T. S., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS and LEONARD DIXON, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 21-3303
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Argued November 1, 2022 — Decided May 15, 2023
Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:16-cv-08303 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether the Center‘s superintendent, Leonard Dixon, is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act,
I
A
In 2015, the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center housed over 300 youth awaiting trial or other court proceedings. That summer, a Twentieth Century Fox Television location scout contacted Superintendent Dixon about filming scenes at the facility for the fictional television series Empire. Dixon agreed, believing it “would be good for the kids” and create “energy in the facility.” Fox TV could use the Center‘s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces to film for five days in June 2015. In exchange, Fox TV would pay a daily lease fee, reimburse any costs incurred, and work with the Center‘s administration to avoid disrupting its normal functions. With permission, Fox TV returned to film retakes for four days in July 2015 and three days in August 2015.
The Center made several adjustments to its daily operations during the Empire filming. Detainees live in housing units known as “pods,” each containing 16 or 18 single rooms that open into an enclosed common area. For safety reasons, the Center maintains a policy of limiting the functional capacity of each pod to 12 or 14 detainees. So that Fox TV could use two pods for filming and storage, during filming days several other pods housed more detainees than the policy suggested. As for daily activities, the detainees in some pods exercised in the facility‘s indoor gyms or in pod common areas instead of the outdoor yard. School was in session for three days during the July filming period, and classes took place in the pods instead of the classrooms. The Center also postponed or cancelled some extra-curricular activities and held visitation hours in a slightly smaller room.
The Chief Judge of Cook County has operational and administrative control over the Center under the County Shelter Care and Detention Home Act,
B
T.S., Q.B., and H.C.,1 detainees at the Center during the Empire filming, filed a proposed class action lawsuit against Dixon
In that same order, the district court addressed the claims against Dixon and Cook County. The plaintiffs, in a claim brought under
As to the state law issues,2 the district court granted Dixon and Cook County summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim but denied it as to the breach of fiduciary duty claim. In a matter of first impression, the district court decided that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and thus had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” A jury could, in the district court‘s view, find that Dixon breached that duty by failing to protect the detainees’ “safety and well-being” during filming.
In so holding, the district court rejected Dixon‘s sovereign immunity defense. Dixon had argued that, as a state employee, he was immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act,
The officer suit exception identified in Murphy played a major role in the district court‘s analysis. Dixon received qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim and thus could not be held liable for a constitutional violation. But the district court reasoned that Dixon‘s qualified immunity did not “negate the possible presence of an underlying constitutional violation,” meaning the officer suit exception could still apply. And since the constitutional and state law claims were based on the same conduct, Dixon could not yet avail himself of sovereign immunity. So, the breach of fiduciary duty claim could proceed to trial. Admittedly, this holding created an unusual dynamic. Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved at trial that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights.
The district court certified the following question:
[W]hether, under Illinois law, the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity applies only if a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a continuing violation of statutory or constitutional law.
This court accepted Dixon and Cook County‘s petition for interlocutory appeal.3 “An appeal under
II
Under the Erie doctrine, “state rules of immunity govern actions in federal court alleging violations of state law.”
Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). An Illinois statute provides that “the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.”
A
We first address whether Dixon, in his superintendent role, is a state actor. Our analysis begins with the Cook County Chief Judge, who appointed Dixon.
In 2007, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Detention Home Act,
Since the Chief Judge acts as a state official in administering the Center, we next address the relationship between the Chief Judge and Dixon. As stated, the Chief Judge appointed Dixon to serve as the Center‘s superintendent, and Dixon serves at his pleasure. Relevant here, the parties stipulated that Dixon had final decision-making authority on behalf of the Chief Judge as to whether to allow and how to accommodate the Empire filming. Therefore, when making these decisions, Dixon was acting with the authority granted him by the Chief Judge. Because he acted under the delegated authority of the Chief Judge—a state officer—Dixon is also a state actor for purposes of any Empire-related decisions.
Resisting this conclusion, the plaintiffs argue that Dixon is a Cook County employee, rather than a state employee, because Cook County pays his salary. Although the county does pay Dixon‘s salary,
B
Dixon is a state actor, so we consider whether he is shielded from suit by state sovereign immunity. Before 1970, Illinois addressed sovereign immunity in its state constitution. The 1870 Illinois Constitution provided that “[t]he State of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity.”
The prohibition “against making the State of Illinois a party to a suit cannot be evaded by making an action nominally one against the servants or agents of the State when the real claim is against the State of Illinois itself and when the State of Illinois is the party vitally interested.” Sass v. Kramer, 381 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. 1978). Therefore, the “formal identification of the parties as they appear in the record is not dispositive.” Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 595. Instead, “[w]hether an action is in fact one against the State, and hence one that must be brought in the Court of Claims, depends ... on the issues involved and the relief sought.” Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ill. 1990). “[S]ubstance takes precedence over form.” Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 595.
The plaintiffs bring a breach of fiduciary claim for damages against Dixon
An action brought against a state employee is considered one against the state when:
[T]here are (1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within that employee‘s normal and official functions of the State.
Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247 (quoting Robb v. Sutton, 498 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). And if an action brought against a state official in his or her personal capacity “could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability,” it is also considered an action against the state. Currie v. Lao, 592 N.E.2d 977, 980 (Ill. 1992).
Scope of Authority. Whether “an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority,” Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247, depends on whether “the employee intended to perform some function within the scope of his or her authority when committing the legal wrong,” Jackson v. Alverez, 831 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). As stated above, Dixon had state authority to accommodate the Empire filming. So, when making operational decisions surrounding Empire, Dixon “intended to perform some function within the scope of his ... authority” as the Center‘s superintendent. Id. And nothing in the record indicates that Dixon acted outside of the scope of his authority.
That Dixon allegedly caused the plaintiff detainees harm in accommodating the Empire filming does not mean that he acted outside the scope of his authority. “[S]overeign immunity presupposes the possibility of a legal wrong by a state employee.” Id. And “legal wrongs are, per se, unauthorized, [so] the relevant question cannot be whether the employee had authority to commit the legal wrong. Instead, the question is whether the employee intended to perform some function within the scope of his or her authority when committing the legal wrong.” Id. In making operational decisions to accommodate the Empire filming, we conclude that Dixon intended to act within the scope of his authority as superintendent.
Source of Duty. Next, we consider whether the “duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State employment.” Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247. “[T]he proper inquiry is to analyze the source of the duty the employee is charged with breaching in committing the allegedly [wrongful] act.” Currie, 592 N.E.2d at 980. Where the alleged wrongful conduct “arose out of the State employee‘s breach of a duty that is imposed on him solely by virtue of his State employment,” sovereign immunity bars the action in circuit court. Id. But “where the employee is charged with breaching a duty imposed on him independently of his state employment, sovereign immunity will not attach.” Jinkins v. Lee, 807 N.E.2d 411, 420 (Ill. 2004).
The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized a few instances in which a state employee‘s duty arose independently of state employment. Sovereign immunity
Here, the source of any duty Dixon owed to the detainees stems solely from his role as superintendent. The plaintiffs argue to the contrary. They claim Dixon owed them a duty as their caretaker, and that this caretaker duty exists independently of Dixon‘s employment. We disagree. Even assuming Dixon acts as the detainees’ caretaker, this duty arises only from his role as superintendent. Dixon would owe no duty to the detainees outside of the detention-center context. And the detainees’ allegations make clear that their claim against Dixon stems from his failure in the performance of his duties as superintendent. So, we have no doubt that the source of any duty Dixon owed the detainees comes from his state employment.
Official Functions. Third, we ask whether the breach involved matters “ordinarily within ... the normal and official functions” of the superintendent of a juvenile facility. Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247. This third criterion “overlap[s] to some extent” with the first. Jackson, 831 N.E.2d at 1164. Allocating facility space, scheduling recreational and extra-curricular programming, and managing the day-to-day operations of the Center remained within Dixon‘s normal and official functions. The plaintiffs argue that Dixon acted “for reasons other than what [he] perceived to be the best interests” of his employer when deciding to allow the Empire filming. However, Dixon‘s motives do not factor into whether he acted within his normal functions.
Under our analysis of the three Healy factors, Dixon acted both within the scope of his authority and within his normal and official functions as superintendent in making decisions related to the Empire filming, and the source of any duty owed to the detainees stems from his state employment. So, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary claim against Dixon is a claim against the State of Illinois and therefore barred by its sovereign immunity statute.
C
For a few reasons, the district court got off track in its analysis of Illinois state sovereign immunity. Admittedly, the State Lawsuit Immunity Act “has generated a considerable body of case law that has not always been consistent in defining those instances where the State is made a defendant in circuit court.” Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 602 (Burke, J., dissenting).
Generally, two lines of cases dealing with suits against state employees have emerged. The first line of cases addresses whether a suit brought against a state employee in his personal capacity is an action brought against the state. In those cases, Illinois courts have applied the three Healy factors to decide whether such a
A second line of cases deals with suits brought against state employees in their official capacities. An official capacity claim against a state official is “not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official‘s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted). The “official acts of State officials are in effect acts of the State.” Sass, 381 N.E.2d at 977. But if a plaintiff “seeks to enjoin the defendant from taking actions in excess of his delegated authority and in violation of plaintiff‘s protectible legal interests,” then “[s]uch a suit does not contravene the immunity prohibition.” Bio-Med. Lab‘ys, Inc. v. Trainor, 370 N.E.2d 223, 227 (Ill. 1977); Ellis v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 466 N.E.2d 202, 206–07 (Ill. 1984). Thus, the officer suit exception applies when a plaintiff seeks to enjoin state officials from ongoing statutory or constitutional violations.
The officer suit exception “is premised on the principle that while legal official acts of state officers are regarded as acts of the State itself, illegal acts performed by the officers are not.” Leetaru, 32 N.E.3d at 596. In these instances, a “suit may therefore be maintained against the officer without running afoul of sovereign immunity principles.” Id. Illinois state courts “have repeatedly reaffirmed the right of the plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to prevent unauthorized or unconstitutional conduct.” Id. But the officer suit exception does not apply in a damages suit. In Parmar, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that “a complaint seeking damages for a past wrong does not fall within the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity.” 106 N.E.3d at 1010. The detainees do not seek to enjoin Dixon from any ongoing violations of statutory or constitutional law. The district court thus erred in applying the officer suit exception to Dixon‘s case, a personal capacity suit seeking damages.
In discussing the officer suit exception, the district court relied on this court‘s decision in Murphy. In that case, a prisoner brought a personal capacity suit against prison officers. Murphy, 844 F.3d at 655. The prisoner sought damages for alleged violations of state and federal law. Id. Murphy cited Leetaru for the proposition that: “[t]he Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law.” Id. While that is an accurate statement of the officer suit exception, the court in Murphy did not discuss the injunctive nature of the relief sought in Leetaru or the fact that Leetaru involved an official capacity suit. In Murphy the court held that, because the defendant had acted “in violation of statutory or constitutional law,” sovereign immunity did not bar the plaintiff‘s claims. Id. at 660. Although the court acknowledged the three Healy factors govern whether a claim against a state official “is a claim against the state,” it did not apply them in its analysis. Id. at 658.
Due to its reliance on Murphy, the district court did not consider the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs or whether the plaintiffs sued Dixon in his personal or official capacity. As stated previously,
III
Dixon is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Healy factors, so we REVERSE the district court‘s denial of summary judgment and REMAND with instructions to DISMISS the remaining claim.