Sullivan v. StateSullivan v. State
A jury convicted Antonio Sullivan of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Wava Benton.1 On appeal, Sullivan contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to present evidence at trial to corroborate Sullivan‘s testimony about prior difficulties between Sullivan and Benton, and by failing to procure expert testimony about Sullivan‘s mental health — specifically about post-traumatic stress disorder —
1. There is no dispute in this case that Sullivan shot and killed an unarmed Benton at the Caribou Apartment complex; multiple eyewitnesses testified that they saw Sullivan shoot Benton, and Sullivan himself admitted it on the stand and continues to admit it on appeal.2 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, additional evidence presented at Sullivan‘s trial showed the following. On the day of Benton‘s murder, the regional manager of the Caribou Apartment complex, who was sitting in the leasing office, heard a gunshot. When he looked out the window, he saw one man running “in a zigzag” while another man was running behind him shooting. According to the regional manager, the man running in a zigzag got “hit and he went down. . . . And then I saw the shooter go up to the victim one more time and fire one more round and then
Two residents of the apartment complex who witnessed the shooting also testified at trial. One of the residents testified that she heard a sound like “fire crackers,” looked out of her apartment window, and “saw a boy running . . . . And I saw another boy running; shot him in the back. . . . The boy fell, and then he walked up and shot the boy in the head.” That resident also positively identified Sullivan from a photographic lineup as the shooter. The other resident testified, “I saw two men running and one fell and the shooter stood over him and shot him two times.” She also positively identified Sullivan from a photographic lineup as the shooter.
Sullivan testified in his own defense at trial, and his was the
Sullivan testified that on the day of the shooting, he was leaving the Caribou Apartment complex when Benton and “like five other guys” (all of whom Sullivan said he had seen with guns in the past) confronted him. Benton said to Sullivan, “didn‘t I tell you not to come around here unless you going to buy from us,” and to “give
As to his mental state during the incident, Sullivan testified that he pulled his weapon in the first place because he was “tired. [Benton] going to keep coming. . . . It‘s not going to stop,” and that Sullivan was “scared for my life. Scared if I don‘t — if I don‘t deal with it, it‘s already done. . . . You either do what you got [to] do or you going to get got or your family going to get got.” And Sullivan testified that based on his past experience with Benton, “[Benton]
Sullivan does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court‘s general practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Sullivan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Sullivan raises one enumeration of error: that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in two ways: (a) by failing to present the testimony of other witnesses at trial to corroborate Sullivan‘s testimony about prior difficulties between Sullivan and Benton, and (b) by failing to procure expert testimony about
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant generally must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (689 SE2d 280) (2010). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. This requires a defendant to overcome the “strong presumption” that trial counsel‘s performance was adequate. Marshall v. State, 297 Ga. 445, 448 (774 SE2d 675) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel‘s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A
(a) Sullivan contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to call witnesses to corroborate Sullivan‘s trial testimony about Benton‘s prior threats to, and harassment of, Sullivan. According to Sullivan, calling witnesses other than himself would have supported the defense‘s theory that Sullivan acted in self-defense or was guilty of only
But “[a] decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of counsel‘s trial strategy and tactics and will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the decision under the circumstances.” Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121, 125 (805 SE2d 18) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). And at Sullivan‘s motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that after receiving a list of potential witnesses from Sullivan and members of his family, trial counsel talked to “between six to eight” potential witnesses, considered each of them, and ultimately made the choice not to call any of them at trial. Trial counsel further explained that although “there could be value” in calling witnesses to corroborate Sullivan‘s testimony, there was also a risk that their testimony could include information that “might not be in the best interest of the client,” and that trial counsel would have made his decision on who to call by
And although Sullivan urges us on appeal to disbelieve trial counsel‘s assertions that he talked to potential witnesses and decided not to call them at trial, the trial court specifically found that trial counsel “spoke to multiple possible witnesses, whom he ultimately declined to call at trial.” Because this finding is supported by the record, it is not clearly erroneous, and we decline Sullivan‘s invitation to conclude otherwise. See Green, 302 Ga. at 818. Because Sullivan has not met his burden of demonstrating that
(b) Sullivan contends that trial counsel‘s failure to procure and present to the jury expert testimony about Sullivan‘s mental health and its effect on his criminal responsibility constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. In an effort to establish this claim, Sullivan relies on the testimony of an expert offered at his motion for new trial hearing who diagnosed Sullivan with post-traumatic stress disorder. Sullivan argues that it was necessary for the jury to hear expert testimony about his post-traumatic stress diagnosis to properly evaluate his criminal liability in this case.
But “the decision whether to present an expert witness,” like other decisions about which defense witnesses to call, “is a matter of trial strategy that, if reasonable, will not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance.” Matthews v. State, 301 Ga. 286, 289 (800 SE2d 533) (2017). Indeed, for a defendant to establish that a strategic decision constitutes deficient performance, a defendant “must show that no competent attorney, under similar
Here, Sullivan‘s family advised Sullivan‘s counsel before trial that Sullivan had a history of mental health issues, and trial counsel obtained and reviewed Sullivan‘s mental health records from Grady Hospital and from the Fulton County jail. As part of his preparation for trial, trial counsel also requested and obtained a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Sullivan “was mentally competent at the time of the alleged incident,” and whether Sullivan was “competent to assist counsel and to stand trial.” The psychiatrist who completed Sullivan‘s evaluation concluded that although Sullivan suffered from depression, cannabis use disorder,
At Sullivan‘s motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that in the course of preparing for trial, he came to believe that Sullivan‘s mental health issues might be relevant to his defense. Trial counsel testified that he remembered receiving and reviewing Sullivan‘s psychiatric evaluation, and that “part of the purpose of reviewing it is to determine whether or not to call someone, so I would have reviewed it for that purpose, yes, but I don‘t recall specifically what I decided and why.” Trial counsel confirmed that he did not consult further with mental health experts or pursue a mental health defense. About that decision, he testified, “I know ultimately I would have decided that it wasn‘t something necessary or that would otherwise be in front of [the] jury if it was necessary, but I don‘t remember specifically as to why, why I determined that it wouldn‘t be necessary or admissible,” but it would
We have explained before that, generally speaking in non-capital cases, a trial counsel‘s “decision to forego or curtail” further investigation of an accused‘s mental health, “even when there has been a previous mental hospitalization[,] is reasonable when an expert has determined that the defendant is fit to stand trial or that he was sane at the time of the offense.” Whitus v. State, 287 Ga. 801, 803-804 (700 SE2d 377) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the expert who performed Sullivan‘s psychiatric evaluation concluded that Sullivan was “competent to stand trial” and was competent “at the time of the offense.” Moreover, the trial court concluded that trial counsel did not perform deficiently in part because trial counsel “obtained mental evaluations [and] consulted medical records.”3 Given this record, even if “other attorneys might
Although Sullivan complains that trial counsel should have “explain[ed] how his client‘s mental health condition would have fueled his fear of Benton and his criminal company,” and that “more was needed,” this is not a case where trial counsel “‘made no effort’ to investigate the potential for a defense . . . based on mental health issues” or “relied exclusively upon [his] own lay evaluation of the mental health of [his] client.” Arnold, 292 Ga. at 271 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). And Sullivan‘s presentation of new expert testimony at the motion-for-new-trial stage diagnosing him with post-traumatic stress disorder and opining about its potential
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.