THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 04-1591
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Dec. 15, 2005.
1377
Our decision did not rest on an interpretation of the term “Internal Code,” but rested instead on our conclusion that permission to copy StorageTek‘s software was implicit in the licensing agreement, which permits the licensee to activate the equipment. StorageTek‘s license stated that “StorageTek grants Customer a personal license to use Internal Code for the sole purpose of enabling the specific unit of Equipment for which the Internal Code was provided ....” We interpreted that provision to allow the customer to activate the Management and Control Units, a process that automatically copies StorageTek‘s software (both the functional code and the maintenance code) into RAM. Because an inevitable consequence of “us[ing] Internal Code for the sole purpose of enabling the specific unit of Equipment for which the Internal Code was provided” is to copy the maintenance code into RAM, the license had to be interpreted to authorize this inevitable consequence as well, even though the license explicitly provided that it was conferring no rights to the maintenance code. Thus, we reiterate the point made in our initial opinion: the license provisions must be interpreted to allow the licensees to activate their equipment, and because StorageTek made it impossible to activate that equipment without copying the maintenance code, the license necessarily authorizes the copying of that code.
For those reasons, and for the reasons set forth in our original opinion, we deny the petition for rehearing.
RADER, Circuit Judge, dissents.
Saul Davis, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of New York, New York, argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General and David M. Cohen, Director, of Washington, DC; and Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, of New York, New York. Of counsel was Michael W. Heydrich, Attorney, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, New York, New York.
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, LOURIE and LINN, Circuit Judges.
MICHEL, Chief Judge.
The Pillsbury Company (“Pillsbury“) appeals the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade upholding the tariff classification of its imported Haagen-Dazs dessert bars by the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs“).1 Pillsbury Co. v. United States, 341 F.Supp.2d 1290 (Ct. Int‘l Trade 2004). Because the finding that the Haagen-Dazs dessert bars are not predominantly sorbet, but frozen ice milk intermixed with yogurt, which is distinguishable from traditional yogurt, is not clearly erroneous, the dessert bars were properly classified. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
The imported products at issue in this case are Haagen-Dazs frozen dessert bars.
Pillsbury filed four protests in response to liquidations of these entries, arguing that the product should instead be classified under subheading 2105.00.50 or 0403.10.90.00—either of which may entitle the product to duty-free status under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). The protests were denied by Customs, which confirmed classification under subheading 2105.00.40. Pillsbury complained to the trial court, which, after holding a full trial, issued a thorough and well-reasoned opinion upholding Customs’ classification. Pillsbury now appeals to this court. We have jurisdiction under
II
This court reviews the meaning ascribed by the trial court to HTSUS terms without deference. Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 282 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002). However, we review whether a particular import fits within those terms—including underlying findings of fact—for clear error. Id. The classification of imported merchandise is governed by the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI“) to the HTSUS. Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998). The GRI provide that a product‘s classification is determined by first looking to the headings, and section or chapter notes. Absent contrary definitions in the HTSUS or legislative history, we construe an HTSUS term according to its common, commercial meaning. Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407, 1409 (Fed.Cir.1995).
Three HTSUS subheadings were put at issue in this case: 2105.00.40, 2105.00.50, and 0403.10.90.00. Subheading 0403.10.90.00 is a default provision for “yogurt” that falls outside the purview of several explanatory notes inapplicable here. Subheading 2105.00.40 covers “Ice cream and other edible ice” that is described in additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4 and is not described in additional U.S. note 10 to chapter 42; products falling outside the scope of additional U.S. note 1 default into subheading 2105.00.50.3 Additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4 states in relevant part:
For the purposes of this schedule, the term “dairy products described in additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4” means any of the following goods: malted milk, and articles of milk or cream . . . .
(emphasis added). Proper classification then turns on two issues. First, if the sorbet coating of the bars predominates over the frozen yogurt-ice milk core, then 2105.00.50 is the correct subheading. Second, if the core predominates, but the core is “yogurt” rather than an “article[] of milk“, 0403.10.90.00 is the correct subheading.
A
Predominance is a factual determination which we review for clear error. Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1352. Although the parties do not dispute the underlying facts surrounding the product, the parties strongly disagree on the trial court‘s resulting inference that the frozen yogurt-ice milk core of the bars predominates. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court applied GRI 3(b) and the explanatory notes thereto. Rule 3(b) states that “[m]ixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made up of different components . . . shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or component which gives them their essential character.” Explanatory Note VIII provides: “The factor which determines essential character will vary as between different kinds of goods. It may, for example, be determined by the nature of the material or component, its bulk, quantity, weight or value, or by the role of a constituent material in relation to the use of the goods.”
After entertaining evidence on both sides, the court found that the core of the bars provides its essential character. On the one hand, the sorbet coating constitutes a marginally greater percentage of the total weight and cost of the bars. In addition, the coating is “essential” to the manufacturing process and gives the bar its size and shape: the bar is produced by freezing sorbet in molds, sucking out the unfrozen center, and injecting the frozen yogurt-ice milk mixture into the void. On the other hand, Haagen-Dazs markets the bar as “Fat Free Vanilla Frozen Yogurt Coated with Raspberry Sorbet“; the packaging states that “[w]e take rich, creamy Haagen-Dazs yogurt and dip it in incredibly smooth Haagen-Dazs sorbet . . . .” Also, when developing the product, Haagen-Dazs decided early on to use vanilla-flavored frozen yogurt in the core, and only finalized the sorbet flavorings after testing multiple options. The trial court relied upon Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed.Cir.2002) (on remand from the Supreme Court), in determining that the marketing emphasis on frozen yogurt outweighed the evidence favoring the sorbet coating. This court in Mead stated that “[w]hile the importer‘s marketing of the goods will not dictate the classification, such evidence is relevant to the determination.” Id. at 1349. The question as to which portion predominates is arguable, and Pillsbury has pointed to no clear error in the underlying finding of facts or the ultimate factual inference. As such, we affirm the trial court‘s determination on this issue.
B
In the alternative, Pillsbury argues that the bars are properly classified as “yogurt” under subheading 0403.10.90.00. Merchandise must be classified “in the condition in which it is imported.” United States v. Citroen, 223 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1912) (quoting Worthington v. Robbins, 139 U.S. 337, 341 (1891)). The core of the dessert bar is made by mixing two ingredients: 12% by weight of a fermented “yogurt base“, and the remaining 88% a “vanilla flavored ice milk base“. Witnesses on both sides acknowledged that, when the two ingredients are mixed together, the mixture becomes a “fermented milk” that can no longer be separated. The fermented yogurt base is dispersed throughout the mixture, resulting in a core that is only partially fermented. Thus, the component ingredients become irrelevant: as imported, the core is frozen, partially-fermented milk.
Finally, the trial court turned to the legal question of whether the phrase “article[] of milk” in additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4 includes partially-fermented milk. We review this statutory construction de novo. Rollerblade, 282 F.3d at 1352. In the words of the trial court, the “items covered by ‘dairy products described in additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4’ are broader than full cream milk or partially or completely skimmed milk.” 341 F.Supp.2d at 1297. We agree. The plain text of additional U.S. note 1 makes clear that the phrase “of milk” was intended to encompass more than just unaltered milk. The note specifically includes “malted milk“. As such, partially-fermented milk can only be properly classified under subheading 2105.00.40.
III
In sum, because Pillsbury has identified no clear error in the factual findings or error in the legal conclusions of the Court of International Trade, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
| 2105.00 | Ice Cream and other edible ice, whether or not containing cocoa: | |
| Ice cream: | ||
| . . . | ||
| Other: | ||
| Dairy products described in additional U.S. note 1 to chapter 4: | ||
| 2105.00.30 | Described in additional U.S. note 10 to chapter 4 and entered pursuant to its provisions | |
| 2105.00.40 | Other | |
| 2105.00.50 | Other | |
