Taylor v. WatersTaylor v. Waters
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Wilkins, Hall, Williams
Before HALL, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion, in which Judge Hall and Judge Williams joined.
COUNSEL
OPINION
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
Clarence I. Taylor, Jr. brought this action pursuant to
I.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Taylor, the record demonstrates the following. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In 1989 or 1990, Investigator Waters learned that a Jamaican individual named “Harold,” later identified as Harold Duncan, was converting cocaine into cocaine base at a specified address in Williamsburg, Virginia and, using this location as a base of operation, was distributing the illegal drugs from his automobile. In April 1992, an informant provided Investigator Waters with details concerning Duncan‘s distribution from his automobile of drugs processed at his residence. An investigation of the automobile tag number provided by the informant disclosed that Duncan resided at the same location that had earlier been identified to the officer. Relying on this information, police officers stopped Duncan‘s automobile, arrested him, and seized a quantity of cocaine. Soon afterward, Duncan admitted that he was a cocaine dealer.
Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant for Duncan‘s apartment because information indicated that additional quantities of drugs remained there. Upon arrival to execute the warrant, Investigator Waters encountered Taylor and learned for the first time that he was Duncan‘s roommate. In the kitchen, officers observed a pot on the counter with white residue on it and discovered a strainer that also appeared to have white residue on it. When questioned about the pot, Taylor explained that he had used it to make tea. The officers also found plastic bags with the corners removed--typical packaging material employed by cocaine distributors--and a brown envelope with a white powdery substance in
Further investigation, however, failed to provide additional evidence of Taylor‘s guilt. Soon after the arrest, Duncan informed Investigator Waters that Taylor was not involved in the offenses, and the informant who
kitchen trash contained cocaine residue. Prior to the preliminary hearing, Investigator Waters reviewed this evidence with the prosecutor assigned to the case. The charges against Taylor subsequently were declared nolle prosequi on July 3, 1992--approximately two months after his arrest--immediately before the preliminary hearing.
Thereafter, Taylor brought the present
The magistrate judge denied the motion. The lower court reasoned that the circumstances known to Investigator Waters did not provide probable cause to believe that Taylor had committed any offense and that consequently Investigator Waters knew or should have known that he was violating Taylor‘s rights. The magistrate judge also ruled that Investigator Waters possessed an affirmative duty to notify prosecutors immediately of information that was exculpatory of Taylor and that the officer had failed to satisfy this obligation, instead simply allowing the prosecution to remain pending until the scheduled preliminary hearing when the charges were declared nolle prosequi. Finally, the magistrate judge denied summary judgment to the officer on Taylor‘s state-law claims. From this ruling, Investigator Waters appeals.3
II.
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages for performing discretionary functions when his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This court has explained:
In analyzing the appeal of a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, it is necessary first to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly violate[d], then to inquire whether at the time of the alleged violation it was clearly established, then further to inquire whether a reasonable person in the official‘s position would have known that his conduct would violate that right.
Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Taylor‘s complaint is far from a model of clarity, rendering enigmatic an identification of “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged [conduct].” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). His complaint simply claims that the facts alleged implicate rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, we address separately the two principal factual assertions alleged by Taylor.
The parties agree that Taylor‘s claim that his arrest was not supported by probable cause alleges a deprivation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Although the right to be free from seizures not founded upon probable cause was well established prior to Taylor‘s 1992 arrest, see, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975), defining the applicable right at that level of generality is not proper, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). Rather,
the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. at 640 (citation omitted); see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.“). Thus, we must consider whether the established contours of probable cause were sufficiently clear at the time of the arrest to make it plain to a reasonable officer that under these particular circumstances arresting Taylor would violate his constitutional rights.
In assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest. United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 931 (4th Cir. 1995). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer “would warrant the belief of a prudent person that the arrestee had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Probable cause only requires enough evidence `“to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” an offense has been or is being committed.‘“) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1103 (1995). Probable cause must be supported by more than a mere suspicion, but evidence sufficient to convict is not required. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
That one is merely present “at the scene of a crime or in the company of a person engaging in criminal activity” is not, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause. Garcia, 848 F.2d at 60 (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948)). Nor is evidence of “a person‘s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity,” without more, adequate to establish probable cause. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).4 Seemingly innocent activ-
ity, however, though not conclusive of probable cause, “may `provide the basis for a showing of probable cause‘” when considered in the context of all of the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111, 1116 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)).
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), state law enforcement officers had obtained information sufficient to support probable cause to arrest George Ker for marijuana possession. When officers arrived at Ker‘s apartment, his wife was present. In discussing whether the officers
Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the time the officers entered the apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry and announcement of their identity, the officers were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who was emerging from the kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she emerged and, without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that her presence in a small room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink would not alone establish a reasonable ground for the officers’ belief that she was in joint possession with her husband, that fact was accompanied by the officers’ information that Ker had been using his apartment as a base of operations for his narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there were not sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her husband, was committing the offense of possession of marijuana in the presence of the officers.
Id. at 36-37. Thus, the Court concluded that the officers possessed probable cause for arrest based on their knowledge that the suspect
was in close proximity to illegal drugs plainly visible in a residence she shared with a known drug dealer who used the residence as his base of operations for distribution.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Taylor, the facts of which Investigator Waters was apprised when he placed Taylor under arrest were closely analogous to those held to sustain a finding of probable cause in Ker. Taylor had lived with Duncan--a confessed narcotics dealer--for many years. Duncan was believed to have used their apartment as a base of operations for his drug distribution activities for at least several years. During the search, a pot--a utensil commonly used to convert cocaine into cocaine base--with white residue on it was in plain view in the kitchen. Taylor had demonstrated both a knowledge of the existence of and a connection to the pot by informing Investigator Waters that he (Taylor) had used it to make tea. Plastic bags, routinely used for packaging and distributing illegal drugs, were located nearby in the common area of the apartment, as was an envelope containing a white powdery substance. Further, the large amount of currency in Taylor‘s bedroom and the information disclosed in his bank statements were consistent with his involvement in a cocaine distribution conspiracy.
Although the facts known to Investigator Waters appear more than adequate to support a finding of probable cause for Taylor‘s arrest, we need not decide that issue because, in any event, the law was not clearly established that an arrest of Taylor under these circumstances would violate his rights. Furthermore, an officer in Investigator Waters’ position could reasonably have believed that the facts known to him were sufficient to establish probable cause for Taylor‘s arrest. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45. Accordingly, we conclude that Investigator Waters is entitled to qualified immunity on Taylor‘s
B.
We next turn to Taylor‘s claim that Investigator Waters’ failure to disclose exculpatory information--that Duncan had indicated that Taylor was not involved in the offenses, that the informant possessed no knowledge of him, and that the search warrant executed in May
had failed to disclose inculpatory evidence--to the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights. Again, we conclude that no settled authority established the illegality of the officer‘s conduct.
Taylor first alleges that this failure to disclose deprived him of his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, has made plain that “[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always
Finally, we consider whether established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence clearly rendered Investigator Waters’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor unconstitutional. We conclude that it did not. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
443 U.S. at 145-46; see Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 812-13 (plurality); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27. Consequently, although open communication between investigators and prosecutors should be encouraged, the failure of an officer to disclose exculpatory evidence after a determination of probable cause has been made by a neutral detached magistrate does not render the continuing pretrial seizure of a criminal suspect unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.6
III.
Investigator Waters also requests that we reverse the decision of the magistrate judge to deny summary judgment in his favor on Taylor‘s state-law claims. The decision of the magistrate judge denying summary judgment on these claims is not a final order, nor did the lower court certify the issue for interlocutory appeal. See
A determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each of the elements of the state-law causes of action is not inextricably intertwined with Investigator Waters’ entitlement to qualified immunity on Taylor‘s
Nevertheless, because we have directed dismissal of all of Taylor‘s federal claims, we instruct the magistrate judge on remand to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice. See
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS