, Attys., Huttash, Dist. Robert En Banc. Asst., Atty., Dally, Sp. State’s E.F. Carl April 20, 1988. Austin, Atty., State’s for the State. Rehearing On Nov. ON
OPINION APPELLANT’S PETITION DISCRETIONARY FOR REVIEW TEAGUE, Judge. appellant aggrava- was convicted of rape
ted under Penal Code 21.03.1 From appellate an examination of the record in cause, appears appellant was *8 repealed years (b) 1. This statute was about af- two An offense committed before the effective alleged ter commission of the offense date this Act is covered the law in effect case, offense, Ag- substantially committed, identical the time at the offense was Assault, gravated place Sexual created in its former law is continued in effeсt Code, legisla- § Penal 22.021. section, Section 13 of the purpose. purposes For of this responsible changes expressly pro- tion for these offense committed before the effective date vided: any of this Act if offense element oc- (a) change ap- in law made this Act curs before the effective date. plies only Leg., p. to an after offense committed on or Acts 68th ch. eff. the effective Sept. date of this Act.
