The Chautauque County Bank v. . WhiteThe Chautauque County Bank v. . White
Were it not for the elaborate opinion of the learned judge, who delivered the judgment of the supreme court, I should deem the interrogatory satisfactorily answered, in the affirmative, by the preceding statement of facts.
The statute declares, “that a judgment of a court of record “shall bind the real estate of the debtor, which he may have
If the assignment and trust deed to Crane and Crosby were operative, the legal title was in them as assignees. If fraudulent, and consequently void, as the plaintiffs assume, and as the court of chancery had decreed, when they directed the appointment of a receiver, then the conveyance by Saxton to the latter, under the order of the court, divested him of all his property, (except that exempted from execution,) the premises in question inclusive.
The power of the court to make the order of November, 1838, is not questioned. The supreme court admit that the conveyance to the receiver is in form, sufficient to transfer the title, and that in terms, it is in conformity with the order. It is said that Lester was a common law receiver. But such a receiver may be, and in this case was, specially authorized to receive what the judgment debtor was directed to transfer and assign. The subject of the transfer was “all the property, rents and real “estate” of Saxton, as provided by the decree, and enumerated in the assignment. We are told “that the effect of the words “assign and transfer, depends upon the intent; and the intent “was, to convey to the receiver just interest enough in the property “to enable him to protect it, and receive the rents and “profits.” This is the view taken by the court below. We are not informed what would be the nature of that partial interest, which, when conveyed, would enable the receiver to acquire possession of and protect the real estate, and yet leave a residuum in the grantor upon which the judgment of the plaintiff would be a lien. The adjudication of the court, and the intention of the chancellor, is to be ascertained from the record. And on examining the decree, we find no allusion to an undefined interest, which is not a legal one, but which will, notwithstanding, give the possession of the lands, and a title to receive the profits, and guard
If this is the true construction of the decree, it disposes of this controversy. The lien of the plaintiffs’ judgment never attached upon the premises; the subsequent sale was inoperative, and conferred no title upon them as purchasers. To this result, it is immaterial whether the object of the assignment to the receiver was merely to protect the property and collect the rents, since the court has determined that the transfer of the whole interest was necessary to enable the officer to discharge those duties. That decision cannot be reviewed here, and is conclusive in this case. Nor is it material whether chancery could decree a satisfaction of the demands of judgment creditors out of the real estate. If the chancellor, in this particular, exceeded his jurisdiction, the sale might be void; but the title of the receiver under the assignment would not be affected. The case made by the plaintiffs, assumes the validity of that transfer; and predicates their title to relief, upon the sole ground of a legal lien, and sale by virtue of their judgment. The difference between the parties to this suit, is not as to the jurisdiction of chancery, to make the order of November, 1838, but as to its construction. The bill, in its frame and parties, can be sustained upon no other ground.
But in the second place, the court of chancery had authority, under the circumstances of this case, to decree a sale of the real estate. The provisions of
The authorities cited by the plaintiffs assert, or imply, these principles. Indeed, their counsel was understood as conceding, substantially, the jurisdiction of the court by the common law; but claimed that it had been limited to sales of personal property, in satisfaction of the judgment, in all cases by statute. In this, I think he is mistaken; and in Leroy v. Rogers, (3 Paige, 237,) the chancellor seems to have been of the same opinion.
It is said that the defendant is estopped from alleging that the plaintiffs’ judgment is not a lien, because he asserted the contrary before his purchase at the receiver‘s sale. The defendant, in his letter to the receiver, of the 4th of April, 1840, insisted
An honest, though mistaken opinion of the law, would be a singular estoppel. Even a lawyer may increase his knowledge as to his legal rights, without forfeiting his estate on account of his former ignorance.
The decree should be reversed, with costs in the supreme court.
The plaintiffs, by their bill, prayed that their judgment of January seventh, 1839, might be decreed to be a lien on the real estate conveyed by the receiver to the defendant, and that the title claimed under the sheriff‘s sale might be decreed to be superior to that claimed under the receiver‘s sale, and for such other relief as might be agreeable to equity. The original owner made an assignment to the receiver for the benefit of creditors, on the fifth day of January, 1839. And if that conveyance was authorized by the law of the land, and the practice of the court of chancery; and if, upon a just construction, it embraced the premises in question, then the judgment of the plaintiffs was never a lien on those premises. The plaintiffs’ counsel contends that neither of these positions is true. I am of the opinion, however, 1st. That the deed executed by Saxton, the
II. But, suppose that I am wrong in the conclusion that the order of the court authorized, or the language of the assignment warranted, the construction which I have assigned to it, and that I have attached too much importance to the final decree, as settling the construction of the conveyance to the receiver, and rendering the sale by him lawful. Suppose the receiver was only vested with the power of a common law receiver, and had no control over the lands of the judgment debtor, and no right to sell them. Upon what ground has the plaintiff invoked the aid of this court? A court of law was just as competent to give a correct construction to this deed, as the court of chancery. And as no discovery was sought, the remedy was purely legal, and should have been sought in a court of law; and inasmuch as this objection was distinctly taken in the answer, it should now be held fatal. An action of ejectment was the proper mode of determining the construction of the deed to the receiver; and the fact that the receiver had conveyed to the purchaser, would not entitle the plaintiffs to set aside the deed as a cloud on their title. The power to sell, appears on the face of the deed, and in the decree and order of the court of chancery; and might as well be disposed of in a court of law as chancery. This point was decided in Cox v. Clift, (2 Comst. 118, 3 Barb. 481) and Van Doren v. The Mayor of New-York, (9 Paige, 388,) where bills were dismissed for a similar reason.
III. It is said that the sale was not authorized, for the reason that the receiver had personal property enough to pay the judgment in favor of Webb Douglass. I am not certain that this allegation is true; but if it should be admitted to be so, the receiver held the real estate for the creditors in all the other suits in which he had been appointed, and could sell to satisfy those judgments.
IV. It is said, again, that the sale was for a grossly inadequate
The decree of the supreme court should be reversed, and that of the vice chancellor affirmed, with costs in the courts below.
Ordered accordingly.