SUTTO v. BOARD OF MEDICAL REGISTRATION AND EXAMINATION OF INDIANA.
No. 30,051
Supreme Court of Indiana
March 5, 1962
242 Ind. 556 | 180 N.E.2d 533
The burden of showing a confession is incompetent is upon the defendant challenging it.
On appeal it is not our privilege to weigh the evidence. The trial court heard the witnesses and could determine better than we their credibility. The fact that a defendant does not have counsel at the time he gave a confession does not make it inadmissible or incompetent for that reason alone. Eiffe v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 57, 77 N. E. 2d 750; May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N. E. 2d 439; Kelley v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 671, 110 N. E. 2d 860.
We find no error committed by the trial court sufficient to warrant a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.
Achor, C. J., and Bobbitt and Landis, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.—Reported in 180 N. E. 2d 235.
SUTTO v. BOARD OF MEDICAL REGISTRATION AND EXAMINATION OF INDIANA.
[No. 30,051. Filed March 5, 1962.]
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Thomas L. Webber, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
BOBBITT, J.—Appellant, Alfred Sutto, filed with appellee, Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana (hereinafter referred to as the “Board“), under the provisions of
The application was denied and appellant petitioned the Superior Court of Allen County for a review of the decision of the Board as provided by the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.1 The cause was venued to the Huntington Circuit Court where the decision of the Board was affirmed, and the appeal here followed.
The errors assigned are (1) the decision of the trial court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law; and (2) the court erred in its Conclusions of Law numbered 1, 2 and 3.
We need consider only whether there was error in the conclusions of law to resolve the questions presented.
The record discloses that appellant, Alfred Sutto, filed his application with the Board for a license to
The Kentucky license was issued to appellant pursuant to the provisions of the Kentucky statutes which required, as qualifications for the right to take an examination, that the applicant be a person of good moral character and a graduate from a chiropractic school or college giving a course of four academic years and requiring actual attendance of at least four thousand 45-minute academic hours in certain subjects, not including chemistry or bacteriology.
The transcript of credits of appellant from The O‘Neill College of Chiropractic, Fort Wayne, Indiana, and appearing in the record as a part of applicant‘s Exhibit No. 1, shows: “TOTAL HOURS (60 Min.) 3200.”
The Board denied appellant‘s application for license on the grounds that he had failed to submit satisfactory evidence that his Kentucky license had been issued under qualifications substantially equivalent to those specified in the Indiana law in that it was not shown that he was a graduate of a chiropractic college requiring four thousand 60-minute hours of resident attendance instruction for graduation and in that he had not been examined in the subjects of bacteriology and chemistry.
The trial court found that the Kentucky license was based upon a written examination given by the Kentucky Board; that appellant was not examined in the subjects of chemistry and bacteriology, the Kentucky law not requiring an examination in these subjects; and that the Kentucky statute required that
The trial court‘s conclusions of law which appellant asserts are in error are as follows:
“1) The petitioner [appellant] failed to establish or to submit satisfactory evidence to the Board that he had been licensed to practice chiropractic in another state under qualifications substantially equivalent to those specified by law for a license to practice chiropractic in Indiana.
“2) The Kentucky license issued to the petitioner was not issued to him under qualifications substantially equivalent to those required by law for a license to practice chiropractic in Indiana.
“3) That the final order of the Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana denying the petitioner‘s application for a license to practice chiropractic in the State of Indiana was supported by competent and substantial evidence of probative value and that said Board did not err in denying petitioner‘s said application.”
Three questions are presented which require our consideration.
- What showing is required of the appellant, Alfred Sutto?
- What is the function and duty of the Board?
- What constitutes qualifications “substantially equivalent” to those specified in the Chiropractic Act of Indiana?
The burden is upon appellant, Sutto, to show that he had been licensed to practice chiropractic in another State under qualifications “substantially equivalent” to those specified in Section 2(a), supra, and Section 3(a), supra, of the Chiropractic Act of Indiana.
The Attorney General has stated fully and ably what an applicant for reciprocal license to practice chiropractic in Indiana must show in Opinion 28 (1958), O. A. G., p. 125, and we adopt his language as follows:
“The record offered by the applicant for reciprocal license here in Indiana must therefore show that he is at least 21 years of age, of good moral character, has taken in the past a written examination in one of the other states in substantially the same subjects required in Indiana with a passing grade of at least 75% in each subject; at the time of such licensure he must have been a graduate of a school which at the time of his graduation required four years’ of not less than four thousand hours of resident attendance instruction.”2
Second: The function of the Board of Medical Registration and Examination of Indiana is to determine as a matter of fact whether the applicant has been licensed to practice chiropractic in another State under qualifications and requirements substantially equivalent to those provided by the Chiropractic Act of Indiana.
“On such judicial review if the agency has complied with the procedural requirements of this act, and its finding, decision or determination is supported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence, such agency‘s finding, decision or determination shall not be set aside or disturbed.”
The decision of appellee, Board, on the question of whether or not the requirements and qualifications for licensing in the State of Kentucky are substantially equivalent to those required in Indiana is conclusive and binding upon the court, and it will not be disturbed if the Board has complied with the requirements of the statute, and its decision is supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Achenbach et al. v. Review Board etc. et al. (1962), 242 Ind. 655, 179 N. E. 2d 873; Board of Medical Registration & Exam. v. Armington (1962), 242 Ind. 436, 178 N. E. 2d 741, 743; Bd. of Med. Reg. and Exam. v. Kaadt (1948), 225 Ind. 625, 630, 635, 76 N. E. 2d 669; State Board of Medical Registration etc. v. Scherer (1943), 221 Ind. 92, 96, 97, 46 N. E. 2d 602.
Third: As hereinabove stated, the Board found that appellant had failed to show that the qualifications required by the State of Kentucky for a license to practice chiropractic were substantially equivalent to those required by the State of Indiana, and the trial
The Kentucky Act3 requires “actual attendance of at least four thousand 45-minute academic hours, in anatomy, physiology, neurology, symptomatology, hygiene, sanitation, pathology, chiropractic analysis, philosophy, and the principles and practice of chiropractic“; while the Indiana Act requires “at least [4] years’ and four thousand [4,000] hours of resident attendance“;
We need only consider here whether “four thousand 45-minute academic hours” are substantially equivalent to “four thousand [4,000] hours of resident attendance instruction.”
Neither the word “hours” nor the words “substantially equivalent” are defined in the Act and, therefore, they must be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense.
As used here the term “hours” refers to the period session of a class in a chiropractic school or college.
An hour in its common and usual sense is “sixty minutes of mean time.” Webster‘s Third International Dictionary.
The record here shows that where chiropractic licenses have been granted by reciprocity, appellee-Board has required a showing of the completion of four thousand 60-minute hours and an examination with a passing grade of 75%. In all of these cases the school of which the applicant was a graduate certified at least four thousand 60-minute hours.
No good and sufficient reason has been advanced why the Board‘s interpretation of the reciprocity provision of the Chiropractic Act of Indiana should be changed.
In our judgment the Legislature intended by the word “hours” as used in
We have been furnished no authority defining the phrase “substantially equivalent,” nor have we been able to find any by our own independent research. We shall then consider the two words of the phrase independently of each other.
“Substantially” has also been defined as something which meets the requirements in its essential and material parts; Town of Checotah v. Town of Eufaula (1911), 31 Okla. 85, 96, 119 Pac. 1014, 1019; Vannest v. Murphy (1907), 135 Iowa 123, 127, 112 N. W. 236, 238; and as “material,” “basic,” and “essential.” Roget‘s Thesaurus in Dictionary Form (Mawson).
“Equivalent” means “equal” or “identical” of equal value, force, import and effect. Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Co. (1937), 10 Cir., 93 F. 2d 127, 132.
In our judgment the Legislature, when it used the phrase “substantially equivalent” in the context of the Chiropractic Act of Indiana meant that which is equal in value in essential and material requirements.
This brings us then to the question: Is four thousand 45-minute hours “substantially equivalent” to four thousand 60-minute hours?
It may readily be observed that a requirement of four thousand class periods of 45-minutes each, is only three-fourths or 75% as much actual time spent in class as would be spent in four thousand class periods of 60-minutes each, or one thousand hours less than is required by the Indiana Act.
Can we say that the qualifications of a State which require only 75% as much resident attendance in class as does Indiana are “substantially equivalent” to those required in this State? The question seems to provide its own answer.
The decision of the Board rests upon a substantial foundation and the evidence here is not such as to compel reasonable men to reach a conclusion different from that reached by the Board, and its decision will not be disturbed.
For the foregoing reasons the trial court did not err in its conclusions of law and its decision is not contrary to law.
Judgment affirmed.
Achor, C. J., and Arterburn, J., concur.
Jackson, J., dissents with opinion in which Landis, J., concurs.
DISSENTING OPINION
JACKSON, J.—I disagree with the narrow interpretation of
Generally the term hours as used academically, is defined as a class or class hour or meeting of a class, for example a class may meet three times a week for a period of 40 to 60 minutes per class, but credit is given for three hours of class work.
The units of “four thousand (4000) hours of resident attendance instruction” expressed in the Indiana Act, and the Kentucky requirement of “actual
The substantially equivalent requirement of
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Landis, J., concurs.
NOTE.—Reported in 180 N. E. 2d 533.
